OMBUDS AND TITLE IX COORDINATORS: PROCEDURAL CONVERGENCE OF UNIVERSITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION MECHANISMS FOR HANDLING SEXUAL MISCONDUCT by Pappas, Brian
OMBUDS AND TITLE IX COORDINATORS: 
PROCEDURAL CONVERGENCE OF UNIVERSITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS FOR HANDLING SEXUAL MISCONDUCT  
 
BY 
 
©2015 
 
BRIAN A. PAPPAS 
 
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Public Administration and the Graduate Faculty of 
the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy. 
 
 
        _____________________________  
 
        Chairperson, Charles Epp 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
        H. George Frederickson 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
        Marilu Goodyear 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
        Steven Maynard-Moody 
 
 
_____________________________  
 
        Rosemary O’Leary  
 
 
_____________________________  
 
        Robert Shelton 
       
  
Date Defended: May 4, 2015 
	   ii	  
 
 
 
 
 
The Dissertation Committee for Brian A. Pappas 
certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: 
 
 
 
OMBUDS AND TITLE IX COORDINATORS: 
PROCEDURAL CONVERGENCE OF UNIVERSITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS FOR HANDLING SEXUAL MISCONDUCT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      ________________________________ 
 
 Chairperson Charles Epp 
 
 
       
Date approved: May 4, 2015 
 
 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   iii	  
ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines university non-law organizational dispute mechanisms 
(Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators) and their handling of sexual misconduct disputes.  In 2011, 
the U.S. Department of Education Office of Civil Rights issued a Dear Colleague Letter to all 
colleges and universities receiving federal funding. In the letter, the Department of Education 
substantially redefined compliance with Title IX’s requirements regarding the university 
response to sexual abuse by faculty, staff or students.  The 2011 letter imposed new liabilities on 
colleges and universities and greatly increased attention to the problem of sexual misconduct at 
universities. In response, universities faced a growing number of lawsuits, a proliferation of 
advocacy groups, and a White House Task Force on Protecting Students from Sexual Assault. 
What, precisely, universities should do in response to these pressures remains somewhat unclear. 
Universities face a dilemma in determining how to create fair, consistent, and reliable processes 
that respect the rights of both alleged perpetrators and victims, while at the same time 
encouraging people to bring complaints forward.  Universities also must determine how to 
change the culture and norms surrounding campus sexual misconduct.  These goals are neither 
easily achieved nor fully compatible. This dissertation examines how two university offices 
responded to these challenges. One is the long-standing office of Ombuds, which by tradition 
and ethical norms has been committed to using informal processes for hearing complaints. The 
other is the office of Title IX Coordinator, which uses formalized processes modeled in some 
ways on procedures used by prosecutors and courts. Data collection comprised of a review of 
1200 documents and interviews with 14 Ombuds and 13 Title IX Coordinators from 22 large 
institutions of higher education.  This dissertation observes that Ombuds and Title IX 
Coordinators, despite being designed in sharply contrasting ways, both face some pressures 
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favoring formality and others favoring informality.  In responding to these cross-cutting 
pressures, the two offices have converged (but not fully) toward a hybrid that blends elements of 
formality and informality.   Drawing on theories of non-law ordering, neo-institutional norms, 
and street-level bureaucracy, this dissertation proposes a theory of procedural convergence to 
understand the evolution of these two offices. The theory of procedural convergence posits that 
organizational processes are shaped by both law-like norms favoring legal formality and 
competing norms of managerial effectiveness and substantive justice favoring informality. 
Rather than being drawn uniformly away from fidelity to law-like norms, as some theories of 
organizational responses to law would suggest, both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds have 
become a complex blend of informality and formality.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   v	  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Completing this degree required overcoming significant geographic and time barriers.  To 
complete my Ph.D. coursework I commuted between Michigan and Kansas while teaching full 
time at Michigan State University College of Law.  Like my grandfather in 1964 and my father 
in 1984, I completed this doctorate while working full time and with small children at home.  
The dissertation topic itself was the result of a significant change in policy.  In April 2011, one 
month before my comprehensive exams, the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights 
issued a Dear Colleague Letter redefining compliance with Title IX.  The letter altered the course 
of my dissertation and proved it is better to be lucky than good.  Indeed, I have been very 
fortunate to have supportive friends, family, and colleagues without whom this achievement 
would not be possible.  To those who have contributed to this achievement, I offer my thanks. 
• To my Mom, Pam Pappas, who graduated with her dental degree at the age of 50 and 
taught me the value of perseverance and that later is far better than never.   
• To my sisters, Lisa and Dana, for their sense of humor.  Most people don’t find them 
funny, but I do. 
• To my in-laws, Allen and Gail Gutovitz, for their support and hospitality.  I stayed at their 
home in Mission Hills, Kansas as I traveled between Michigan and KU.     
• To Mary Bedikian and my colleagues at Michigan State University, who provided me 
with a path to an academic career.  Mary is a wonderful mentor, and an even better friend.   
• To my research assistants, Mallory Donick, Michael Fenech, Kristin Kolakowski-Godin, 
and Melissa McDonald, for their citation and university research work.  
• To my dissertation chair, Chuck Epp, who let me make my own mistakes but provided me 
with the guidance and support to see this project through.   
	   vi	  
• To the public administration faculty and staff at the University of Kansas, for their 
collegiality, humanity, and support for non-traditional Ph.D. students. 
• To Tony Reames, a fellow Ph.D. graduate, for his support and encouragement as the 
deadlines grew near.   
• To my Dad, Richard Pappas, a college and university president for over 25 years, for his 
unwavering support and belief in me, and for teaching me by example how to be a leader.      
• To my late Grandfather, Charles Pappas, for whom my son is named, for providing me 
with the inspiration to persevere.  Charlie earned his Ph.D. at Ohio State University in 
1964 while commuting between Columbus, Ohio and Marquette, Michigan, where he 
worked full time at Northern Michigan University.   
• To my Grandmother, Sydell Pappas, for her love, encouragement, and support during our 
weekly lunches with Charlie and Ben.  Without her support, there would not be even one, 
let alone three, generations with doctoral degrees.         
• Most importantly, to my wife Debbie and our sons Charlie (born in July, 2011) and Ben 
(born in May, 2014) for their patience, love, and understanding.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   vii	  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
CHAPTER 1.  Introduction………………………………………………………………………...1 
 
CHAPTER 2.  Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators……………………………………………….47 
 
CHAPTER 3.  Authority………………………………………………………………………….94 
 
CHAPTER 4.  Mission…………………………………………………………………………..129 
 
CHAPTER 5.  Confidentiality…………………………………………………………...............161 
 
CHAPTER 6.   Impartiality and Independence………………………………………………….217 
 
CHAPTER 7.  Title IX Coordinators and Formality…………………………………….,……...259 
 
CHAPTER 8.  Ombuds and Informality………………………………………………...............293 
 
CHAPTER 9.  Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….319 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………343 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   1	  
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION   
 
Sexual misconduct is an ongoing problem on university campuses, and universities are 
struggling to develop procedures to address it.  This dissertation focuses on two alternative 
structures for addressing this problem that are characteristic of a long-standing tension in the 
United States legal system: the tension between legal formality and informality. The first of these 
university structures is the Title IX Coordinator, an official charged with enforcing the law, 
through law-informed procedures. The second is the Ombuds, an official who, although given no 
formally defined responsibility, is available to hear all manner of complaints and usually 
performs this role through no law-like procedures.  Each of these structures hears and responds 
to complaints of sexual misconduct. The fact that they do so through what are ostensibly 
radically different procedures offers the opportunity to compare the institutionalized practices of 
legal formality and informality. That is the subject of this dissertation. 
The difficulty facing universities in the area of sexual misconduct, and the high stakes 
accompanying the tension between these two alternative procedures, is compounded by sharp 
cross-cutting pressures. On the one side there is an epidemic of peer sexual violence (one student 
sexually harassing another in a manner that includes physical conduct) occurring on campuses 
across the nation.  For example, a survey of over 5,000 undergraduate women and over 1,000 
undergraduate men at two large public universities and found that 13.7% of undergraduate 
women reported at least one completed sexual assault since entering college and 6.1% of 
undergraduate men reported experiencing attempted or completed sexual assaults (Krebs et al., 
2007, p. vii, 5-5; see also Lisak and Miller, 2002, 73).   In this dissertation I will refer to those 
who have experienced sexual assault as “survivors,” the term that is commonly used by their 
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supporters.1   Drugs and alcohol surely contribute to many of these assaults, accentuating the 
problem as so many college students drink to excess  (DeJong, 2004, p. 104).   
Universities were clearly put on notice about these problems, if they had not been before, 
by a groundbreaking “Dear Colleague” letter issued by the U.S. Department of Education in 
2011 that required universities to take steps to address the problem or risk loss of federal 
funding.  According to the Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) website, the 2011 
Dear Colleague Letter “created a new profession and a new field” (“About ATIXA and Title 
IX”, 2014).   A watershed moment that redefined the administration of school sexual misconduct 
disputes, the 2011 Dear Colleague letter clarified a university’s obligation to take immediate 
action to eliminate, prevent, and remediate any harassment the school should know about that 
creates a hostile environment.  It also required universities to address peer-to-peer sexual 
misconduct.   
As a result of the changes in enforcement, a network of self-identified survivors and 
allies called Know Your IX (referring to Title IX of the Civil Rights Act) began in 2013 and 
seeks to advocate for changes and educate students across the country about their civil right to 
education free from sexual violence and harassment (“About Know Your IX”, 2014).   
Universities face contrary pressures, too. Some male college students who feel unfairly 
accused of sexual assault, along with their families, have organized a new national advocacy 
group known as Families Advocating for Campus Equality (FACE) and are pushing for greater 
procedural protections in university procedures for those accused of sexual assault (Wilson, 
2014a, p. A38).  Likewise, in October, 2014, 28 members of the Harvard Law School Faculty 
signed a letter objecting to the policy and procedures enacted by Harvard in July of 2014.  They 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This dissertation uses the term “survivors” throughout as it represents self-determination and strength instead of 
the more commonplace usage of victim that implies weakness and powerlessness.  The term “victim” is retained in 
its original form in quotations.  When discussing Title IX processes, often the term “complainant” is used.       
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argue the procedures “lack the most basic elements of fairness and due process, are 
overwhelmingly stacked against the accused, and are in no way required by Title IX or 
regulation” (Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 2014).   
This dissertation examines universities’ responses to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 
subsequent requirements.  The dilemma facing universities is how to create fair, consistent, and 
reliable processes that respect the rights of both alleged perpetrators and victims, while at the 
same time encouraging victims to bring complaints forward.  As will be described below, these 
contrasting goals are often deeply in tension with each other. The difficulty of the dilemma is 
compounded by the fact that universities are increasingly expected to change the culture and 
norms shaping campus sexual misconduct so as to reduce the extent of the problem. As will be 
described below, some measures to achieve these goals seem to require greater formality in 
procedures; some seem to require greater informality. There is no easy resolution of these 
tensions.     
Since 2011, universities have scrambled to revise their policies and procedures for 
addressing sexual assault, and how they are doing so makes it possible to examine an age-old 
debate in American law and socio-legal studies between those who favor legal formality and 
those who favor informal alternatives.  As briefly noted above, complaints of sexual misconduct 
on university campuses are addressed via two different mechanisms: Title IX Coordinators and 
Ombuds. The origins, development, institutional structures, and ideologies of these offices differ 
considerably. Title IX Coordinators partake of a formal legal structure and ideology that 
emphasizes notice, law-like due process, and punishment.  Ombuds use an informal structure and 
ideology that emphasizes confidentiality, psychological values of truly hearing the perspectives 
of affected parties in all of their complexity, and use of this knowledge to inform systemic 
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change.  These differing mechanisms represent sharply divergent ways of addressing the difficult 
issues posed by campus sexual misconduct. 
Some past research examines each of these types of offices. Title IX Coordinators are a 
type of formal legal compliance office that was widely adopted in response to the Civil Rights 
Act. Similar formal offices, particularly Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) and Affirmative 
Action (AA) offices, have been widely studied (Edelman, 1990, 1992; Edelman et al., 2010, 
2011; Dobbin & Kelly, 2007).  These studies identify EEO/AA offices as a sort of “non-law” 
structure that is meant to interpret and enforce law inside a bureaucratic organization.  These 
studies of EEO/AA offices mainly compare these offices to a court-like ideal and, in light of this 
comparison, generally observe that these types of offices, although legally framed, tend toward 
more informality in practice. Title IX Coordinators are just such a structure, and, like EEO/AA 
offices, operate somewhat more informally than the court-like ideal.  
Some other past research examines how Ombuds work (Harrison, 2003, 2004, 2007; 
Harrison & Morrill, 2004).  This research mainly compares these Ombuds’ practices to an ideal 
type of Ombuds and generally observes that these offices face considerable pressure to become 
more formal in comparison to this ideal type.   
While it is undoubtedly true that Title IX Coordinators are less court-like than true courts, 
and Ombuds are, in practice, not fully true to their guiding model, it is also likely that these 
different offices remain different from each other: Coordinators are likely to act more formally 
and legally, and Ombuds are likely to act more informally and non-legally. But no research has 
empirically compared these internal offices to each other, nor has any examined how in practice 
they address the difficult matter of sexual misconduct, nor how well they address sexual 
misconduct. My dissertation examines these questions with a comparison of Title IX 
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Coordinators and Ombuds at universities across the United States. Both of these offices may be 
thought of as “non-law” interpreters of legal norms: one in a more formal mode, the other in a 
more informal mode.   
In examining these mechanisms, my data consist of interviews of fourteen Ombuds and 
thirteen Title IX Coordinators from twenty-two institutions of higher education nation-wide, 
along with documents authorizing and regulating Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators.  My thesis 
is that Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, despite being designed in sharply contrasting ways 
(informal versus formal), both face some pressures favoring formality and others favoring 
informality.  This research finds the two offices, in responding to these cross-cutting pressures, 
have converged (but not fully) toward a hybrid of formality and informality.  This research has 
important implications for efforts to effectively combat sexual misconduct on university 
campuses.  This research also has important implications for the creation of non-law dispute 
mechanisms and the balance between individual rights and the organizational development of 
legal norms. The remainder of this introduction briefly introduces the basic institutional and 
ideological differences between Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds and then outlines the 
theoretical lenses to be used in studying how they work in practice.   
THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ON CAMPUS  
 
The legal environment puts pressure on universities to address the problem of sexual 
misconduct through the lens of individual complaints.  The Department of Education’s Office of 
Civil Rights (OCR) is tasked with enforcing Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 
(20 U.S.C. § 1681; 2006 & Supp. V. 2011).  Title IX promotes equity in academic and athletics 
programs, prohibits hostile environments on the basis of sex, prohibits sexual harassment and 
sexual violence, and directs universities to protect complainants against retaliation and to remedy 
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the effects of other gender-based forms of discrimination. Title IX was adopted by Congress in 
order to effectuate an individually-based remedy, activated by individual complaints, rather than 
authorize a federal enforcement agency (like the National Labor Relations Board) to oversee and 
direct broad reforms in the regulated sector (Farhang, 2010).  In response to Title IX, universities 
created Title IX Compliance officers and organizational mechanisms for addressing individual 
complaints of sexual harassment and gender inequities.   
The legal standards for compliance by universities remained unclear until OCR issued the 
groundbreaking “Dear Colleague” letter on April 4, 2011.  The letter clarified a school’s 
obligation to take immediate action to eliminate, prevent, and remediate any harassment the 
school should know about that creates a hostile environment.  Among other mandates, the letter 
required schools to create nondiscrimination policies that prohibit sex discrimination and sexual 
violence, to provide notice of grievance procedures, to use a preponderance of the evidence 
burden of proof, and to require training on sexual misconduct and knowledge of sexual violence 
for fact finders and decision makers.   
Subsequently, the 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act sought to 
provide clarity to the requirements surrounding Title IX (American Council on Education, 2014, 
p. 1). Section 303 requires that institutions create a coordinated community response and 
establish prevention and education programs and train all campus law enforcement and members 
of campus disciplinary boards to respond effectively.  In concert with the new law, federal 
administrators are making it clear that preventing and handling campus sexual assaults must be a 
university priority.   
In January 2014 President Obama pledged to develop a coordinated federal response to 
combat campus sexual assault (Sander, 2014a, p. A7). President Obama created a White House 
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Task Force on Protecting Students From Sexual Assault, designed to provide colleges with 
information on best practices, to ensure compliance with legal obligations, to increase the 
transparency of federal enforcement, increase the public’s awareness of individual colleges’ 
compliance with the law, and to facilitate coordination among federal agencies (Sander, 2014a, 
p. A7).  The White House Task Force (WHTF) issued its first report, “Not Alone,” in April 2014, 
and created a website, notalone.gov to provide resources for schools and students.  The task force 
report recommends campus climate surveys (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, p. 8) active engaging 
with men, and actively creating campus bystander programs to change campus cultures (WHTF, 
Not Alone, 2014, p. 2).  The report also recommends giving survivors more control over the 
process by ensuring a place to go for confidential advice and support (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, 
p. 17).  It recommends training for officials in how to address the trauma that attends sexual 
assault (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, pp. 3-4).    
Since OCR began tracking sexual misconduct Title IX complaints in 2009, the number of 
complaints filed against colleges has tripled from 11 in 2009 to 33 through April of 2014 
(Newman & Sander, 2014, p. A24).  As of November 1, 2014, more than 80 colleges were under 
federal investigation for possible violations of Title IX (Lewontin, 2014, p. A4).  Despite this 
trend, an analysis of Title IX complaints filed with the Department of Education from 2003 to 
2013 found that fewer than one in ten led to a formal agreement to change campus policies 
(Newman & Sander, 2014, p. A24). 
Increased attention to sexual misconduct has also led to a proliferation of complaints and 
lawsuits.   In January of 2013, student Andrea Pino, two other students, an alumna, and a former 
administrator made a federal complaint against the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
accusing the university of negligently handling its responses to rape (Sander, 2013b, p. A20). 
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Students elsewhere filed similar complaints against universities like Amherst, Berkeley, 
Dartmouth, Occidental, Swarthmore, and Vanderbilt (Sander, 2013b, p. A20).  In July, 2013 the 
University of Connecticut announced it would pay nearly $1.3 million to settle a federal lawsuit 
filed by five current and former female undergraduate students claiming the university had 
mishandled their sexual assault complaints (Vendituoli, 2014, p. A4). 
Students accused of sexual misconduct are also filing complaints.  Daniel Kopin, a 
former student at Brown University, sent a letter to the U.S. Education Department’s Office for 
Civil Rights, sharing his side of a sexual encounter that resulted in his suspension (Vendituoli, 
2014, p. A4).  In June 2013, Peter Yu sued Vassar College, arguing that the college denied him 
due process throughout the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and had discriminated against 
him because of his sex (Sander, 2013a, p. A14). Specifically, Yu claimed officials did not 
properly advise him of grievance policies and did not allow him legal representation at the 
disciplinary hearing (Sander, 2013a, p. A14).  Similar complaints were filed against St. Joseph’s 
University in July 2013, and a federal lawsuit was filed against Xavier University in August 
2013, claiming that the university conducted a fundamentally unfair hearing (Sander, 2013a, p. 
A14).  These three lawsuits all share several allegations in common:  Campus officials withheld 
key evidence in hearings, were hasty to rush to judgment, and a general presumption of guilt 
prevailed (Sander, 2013a, p. A14). In sum, young men are as unhappy with the outcome of 
college investigations as their accusers, and often both sides find the process unfair (Wilson, 
2014b, p. A11).  
 Attorneys representing both survivors and the accused report they are seeing an uptick in 
cases.  Brett Sokolow, president of the National Center for Higher Education Risk Management 
(which also oversees ATIXA, the Association of Title IX Administrators) notes receiving nearly 
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60 calls from accused students and their parents, of which he is now representing roughly a 
dozen (Wilson, 2014a, p. A38).  Another attorney, Andrew Miltenberg, reported receiving fifteen 
calls each month in 2014 (Wilson, 2014a, p. A38).     
In sum, Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds address campus sexual misconduct in an 
increasingly legalized environment that is characterized by growing complaints, liability 
pressure, and legalized directives form the Department of Education’s OCR.   
THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT ON CAMPUS 
 
Sexual misconduct among fellow students and professors is a very serious problem and 
universities face a dilemma in how to deal with it.  There is an epidemic of peer sexual violence 
(one student sexually harassing another in a manner that includes physical conduct) occurring on 
campuses across the nation.  With studies ranging from the mid-1980s to 2007, the effort to 
combat campus peer sexual violence is in its fourth decade (Cantalupo, 2012).  
Research shows that a small number of repeat perpetrators commit the vast majority of 
sexual violence (Lisak & Miller, 2002), requiring mechanisms for identifying and stopping these 
repeat offenders.  A 2002 study surveyed 1882 male university students and found that 4% of the 
study’s subjects accounted for 28% of the violence, a rate ten times greater than that of non-
rapists (Lisak & Miller, 2002, p. 76).  Fraternity men have been identified as more likely to 
perpetrate sexual crimes than non-fraternity men (Krebs et al., 2007, pp. 2-11).  Crosset et al. 
(1996) found that while male student-athletes made up 3.3% of the population at Division I 
institutions, they represented 19% of the alleged sexual assault or domestic violence perpetrators 
in judicial affairs records (pp. 171, 73).  High profile cases of sexual violence by athletes persist, 
including the rape allegations facing Heisman Trophy-winning quarterback Jameis Winston 
(McCann, 2014, p. 13), the delay and ultimate expulsion of University of Michigan Kicker 
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Brendan Gibbons (Slovin & Rubenfire, 2014), and the 2011 suicide of University of Missouri 
Swimmer Sasha Menu Courey, sixteen months after an uninvestigated allegation of rape by a 
football player (Farrey & Noren, 2014). 
Evidence indicates sexual misconduct is widely underreported.  A 2007 survey indicated 
that only 16% of physically forced survivors and 8% of incapacitated sexual assault survivors 
contacted a survivor’s, crisis, or health care center after the incident. Only 2% of incapacitated 
survivors and 13% of physically forced survivors report the incident to law enforcement (Krebs 
et al., 2007, p. xvii).  Other studies estimate that ninety percent or more of survivors of campus 
sexual assault do not report the incident (Fisher et al., 2000).   
 Evidence indicates non-reporting occurs due to a fear of reprisal and a belief the process 
will not work or not be fair.  In a 2001 survey of graduate students, 21% of those experiencing 
harassment reported the behavior, 30% experienced retaliation after reporting, and 58% believed 
the reporting process and complaint handling could be improved (UMN-TC Survey, 2011, p. 5).  
The problem especially occurs within relationships (romantic as well as hierarchical), making it 
more difficult for survivors to come forward.  Most perpetrators of rape or attempted rape are 
known to the survivor, including classmates and friends (70% of completed rapes) and 
boyfriends or ex-boyfriends (23.7% of completed rates and 14.5% of attempted rapes) (Fisher et 
al., 2000, p. 19).  Employee-to-student and faculty-to-student sexual misconduct are also campus 
problems that implicate Title IX.  Employee misconduct more generally is an ongoing problem 
as indicated by the Jerry Sandusky child sexual abuse scandal and scandals at Syracuse 
University, University of Texas, the University of Arkansas and many other examples (Dennie, 
2012, p. 830; Heckman, 2009).  Tepper and White (2011, p. 83) suggest that the decentralized 
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environment, the focus on academic pursuits, and the hierarchical intellectual environment allow 
harassing behaviors to go unchecked in academic institutions.   
In part, the breadth of the problem is a product of the university context itself, requiring 
that institutions take action to remediate the effects of sexual misconduct.   In a 2014 survey of 
more than 300 schools commissioned by Senator Claire McCaskill, more than 40% of U.S. 
colleges and universities conducted no investigations of sexual assault allegations over the past 
five years (Marklein & Shesgreen, 2014).  Further, the survey found that only 16% of schools 
conduct “climate surveys” to determine the prevalence of sexual assault on campus, and only 
about half of colleges have a hotline that survivors can call to report a sexual assault (Marklein & 
Shesgreen, 2014).  Nearly 73% of schools do not have protocols for how campus authorities and 
local law enforcement should work together on cases (Marklein & Shesgreen, 2014). 
Employee perceptions of organizational tolerance to sexual harassment are significantly 
related to the frequency of sexual harassment incidents and the effectiveness in combating the 
problem (Gallivan Nelson et al., 2007; Miner-Rubino & Corina, 2004).  Organizationally, studies 
reveal that where a choice of sanctions for harassment is available, it is common for the least 
stringent to be selected, such as a formal or informal warning without further action (Salin, 
2007).  Such responses indicate a deflection of organizational responsibility and may indicate a 
‘climate of tolerance’ (McDonald, 2012).  
In sum, Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds face a context in which there is a lot of sexual 
misconduct by students and university employees, repeat offenders cause a lot of the problems, 
misconduct especially occurs within romantic and other relationships involving power dynamics, 
and survivors are very hesitant to come forward. It is important to have processes in place that 
facilitate rather than discourage individuals to make complaints. It is also important to have 
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processes that fairly adjudicate responsibility for misconduct. Finally, it is important to have 
mechanisms for ensuring that university leaders know about significant problems and to develop 
ways to address them.   
THE THEORETIC LENSES AND THIS DISSERTATION’S THESIS 
 
The lens used for studying how universities respond to the dilemma of university sexual 
misconduct is the literature on non-law forms of ordering and neo-institutional theory.  In Rules 
versus Relationships:  The Ethnography of Legal Discourse Conley and O’Barr (1990) describe 
a useful way for differentiating Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators.  According to Conley and 
O’Barr (1990, p. ix) litigants with a relational orientation “come to the legal system seeking 
redress for a wide range of personal and social wrongs.  In talking about their problems, they 
predicate rights and responsibilities on a broad notion of social interdependence rather than on 
the application of rules.  The courts often fail to understand their cases, regardless of their legal 
merits, and this frequently results in frustration and alienation.” Typical of women, the poor, the 
uneducated, and those traditionally denied access to sources of social power (Conley & Barr, 
1990, p. 173, citing O’Barr, 1982; Conley et al., 1978), those with a relational orientation feel 
they do not have a proper opportunity in formal processes to tell their story (Conley & O’Barr, 
1990, p. 172).  By contrast, litigants with a rule orientation ”evaluate their problems in terms of 
neutral principles whose application transcends differences in personal and social status… they 
emphasize these principles rather than such issues as individual need or social worth.”  (Conley 
& O’Barr, 1990, p. ix).  This discourse treats “rules as transcending the social particulars of 
individual cases… [and] thus rejects the fundamental premise of the relational orientation”  
(Conley & O’Barr, 1990, p. 172).   
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 Conley and O’Barr’s research describes different litigants, but it just as easily describes 
the differences between the archetypal Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator. The archetypal 
Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator operate with very different purposes, structures, and norms. 
While the model Ombuds has an informal, relational orientation based on the core principles of 
impartiality, confidentiality, informality, and independence, the archetypal Title IX Coordinator 
has a formal, rule-based orientation based on compliance with and enforcement of Title IX.  
These orientations and the differing sources of authority affect each mechanism’s typical 
mission, the formality of the processes used, and how each views the key principles of 
impartiality, independence, and confidentiality. In later chapters I will describe in more detail 
how these two differing offices follows sharply different models: formality versus informality.    
Nonetheless, although Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators follow sharply different 
models, they are likely to be drawn in similar directions by common elements of their 
institutional and legal environment. Both are examples of what scholars call “non-law” dispute-
processing mechanisms (Auerbach, 1983; Ellickson, 1991), and a large body of literature on such 
mechanisms finds that they are pulled by a complex mix of legal and institutional pressures 
toward a sort of hybrid, quasi-law like organizational form.  
To understand “non-law” mechanisms, it is helpful to examine the classic studies on 
avoidance of law in the United States. Informality in dispute processes is driven by people and 
organizations that dislike formal procedures and the publicity and loss of control that attends 
them.  As a result they try to resolve things informally, “behind the scenes.”  Auerbach (1983), 
Ellickson (1991), and Robinson (2013) all examine such instances of non-law order, with 
McAdams (1997), Blocher (2012), and Kostritsky (2013) investigating how norms and law 
interact.  In Justice without Law (1983), Auerbach analyzes how particular communities of 
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American society resolve disputes without recourse to law.  He argues that because the United 
States is an exceptionally rule-oriented and litigious society with the law residing exclusively in 
the hands of lawyers, myriad groups—minority religious sects, commercial business 
associations, progressive policy reformers, and universities, to name just a few—have 
established non-law dispute resolution systems to avoid the strictures and proceduralism of the 
formal legal system.  
There is a large neo-institutional literature on how these “non-law” offices and processes 
inside bureaucratic organizations develop (Edelman, 1990, 1992; Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 
1999; Edelman et. al., 2010, 2011; Dobbin & Kelly, 2007). Formal, “non-law” organizational 
alternatives were first examined by Selznick (1969) who observed the law as a normative 
influence on organizations, contributing to increasing levels of formalism in organizations’ 
internal dispute-processing systems.  Building on this institutional perspective in organizations 
theory, legal environment theory emphasizes the isomorphic influence of the normative 
environment on organizational structure and behavior (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott & Meyer, 1983).  While classical organization theory emphasizes efficiency 
and control as the motivation for the formalization of organizational governance (Weber; Blau & 
Schoenherr, 1971), neo-institutional theorists (Edelman, 1990, 1992; March & Olsen, 1989, 
1995) argue that organizations tend to adopt internal structures that mimic responsiveness to 
norms in the external legal environment so as to facilitate their legitimacy.  Recent scholarship 
(Edelman, Uggen, & Erlanger, 1999; Edelman et al., 2010, 2011.) has increasingly observed that 
organizational “responses” to external law so greatly shape what is meant by “compliance” that 
we should think of organizations as “constructing” their legal environment. That is to say, courts 
have come to accept organizations’ internal EEO/AA policies and procedures as what the law 
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requires.    In this way institutionalized organizational structure influences judicial views of 
compliance with the law.  Effectively formal organizational dispute systems create non-law 
mechanisms of avoiding liability.  As non-statutorily required structures are created, judges first 
reference the structures, then employers point to these structures to justify their actions as 
nondiscriminatory, and finally over time an iterative process develops in which judicial opinions 
and precedents treat such structures as indicators that the organization is complying with the law 
(Edelman et al., 2011).   
Although these internal offices are a type of “non-law” alternative, observers have long 
noted that they come under pressure to mimic the formal processes of law. Although Edelman 
has long argued that this mimicry is often akin to empty symbolism (Edelman 1990, 1992), she 
has acknowledged that the managerial structures representing compliance often are quite legal 
(i.e. formal) in nature, and look superficially like legal institutions (policies and rules resemble 
legal rules, grievance procedures look like judicial proceedings, etc.) and that the more an 
organizational process mimics the formality of a legal process, the greater the likelihood that the 
process will receive deference and legitimacy by the courts (Edelman et al., 2011).  Auerbach 
(1983) also describes how alternatives come under pressure to mimic formal processes.  He notes 
how non-law dispute resolution systems, particularly small claims courts, commercial 
arbitration, and labor arbitration, among others, have become significant parts of the legal 
system.  Auerbach (1983) observes that many such reforms have subtly gravitated toward greater 
procedural formalism over time as they have faced criticisms for a perceived lack of procedural 
fairness. Likewise, Epp (2009) has argued that organizational managers often are pressured by 
threats of liability to adopt law-like policies and procedures that are more formalized and 
extensive than they initially preferred. Contrary to the image depicted by Edelman (1990, 1992) 
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and Edelman et. al (2011) of managerial control over this internal institutionalization of law, 
Epp’s evidence (2009) suggests that under pressure from liability, bureaucratic organizations are 
often drawn far along the path toward legal formality. 
Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds can both be thought of as very different versions of 
the tendency to create “non-law” vehicles.  Ombuds typify the use of “non-law” community 
norms as they have no inherent power to hire, fire, or enact and enforce organizational changes.  
The levers available to Ombuds are all persuasive in nature.  As a result, an Ombuds’s influence 
is organizationally created, but without coercive authority.  It is entirely determined by the 
legitimacy ascribed by organizational members and stakeholders.  In a 2007 International 
Ombudsman Association Survey, one Ombuds respondent noted, “We have no coercive power.  
Our power comes from our ability to persuade, to act quickly, and to take on what no one else 
will”  (Erbe & Sebok, 2008, p. 30).  Less obviously Title IX Coordinators, too, are a version of 
the various internal organizational offices that are created to avoid having internal disputes 
automatically shunted out to regular courts for resolution.  Thus they, too, are a type of “non-
law” alternative to the formal law.   
In sum, although Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds start from very different institutional 
premises, these theories suggest that both are likely to be subject to similar cross-cutting 
institutional pressures. Some of these pressures favor greater informality. Others favor greater 
law-like formality.  Since the ideal-type of Title IX Coordinator is already quite formal, I expect 
to find that this office will be pulled in practice more toward greater informality.  Since the ideal-
type of Ombuds is already quite informal, I expect that this office will be pulled toward greater 
formality.  How they respond in practice to these cross-cutting pressures is the subject of this 
dissertation.  This dissertation proposes the following thesis:  Formal and informal non-law 
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organizational dispute mechanisms (in this instance, Title IX coordinators and Ombuds) 
converge over time and begin to resemble one another.  This will be called procedural 
convergence. In the case of these Coordinators and Ombuds, this procedural convergence is 
evident on the key values of confidentiality, impartiality, and procedural formalism. The issue of 
confidentiality implicates a tension between the individual’s interest in controlling others’ access 
to personal information versus the organization’s interest in divulging that information for the 
purpose of better managing and controlling abuses and insulating itself from liability for these 
abuses.  The issue of impartiality implicates a tension between neutrally adjudicating a dispute 
between two individuals versus fully investigating that dispute to discover the truth. The issue of 
procedural formalism implicates a tension between the judicial model of fair procedures versus a 
psychological model that emphasizes the value of being heard and respected. These tensions will 
be summarized in more detail in the following section.  
For now, the important point is that in addressing these tensions, Ombuds and Title IX 
coordinators start in principle from sharply different normative positions but converge toward 
similar practices. This convergence is not full and complete, but it is greater than would be 
anticipated by the normative principles of these two contrasting models. Thus, with regard to 
confidentiality, both roles offer complainants less confidentiality than promised by the principled 
Ombuds model, but more than offered by the enforcement-oriented Coordinator model.  With 
regard to impartiality, both roles offer less impartiality than promised in principle by either the 
strict independence and non-partiality of the Ombuds model or the clear separation of 
investigative and adjudicatory roles mandated by administrative law. With regard to procedural 
formalism, Ombuds and Coordinators offer complainants less procedural formalism than a court 
of law, but considerably more than promised in principle by the wholly informal Ombuds model.   
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This proposed model of procedural convergence is distinct from the neo-institutional 
model of symbolic mimicry of the law favored by Edelman (1990, 1992). In that neo-
institutional model, organizational responses to law are described as symbolic mimicry that 
follow the image of law but in practice are influenced mainly by managerial interests. We might 
call this a model of organizational divergence from law. In Edelman’s description, while 
organizational structures may mimic the law, they diverge from it in order to serve managerial 
and organizational interests in efficiency. It must be remembered that Edelman studied mainly 
formal organizational structures that are based on a law-like model; it is not entirely surprising 
that these are less “law”-like in practice than they first appear.  This dissertation, by studying 
both Title IX coordinators, a formal organizational structure, and Ombuds, an informal 
organizational structure, we see that the pull is not exclusively away from the law-like model.  In 
fact, Ombuds are pulled in practice more toward the law-like model.  Title IX coordinators and 
Ombuds thus do not engage in practice in a common divergence away from law; instead they 
engage in a common convergence toward a hybrid middle ground that incorporates some 
elements of law-like procedure and some elements of managerial efficiency.  
This convergence toward some elements of law and some of managerial efficiency 
appears to be driven by two major forces. The first of these is perceived liability pressure and the 
need to protect the official (whether the Title IX Coordinator or the Ombuds) and the university 
from exposure to liability. This perceived pressure draws both Coordinators and Ombuds toward 
taking some law-influenced actions that will be described in detail in the following chapters.  
The second of these pressures is very different. It is the desire to produce substantive justice 
(good outcomes) in individual cases as opposed to strictly following a principled model.  
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In addition to theories of non-law ordering, how universities have responded to this 
dilemma may be understood in part through the lens of bureaucratic politics theory, and 
specifically the theory of street-level bureaucracy.  Theories of bureaucratic politics focus on 
how administrative officials make discretionary decisions that shape administrative policy. .  
Theories of street-level bureaucracy specifically focus on how individuals on the front lines of 
administration play active roles in this process of bureaucratic politics, and how their 
discretionary decisions shape the enforcement of rules and laws (Lipsky, 1983; Maynard-Moody 
& Musheno, 2003).  As Maynard-Moody and Musheno note, “street-level work is ambiguous 
and marked by conflicting signs, leaving the worker to determine how to respond” (Maynard-
Moody & Musheno, 2003, p. 153).  As illustrated by the below hypotheticals, “the needs and 
character of [the individuals served] (as defined by the [Title IX Coordinator or Ombuds]) and 
the demands of rules, procedures, and policies (as understood by the [Title IX Coordinator or 
Ombuds] exist in unresolveable tension” (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003, 156).   
The deep dilemma facing university officials, and the cross-cutting pressures on them, 
may be illustrated by a hypothetical scenario based loosely on many of my interviews. Imagine 
you are a Title IX Coordinator and a female undergraduate student is in your office telling you 
she was a victim of a sexual assault.  You believe her, but you believe it is a coin-toss as to 
whether the evidence will be enough to prove that the assault occurred.  She never wants to see 
the perpetrator again, she does not want her parents to find out, and she is wary of going through 
a public hearing.  She is very emotional and simply wanted someone to know what happened.  
According to the 2011 Dear Colleague letter and your university’s official policies, you have an 
obligation to investigate every instance of sexual misconduct. Yet you also know that the hearing 
process in this case would be arduous and could generate considerable publicity.  You also know 
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that, if you begin even the first step of the formal process of investigation and hearings as 
required by the 2011 letter and university policy, you will be unable to guarantee confidentiality 
to this distraught student.  What do you do?    
Consider another scenario. Imagine you are an Ombuds and the same female 
undergraduate student is in your office telling you she was a victim of a sexual assault.  Your 
institution is under investigation by the Office of Civil Rights for the mishandling of prior sexual 
assault complaints.  Because of this investigation and the heightened attention to adhering strictly 
to the guidelines in the 2011 Dear Colleague letter, you face considerable pressure to report any 
instances of sexual misconduct. To do otherwise would seem to the investigators, and your 
university superiors, as an instance of precisely the sort of problem the Dear Colleague letter 
aimed to correct: a pattern of sweeping abuses under the rug. But, as an Ombuds, you are bound 
by a long tradition and an ethical commitment requiring you to maintain the confidentiality of 
every person who makes a complaint to you. This confidentiality is the essence of the Ombuds 
role. The undergraduate student before you  asks you about the investigation and hearing 
process, which you know to be difficult for victims and often does not result in a finding of 
misconduct. Hearing your description of the process, she says that she does not want to be 
dragged through such an ordeal.  This is the second person over the past two years to come into 
your office and make such an allegation against this particular perpetrator. The two complaints 
are quite similar. They seem to you to be quite credible and compelling evidence that the 
university has in its employment a sexual predator. What do you do?       
Both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators act as street-level bureaucrats when faced with 
individuals needing their help. Like street-level bureaucrats everywhere, they are pulled in 
different directions by competing norms and pressures. Title IX Coordinators are buoyed by the 
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increasing attention paid to Title IX, but must navigate the often conflicting interests expressed 
by university legal counsel, administrators, students, and activists.  Ombuds face greater threats 
to institutional legitimacy than Title IX Coordinators.  The attention and pressure on universities 
to discover, investigate, and eradicate sexual misconduct places significant pressure on 
organizational actors like Ombuds with the ability to provide absolute confidentiality.  Operating 
outside traditional operating procedures, and without an ability to evidence results, Ombuds are 
experiencing pressure to relax their stated principles and act as an additional compliance 
mechanism.  
As will be described in the following chapters, both Coordinators and Ombuds 
sometimes believe that in order to stop an abuse or hold an abuser accountable they must depart 
from the strict requirements of their respective models. In many such instances they do so.  In 
addition to these two major forces, the evidence in following chapters also suggests that 
individual officials vary in their degree of principled commitment to their respective official 
roles. Thus, some Ombuds are more willing than others to depart from the ideal-type of an 
Ombuds; some Title IX Coordinators are more willing than others to depart from the prescribed 
Coordinator role. 
As opposed to symbolic mimicry, procedural convergence is what occurs when formal 
and informal organizational dispute mechanisms, facing liability pressures and the felt need to 
bring justice, depart from their respective models.  The law is a powerful force that paradoxically 
pushes Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds to utilize each other’s core strategy.  By becoming 
more formal or informal, each role seeks to serve both the institution and the individuals 
involved. Fundamentally, convergence occurs due to complex tradeoffs that require Ombuds and 
Title IX Coordinators to maintain or relax their standards in the face of significant pressure to 
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protect the university community and vulnerable individuals from harm.  These cross-cutting 
pressures arise in the context of several key tensions between competing values. These tensions 
are reviewed in the next section.     
KEY TENSIONS FACED BY OMBUDS AND TITLE IX COORDINATORS  
 
Some pressures on Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators push toward greater formality; 
some push toward greater informality. Many years ago Verkuil (1975) noted how the pervasive 
model of legal formality is likely to push Ombuds toward greater formality:   
The ombudsman's potential as a procedural system is largely bound up with our 
commitment to the adversary system. The ombudsman and adversary systems are 
substantially competing procedures for the regularization of informal processes; 
each is based on a different conception of the dispute resolution process and 
reflects different underlying social and political values. While the two systems 
could coexist in harmony if spheres of influence were delineated reflecting the 
appropriateness of their respective procedures, the spread of the adversary system, 
in response to the perceived commands of procedural due process, into many 
areas of administrative decisionmaking has stymied the development of the 
ombudsman alternative. (p. 846) 
 
The tension between formality and informality encompasses several particular conflicts 
or tensions, and this section will examine these. Generally speaking, they are parts of a general 
conflict between individual self-determination and broader organizational interests.   On the one 
hand, an individual who feels she has been subjected to sexual harassment or assault has a strong 
interest in shaping whether and how the university pursues an investigation and disciplinary 
action in response to her grievance. Often these individuals do not even file a complaint because 
they fear losing control of the process.  By contrast, universities have a strong interest in 
vigorously investigating these cases and carrying out discipline when it is merited, in the view of 
the university. This interest serves the value of setting clear norms, punishing bad actors, and 
deterring future misconduct. It also serves the value of protecting the university from liability for 
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failing to do enough to stamp out misconduct. In pursuit of these goals, often a university will 
want to investigate and discipline even if the complainant does not. 
Confidentiality versus mandatory reporting 
Confidentiality and the reporting of sexual misconduct illustrates the tension between 
self-determination and organizational interests.  Confidentiality is the principle that information 
disclosed by one party to another may not be disclosed to third parties except upon the consent of 
the party who initially disclosed it. Thus, if a person complains to an official of a sexual assault, 
under the principle of confidentiality that official may not report this to anyone else unless the 
complainant wishes this to be done.  By ensuring confidentiality, officials serve the values of 
encouraging people to report misconduct, assisting survivors in getting any needed support, and 
providing survivors with self-determination in maintaining control regarding what will happen 
with the complaint.   
The principle of confidentiality is in tension with the principle of mandatory reporting. 
Mandatory reporting is the requirement that any employee of an organization who learns of a 
violation of a policy must report this to organizational officials charged with enforcing this 
policy. Thus, many universities have a policy requiring that any employee who learns of sexual 
misconduct in violation of law or university policy must report this to the Title IX Coordinator or 
a similar official. The values served by mandatory reporting are to set clear norms against sexual 
violence by encouraging reporting, punishing bad behavior, and deterring future misconduct.  
These organizational values also serve to protect the organization from liability.   
Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds take different approaches to the tension between these 
two principles. Title IX Coordinators promise confidentiality, but only to the extent that it does 
not interfere with the law and interests of compliance. Put simply, Coordinators give priority to 
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reporting and compliance. Ombuds give priority to confidentiality. They promise absolute 
confidentiality, and do not make reports about specific individuals.  Ombuds only make reports 
about trends when the complete anonymity of the visitor can be ensured.      
The tension between these two approaches to confidentiality was clearly articulated in 
Not Alone, the first report of The White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual 
Assault (2014): 
Sexual assault survivors respond in different ways.  Some are ready to make a 
formal complaint right away, and want their school to move swiftly to hold the 
perpetrator accountable.  Others, however, aren’t so sure.  Sexual assault can 
leave survivors feeling powerless—and they need support from the beginning to 
regain a sense of control.  Some, at least at first, don’t want their assailant (or the 
assailant’s friends, classmates, teammates or club members) to know they’ve 
reported what happened.  But they do want someone on campus to talk to—and 
many want to talk in confidence, so they can sort through their options at their 
own pace.  If survivors don’t have a confidential place to go, or think a school 
will launch a full-scale investigation against their wishes, many will stay silent.  
In recent years, some schools have directed nearly all their employees (including 
those who typically offer confidential services, like rape crisis and women’s 
centers) to report all the details of an incident to school officials- which can mean 
that a survivor quickly loses control over what happens next.  That practice, 
however well intentioned, leaves survivors with fewer places to turn. (p. 11)  
 
Confidentiality is thus both a challenge and an opportunity for Title IX Coordinators and 
Ombuds.  As an opportunity, confidentiality can be used to build trust, provide self-
determination, and ensure privacy for survivors and alleged perpetrators.  Confidentiality also 
presents significant challenges because it may prevent people from the reporting of all known 
instances of sexual misconduct.  Without knowing about an instance of sexual misconduct, 
university officials are unable to investigate and remedy problems, potentially exposing the 
institution to liability.  
How much confidentiality is honored has implications for survivors’ choice of whether 
and how to report.  Cantalupo (2009, p. 680) argues that due to the epidemic nature of peer 
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sexual violence on campuses and the overwhelming non-reporting, and the cycle of non-
reporting and violence perpetration, survivors have an obligation to come forward and report. In 
this view, the survivor’s self-determination is subordinated to the broader interest in deterring 
sexual misconduct.  Beloof (1999) notes that it is important to preserve the possibility of non-
reporting at the request of a survivor because doing so acknowledges “the victim’s desire to 
retain privacy; the victim’s concern about participating in a system that may do [her] more harm 
than good; the inability of the system to effectively solve many crimes; the inconvenience to the 
victim; the victim’s lack of participation, control, and influence in the process…” (p. 306).   
Some have argued that confidentiality encourages the filing of complaints by survivors.  
According to Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin (2009, p. 52), the most common reasons individuals 
decide not to make a complaint or take other steps to stop behavior they find unacceptable 
includes “fear of loss of relationships, and loss of privacy, fear of unspecified ‘bad 
consequences’ or retaliation, and insufficient evidence.”  A 2002 Time/CNN Survey/Harris 
Interactive poll revealed that 87 percent of the public perceived that whistleblowers face 
retaliation some or most of the time (Commission on Public Trust Report, 2003, 23).  In a 1999 
survey of whistle blowers, 69% stated that they lost their jobs or were forced to retire as a result 
of coming forward, and another 69% reported that they were criticized or avoided by their co-
workers (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999, p. 120).  Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin (2009) note that fear 
of retaliation is a common reason to avoid reporting, but that forbidding retaliation is not very 
effective because “few people understand or trust such a policy” and retaliation is hard to prove 
and prevent where “delayed, indirect, diffuse, outside the workplace, or covert” (p. 54).   
Anonymous hotlines or reporting mechanisms are sometimes proposed as a way of 
encouraging the making of complaints, but some research suggests that these mechanisms are not 
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as effective for this purpose as sometimes believed.   Despite a 2007 survey indicating that half 
of employees had personally observed violations of company ethics standards, policy, or the law 
(Gabriel, 2008, pp. 1-2), a 2007 Corporate Governance and Compliance Hotline Benchmarking 
Report surveyed over 650 companies and revealed an aggregate reporting rate for all sectors was 
8.27 reports per 1,000 employees or less than 1 percent (Corporate Governance and Compliance, 
2007).   
A possible explanation for why anonymous reporting mechanisms do not much 
encourage reporting is because survivors want someone they can talk to confidentially before 
deciding whether or not to make an official report.  This is echoed in the data on bystander 
interventions, noting over half of respondents in a national survey of adults suspected a friend, 
family member, or co-worker that was a survivor of domestic violence, but 65% wanted more 
information about what to do (WHTF, Bystander-Focused Prevention of Sexual Assault, 2014, p. 
3). Further, college students surveyed indicated that 58% did not know how to help a survivor 
(WHTF, Bystander-Focused Prevention of Sexual Assault, 2014, p. 3).  
Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin describe the organizational context as a barrier to reporting, 
noting that when the complaint system is not seen as safe, accessible, and credible, it is because 
it may ignore “ugly behavior that is not overtly illegal” (Rowe, Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, pp. 54-
56).  Further there could be the perception that important people get treated differently, or the 
system’s procedures are not accessible, take a long period of time, do not respect privacy, or are 
overseen by the people seen as the source of the problem (Rowe, Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 57).  
In contrast to anonymous hotlines, in-person mechanisms that promise confidentiality, like 
Ombuds, have been shown to increase trust in the organization and possibly encourage the 
making of complaints (Sulkowski, 2011, pp. 53-65).  In a study of campus Ombuds, Harrison 
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and Doerfel (2006, p. 145-46) found that over 50% of students bringing an issue to an Ombuds 
perceived favorable or somewhat favorable outcomes.  Of students who did not receive a 
favorable outcome, a majority still thought the process was fair and contributed to feeling trust 
and commitment toward the organization (Harrison & Doerfel, 2006, p. 145-146).  
Ombuds are capable of providing survivors with confidentiality and self-determination, 
and research indicates student satisfaction rates of 60 to 90 percent after using an Ombuds on a 
range of student-faculty disputes from grading policies to harassment (Harrison, 2004; Robbins, 
1993; Rowe, 1993).  Most importantly, prior research indicates female students may especially 
benefit from speaking with an Ombuds.  Surveying students who used an Ombuds, Harrison 
(2007, p. 358) found female students were significantly more likely to pursue a future grievance 
of harassment.  Women were also significantly more concerned than men about confidentiality, 
specifically the effect of pursuing a grievance on their department standing, potential retribution, 
and they were more likely than men to expect negative outcomes (Harrison, 2007, p. 358).     
Utilizing an Ombuds is not, however, the easy answer to the problem of unreported 
sexual misconduct.  There are several issues complicating an Ombuds’s ability to provide 
survivors with confidentiality, self-determination, and control over the process.  First, research 
indicates that although many students know about the Ombuds, there is confusion about what the 
office can do (Harrison, 2007, p. 359). Second, there is although Ombuds promise 
confidentiality, whether this promise is legally enforceable remains somewhat unclear.   There is 
little case law protecting the confidentiality of communications with Ombuds, and often the level 
of confidentiality is controlled by the organization itself.  No U.S. State embraces the 
ombudsman privilege as it is envisioned under the standards of the premier professional Ombuds 
organization, the International Ombudsman Association (IOA) (Van Soye, 2007, pp. 128).  Four 
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states (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nebraska) grant the ombudsman a privilege not to testify 
(Van Soye, 2007, p. 129).  A federal court common-law privilege is sometimes recognized for 
employee communications with a corporate Ombuds (Monoranjan Roy v. United Technologies, 
1990; Kientzy v. McDonnell Douglas Corp, 1991; Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 1997).  
Established on a case-by-case basis, the burden is on the party claiming the privilege to establish 
the following Wigmore Factors (8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 2285 [McNaughton rev. 
1961]): 1) The communication is made in the belief it will not be disclosed; 2) confidentiality is 
essential to maintaining the relationship between the parties; 3) the relationship is one society 
considers worthy of being fostered; and 4) the disclosure causes an injury to the relationship 
greater than the benefit of the correct outcome of the litigation.  Macallister (2001, p. 16-17) and 
Howard (2011b, pp. 277-294) caution Ombuds to have widely and consistently publicized 
information in print and online that consistently asserts the confidentiality of the office.  This 
forms the basis for an “implied contract,” or that the ombudsman program is made available to 
those who abide by the principles upon which the office was established (Howard, 2011a, p. 10).  
The barriers to using an Ombuds office to provide self-determination to survivors includes a lack 
of understanding of what an Ombuds does and uncertainty regarding confidentiality.   
Universities encourage mandatory reporting to support their interest in bringing 
forwarded complaints of sexual misconduct so they can be investigated, the perpetrators 
punished, and abuses deterred. The key question for Title IX Coordinators is whether it is 
appropriate for organizational members without a recognized privilege (medical, legal, religious, 
or psychological) to be exempt from mandatory reporting requirements.  In order to bring as 
many complaints forward as possible, organizations often impose zero-tolerance mandatory 
reporting requirements.  Lewis et al. (2013) indicates the tension between preserving privacy and 
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requiring reporting by every employee so no complaint “slips through the cracks” (p. 10).  Many 
campus attorneys favor mandatory reporting to limit potential exposure to liability.  Specifically 
addressing the reporting question, David Miller (2011) notes:  
“Who could not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence (or any other kind of 
violence…exposed to the full consequence of their actions, along with those who 
knowingly abet their horrible behavior?   Knowledge is responsibility, and those 
in the know must also be held responsible for not acting on what they know if not 
acting betrays the public trust” (p. 6).  
 
Miller (2011) notes that confidentiality in such instances may be used to protect perpetrators:  
“[F]or some, Ombudsman informality offers too much ambiguity, and confidentiality is seen as 
conspiracy to preserve the interests of such perpetrators against the exercise of justice” (p. 6)   
 Mandatory reporting policies may inhibit reporting because individuals do not want to get 
other people fired or in trouble, and do not trust the employer to do a fair investigation (Rowe, 
Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 57).  Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin (2009) note, “if the dilemmas are 
managed badly by providing too few options (and zero tolerance may offer no options), fewer 
people will come forward” (p. 58).  Miller echoes this view (2011):  
“[T]he provision of a safe place in which options for action and response can 
safely be heard, away from the clamour of police sirens and media-fuelled public 
approbation, can help to protect the public interest by ensuring that matters have a 
greater likelihood of swift resolution… [An Ombuds] very informality, neutrality 
and confidentiality enable the exercise of justice by ensuring that alleged victims 
and perpetrators can safely and more fully consider their options for exercising 
their rights” (pp. 6-7) 
 
How can institutions encourage survivors to come forward?  Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin 
(2009, p. 63) encourage the use of Ombuds offices as “[t]here is no single policy that will make 
an organization seem trustworthy and no single procedure or practice that will guarantee that 
people will overcome all the barriers to coming forward.”  Chapter 5, on confidentiality, 
examines the different approaches used by Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds   to address the 
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tension between confidentiality and reporting, and in doing so, illuminates the tension between 
survivor rights and self-determination and organizational interests in avoiding liability.  
Settlement versus Precedent 
A second tension lies between the value of settlement and the value of establishing clear 
precedent. Settling a complaint through a mutual agreement rather than an official determination 
serves the interests of individual self-determination over how a dispute is handled, privacy, and 
efficiency; settlement may also serve an institutional interest in avoiding publicity and public 
liability. By contrast, making an official decision regarding a complaint establishes a precedent 
and this serves the interest in setting clear norms regarding sexual misconduct; these precedents 
may clearly send the message that misconduct will not be tolerated.   
Ombuds are predisposed to settlement; Coordinators are predisposed to official decisions 
and official precedent. Each has a potential down-side. Jennifer Reynolds (2012) contends that  
Ombuds could be used to protect against liability and that “one could imagine the Ombuds, a 
silky-voiced character who manipulates the hapless, under resourced Employee or Consumer 
through various cognitive heuristics into willingly foregoing meritorious claims, thus protecting 
the organization from shouldering costs associated with investigation, procedure and possible 
impacts on human resources” (p. 532). By the same token, Coordinators who are set on 
establishing an official precedent may drag hapless individuals through and official process that 
they may greatly wish to avoid and which further harms their emotional health.    
These tensions implicate confidentiality, as mandatory reporting policies are often 
designed to trigger the use of formal mechanisms.  Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin (2009) note that 
zero tolerance policies create “a powerful tension between ‘getting problems solved efficiently at 
the lowest possible level’ by helping people to act on their own—which requires delegating a 
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significant proportion of conflict management—and trying to establish complete control over all 
unacceptable behavior by centralizing conflict management” (p. 57).  Essentially the question of 
settlement versus precedent is also one about individual self-determination versus organizational 
interests.   
What Constitutes a Hearing and Fair Procedures? 
 
 A third tension is between fair procedures and efficiency in hearing and deciding a 
contested complaint. The value of fairness in procedures serves two important goals: treating the 
parties with dignity by fully hearing their perspectives, and accurately determining a just 
outcome.    For survivors, fairness  requires universities to follow the law and investigate, punish, 
and deter misconduct in order to ensure a hostility-free educational environment.  For alleged 
perpetrators, it requires universities to adjudicate complaints in a way that adequately protects 
their right to due process: to present their side of the story and challenge the complainant’s story 
if they wish.  Fairness also serves the goal of avoiding mistakes in assessing the facts. 
Nonetheless, fairness, if taken to an extreme, can be extremely time-consuming and inefficient, 
and institutions have a strong interest in hearing and deciding on complaints in an efficient 
manner. 
The two structures, Ombuds and Coordinators, address this tension between fairness and 
efficiency differently. Ombuds are to be advocates for fair procedures generally while Title IX 
Coordinators are bound to comply with and enforce Title IX law and policy.  A Title IX 
Coordinator must ensure that the investigation and adjudication processes are fair to both 
complainants and respondents.   
Still, there is ambiguity in how each mechanism defines fair procedures.  As advocates 
for fair procedures, Ombuds use overarching principles to guide their work, but there is no IOA 
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Standard of Practice defining what types of procedures are required to meet the general principle 
of fairness or how to determine what is fair.  Doing this requires “multi-partiality” or a 
commitment to fairness and everyone’s best interests (Erbe & Sebok, 2008, p. 31). Gadlin (2011) 
describes the difficulty in applying formal rules, processes, or procedures in all situations: 
“In educational settings and workplaces, many tension points and conflicts arise 
within the context of relationships and work-related interactions.  In these 
situations assessing fairness is extremely complex and highly subjective; complex 
because it is confounded with other factors and subjective because there may not 
be common standards against which to assess actions” (p. 42).   
 
Inherently, the Ombuds must navigate tensions between 1) What constitutes advocacy for 
specific individuals versus principles (and is there a difference) and 2) How to determine 
when, whether, and which policy violations contravene conceptions of fairness that 
demand intervention.  Sturm and Gadlin (2007, p. 7) respond to the critique that 
organizational dispute resolution satisfies disputes at the individual complaint level 
without aggregating claims and addressing institutional problems.  They argue that 
settlement and informal organizational dispute systems do have the capacity of achieving 
both organizational interests in efficiency and in systematic improvement in compliance 
with the law.  Ombuds are also to serve fairness in general by providing what is called 
“upward feedback” that reports general trends in individual complaints in order to 
recommend systematic changes to improve institutional fairness generally (Sturm & 
Gadlin, 2007, p. 10; see also Reuben 2005, 56).  In general, though, the character of the 
Ombuds commitment to fairness is as a general principle favoring respect for the voice of 
all affected parties, rather than to specific procedures.  
By contrast, Title IX Coordinators tend to address the tension between fairness and 
efficiency by establishing specific rule-based procedures for addressing complaints. In part this 
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is a response to growing pressure from the legal environment and liability concerns to provide 
increasingly formal processes for handling sexual misconduct.  According to Triplett (2012, p. 
498), public college students have constitutionally protected due process rights, but courts 
disagree as to the parameters of those rights.  Due process demands that both the procedures and 
the results must be fundamentally fair even if they are not perfect or precise (Kaplin & Lee, 
1995, p. 455).  Procedural due process rights that must be followed prior to a suspension or 
expulsion (Goss v. Lopez, 1975) includes notification of the complaint, providing the evidence 
against the accused, time to respond and present evidence to the contrary before an impartial 
decision maker, and clearly understood burden of proof.  The accused student must have the 
opportunity to present his own defense, but there is no requirement of a judicial hearing with the 
right to cross-examine witnesses, call witnesses, or secure counsel (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, p. 583).  
Substantive due process also includes the universality of the rule application to all persons 
similarly situated (Kaplin & Lee, 1995, p. 456).  Private institutions must abide by what they 
have promised students in the school’s policies and procedures (Cantalupo 2012, p. 514), which 
must be fundamentally fair (Psi Upsilon of Phila. V. Univ. of Pa., 1991).   
 How Coordinators are to balance fairness and efficiency remains a matter of much 
dispute. One area of dispute is what constitutes a “hearing” for due process purposes. As 
described in Chapter 2, there are “Hearing,” “Investigation,” and “Hybrid” models identified 
by the Association for Student Conduct Administration for resolving allegations of sexual 
misconduct (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).   ATIXA’s Model Investigation Process is a hybrid model 
in which the investigator makes a determination but the accused is entitled to a hearing if 
they reject the findings in whole or in part (ATIXA Training Manual, Model Investigation 
Process, 2013, p. 40).   
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 OCR does not require a hearing, with the OCR Q&A Document (2014, p. 25) broadly 
interpreting a hearing to be satisfied by an investigation in which there is equal opportunity 
for both parties to present witnesses and other evidence.  There is no requirement that 
universities provide an appeal, as long as any appeal is equally provided for both parties 
(OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 26).  Further, while OCR requires Title IX Coordinators to guard 
against conflicts of interest, the Title IX Coordinator may act as the investigator as long as 
they are not involved in any subsequent appeal process (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 12).  While 
OCR does not mandate any of these aspects of due process, the Q&A document (2014) 
specifically states, “The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistently 
with any federally guaranteed due process rights” (p. 13).  What procedures are legally 
required will vary depending on whether the defendant has a constitutionally protected 
property interest at stake.  Students have no such interest in living in the residence halls or 
even in enrollment at a university.  Employees, including faculty, may have such an interest 
in their employment or the terms of their employment.   These questions are further explored 
in chapter two.   
 The hearing question is exemplified by the differing procedures used for students and 
for faculty at the University of Kansas.  The University utilizes a hybrid model for students, 
providing for an initial investigation and determination of sanctions, followed by an appeal as 
students are “entitled to a hearing in accordance with procedure established by the Office of 
Student Affairs.”  The formal hearing is known as a panel hearing, “conducted with more 
formal procedures” including the chance to present evidence, and ask questions of any 
witnesses or the other students involved (University of Kansas, Formal v. Informal 
Processes).  The panel will then make recommendations to the Office of the Vice Provost for 
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Student Affairs, with an appeal possible on the grounds of 1) Failure to follow procedures, 2) 
Inconsistency with applicable provisions of other rules or state or federal law, 3) Factual 
determinations not supported by the record, and 4) Arbitrary and capricious decisions 
(University of Kansas, Appeal Process).  The appeal policy notes that “[a]ppeal requests may 
be denied in cases not having sufficient grounds in one or more of these areas” (University of 
Kansas, Appeal Process).  
In contrast, the University of Kansas appeal procedures for faculty do not provide for an 
adversarial hearing, and thus may not adhere to due process requirements (See Formality 
Chapter, p. 276-279).  A question persists about whether individuals accused of sexual 
misconduct should be afforded due process rights to adversarial hearings, and at what point in 
the process it must be included.  As indicated in Chapter 2 (pp. 59-62), there is uncertainty 
regarding the requirement to separating the investigator and hearing officer functions, with one 
key factor being whether the procedure is governed by federal or state law.  The question of what 
constitutes a hearing is further discussed in Chapter 7.   
A second unresolved procedural issue is the equality of interim accommodations.  Recent 
OCR guidance indicates that interim measures to address a complaint (e.g., to ensure that 
misconduct is stopped) should be taken immediately and should “minimize the burden on the 
complainant” (OCR Q&A, 2014, pp. 32-33).  Henrick (2013, p. 62) argues this is harmful to the 
due process rights of the accused as “alleged perpetrators [would thus face] expulsion from their 
residences upon accusation...” By contrast, Cantalupo (1999, p. 686) sees “innocent until proven 
guilty” as beneficial to the accused, harmful to the rights of the survivor, and an indication of the 
depth to which the criminal-law mindset still pervades institutional responses. 
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A third issue is the burden of proof. In a criminal court, the prosecutor bears the burden 
of proving the charges “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is, in theory, a high standard. 
Coordinators have a considerably lower burden in university administrative proceedings. The 
OCR Question and Answer Document released in 2014 confirms as the burden of proof the use 
of a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 26).  This simply means that 
the university must show that the alleged perpetrator was more likely than not (over fifty 
percent) to have perpetuated the act.   
  There is significant disagreement regarding the OCR-mandated use of the preponderance-
of-the-evidence standard (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 26).  Commenters and one federal court have 
suggested that “clear and convincing” proof is the standard necessary to ensure adequate 
protection of the accused student’s right to procedural due process (Weizel, 2012, p. 1639).  
“Clear and convincing” is typically applied in civil cases in which the “individual interest at 
stake is deemed extremely important” (Weizel, 2012, p. 1640).  The Mathews test (Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 1976) of three factors is used to determine whether the liberty interest is significant 
enough to warrant a higher evidentiary standard.  These factors effectively attempt to balance the 
competing tensions between individual rights (first, the interests impacted and second, the risk of 
being deprived of those interests given the procedures use) with organizational interests (the 
fiscal and administrative burdens of additional procedural requirements).  Commentators like 
Triplett (2012, p. 517) and Weizel (2012, p. 1643) argue that the preponderance standard is 
appropriate, but argues that accused students have liberty interests in preserving their good 
names and reputations, but Hendrix (2013, p. 614) argues against the preponderance standard 
because it only requires a “feather” more of proof on the accuser’s side, and creates unacceptable 
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risk for the accused.  Hendrix (2013, p.  614) argues that a clear and convincing standard would 
ensure that those punished are actually guilty.    
   The case law regarding accused students’ due process rights supports the idea that 
colleges and universities are not required to imitate the criminal justice system in structuring 
their student disciplinary processes (Cantalupo, 2012, p. 512).  Courts have consistently 
reiterated the distinction between disciplinary hearings and criminal proceedings (Cantalupo, 
2012, p. 516, n. 150-151).  The case law thus confirms that institutions are under no obligation to 
treat accused students like criminal defendants and provide them with the required constitutional 
due process rights (Cantalupo, 2012, p. 513). Cantalupo (2012) argues that the “criminal” 
institutional response to sexual violence is ineffective and perpetuates campus sexual violence.  
The “criminal” response is largely due to legal incentives to create an administrative model 
geared to achieve the school’s goals through “kangaroo courts” that favor the alleged perpetrator 
(Cantalupo, 2011, p. 208). Institutional disciplinary procedures adopt standards of proof, 
evidentiary, and due process requirements provided to criminal defendants.  Such responses 
contravene the intent of the laws that govern campus peer sexual violence (Cantalupo, 2012).  
Under Title IX, sexual harassment in schools is prohibited as a form of discrimination, but 
because Title IX enforcement does not account for the frequent survivor non-reporting, there is 
an incentive for institutions to adopt a criminal approach to reporting.  In this way, fewer 
individuals come forward because of the nature of the proceedings necessary for vindicating 
sexual misconduct.   
On the other hand, Stephen Henrick (2013) argues that institutions of higher learning 
have incentives to falsely convict students.  Henrick (2013, p. 51) argues for removing sexual 
violence claims from college campuses to civil and criminal judicial systems.  Henrick (2013) 
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bolsters his argument for removing sexual violence claims from campuses by analyzing OCR 
administrative enforcement decisions and noting considerable inconsistency.  For example, OCR 
has held that giving an accused student access to the complainant’s statement before requiring a 
response is in one circumstance a Title IX violation and in another, not a violation.2  OCR 
decisions were also contradictory as to whether a complainant has an obligation to clarify that 
she or he has been sexually harassed, and whether providing the accused with an opportunity to 
appeal without notifying the complainant of the appeal is a Title IX violation (Henrick, 2013, p. 
68).  Henrick concludes that OCR does not adequately protect the rights of accused students, and 
argues that a school deliberately indifferent to an accused’s suffering should also implicate Title 
IX, providing for gender equity in administering the law (Henrick, 2013, p. 75).  Questions 
regarding the requirement to provide a hearing are revisited in chapter two.   
In sum, questions of due process are fundamentally about the differences between formal 
and informal processes.  This research examines the tensions underlying formal and informal 
processes:  How do such Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators use rules versus relationships, and 
navigate tension between individual rights and interests versus organizational policies and 
prerogatives?  Changing legal norms and liability concerns further heighten the pressure on Title 
IX Coordinators and Ombuds to strike an appropriate balance between these conflicting interests. 
The following empirical chapters examine how the archetypal models of Coordinators and 
Ombuds strike this balance, and then how actual Coordinators and Ombuds do so in practice.  
Both mechanisms are torn by these competing values, considerations, and tensions, and despite 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Henrick compared Bethany Lutheran College, OCR Complaint No. 05-08-2043 (June 23, 2008) (giving the 
accused access to the complainant's statement before requiring him to respond to sexual assault allegations does not 
violate Title IX) with Sonoma State University, OCR Complaint No. 09-93-2131 (Apr. 29, 1994) (giving the 
accused access to the complainant's allegations before requiring him to respond is a Title IX violation).  
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very oppositional archetypes, in practice Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators converge and 
resemble one another more often than they diverge and stand in sharp contrast.  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DISSERTATION OUTLINE   
 
I interviewed fourteen Ombuds and thirteen Title IX Coordinators from 22 institutions of 
higher education nation-wide.  The research methods consisted of open-ended interviews, 
content analysis of these interviews, and the analysis of documents relating to each role.  The 
first step was the creation of a subject selection matrix.   The participants were from every region 
of the country, with participants primarily from large doctoral degree granting public and private 
research institutions, but several master’s level institutions were also included.   
Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators selected to participate 1) served in full time roles, 2) 
served in centralized Title IX or Ombuds offices, and 3) claimed to follow the standards of 
practice used by Ombuds and Title IX professionals.  Once interviews were underway, two 
Ombuds were interviewed who serve in dual institutional roles and only perform duties as 
Ombuds on a part-time or temporary basis.  Also for purposes of analyzing the role’s archetype 
and its possible departures, one of the key variables used for selection purposes was whether 
Ombuds claimed to follow the International Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice.  
Often this was indicated on the Ombuds’s website, and while many Ombuds specifically noted 
practicing to the standards, it was sufficient to state that the Ombuds values informality, 
independence, impartiality, and confidentiality. 
It is important to note that Ombuds who served as an office of notice were not included in 
the study.  This ensured Ombuds were “real” instead of some other kind of office that is called 
an Ombuds but is really something different.  It was important to eliminate from consideration 
any Ombuds offices that served as official “offices of notice” for legal purposes, as these offices 
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are in explicit violation of the norms of the Ombuds profession and are mimicking the formal 
dispute resolution mechanisms.  Eliminating these “Ombuds in name only” offices ensured that 
any observed variation by Ombuds away from the archetypal model is informal, rather than 
official, divergence.   Further, individuals serving as both Ombuds and currently in a significant 
management function were also eliminated from consideration as they de facto served as notice 
to the institution. Among the Ombuds chosen, none officially served as offices of notice, but one 
was required to report instances of sexual misconduct.     
It is also important to note that the sensitive nature of the topic restricted the sample size.  
Despite contacting hundreds of Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, fourteen Ombuds and 
thirteen Title IX coordinators agreed to participate in the study.  While it is possible that the 
twenty-seven officials who agreed to be interviewed were somehow systematically different 
from others who declined, I suspect that they were more typical than unique.  Participants 
described working to address a wide range of complaints of sexual misconduct, including some 
cases of what can only be described as egregious abuse by high-level university employees, and 
so those who agreed to be interviewed were not limited to officials who had faced only low-
level, uncontroversial cases. Nor were the participants limited to people new in their role; they 
included a number of seasoned veterans. In all of these ways, the participants, while relatively 
small in number, do not appear to be systematically skewed in any obvious way 
Research subjects were first contacted via e-mail followed by a phone call.   Often many 
conversations were needed until the subjects agreed to participate in the study.  I received many 
interesting e-mail responses in my efforts to encourage participation.  One prestigious 
institution’s Title IX coordinator noted: 
“Of course, the [General Counsel] will have to approve the Title IX Coordinator’s 
discussion with you…[School name] obviously does not want to waive attorney- 
	   41	  
Client privilege in speaking with you.”   
 
Confidentiality of participants’ communications was a foremost concern.  More than one 
Ombuds indicated that they believed participation in this study to constitute a violation of the 
confidentiality requirements of the profession, but almost universally asked to receive the results 
of the study.  My consent script ensured participants that I was not comparing the work of any 
Ombuds and Title IX coordinators at the same institution or regarding the same conflict, but 
instead was examining the work of Ombuds and Title IX coordinators more generally.  I also 
promised not to share what anyone told me with anyone else, including not revealing who 
participated or did not participate.  My consent script described the project and discussed 
confidentiality as follows: 
As a lawyer and a mediator, confidentiality is essential to my work.  For this 
project I will be recording the conversations, but the recordings will be deleted 
once the conversation is transcribed.  No identifying information (by specific 
incident, individual, or institution) will be included in the transcriptions, and I will 
utilize a numeric code identifiable only to me that will allow me to identify the 
interviewee.  These transcripts will not be made public or even available to 
anyone for subsequent research.  The transcripts will be coded for key words and 
I will use portions of the transcript to illustrate my research findings.  For any 
example I use in my dissertation I will first contact the person who told me the 
story to ensure that in no way does the example provide any identifying 
information in terms of institution, incident, or individual.  The control over these 
stories rests with you.  While I may interview Ombudsman and Title IX 
coordinators from the same institution, I will not share what one person tells me 
with any other.  This study is not designed to compare (and will not compare) the 
work of any ombudsman or Title IX coordinator on a specific case.  I will be 
comparing (generally) the experiences of Ombudsman as a whole and Title IX 
coordinators as a whole.  In addition, I will not share with anyone who is 
participating or not participating. 
 
Generally, the interviews with each participant consumed 1.5-2 hours, but in some 
instances conversations lasted up to three hours and multiple sessions.  The first interview 
typically lasted an hour and included a list of is to gain basic information about the individual’s 
role and background.  The questions for the first interview are included in the appendix.  
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Roughly one to two weeks after the first interview, I conducted a second interview.  Both 
interviews were conducted by phone.  For the second interview I sough non-specific accounts of 
three types of cases:  1) their most recent case to collect a quasi-random sample, 2) a case where 
the individual being served perceived a positive outcome, and 3) a case where the individual 
perceived a negative outcome.  At the interviewee’s discretion, this could be the interviewee’s 
perception of the individual’s views of positive or negative outcomes, or it could be direct 
knowledge that the individual perceived a positive or negative outcome.   The definition of 
positive and negative was left to the interviewee’s (and visitor’s) interpretation.  “Individuals” 
included students, faculty, or staff.  These stories initially related to grade disputes, racial 
discrimination, and sexual harassment.  With the Dear Colleague Letter changes at the front of 
Title IX coordinator’s minds, sexual harassment disputes quickly became the focus.  Racial 
discrimination served as a reliable proxy due to the rights-based nature of those issues and their 
relative importance for complainants and respondents.  One major limitation of this research was 
in asking the Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators about their perceptions of the visitors and not 
learning first hand of the visitors’ perceptions.  Another limitation is the increased attention 
focused on sexual misconduct on university campuses.  Confidentiality became a barrier to 
utilizing the participants’ stories.  In order to encourage participation I agreed to provide the 
participants with complete control over the content of their stories, and as a result I was unable to 
publish almost any of the specific details shared in any specific instance.  This curtailed my 
ability to fully illuminate the participants’ statements with concrete examples.  Following the 
interviews, the recordings were transcribed and destroyed.  The transcripts were then redacted to 
omit any identifying information.    
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 My data collection also included documents relating to Title IX, Ombuds, and university 
sexual misconduct.  The documents reviewed fall into distinct categories, illustrated in the below 
chart: 
Category Documents Pages 
Title IX/Professional Association Ethical Guidance, Policies, and Best Practices 
Documents  116 1484 
International Ombuds Association Ethical Guidance, Policies, and Best Practices 
Documents 92 888 
Government (OCR, White House) Policy Documents 44 776 
Judicial Opinions and Laws 51 625 
University Ombuds Reports, Brochures, Policies & Authorizing Documents 98 389 
University Title IX Reports, Brochures, Policies & Authorizing Documents 123 1026 
Title IX and Ombuds Job Postings 64 138 
News Articles on University Sexual Misconduct 622 2098 
TOTALS 1200 7219 
 
 The first category includes documents published by the Association of Title IX 
Administrators (ATIXA), The Association for Student Conduct Administration (ASCA), and the 
National Center for Higher Education Risk Management (NCHERM).  These include the 
ATIXA training manual for Title IX Coordinators, and documents providing best practices, 
ethical guidance, and policy recommendations.  ATIXA and NCHERM are the definitive source 
of guidance for university Title IX administrators.  The next category includes all ethical, policy, 
and best practices documents provided by the primary Ombuds professional association, the 
International Ombuds Association (IOA).  These documents augmented the interviews by 
providing the framework for the Title IX and Ombuds archetypes and each role’s requirements.  
To the author’s knowledge, almost every document authored by these organizations over the past 
ten years was included in the review.   
A third category includes all government documents, including Department of Education 
Office of Civil Rights Dear Colleague Letters and findings of the White House Task Force on 
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Protecting Students From Sexual Assault.  These documents, along with multiple judicial 
opinions and statutes, formed the basis for understanding the changing nature of the law 
governing university sexual misconduct.  These documents are reviewed beginning in chapter 
two and include all Dear Colleague Letters and the vast majority of policy documents issued by 
OCR.   
The fifth and sixth document categories include any rules, regulations, documents, 
standards, reports, and procedures relating to the Ombuds and Title IX offices at any institutions 
meeting my case (university)-selection protocol.  University documents provide context and 
depth for understanding the university response to the changing legal requirements.  Many 
university policies and procedures changed during the course of this project, but most 
Universities utilize a “hybrid” approach of the “Investigation” and “Hearing” models for 
handling sexual misconduct.  Pennsylvania State University, Harvard University, and the 
University of Kansas are utilized as specific examples of the three approaches.  Specifically, The 
University of Kansas utilizes a hybrid approach for students in which the Title IX office 
conducts an investigation and makes a recommendation and if the findings are disputed, the 
student may request a hearing (University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint Resolution 
Process, Investigation).  In cases involving faculty, the process is more similar to the 
investigation model, and the faculty may not be entitled to a hearing (University of Kansas, 
Governance Procedures, Procedures of the Faculty Rights Board, VI.A.).  Pennsylvania State 
University utilizes a hearing model in which no hearing is provided but is experimenting by 
utilizing either an investigation or a hearing model, to be determined on a case-by-case basis 
(PSU, Code of Conduct and Student Conduct Procedures).  Harvard University utilizes an 
investigation model that provides no hearing (Harvard, ODR, Procedures for Handling 
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Complaints Involving Students Pursuant to the Sexual and Gender-Based Harassment Policy) 
while the Harvard Law School process utilized a hearing model in which the Title IX 
investigation determines whether there is enough information to proceed to a hearing (Harvard, 
HLS Sexual Harassment Resources and Procedures for Students).  Harvard Law School now 
uses an interim policy complying with the university policy (HLS Sexual Harassment Resources 
and Procedures for Students), and 28 members of the Harvard Law School Faculty signed a letter 
objecting to the policy and procedures enacted by Harvard in July of 2014.  They argued the 
procedures “lack the most basic elements of fairness and due process,” most notably the lack of 
an adversarial hearing (Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, 2014).    
The University of Kansas and Michigan State University are also specifically utilized as  
representative examples of an Ombuds office conforming to the IOA standards.  The majority of 
Ombuds offices in higher education conform to the IOA standards, but a significant minority do 
not.  Job postings for both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds make up the seventh document 
category and provide insights into each role’s preferred qualifications and job requirements.  The 
document review included the majority of job postings for Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators 
between 2013 and 2015.   
Finally, the last document category includes news articles on university sexual 
misconduct, compiled from a wide variety of sources.  Typically this dissertation utilizes articles 
from the Chronicle of Higher Education, which continues to cover the issue of university sexual 
misconduct extensively.  The news articles included the vast majority of articles available 
between 2011 and 2015, and provide context for the attention the issue is receiving and the 
environment in which universities are operating.  In total, the document review encompasses 
over twelve hundred documents totaling over seven thousand pages.  
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Organization of the dissertation 
 This dissertation is organized as follows:  Chapter two describes formal organizational 
dispute systems, legal mandates, and effectiveness in addressing university sexual misconduct. It 
also reviews informal organizational mechanisms for addressing sexual misconduct, including 
organizational Ombuds and the use of mediation.  Chapters three through seven explore these 
tensions in an empirical analysis of the archetypal Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator in terms of 
their adherence or departure in the areas of authority, mission, confidentiality, impartiality and 
independence, and formality.  Chapter eight analyzes these results in the context of the 
theoretical questions and provides context for the results.   
CONCLUSION 
 Universities are struggling to balance institutional concerns with individual rights.  
Donna Shestowky argues that as universities try to address sexual misconduct, self-determination 
and institutional efficiency often work at cross-purposes, making justice difficult to obtain (2008, 
p. 551).  Examining formal and informal organizational mechanisms, this dissertation uses a lens 
of rules versus relationships, and individual versus organizational interests to evaluate how these 
mechanisms interrelate in their handling of sexual misconduct on university campuses.  
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CHAPTER 2:  OMBUDS AND TITLE IX COORDINATORS  
 
 This chapter provides a succinct summary of what is known about Title IX Coordinators 
and Ombuds.  This includes a thematic analysis of the main elements of these different entities. 
For this analysis, I rely on data from statutes, judicial decisions, university documents, and 
professional guidance from the Title IX and Ombuds’ professional associations.  Educational 
Ombuds first appeared in the 1960’s with the establishment of offices at Michigan State 
University and Eastern Montana College to hear student and faculty complaints during a time of 
widespread student unrest (Van Soye, 2007, p. 123). Today there are at least 200 college and 
university Ombuds in the United States who handle problems affecting students, faculty, and 
staff (Yarn & Jones, 2006, p. 373).  Functionally, a university or college Ombuds is a 
confidential resource for anyone with an issue both with and within the organization, including 
staff, faculty, or students.  Ombuds and other organizational dispute resolution processes were 
initially seen as a way to respond internally to complaints, reduce litigation costs, and 
demonstrate organizational concern (Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, 1993; Shapiro & Kolb, 1994).  
The work of Title IX Coordinators originated with Title IX.  Originally codified in the 
Title IX implementing regulations (35 C.F.R. § 106.8 (a)), federal funding recipients are required 
to “designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply with and carry out its 
responsibilities under [Title IX], including any investigation of any complaint communicated to 
such recipient alleging its noncompliance with [Title IX] or alleging any actions which would be 
prohibited by [Title IX].”  The April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter reaffirmed the requirement 
(p. 6) of designating a responsible employee, a role which over thirty-years after the Title IX’s 
implementation is now known as a Title IX Coordinator.  According to ATIXA estimates, there 
are 25,000 individuals who assure Title IX compliance in schools, colleges, and universities 
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across the country (“About ATIXA and Title IX”, 2014).   This means coordinating 
investigations and providing information and consultation to potential complainants, and 
receiving formal notice of complaints.  Title IX Coordinators or their staff schedule, coordinate 
or oversee grievance hearings, conduct investigations, make findings of violations of Title IX, 
notify parties of decisions, and provide information of the right and procedures of appeal.  They 
also train staff, maintain records, ensure that timelines and procedures are followed, and provide 
ongoing training, consultation, and technical assistance.   The authority of a Title IX coordinator 
is to conduct a formal and defined process to determine whether there has been a violation of the 
law.  All educational institutions are bound by their own policies and procedures, by 
constitutional due-process mandates, state contract and civil rights law, federal education laws, 
and the oversight of the Department of Education Office of Civil Rights.   
This chapter describes the key institutional features and procedures used by both Ombuds 
and Title IX Coordinators. For Coordinators, the focus is on the legal requirements governing 
Title IX compliance work and the processes Title IX Coordinators use in handling complaints of 
sexual misconduct.  For Ombuds, the focus is on Ombuds’ standards and practices. These 
descriptions illustrate the sharp differences between the informal role of an Ombuds and the 
formal position of a Title IX Coordinator.   
TITLE IX COORDINATORS:  LEGAL REQUIREMENTS AND PROCESSES 
Universities are legally required to have a Title IX Coordinator in order ensure 
compliance with Title IX and other applicable laws that address sexual misconduct and 
confidentiality rights.  As these Title IX Coordinators are essentially legal compliance officers, 
there is a maze of law and regulation controlling the requirements relating to campus sexual 
violence.  Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2006)) prohibits 
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employers from discriminating in the terms and conditions of employment based upon “race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”  Title VII applied in employee sexual harassment in 1986 
when the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson held that sexual harassment was a 
form of prohibited discrimination.  There are two main bases for employment sexual harassment 
liability under Title VII, the quid pro quo and hostile work environment theories.  Quid pro quo 
harassment occurs when a supervisor inflicts a tangible job detriment or conditions a job benefit 
on acceptance of sexual advances.  In a “hostile work environment,” employers may be liable 
when the employer has notice of a “sufficiently severe or pervasive” environment such that it 
alters the plaintiff’s conditions of employment (Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth 1998, p. 
67).  In Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998) and Burlington Industries (1998) the Supreme 
Court provided that an employer may be held vicariously liable for an actionable hostile work 
environment created by a supervisor in the survivor’s chain of command (Edelman et al., 2011, 
p. 908).  The employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages if there is no 
tangible employment action (i.e., demotion, discharge, or undesirable reassignment) (Edelman et 
al., 2011, p. 908).  In order to raise this defense, the employer must show that 1) the employer 
exercised reasonable care to provide accessible complaint procedures and to prevent and 
promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to 
take advantage of any complaint procedures provided by the employer or to otherwise avoid 
harm (Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 1998, p. 765; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 1998, 
p. 807).  
Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. § 1681; 2006 & Supp. V. 
2011) promotes equity in academic and athletics programs, prohibits hostile environments on the 
basis of sex, prohibits sexual harassment and sexual violence, requires institutions to protect 
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complainants from retaliation, and requires them to remedy the effects of other gender-based 
forms of discrimination.  Specifically, Title IX states:  “No person in the United States shall, on 
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”  
In regulations effective in 1975, every school district and college in the United States is required 
to have a Title IX Coordinator who oversees implementation, training, and compliance with Title 
IX (35 C.F.R. § 106.8 (a)).  
Title IX is silent about what constitutes discrimination, what must be done to prevent it, 
and what remedies are available if discrimination occurs.  In Oona v. McCaffrey (1998), Kinman 
v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist. (1996), Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools (1992), the courts 
continued their tradition of interpreting Title IX to impose similar requirements as Title VII.  In 
1999, after twenty-four district and six appellate courts divided on the issue (Short, 2006, p. 40), 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education held that a private 
damages action for sexual harassment may proceed on Title IX grounds only where the funding 
recipient acts with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment. The court’s majority 
noted that the harassment must be “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it 
effectively bars the survivor’s access to an educational opportunity or benefit” (p. 632).  
According to Walker (2010), the resulting test for cases involving sexual assault or rape on 
college campuses includes four components.  First is substantial control over the harasser and the 
environment in which the harassment occurred.  Second is actual knowledge of the harassment.  
Third is harassment “so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” that it deprives the survivor 
of equal access to educational programs and activities.  Finally, there must be deliberate 
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indifference to the acts, defined as a “clearly unreasonable” response under the circumstances 
(pp. 110-111).  
Colleges and universities must be compliant with both Title VII and Title IX (Lewis et 
al., 2013, p. 4).  One key difference between Title VII and Title IX is when an investigation must 
occur.  In situations implicating Title VII, once notice is given to the institution a full 
investigation is automatically triggered (Lewis et al., 2013, p. 14).  This can be contrasted with 
Title IX, where there can be a preliminary investigation to determine the necessity of a formal 
investigation (Lewis et al., 2013, p. 12).   
These court cases and the lack of clarity surrounding Title IX require Title IX 
Coordinators to oversee compliance in an uncertain environment.  Coordinators must investigate 
to determine if the harassment deprives individuals with equal access to educational 
opportunities.  If it is found to be harassment under Title IX, Coordinators must ensure that the 
school’s response is not deliberately indifferent to the harassment.  Under the Faragher test, the 
Coordinator must make sure the institution exercises reasonable care to provide accessible 
complaint procedures and to prevent and promptly correct any sexually harassing behavior.  
Confronted with survivors who may not want to participate in the investigation and subsequent 
processes, Title IX Coordinators are under pressure to balance institutional interests in avoiding 
liability and fulfilling the legal mandate, and survivors’ interest in getting needed support.     
In addition to a survivor’s private right of action against her school (Franklin v. Gwinnett 
Cnty. Pub. Schs., 1992), Title IX is also enforced through administrative enforcement by the 
Department of Education’s Office of Civil Rights (OCR).  Typically, OCR enforcement takes 
place following a complaint being filed regarding a school’s response to a sexual harassment 
case.  The OCR process is not compensatory, so student survivors are not awarded monetary 
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damages.  When a complaint is filed, OCR conducts a comprehensive investigation of that 
school’s response system, including a review of institutional policies and procedures, the steps 
the school took to resolve a complaint, and files relating to past sexual harassment cases.   OCR 
interviews individuals and ultimately issues a “letter of finding” (“LOF”) addressed to the 
school.  Often a “commitment to resolve” is attached and must be signed by the school 
(Cantalupo, 2012, p. 504, n. 78-82).   
Periodically OCR issues letters of clarification, interpreting the regulations governing 
Title IX.  While these “Dear Colleague” letters lack the force of law, courts pay them great 
attention due to deference prescribed by Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
(1984), a landmark Supreme Court decision that directed courts to defer to administrative 
interpretations of their authorizing legislation except when those interpretations contravene the 
law.  As noted above, under Title IX a school’s primary responsibility is to take immediate 
action to eliminate, prevent, and remediate any harassment the school should reasonably know 
about that creates a hostile environment.  The Dear Colleague Letter issued on April 4, 2011 
dramatically shifted the interpretation of this university responsibility by prescribing the 
knowledge and evidentiary standards for handling sexual misconduct disputes and by requiring 
universities to address student-to-student sexual misconduct.  
The letter requires a university to take action “[i]f a school knows or reasonably should 
know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile environment” (DCL, 2011, p. 4).  
This interpretation represented a sharp departure from the “actual knowledge and deliberate 
indifference” standard for private lawsuits for monetary damages.  Schools can no longer avoid 
knowledge of sexual harassment and it is much easier to show that responsible university 
employees knew or should have known of the misconduct.  The letter also required universities 
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to make determinations in cases of alleged harassment or misconduct on the basis of a 
preponderance-of-the evidence standard, noting that “[t]he ‘clear and convincing’ standard … 
currently used by some schools, is a higher [and improper] standard of proof” (DCL, 2011, p. 
11).  A perpetrator will be found responsible if it is more likely than not, i.e. a 50% threshold, 
that the misconduct occurred.  Clear and convincing, requires the evidence to indicate that it is 
substantially more likely to be true than not.   
The letter also explained that campus adjudicatory proceedings are wholly distinct from 
criminal proceedings and that neither proceeding’s outcome should affect the other (DCL, 2011, 
p. 10).  As a result any criminal charges or criminal investigation will neither impact nor be 
impacted by the university’s investigation and handling of the misconduct.  The 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter also requires schools to consider the effects of off-campus conduct when 
evaluating whether or not a hostile environment exists on campus.  The letter stated that 
“[s]chools may have an obligation to respond to student-on-student sexual harassment that 
initially occurred off school grounds, outside a school’s education program or activity” and “[i]f 
a student files a complaint with the school, regardless of where the conduct occurred, the school 
must process the complaint in accordance with its established procedures” (DCL, 2011, p. 4).   
Under Davis, the institution must have substantial control over the harasser and the environment 
in which the harassment occurred in order to proceed with a private lawsuit.  OCR requirements, 
meanwhile expands substantial control to include student-on-student sexual harassment, 
wherever it occurs, dramatically increasing the scope of the cases for which Title IX 
Coordinators are responsible.     
The letter also provides guidance on what constitutes fair procedures, including 
discouraging schools from allowing the parties to question or cross-examine one another, giving 
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institutions discretion to determine whether to permit parties to have counsel (provided both 
sides are treated equally), and mandating that both parties have the right to invoke an appeal 
process (DCL, 2011, p. 12).  The letter reiterates the opportunity for both parties to present 
witnesses and other evidence, describes time frames for the stages of the process, and provides 
for notice to parties of the outcome of the complaint (DCL, 2011, p. 9).   Further, mediation 
should not be used to resolve sexual assault complaints (DCL, 2011, p. 8) and that other rule 
violations (such as alcohol or drug use) will be addressed separately and do not make the 
survivor at fault for sexual violence (DCL, 2011, p. 15).  Further the complainant and the alleged 
perpetrator must be afforded similar and timely access to any information that will be used at the 
hearing (DCL, 2011, p. 11).  In terms of the rights of the accused, the Dear Colleague Letter 
(2011, p. 12) states, “[p]ublic and state-sponsored schools must provide due process to the 
alleged perpetrator.  However, schools should ensure that steps taken to accord due-process 
rights to the alleged perpetrator do not restrict or unnecessarily delay the Title IX protections for 
the complainant”  
The Dear Colleague Letter (2011) requires training for employees likely to witness or 
receive reports of sexual misconduct, including teachers, law enforcement, administrators, 
counselors, attorneys, health personnel, and resident advisors (p. 4).  Further, it declares that in 
sexual violence cases the fact-finder and the decision-maker should have adequate training or 
knowledge regarding sexual violence (DCL, 2011, p. 12). All schools should implement 
preventative education programs and make comprehensive survivor resources available (DCL, 
2011, p. 14).  Finally, the Dear Colleague Letter (2011) affirms the requirement that universities 
are required to employee a Title IX Coordinator and clarifies that Title IX coordinators should 
not have other job responsibilities that may create a conflict of interest (p.7).  For example, the 
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letter specifically states “serving as the Title IX coordinator and a disciplinary hearing board 
member or general counsel may create a conflict of interest” (DCL, 2011, p.7).   
The 2013 reauthorization of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA, Pub. L. 113-4) 
specifically included the Campus Sexual Violence Elimination Act in Section 303 (Grants to 
Combat Violent Crimes on Campuses) and Section 304 (Campus Sexual Violence, Domestic 
Violence, Dating Violence, and Stalking Education and Prevention).  Originally signed into law 
in 1994 as Title IV, sec. 40001-40703 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, 
the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) provided $1.6 billion toward investigation and 
prosecution of violent crimes against women, imposed automatic and mandatory restitution on 
those convicted, and allowed civil redress in cases prosecutors chose to leave unprosecuted.  
Reauthorized by Congress initially in 2000 and 2005, the Act also established an Office on 
Violence Against Women (OVAW) within the Department of Justice.  OVAW administers grant 
programs to reduce domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, and stalking on campus.  
In 2014, federal regulations were issued (34 CFR Part 668) clarifying the 2013 VAWA 
reauthorization.  Specifically, they require institutions to maintain statistics (including numbers 
of unfounded crime reports), to educate incoming students and new employees, to engage in 
ongoing awareness campaigns, to describe disciplinary proceedings in detail, to detail a list of 
possible sanctions, and to indicate the range of protective measures the institution may offer.  
Additionally, these regulations allow students who report or are accused of a sexual assault to 
have an advisor of their choice (including an attorney) accompany them to any meetings (Sander, 
2014c, p. A12). Colleges may not restrict the choice of adviser or limit the adviser to some 
meetings, but may control the extent of the advisers’ participation as long as these restrictions are 
	   56	  
applied equally (Sander, 2014c, p. A12).  This echoes the guidance provided in the OCR Q&A 
document regarding attorney participation (p.26).   
In concert with the new law, federal administrators are making it clear that preventing 
and handling campus sexual assaults is a priority.  In January 2014 President Obama pledged to 
develop a coordinated federal response to combat campus sexual assault (Sander, 2014a, p. A7). 
This included creating a White House Task Force on Protecting Students From Sexual Assault, 
designed to provide colleges with information on best practices, to ensure compliance with legal 
obligations, to increase the transparency of federal enforcement, increase the public’s awareness 
of individual college’s compliance with the law, and to facilitate coordination among federal 
agencies (Sander, 2014a, p. A7).  The White House Task Force’s first report, “Not Alone,” was 
released in April 2014, along with a website, notalone.gov to provide resources for schools and 
students.  The administration’s goals are to 1) Identify the scope of the problem on college 
campuses; 2) Help prevent campus sexual assault; 3) Help schools respond effectively when a 
student is assaulted; and 4) Improve, and make more transparent, the federal government’s 
enforcement efforts (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, p. 6).  The task force report recommends that 
universities should carry out surveys of their students to assess the extent of the problem. The 
report declares that it is the Administration’s goal to make the surveys mandatory in 2016.  
Further, the Task Force’s report recommends that university officials should work to  
engage with men to encourage them to step in when someone’s in trouble (WHTF, Not Alone, 
2014, p. 2) and actively create campus bystander intervention programs (WHTF, Not Alone, 
2014, p. 9).  The report also recommends that university officials should give the survivors of 
sexual misconduct more control over the process by ensuring a place to go for confidential 
advice and support (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, pp. 11-12).  The report observes that survivors are 
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especially concerned about maintaining their confidentiality and are hesitant to make reports  
(Not Alone, 2014, p. 11).  While many survivors want the school to respond quickly, others are 
not so sure and want someone to talk to before they lose control of what happens next.  
Mandating that all employees report sexual misconduct, including those designated to provide 
rape crisis services, leaves survivors with fewer places to turn (Not Alone, 2014, p. 11).  The 
report thus recommends that “schools should identify trained, confidential survivor advocates 
who can provide emergency and ongoing support” (Not Alone, 2014, p. 11).  It recommends that 
these opportunities should include on-campus counselors and advocates, survivor advocacy 
offices, women’s and health centers, and licensed and pastoral counselors (WHTF, Not Alone, 
2014, p. 3).  Responding effectively, according to the report, also includes ensuring a 
comprehensive sexual misconduct policy, trauma-informed training for school officials, better 
school disciplinary systems, and community partnerships (WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, pp. 11-16).  
The report recommends increased transparency, including how reports should be publicized to 
the campus community providing publicity about how survivors may find advocates on campus 
(WHTF, Not Alone, 2014, p. 17).  
 In addition to releasing the Not Alone report, OCR also issued answers to frequently 
asked questions relating to the April 2011 Dear Colleague Letter.  It clarifies several important 
issues, including specifying that schools may use the same or separate procedures to resolve 
sexual violence and sexual harassment complaints (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 14).  Further the OCR 
Q&A document specifies that a balanced and fair process must include (p. 26):   
• A preponderance-of-the-evidence standard used in any Title IX 
proceedings, including any fact-finding and hearings.  
 
• Equal permission or restriction on either side’s ability to have an attorney 
or other advisor participate in any stage of the process. 
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• Equal permission or restriction of either side’s ability to submit third-
party expert testimony.  
 
• Notification of both sides, in writing, of the outcome of both the 
complaint and any appeal.   
 
The 2014 OCR Q&A document provides information on a host of issues and 
demonstrates a marked increase in guidance from the federal government.   
Overall, the White House Task Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault 
contributed to a dramatic increase in attention on university sexual misconduct; in 
general the Obama Administration has pushed greater administrative enforcement of 
Title IX.  In February, 2014 OCR head and assistant secretary of education Catherine 
Lhamon stated that her office would be working faster and better to make sure colleges 
abide by federal law (Sander, 2014b, p. A9).  Llahmon observed that too often 
universities had sent the message that victimized students are worth less than the people 
who assault them, and she declared: 
My job as the chief enforce is to radically change that message.  I know we can do 
that together.  And I also know that if you don’t want to do it together, I will do it 
to you.  Do not wait until the next assault to make a change.  Do not wait until a 
student files a complaint.  Act now.  (Sander, 2014b, p. A9)   
 
These statements are further illuminated by the enforcement data.  Since OCR began tracking 
sexual misconduct Title IX complaints in 2009, the number of complaints filed against colleges 
has tripled from 11 in 2009 to 33 through April of 2014 (Newman & Sander, 2014, p. A24).  
OCR now publicly releases the names of colleges and universities under investigation for Title 
IX violations, and as of November 1, 2014, more than 80 colleges were under federal 
investigation (Lewontin, 2014, p. A4).  Despite the trend of increasing enforcement, an analysis 
of Title IX complaints filed with the Department of Education from 2003 to 2013 found that 
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fewer than one in ten led to a formal agreement to change campus policies (Newman & Sander, 
2014, p. A24).   
The larger significance of increasing administrative enforcement actions is that it 
radically alters the Title IX compliance landscape on university campuses.  Title IX is a federal 
funding condition under Congress’s spending power (Title 20 U.S.C. §1682), creating significant 
financial stakes for colleges and universities in the event of non-compliance.  Increasing 
administrative enforcement is largely responsible for the increase in publicity on the problem of 
sexual misconduct and the resulting frenetic activity by universities to respond and achieve 
compliance.  
Other laws are implicated by the work of Title IX Coordinators.  The Jeanne Clery 
Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act (“Clery Act”) is a 
federal statute (20 U.S.C. § 1092(f)) that requires all colleges and universities that participate in 
federal financial aid programs to keep and disclose information about crime on and near their 
respective campuses.  Schools must publish policies designed to prevent sexual violence and 
respond to it once it occurs (20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(A)(2008)) that include specific information 
about: 1) reporting (20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iii)(2008); 2) the survivor’s right to notify law 
enforcement and receive school assistance in doing so (20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(v)(2008)); 3) 
instructions to survivors as how to preserve evidence of sexual violence (20 U.S.C. § 1092 
(f)(8)(B)(iii)(2008); 4) information about options and assistance for changing living and 
educational arrangement (20 USC §1092 (f)(8)(B)(vii)(2008); and 5) disciplinary procedures that 
explicitly treat accuser and accused equally in terms of having others present at hearings and to 
know disciplinary outcomes (20 U.S.C. § 1092 (f)(8)(B)(iv)(2008)).   
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The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)(20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR 
Part 99) protects against the unauthorized disclosure of confidential student education records.  It 
grants parents of minor-aged students and students 18 and older the right to access educational 
records, to challenge the records’ contents, and to have control over disclosure of personally 
identifiable information in the records.  Applying to all schools receiving federal funds, Congress 
has modified FERPA nine times, most significantly with the passage of the Clery Act.  Congress 
never defined what constitutes an education record, so some schools apply the provision broadly 
to include any document that names a student.  Confusion exists over how colleges should apply 
its provisions, and whether it requires closed disciplinary proceedings (The Center for Public 
Integrity, 2009).  
FERPA’s guarantee of student rights to confidentiality has important implications for 
sexual misconduct investigations. As described by Pavela & Swinton (2011), schools must 
inform the complainant that if she (or he) wishes to file a formal complaint, the school cannot 
ensure confidentiality; conversely, if the complainant wishes to maintain her (or his) 
confidentiality, the school must inform the complainant that the school’s ability to address the 
problem may be limited because investigators will be precluded from giving the complainant’s 
identity to the alleged perpetrator and this will foreclose a full investigation of the complaint.  
According to these authors, the school should weigh complainant requests for confidentiality 
against the following factors: the seriousness of the alleged misconduct, the complainant’s age, 
any complaints about the same individual, and the alleged harasser’s right to receive information 
about the allegations if the information is maintained as an “education record” under FERPA.    
 There are also due process and administrative laws implicated in the work of Title IX 
Coordinators.  In U.S. law, the right to due process is based on the Fifth Amendment, which 
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binds the federal government and prescribes that “No person shall be held… nor shall be 
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law…” The states are bound by the 
same language in the Fourteenth Amendment.  In Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), the court held 
that to trigger the protection of due process there must be a recognized liberty interest or specific 
property right.  The court found no property or liberty right in student dismissals.  According to 
Triplett (2012, p. 498), public college students have constitutionally protected due process rights, 
but courts disagree as to the parameters of those rights.   As education is not deemed a 
fundamental right, there is no requirement to use an elevated burden of proof, such as clear and 
convincing evidence, or to provide a right to cross-examine witnesses.  Due process demands 
that both the procedures and the results must be fundamentally fair even if they are not perfect or 
precise (Kaplin & Lee, 1995, p. 455).  Procedural due process includes notification of the 
complaint, providing the evidence against the accused, time to respond and present evidence to 
the contrary before an impartial decision maker, and the understanding as to burden of proof.  
Substantive due process also requires that rules must be universally and equally applied to all 
persons who are similarly situated (Kaplin & Lee, 1995, p. 456).   
 Administrative law provides additional guidance for Title IX Coordinators.  
Under the Administrative Procedure Act: 
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, 
participate or advise in the recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to 
section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings…(§ 
554(d)(2)) 
 
As a result, under Federal law the functions of investigator or prosecutor and Administrative 
Law Judge or hearing officer must be kept strictly separate.   
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When the procedure occurs under state law, however, the separation need not be so strict, 
but it still must be there.  In Withrow v. Larkin (1975), the Court held that a combination of 
investigative and adjudicative functions in a state agency is not per se impermissible.  The court 
did suggest, however, that the combination of these functions in a single individual official 
would raise more serious concerns.   When the procedure is governed by state law, 
constitutionally protected property interests trigger the required separation.  As noted above, in 
Board of Regents v. Roth (1972), the court held that to trigger the protection of due process there 
must be a recognized liberty interest or specific property right.  The court found no property or 
liberty right in student dismissals.  This chapter returns to discuss due process rights in 
examining Title IX complaint handling processes.   
In this complex legal environment, Title IX Coordinators must examine the changing 
requirements under each of these statutes, as Title IX, FERPA, Clery Act, and due process 
requirements serve as Title IX Coordinators’ primary sources of authority.  Title IX Coordinators 
must redefine their missions to include, among other requirements, investigating peer-to-peer 
sexual misconduct allegations both on and off-campus, and educating and surveying the campus 
in an effort to create misconduct-free learning environments.  Title IX Coordinators must also 
reexamine the impartiality and independence of their role in these processes to ensure they are 
not serving in both an investigative and hearing officer capacity.  Institutional grievance policies 
and investigation protocols must be scrutinized to ensure due process and the correct application 
of law and policy.   Policies relating to confidentiality and reporting must be redefined in light of 
these changing goals.  These changes provide much needed guidance to Title IX coordinators.   
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter resulted in the formation of the Association for Title IX 
Administrators (ATIXA) and the ATIXA website notes, “nearly 30 years after the Department of 
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Education mandated that school districts and colleges designate Title IX Coordinators, we’re still 
not entirely sure what the appropriate role, functions, and expectations of Coordinators are” 
(“About ATIXA and Title IX”, 2014).  As a result, OCR’s April 4, 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
“created a new profession and a new field” (“About ATIXA and Title IX”, 2014).   
TITLE IX COMPLAINT HANDLING PROCESSES  
 
Title IX compliance offices are structured in a variety of ways but their core 
responsibility is to oversee enforcement of federal civil rights law within universities.  Title IX 
compliance operations studied are typically centralized in either institutional equity or equal 
opportunity offices, human resources offices, or diversity offices.  Sometimes Title IX 
Compliance is paired with other functions, resulting in a variety of combinations of the above 
offices (for example, Institutional Equity and Diversity, or other combination).  As a result of the 
changes in Title IX law described above, Title IX Coordinators increasingly hold the Coordinator 
title alone, but previously it was commonly paired with Director titles requiring race, age, 
disability or other discrimination compliance work.  As opposed to Ombuds whose ethical 
requirements of independence and impartiality prohibit holding multiple roles, many Title IX 
Coordinators interviewed for this study held dual roles requiring other compliance or diversity 
responsibilities.  This section provides an overview of the standard Title IX processes, based on 
observations from both interviews and university policies, rules, and procedural documents.       
In the typical configuration observed in this study, a primary Title IX Coordinator and 
several deputies or investigators handle the investigations and processing of sexual misconduct 
complaints.  This can range from one sole Title IX Coordinator who handles all Title IX 
compliance work to other institutions with offices encompassing multiple deputy coordinator or 
investigators.  Often there is a primary Title IX compliance office overseen by a primary Title IX 
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Coordinator and additional deputy Title IX Coordinators.  Typically deputy coordinators include 
administrators in Student Affairs, Athletics, and Human Resources departments and provide a 
more localized person to whom complaints can be made.  Deputy coordinators funnel complaints 
back to the centralized Title IX office for investigation.  Less commonly, but also observed in 
this study, the Title IX Coordinator is an upper level administrator tasked with overseeing the 
Title IX Compliance program, but has little responsibility for doing the actual investigating.  Or 
alternatively, two or more Title IX investigation procedures are set up with a student conduct 
office handling student-to-student misconduct, and an institutional equity or human resources 
office handling employee misconduct.   
Organizationally, the structuring of Title IX Compliance offices appears to result from 
two factors.  First, the structure is affected by the relative influence of the institutional actors 
involved in their design, including general counsel, student affairs administrators, or human 
resources personnel. Second, the structuring of Title IX compliance offices appears to have 
developed organically over time as additional legal requirements were added to individuals’ job 
responsibilities on a piecemeal basis.  Universities now must navigate a maize of regulation 
(Carlson, 2014).  
Wherever and however Title IX compliance offices are located and structured, the 
processes used include many common features.  Guidance on correct policies and procedures 
existed for university administrators prior to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter.  This included 
Stoner and Lowery, (2004, p. 27, n. 86) who articulated a model code of conduct and processes 
for handling code violations, including sexual misconduct.  As opposed to the informal processes 
used by Ombuds, Title IX actors follow relatively formal and prescribed grievance policies and 
procedures designed to efficiently resolve sexual harassment complaints in compliance with state 
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and federal law.  This section does not describe a model process used by all Title IX 
Coordinators.  In fact, there is significant variation from university to university.  This section 
provides a starting point for understanding how Title IX conflicts are handled, describing a 
hearing model, an investigation model, and hybrid approaches utilizing features of each.   This 
section also describes features common to most university and colleges irrespective of model.     
 The Association for Student Conduct Administration identifies “Hearing” and 
“Investigation” models for resolving allegations of sexual misconduct (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).   
In the Hearing Model, an investigation takes place prior to a hearing to determine there is 
enough information to substantiate a complaint, to provide separation between the 
investigation and adjudication functions, and to allow a trained professional complete the 
fact-finding work for the hearing body (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).  The Title IX Coordinator in a 
Hearing Model may act as an investigator and present their findings of fact to the hearing 
body.  Additionally, the Title IX Coordinator may act as an advisor to the hearing body 
regarding correct procedures, as logistical support to coordinate schedules, and as a 
complainant initiating complaints on behalf of the college (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).   The 
hearing body may be administrative and involve only one adjudicator or a combined panel of 
at least three members comprising faculty, staff, or students (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).  The key 
aspect of the hearing model is the initial determination is made by the panel or administrator 
and not the Title IX Coordinator.   
 For example, Pennsylvania State University follows a Hearing Model for resolving 
allegations of sexual misconduct.   Each case is assigned to a case manager, who investigates 
to determine if the information acquired reasonably supports a Code of Conduct violation, 
and then recommends charges and sanctions.  If the alleged perpetrator contests the charges, 
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the matter is forwarded to a hearing after which either side may appeal (PSU, Code of 
Conduct and Student Conduct Procedures, 13-14).  Likewise, Harvard	  Law	  School’s	  
process	  utilized	  a	  traditional	  hearing	  model	  in	  which	  the	  Title	  IX	  investigation	  
determines	  whether	  there	  is	  enough	  information	  to	  proceed	  to	  a	  hearing	  (Harvard,	  HLS	  
Sexual	  Harassment	  Resources	  and	  Procedures	  for	  Students).	  	  The	  Harvard	  Law	  School	  
procedures3	  have	  been	  updated	  to	  mirror	  the	  investigation	  model	  adopted	  by	  the	  
broader	  university	  and	  are	  in	  force	  on	  an	  interim	  basis,	  but	  not	  without	  dispute.	  	  Last	  
October	  28	  members	  of	  the	  Harvard	  Law	  School	  Faculty	  signed	  a	  letter	  objecting	  to	  the	  
policy	  and	  procedures	  enacted	  by	  Harvard	  in	  July	  of	  2014.	  	  They	  argued	  the	  procedures	  
“lack	  the	  most	  basic	  elements	  of	  fairness	  and	  due	  process,”	  most	  notably	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  
adversarial	  hearing	  (Rethink	  Harvard’s	  Sexual	  Harassment	  Policy,	  2014).	  	  	  	  	   
 The absence of an adversarial hearing is one of the key features of the Investigation 
Model.  Under an Investigation Model, a complaint is assigned to an investigator who 
interviews the victim and determines interim actions or remedies.  The alleged perpetrator is 
then informed of the complaint and both sides have the opportunity to meet with the 
investigator and provide information regarding the complaint.  Witnesses may be interviewed 
and the investigator drafts a summary of the information which both victim and alleged 
perpetrator may review.  An investigation report is created and forwarded to an adjudicator to 
issue findings and sanctions (ASCA, 2014, p. 16).  At Pennsylvania State University, an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  The	  Harvard	  Law	  School	  website,	  http://hls.harvard.edu/about/title-­‐ix-­‐information/,	  last	  accessed	  April	  1,	  
2015,	  includes	  both	  sets	  of	  procedures.	  	  Under	  the	  heading	  “HLS	  Students	  and	  Faculty”	  the	  website	  notes	  
“HLS	  has	  amended	  its	  Guidelines	  Related	  to	  Sexual	  Harassment	  on	  an	  interim	  basis	  to	  align	  them	  with	  the	  
new	  University	  policy.”	  A	  link	  leads	  to	  the	  interim	  policy	  conforming	  to	  the	  investigation	  model	  used	  by	  the	  
broader	  university.	  Further	  down	  the	  page,	  under	  the	  heading	  “HLS	  Students,”	  the	  website	  states,	  “The	  
following	  procedures	  for	  complaints	  against	  students	  have	  been	  adopted	  by	  the	  HLS	  faculty,	  and	  have	  been	  
submitted	  to	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Education	  for	  review.”	  	  A	  link	  to	  the	  HLS	  Sexual	  Harassment	  Resources	  
and	  Procedures	  includes	  the	  opportunity	  for	  an	  adversarial	  hearing	  after	  an	  investigation	  determines	  there	  is	  
enough	  evidence	  to	  proceed.	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alternative “Investigative Model” is available in which the same process is followed as the 
Hearing Model, only the investigator’s findings are forwarded to a Title IX Decision Panel 
which reviews the information and makes a decision without utilizing a hearing (PSU, Code 
of Conduct & Student Conduct Procedures, p. 14-15).   Appeals are available under either 
model, but only on grounds of stated procedures not being followed, the existence of new, 
unavailable evidence, and unfair sanctions outside of the normal ranges (PSU, Code of 
Conduct & Student Conduct Procedures, p. 18-19).   As illustrated by Pennsylvania State’s 
procedures, the main difference between the Investigation and Hearing models is the right to 
have a hearing.  In both circumstances the investigator issues a report with factual findings 
and conclusions.  
 A third approach is to use a “Hybrid” of hearing and investigation models, and this is 
the approach recommended by ATIXA’s Model Investigation Process. The Hybrid Model 
uses an approach in which the investigator makes a determination but the accused is entitled 
to a hearing if they reject the findings in whole or in part (ATIXA Training Manual, Model 
Investigation Process, 2013, p. 40).  This is the approach utilized for students at the 
University of Kansas, whose procedures are described in detail in Chapter 7.  
 For nearly every University included in this study, the standard model is a hybrid in 
which the investigator makes interim findings that may then be appealed to a hearing before 
an administrator or a panel.  It is not always easy to discern the difference between a hybrid 
model and the hearing model, especially because the difference rests on whether the 
investigative report includes formal outcomes and whether the hearing is the first 
determination or is instead an appeal.  Regardless of model, as discussed in Chapter 6, Title 
IX Coordinators act similar to a police investigator or a prosecutor and can be contrasted 
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with Ombuds who are more akin to a Rabbi or a Priest.  The next section describes the Title 
IX process from complaint through appeal along with the standard derivations for the Hybrid 
model most commonly observed in this study.     
University sexual misconduct policies, per Title IX requirements, define and prohibit 
sexual misconduct and specify Title IX complaint procedures.  These policies describe where 
complaints may be made, and they often require different campus groups (faculty, staff, students, 
etc.) to use specific offices for making reports.  Common to all institutions, any complaint may 
be brought directly to the University’s Title IX Coordinator or to any deputy coordinators.  
Complaint procedures typically indicate which community members are required reporters, 
including supervisors, managers, and any employees designated as mandatory reporters.  For 
individuals who do not want to make a report, but want to speak with someone confidentially, 
some processes recommend that complainants should take their complaints to university 
counseling services or (less frequently) the Ombuds.  
After a complaint is received, grievance procedures are used for carrying out the 
investigation and resolution of the complaint.  Complaints are initially investigated under the 
oversight of the university’s Title IX Coordinator, and typically involve interviews of the 
complainant, the alleged perpetrator, and other witnesses and a review of the applicable policies 
and the employee’s or student’s records.  Interim measures such as changes to class or housing 
assignments for students or work assignments for employees may be taken to promote safety.  
These changes depend on a variety of factors, including but not limited to the severity of the 
alleged misconduct.  Most policies provide for confidentiality to the extent allowed by law, 
prohibit retaliation for making complaints, and allow the institution to investigate incidents of 
which it has become aware without a formal complaint.  Further, institutions typically will 
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conduct an investigation and proceed with further adjudication on the basis of that information, 
even without the cooperation of the individuals involved.  
Grievance processes may specify that the Title IX Coordinator, at his or her discretion, 
may meet with both sides (if they both agree) in an attempt to resolve the issue (DCL, 2011, p. 
8).  There must be appropriate involvement by university personnel, for example a trained 
counselor, mediator, or a teacher or administrator (DCL, 2011, p. 8).  Participants must be 
notified that at any time they can end the informal process and being a formal complaint process 
(DCL, 2011, p. 8).  Even with voluntary agreement of both sides, mediation is not appropriate 
for use in resolving complaints of sexual violence and grievance procedures should state that 
mediation will not be used for such complaints (DCL, 2011, p. 8).  Both Ombuds and Title IX 
Coordinators use mediation to resolve sexual misconduct, in some instances working 
cooperatively in the process.    
Following the investigation, Title IX Coordinators may take multiple different routes.   
Most Title IX Coordinators interviewed for this study had the authority to make determinations 
of Title IX violations and to make recommendations regarding potential sanctions.  These 
recommendations go to either an administrator tasked with reviewing and confirming the Title 
IX Coordinator’s report and issuing sanctions, or to a hearing board or panel reviewing the Title 
IX Coordinator’s report and issuing appropriate sanctions.  Where the administrator reviews the 
Title IX Coordinator’s recommendations and determines sanctions, often the respondent has the 
ability to appeal the result to a hearing board or panel.  Or, where the Title IX Coordinator’s 
recommendations triggers a hearing to determine whether a violation of Title IX occurred and to 
issue any resulting sanction, that determination can often be appealed to an administrator who 
makes a final decision.  In some situations responsibilities are divided as a panel or board 
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determines the existence of fault and then an administrator or the Title IX Coordinator 
determines the appropriate sanctions.  
If the complaint goes to a hearing, a panel or board comprised of students, faculty, and 
staff will seek to establish (depending on the processes used above) either 1) Whether or not 
there is a violation of Title IX or university policy, 2) What is the appropriate sanction for the 
violation, or 3) Whether the Title IX Coordinator’s or the administrator’s findings or sanctions 
were in error.  Often the Title IX Coordinator in such situations assumes the role of the 
complainant and the survivor is allowed to decide whether or how much she or he will cooperate 
in the process (as co-complainant, witness, or not participating at all).  In other situations, the 
Title IX Coordinator serves no role, or serves as an impartial witness in the conduct hearing, 
testifying about the results of the investigation.  
There is significant ambiguity regarding whether the Title IX Coordinator’s role is to 
make a judgment as if he or she were a judge, or a charge as if they were a prosecutor or grand 
jury.  The Dear Colleague Letter (2011, p. 11) prescribes a preponderance of the evidence burden 
of proof, requiring the alleged conduct to be more likely than not to have occurred.  In some 
situations the standard used during a hearing is whether the Title IX Coordinator’s judgment was 
arbitrary or capricious, meaning it was without reasonable basis in fact.  This deferential standard 
of review used in the review of discretionary administrative decisions generally upholds a Title 
IX Coordinator’s determination and indicates that the “hearing” is really an appeal from a 
judgment.  Using different standards at different stages is met with conflicting or ambiguous 
OCR guidance.  On one hand OCR requires universities use a preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard for all proceedings (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 26).  On the other hand, OCR then provides 
universities with the “flexibility to determine the type of review it will apply to appeals” (OCR 
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Q&A, 2014, p. 37).  The OCR guidance states the type of review used on appeal shall be applied 
the same regardless of which side files the appeal (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 37).           
Much of the ambiguity in the Title IX Coordinator’s role corresponds to uncertainty in 
what constitutes compliance.  The Dear Colleague Letter (2011, p. 7) requires that Title IX 
Coordinators not have job responsibilities that create a conflict of interest (such as a disciplinary 
hearing board member or general counsel).  This prescription resulted in efforts to more clearly 
separate investigative and adjudicatory functions.  Motivated by liability concerns, at least one 
major education insurer recommends universities handling student-perpetrated sexual assault to 
not place conclusions in the investigators report, as these conclusions may be seen as a judgment 
that is not within the authority of investigators to make (United Educators Powerpoint, 2012).  
As a result, a minority of Title IX Coordinators in this study were limited to investigating and 
determining whether sufficient evidence (or probable cause) existed to trigger a hearing to 
determine Title IX violations and punishment.   
 The investigative/adjudicatory division of roles is not a requirement of Title IX or OCR, 
and Title IX Coordinators at many institutions make “judgments” regarding outcomes despite 
either conducting or directing the investigation.  The OCR Q&A provides that the Title IX 
Coordinator does not necessarily have to be the person who conducts the investigation (p.25).  If 
the Title IX Coordinator does conduct the investigation there must not be a conflict of interest 
(OCR Q&A, p. 25).   Specific examples of a conflict of interest include where the Title IX 
Coordinator is also the Athletic Director, Dean of Students, or “serves on the judicial/hearing 
board or to whom an appeal might be made” (2014, p. 12).  This conflict of interest definition 
suggests that Title IX does not bar the Coordinator from making the initial determination of guilt 
or innocence, as long as they do not oversee the appeal.   
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Further, what constitutes an investigation is broadly defined by OCR (Q&A, 2014) as 
including the investigation, any hearing, the decision-making process used to determine if the 
conduct occurred, and what subsequent actions the will be taken (pp. 24-25).  While this 
“investigation” must include the equal opportunity for both parties to present witnesses and other 
evidence, the OCR Q&A document states, “Title IX does not necessarily require a hearing” but 
there may be additional “legal rights or requirements under the U.S. Constitution, the Clery Act, 
or other federal, state, or local laws” (OCR Q&A, p. 25, n.28).  
If a hearing is provided, OCR does not require universities to allow cross-examination of 
either side or their witnesses (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 31).  If schools allow for cross-examination 
of witnesses, both sides must have equal opportunity to do so.  During a hearing on alleged 
sexual violence, OCR “strongly discourages a school from allowing the parties to personally 
question or cross-examine each other” as it “may perpetuate a hostile environment” (OCR Q&A, 
2014, p. 31).  OCR prohibits “[q]uestioning about the complainant’s sexual history with anyone 
other than the alleged perpetrator” and notes “the mere fact of a current or previous consensual 
dating or sexual relationship…does not itself imply consent or preclude …sexual violence (OCR, 
Q&A, 2014, p. 31).  These prescriptions indicate that a Title IX Coordinator’s investigation 
providing opportunity for the presentation of witnesses and evidence, without an adversarial 
hearing providing for confrontation of those witnesses, satisfies Title IX requirements of what 
constitutes a fair and balanced process.   
Additionally, there is no requirement that universities provide an appeal, but “if 
the school provides for an appeal, it must do so equally for both parties” (OCR Q&A, 
2014, p. 26).   OCR recommends universities use an appeals process “where procedural 
error or previously unavailable relevant evidence could significantly impact the outcome 
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of a case or where a sanction is substantially disproportionate to the findings” (OCR 
Q&A, 2014, p. 37).   OCR leaves the design of the appeals process to the university, “as 
long as the entire grievance process, including any appeals, provides prompt and 
equitable resolutions of sexual violence complaints, and the school takes steps to protect 
the complainant in the educational setting during the process” (Q&A, 2014, p. 37).    
While OCR and Title IX do not confer the right to an adversarial hearing, or an appeal, 
the Q&A document (2014) further clarifies the interplay between due process and Title IX: 
 The rights established under Title IX must be interpreted consistently with any 
federally guaranteed due process rights.  Procedures that ensure the Title IX rights 
of the complainant, while at the same time according any federally guaranteed 
due process to both parties involved, will lead to sound and supportable decisions.  
Of course, a school should ensure that steps to accord any due process rights do 
not restrict or unnecessarily delay the protections provided by Title IX to the 
complainant.  (p. 13) 
 
The ambiguity regarding the Title IX Coordinators’ role in the process is evidence of the 
“informality” that creeps into an ostensibly formal process within a bureaucratic organization.  
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter and 2014 Q&A document provide evidence of the legalizing 
and formalizing pressures being experienced by Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds.  The 
questions of what is the appropriate role of Title IX Coordinators in the investigation, what 
constitutes a hearing, and whether an appeal is required all implicate the norms of impartiality, 
independence, and formality discussed in chapters six and seven.    
Outside of the University’s process, faculty and staff may file complaints under Title IX 
with the U.S. Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR).  The OCR process does 
not require the person or organization filing the complaint to be a survivor of the alleged 
discrimination, but the complaint must be filed with OCR within 180 days of the date of the 
alleged discrimination.  If the complaint is also processed through the university’s grievance 
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process, an OCR complaint must be filed within 60 days of the last act of the institutional 
grievance process (“How to File a Discrimination Complaint with OCR,” 1998).  OCR will wait 
for the conclusion of the institutional process prior to commencing its own investigation.  Once a 
complaint letter is received, an investigation is conducted to determine if there has been a 
violation of Title IX.  If so, OCR will attempt to obtain voluntary compliance and negotiate 
remedies.  Enforcement action, such as court action by the Department of Justice before an 
Administrative Law judge to determinate federal funding, may be initiated if OCR is unable to 
obtain voluntary compliance (“How to File a Discrimination Complaint with OCR,” 1998).  
Such action has never been taken (Jones, 2010).  Individuals can file a claim in court, and do not 
need to first file a complaint with OCR.  If court action is commenced, OCR will not continue to 
pursue the complaint (“Q&A on OCR’s Complaint Process”).   
In sum, Title IX Coordinators are an essentially legal compliance office within a 
university. They are charged by university administrations with enforcing the university’s legal 
obligations regarding illegal discrimination and sexual misconduct among students and 
employees. In carrying out these responsibilities, Coordinators oversee a law-like process of 
investigation and adjudication. As is typical of organizational compliance officers, there is likely 
to be a considerable degree of slippage for the requirements of the formal law. Nonetheless, the 
basic point is that the Coordinator is modeled on the formal legal process. 
OMBUDS:  STANDARDS AND PRACTICES  
 
Ombuds are designed as informal mechanisms for resolving disputes, in direct contrast to 
the formal complaint handling role of a Title IX Coordinator.  Unlike the myriad rules and 
regulations governing the work of Title IX Coordinators, Ombuds are guided only by 
professional standards of practice, best practices, and a code of ethics.  They are also often 
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governed by institutional rules describing their role within the institution.  Charles Howard, 
author of The Organizational Ombuds (2011b), describes the origins of the Ombuds function as 
a response to the ineffectiveness of formal complaint systems (p. 144).   As legal, compliance, 
and human resources personnel are unable to provide confidentiality to employees seeking to 
report misconduct or other conflicts (Howard 2011b, p. 144), legislators and organizations 
sought other means of complying with the law and resolving inter-organizational conflict.  
According to Howard Gadlin, the longtime Ombuds of the National Institute of Health, 
“the role of the ombudsman is perhaps the least well understood in the field of alternative dispute 
resolution” (2000 p. 37).  Noting that “[a]ll ombudsman give voice to people who might 
otherwise be disadvantaged in their dealings with the management and bureaucracy of the 
institution...”, Gadlin (2000, p. 38) argues that there is confusion about what an Ombuds is and 
significant dispute on the issue among Ombuds themselves.  There is basic confusion resulting 
from a lack of a common definition of the term Ombuds, how it is interpreted, and who uses it 
(Levine-Finley & Carter, 2010, p. 126).  There is also confusion as to whether the term 
“ombudsman” is gender-specific.  This dissertation uses the general term “Ombuds” except in 
quotations that use another term.   
 There are many different types of Ombuds.  Gadlin describes (2000, p. 38) “classical 
Ombuds” as those originating from the Swedish parliament in the early 1800s and which have 
statutory independence, the authority to investigate complaints and the authority to issue reports 
or recommendations.  By contrast, Organizational Ombuds are established not by statute but by 
their organization’s institutional governance structure and do not typically have a formal 
investigative function.   Gadlin (2000, p. 40) notes that where the classical Ombuds of Sweden 
and western Europe were highly skilled and legally trained professionals with very high status, 
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the first university and corporate Ombuds were “truly amateurs” selected on the basis of their 
knowledge of the institution and their personal reputations for integrity, fairness, and sympathy.  
Over time, the Ombuds role became institutionalized and standards of practice developed.  
  Many organizations founded Ombuds programs as a means of providing alternatives to 
formal grievance systems and for attending to the underlying interests that give rise to disputes 
and which often are not well addressed by formal rules and organizational guidelines (Gadlin 
2000, p. 43).  Ombuds and other organizational dispute resolution processes were initially seen 
as a way to respond internally to complaints, reduce litigation costs, and demonstrate 
organizational concern (Edelman, Erlanger, & Lande, 1993; Shapiro & Kolb, 1994).  Ombuds 
are now common mechanisms in both the private and public sector.  One survey found that ten 
percent of responding corporations employed Ombuds and that over 1,000 U.S. corporations use 
Ombuds (Lubbers, 1997, p. 6).  Educational Ombuds first appeared in the 1960’s with the 
establishment of offices at Michigan State University and Eastern Montana College to hear 
student and faculty complaints during a time of widespread student unrest (Van Soye, 2007, p. 
123). Today there are at least 200 college and university Ombuds in the United States who 
handle problems affecting students, faculty, and staff (Yarn & Jones, 2006, p. 373).   
Functionally, a university or college Ombuds is a confidential resource for anyone who 
has a complaint or concern about a university employee or policy.  Ombuds are intended to help 
to defuse situations before they become larger problems by helping individuals think through 
options, clarify goals, and improve communication.  Ombuds do not tell people what to do; 
instead, they are intended to listen without judgment.  Most importantly, Ombuds provide 
confidentiality to individuals and do not put the institution on “notice” for purposes of creating a 
legal responsibility to act.  Ombuds do not duplicate any services, in the sense that they have no 
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authority to formally resolve a dispute, impose a sanction, or order a remedy; instead, they 
merely provide a place for people to turn if they don’t know where to go. Ombuds direct 
individuals to the appropriate service or department and have no administrative power to change 
grades, sanction, punish, or change policies.  
One key question regarding Ombuds is whether they only assist with individual conflicts 
or whether they may address larger organizational issues.  According to Charles Howard (2011b, 
p. 80) an Ombuds does have the power to check and inform organizational power because “[t]he 
freedom from management responsibility, combined with the everyday process of speaking with 
people from any and all levels or locations of the organization, give the Ombuds a unique 
perspective on how the organization is performing and what problems it and its people face.”  
Armed with this information, an Ombuds can provide recommendations to organizational leaders 
on how to address broad institutional problems.   This is done anonymously in order to protect 
confidentiality.  Through feedback, improvements can be instituted, but these are neither 
suggested nor administered by the Ombuds.  By presenting the data that help to identify trends, 
Ombuds can persuade managers to buy into system change (Wagner, 2000, p. 108).  Howard 
(2011b, pp. 80-81) sees the Ombuds as having many roles, including as “an institutional 
response to curb wrongdoing or unethical behavior, a facilitator of appropriate conduct by both 
individuals and the organization itself, and an agent for promoting systemic change where 
necessary.”  
Through these organizational activities Ombuds serve an important function of 
identifying problems missed by other processes, due to the ability to provide confidentiality and 
to bring issues identified as trends to the forefront.  The Ombuds mechanism may be an effective 
alternative, as research indicates that individuals are often hesitant to file formal complaints.  For 
	   78	  
example, in a 2007 study 39% of college students indicated that students had conflicts they 
wanted to pursue but did not, most commonly due to fear of retribution (37%), expectation of a 
negative outcome (38%), and lack of knowledge of how to pursue the conflict (33%) (Harrison, 
2007, p. 355).  Rowe (2009, p. 280) notes that several dozen reasons explain why people do not 
act directly and effectively when they see unacceptable behavior and do not use conflict 
management systems in timely and appropriate ways.  Rowe (2009, p. 280) highlights fear of 
loss of relationships, fear of retaliation or other bad consequences, the fear that they will not 
appear credible to management, and inaccessibility or lack of credibility of those who might 
make a difference.  Additional factors include a belief that people lack “enough evidence” to 
pursue an issue, lack of knowledge about relevant resources or policies, distrust of senior 
management, shame, and a belief that no one will listen.  
Noted Ombuds Brian Bloch, David Miller, and Mary Rowe argue for alternatives to 
making formal complaints (Bloch et al., 2009: p. 241): 
Our experience is that only a relatively small proportion of the population is 
comfortable with formal actions (although importantly, some in this group are 
satisfied only by formal investigations and formal action).  But most people, most 
of the time, are quite reluctant to act on the spot, or report unacceptable behavior, 
if they believe this will result in formal action.  This is one of the reasons why 
options are needed in a complaint system.  (p. 241)  
 
Ombuds issue annual or biannual reports, and the most recently available report from the 
University of Kansas Ombuds echoes the need for informal options.  The report notes “No one 
solution, department, or university unit can respond effectively to all situations. It is important 
that the University of Kansas provides both formal and informal options for campus members to 
address their concerns” (University of Kansas Ombuds Office Bi-Annual Report, 2011, p. 15).  
The report describes the results of a user survey of 102 of the 786 individuals meeting with the 
Ombuds during the 2009 to 2011 reporting period.  Individuals accessing the Ombuds office 
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included faculty, students, and staff with a diverse range of issues from grade disputes to 
promotion issues and tenure conflicts.  When asked what they would have done without the 
Ombuds office, a sample of the survey respondents indicated:  Resigned, hired an attorney, left 
the university, escalated the problem at additional time and cost, and nothing as they had 
nowhere else to go (University of Kansas Ombuds Office Bi-Annual Report, 2011, p. 15).  
For purposes of a direct comparison of reporting rates for one campus, the Title IX 
Coordinator at the University of Michigan released an inaugural annual report indicating that 129 
instances of sexual misconduct were reported between 2013 and 2014 (UM Student Sexual 
Misconduct Annual Report, 2014, p. 2).  Of the 129 reports, 58, or 45%, were deemed to not fall 
under the purview of the sexual misconduct policy (UM Student Sexual Misconduct Annual 
Report, 2014, p. 2).  By comparison, the most recent report of the Ombuds at the University of 
Michigan (2012-2013) indicates the Ombuds met with 217 visitors, 86% of whom were students 
(UM Ombuds Annual Report, 2013, pp. 2-3).  Of 98 non-academic concerns brought to the 
Ombuds attention, 25 concerned harassment and discrimination (UM Ombuds Annual Report, 
2013, pp. 2-3).   
 Evidence indicates Ombuds assist in restoring a visitor’s trust and commitment towards 
the organization.  According to Harrison and Doerfel (2006, 130), if conflict is handled in a way 
that violates expectations (taking time to actively listen when the person does not expect to be 
treated that way), trust and commitment are likely to increase.  Likewise, violating expectations 
in a negative way will decrease organizational evaluations.  Harrison and Doerfel’s 2006 study 
demonstrated that perceptions of unfairness can lead to escalation of grievances and negative 
evaluations of the organization.  In just over 50% of cases studied, students pursuing grievances 
through the Ombuds obtained favorably or somewhat favorable outcomes.  The majority of those 
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who did not receive a favorable outcome still thought the process was fair and returned to feel 
trust and commitment toward the organization (Harrison & Doerfel, 2006, pp. 145-146).  
 In addition to identifying problems and restoring individuals’ views that the institution 
cares about their concerns, much of the basis for the use of Ombuds offices is related to 
confidentiality and avoiding legal liability. Wagner describes (2000, p. 107) Ombuds as able to 
provide an “early warning” to “consult front-line staff or direct reports about morale or behavior 
or procedures in a certain area” as long as they protect the anonymity of the individuals involved.  
Remedial steps such as focused training, department level surveys to determine specific issues, 
and other such mechanisms can be used to address misconduct.  Ombuds can provide these 
services if confidentiality can be maintained, and thus can ameliorate the effects of conflict that 
often linger within the organization.  For example, Lee et al. (2004) examined a survey of 
government workers and that the damage caused by sexual harassment are not limited to the 
initial event but instead can hurt the target, harasser, and organization members for an extended 
period (2004, p. 318).  
 While employed by the university and typically reporting to the president, Ombuds sit 
outside the formal administrative structure.  McGrath (1997, p. 473) notes several sources of 
Ombuds’ authority other than their managerial position.  These include the ability to gain access 
to information, establish professional relationships with the very top of the organization, the 
ability to recommend cases to more formal options, their problem-solving skills, and their 
personal credibility based in charisma and moral authority.  As extensive knowledge of the 
organization and its operations is important, most Ombuds are picked from within the 
organization (McGrath, 1997, p. 471; Rowe, 1987, p. 137).   
 According to Harrison and Morrill (2004, p. 323), Ombuds are likely to use a set protocol 
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with visitors.  Utilizing their research on students, Harrison and Morrill describe the standard 
interaction.  First the Ombuds will describe the process, including the Ombuds’ power and the 
boundaries of confidentiality.  This is to manage expectations (specifically avoiding the belief 
that the Ombuds will unilaterally make a decision) and to aid in the free sharing of information 
without fear of retaliation (Harrison & Morrill, 2004, p. 323).  The next step is for the Ombuds to 
ask the student to tell their story in order to gain information and determine options for 
proceeding.  It is in this second step that the Ombuds “engages in active listening to show that a 
representative of the university is listening and cares about the rights and concerns of the 
disputant (Harrison & Morrill, 2004, p. 323).  Other Ombuds may engage in more interrogation 
in order to determine the truth, according to the goals the Ombuds seeks to achieve (Harrison & 
Morrill, 2004, p. 323).  Ombuds then seek to help the student gain access to information, 
brainstorm and think through options, or to intervene and facilitate some sort of resolution.  The 
next section describes each of the main standards of the International Ombudsman Association, 
which, when upheld, contribute to trust and relationship building.   
THE INTERNATIONAL OMBUDSMAN ASSOCIATION’S PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS  
 
Early standards for organizational Ombuds are described as “abstract principles that the 
pioneers… translated into practices tailored to the structure, cultural dynamics and missions of 
particular organizations (Gadlin, 2005, p. 15). These early principles included a commitment to 
impartiality, neutrality, independence, confidentiality, and a justice orientation (Gadlin, 2005, p. 
15).  Standards coalesced around leading professional organizations for organizational Ombuds, 
including The Ombudsman Association (TOA) and the University and College Ombuds 
Association (UCOA)(Gadlin, 2005, p. 15).  The International Ombudsman Association (IOA), a 
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merger of multiple Ombuds professional groups, is now the primary association for individuals 
working as Ombuds.   
Updated to version three in 2009, the IOA Best Practices statement (2009) provides 
guidance to Ombuds on how to operationalize the main Standards of Practice.  The IOA Code of 
Ethics (2007) provides the essential prescription and standards requiring Ombuds will remain 1) 
Independent to the greatest extent possible, 2) Neutral and not engage in conflicts of interest, 3) a 
confidential source of communications, except where there is imminent risk of harm, and 4) 
outside of the reach of formal adjudicative or administrative proceedings.  Notably, Standard 4.8 
states that the Ombuds “endeavors to be worthy of the trust placed in the Ombudsman Office” 
(IOA SoP, 2009).  Tim Griffin (2010) sees the standards as valuable, but states:  
[U]ltimately [it is] the perceptions of the people within the organization that 
determine whether and how the office is utilized, enable the ombudsperson to 
perform his or her duties, and ascertain the degree to which the office is a valued 
element of the organization.  These perceptions are formed and sustained not by 
words written in obscure documents, but through the relationships developed 
between the ombudsperson and other people within the organization.  (p. 66) 
 
Each standard is briefly reviewed and described, beginning with independence.     
Independence requires that the Ombuds and the Ombuds office are independent from 
other organizational entities (Standard 1.1), holds no other organizational position that might 
compromise independence (Standard 1.2), retains sole discretion with how to act regarding 
specific concerns or observed trends (Standard 1.3), has access to all organizational information 
and individuals as permitted by law (Standard 1.4), and the Ombuds has the authority to select 
their own staff and manage their budget and operations (IOA SoP, 2009, Standard 1.5).  
Specifically independence requires that the Ombuds report directly to the highest level of the 
organization, with an employment status indicating that they are not subordinate to senior 
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officials.  Functionally, independence means operating independently from “control, limitation, 
or interference” (IOA Best Practices, 2009, p. 2). 
Hayden (1997) conducted a survey regarding the role of the Ombuds office in higher 
education, and found that most university Ombuds report high up in the organization and are 
independent of lower-level supervisors.  Over 80% of respondents reported to the President, 
Chancellor, or Vice-president and Provost levels of the organization (Hayden, 1997, p. 4).  
Roughly ten percent reported to student judicial affairs, student affairs, judicial affairs, or 
affirmative action offices (Hayden, 1997, p. 4).  The survey also indicated that over 30 percent of 
Ombuds hold multiple roles, such as Dean, Director, Faculty, potentially threatening the 
independence of the role (Hayden, 1997, p. 5).  
 With regard to independence, the Ombuds model is radically different from Title IX 
Coordinators.  While the Ombuds reports to the highest levels of the institution, the Ombuds is 
deemed to operate outside of the organizational structure, and not be subordinate to any 
individual’s control.  A Title IX Coordinator is not independent of the organizational structure, 
existing within the organizational chain of command, and beholden to the organization’s 
directives.  Despite the lack of independence, Title IX Coordinators must have the freedom to 
advocate for compliance with Title IX law and policy.  An Ombuds independence has significant 
implications for a university’s legal obligations under Title IX.  OCR’s Q&A document (2014) 
does not mention Ombuds and do not provided Ombuds with the ability to maintain 
confidentiality.  As a result, significant liability concerns arise when organizational actors like 
Ombuds are independent of the organizational structure, not mandated to report, yet are able to 
hear and informally handle sexual misconduct concerns.  This dissertation returns to issues of 
independence in chapter six.    
	   84	  
A second, and closely related, IOA Standard of Practice is neutrality and impartiality 
(hereafter discussed as impartiality)(IOA SoP, 2009).  Longtime Ombuds Frances Bauer (2000, 
p. 65) notes that early conceptions of what an Ombuds needed to do to remain neutral “was 
simply not explained.”  Impartiality requires (Standard 2.1) Ombuds to be neutral, impartial and 
unaligned, while “striv[ing] for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the treatment of people 
and the consideration of issues” (IOA SoP, 2009, Standard 2.2).  This includes not advocating on 
behalf of any individual within the organization, and advocating for processes that are fair and 
equitably administered.  Howard Gadlin (2011, p. 39) argues for reconsidering Standard 2.2 as 
“the boundary between advocating for a fair process and advocating for a person is not always 
clear, and in some circumstances exercising our discretion includes advocating on behalf of a 
person or even an outcome.”  Gadlin is not arguing that Ombuds should be placed in the role of 
advocate, but that Ombuds should have the discretion to exercise judgment when fair process 
requires advocating for a person or a particular outcome (2011, pp. 39-40).  Gadlin effectively 
asks who decides what is a fair process?  Sebok and Rudolph (2010, p. 25) note that Ombuds, 
like everyone else, have biases and “have their own unique life experiences, values, perspectives, 
preferences, and opinions.”  As Ombuds have no way of controlling how their actions will be 
interpreted by others, “[O]mbuds neutrality is often an elusive goal to which ombuds aspire but 
only sometimes achieve” (Sebok & Rudolph, 2010, p.  25). Tim Griffin (2010) notes the 
importance of the appearance of impartiality: 
[I]f the ombudsperson is not perceived as able to offer a neutral and independent 
perspective to issues, constituents will assume that the options offered by the 
ombudsperson will instead reflect a particular bias.  Consultees who perceive such 
a bias might suspect that the ombudsperson’s suggestions are somehow designed 
to achieve some purpose other than the outcome desired by, and in the best 
interest of, the consultee.  (p. 67)   
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As the Ombuds is unable to serve as an advocate, Griffin (2010, p. 69) believes the Ombuds 
must have a “broad knowledge of the people in the organization who are willing and able to 
effectively serve as advocates for particular types of people.”  Developing these relationships 
contributes to an Ombuds’ capacity to help visitors.  
 In striving to be impartial, Ombuds experience tension between “the desire to assist a 
complainant and a need to represent the best interests of the organization” (Kolb, 1987, p. 675).  
This is echoed in Levine-Finley & Carter’s study (2010, p. 134) of Ombuds:  “[t]here is a tension 
between maintaining neutrality…[and] the responsibility to raise issues to leadership and offer 
suggestions for resolution.” Kolb argues that Ombuds balance these competing interests by 
framing the problems according to the kinds of remedies available to them.  According to Kolb 
(1987, p. 680) the “ombudsmen’s positions in the organization and their interpretation of the role 
affect the way problems brought to them are diagnosed and defined.”  While most Ombuds want 
to help individuals and represent their interests, they also identify with the “corporate aims of 
efficiency and lack of disruption,” understanding that protecting the company from civil suits 
and other problems “is part of the rationale for the function.”  Gadlin (2012, p. 35) describes “a 
frighteningly passive interpretation of neutrality, one that eschews influence in any form” and 
questions how an Ombuds can exercise discretion about how to act without some kind of 
evaluation of what constitutes fair procedures?  Gadlin is clear that he is not seeking to offer 
evaluation but that the Ombuds assessment of fairness should inform and guide subsequent 
actions (2012, p. 36).  This tension in how Ombud determine what is fairness and in what areas 
they can advocate for systemic changes is further described in the chapter on impartiality.    
Regarding the important value of impartiality, the Ombuds version of this value is similar 
to the Title IX Coordinator’s version in some ways and different in others.  The IOA Standard 
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articulating impartiality requires Ombuds to be advocates for fair principles like the ability to be 
heard, but not to advocate for any one individual, or for the organization itself.   Title IX 
Coordinators also must advocate for fairness, but in terms of maintaining the integrity of the 
grievance process.  This is done by ensuring the fairness of the grievance processes, utilizing 
laws, rules, and other formal requirements instead of basic principles of fairness.  Title IX 
Coordinators are to be impartial to the interests of both the complainant and the respondent, but 
partial to the goals and requirements of the law.  Both roles’ impartiality are implicated due to 
institutional goals to avoid liability, creating pressure to hedge towards formality or informality 
in various circumstances.  Both roles vacillate on the question of whether they work primarily to 
protect students or the university from harm.  Impartiality is further examined in chapter 6.  
Confidentiality is another IOA Standard of Practice (2009), with Standard 3.1 requiring 
Ombuds hold communications in strict confidence by not revealing, nor being required to reveal 
(without express permission), the identity or information that could lead to identification of any 
visitors contacting the office.   Further, the Ombuds only takes action with the individual’s 
express permission.  This is done at the discretion of the Ombuds, and only when it can be done 
safeguarding the individual’s identity.  Describing confidentiality as a privilege, the standard 
provides an exception where there appears to be imminent risk of serious harm, which is an 
assessment that is to be made by the Ombuds (IOA SoP, 2009, Standard 3.1).  Standard 3.2 
specifically states that communication between the Ombuds and others is privileged, with the 
privilege held by (and thus only waivable by) the Ombuds and the Ombuds office (IOA SoP, 
2009). Confidentiality should be discussed with visitors prior to them sharing their concerns 
(IOA Best Practices, 2009, p. 6). 
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Other IOA standards regarding confidentiality include Standard 3.4, requiring that the 
Ombuds safeguard individuals’ identities when providing systematic, upward feedback; 3.5, 
requiring the Ombuds to keep no records containing identifying information on behalf of the 
organization; 3.6 requiring the Ombuds to maintain information such as notes, phone messages, 
calendars, in a secure location, protected from inspection, with a standard, consistent practice for 
destroying information (IOA SoP, 2009).  The IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 7) suggest that 
record-keeping systems and databases should be separated from the organization’s technology 
system.  Technology questions pose a particular challenge for Ombuds, given the dramatic 
increase in electronically stored information (Mousin, 2011). Many Ombuds use a record 
destruction policy, but there is a lot of information not within an Ombuds’s control, including but 
not limited to smartphone and other device data backup systems.  
IOA Standard 3.7 (2009) requires the Ombuds to prepare reports and data in a way that 
protects confidentiality.  IOA Standard 3.8 (2009) describes notice directly, stating that 
communications made to the Ombuds are not considered notice to the organization.  The 
Ombuds is not an agent of the organization, should not be designated as an agent, and will not 
accept notice to the institution but instead may refer individuals to the appropriate place to 
provide formal notice.  IOA Standard 4.6 (2009) specifies that Ombuds identify trends, issues 
about policies and procedures, without breaching confidentiality or anonymity.  These 
confidentiality guidelines create both opportunities and challenges for the practice of Ombuds. 
Confidentiality is defined differently by Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators.  For Title IX 
Coordinators, confidentiality can be provided to the extent that the law allows, requiring 
Coordinators to preference compliance with law and policy above confidentiality.  This 
complicates efforts to encourage survivors to come forward and make complaints.  For Ombuds, 
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confidentiality is an absolute concept within very limited exceptions and it serves as a pre-
requisite to the work of assisting individuals with their conflicts.  The less than certain nature of 
an Ombuds confidentiality privilege and status as a non-mandatory reporter complicates 
universities’ legal obligations under Title IX.  How each role handles confidentiality is further 
examined in chapter five.        
 The fourth and final IOA Standard of Practice (2009) is Informality.  IOA Standard 4.1 
(2009) describes the informal basis in which the Ombuds functions, including “listening, 
providing and receiving information, identifying and reframing issues, developing a range of 
responsible options, and – with permission and at the Ombudsman discretion—engaging in 
informal third-party intervention.”  The standard also articulates empowerment as a goal, stating 
that “[w]hen possible, the ombudsman helps people develop new ways to solve problems 
themselves.”  The IOA Best Practices supplement (2009, p. 9) further expands on the ways 
options may be individually tailored, with Ombuds options including third-party interventions 
like shuttle diplomacy, facilitating communication, and informal mediation.  Mediation, when 
used by an Ombuds, is a voluntary process and may or may not produce a written document.  
These written agreements should not be maintained by or within the Ombuds office (IOA Best 
Practices, 2009, p. 9).     
Rowe (2012, p. 8) describes informality as the fourth pillar of Ombuds practice, 
recognized slowly over a period of time after independence, confidentiality, and 
neutrality/impartiality were widely adopted.  Rowe (2012, p. 8) asserts that informality is today 
as essential as any of the other principles, and that without it, an Ombuds practice “could not 
function in today’s legal climate…[as] many managers would find [Ombuds] to be interfering 
with their authority.”    
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Rowe (2012, p. 11) discusses several meanings for informality, including not putting 
complaints in writing, conflict management without a written record, and also the lack of 
management decision-making power.  Rowe also mentions the inability to serve as witnesses or 
conduct investigations for the purpose of administrative decision-making (2012, p. 11).  Sebok 
(2012) operationalizes the IOA Standard of Practice (2009) on Informality by explaining to 
visitors that he does not give legal advice, and also does not:   
1) Accept formal notice for the organization about a problem…2) Arbitrate, 
adjudicate, or formally investigate complaints; 3) Make official determinations for 
the organization about violations of rights, performance failures, or who was right 
or wrong in a given situation; 4) Maintain written records on behalf of the 
organization; 5) Participate in—let alone administer—formal procedures such as 
grievances, hearings, or disciplinary proceedings, or appeals; 6) Sanction anyone; 
or 7) Meet with people who do not want to meet with me.  (p. 38) 
 
Rowe (2012, p. 11), notes that informality and the lack of formal power does not equate 
to powerless, and she cites as examples an Ombuds’s referent authority, moral authority, power 
from information, expertise, problem-solving ability, perseverance and building relationships.  
Rowe (2012, p. 12) sees the four pillars of Ombuds practice as being essential to one another and 
analyzes the interdependence between them.  For example, Rowe notes that an Ombuds cannot 
be considered independent without being impartial and neutral.  She also notes that an Ombuds 
cannot be permitted to be confidential without being designated as “informal.” Rowe further 
argues (2012, p. 12) that “[b]y definition, independence does not combine well with formal, 
hierarchical, decision-making power within an organization…[as] it is easier to come up with a 
variety of options…as an independent professional…apart from ordinary line and staff 
structures.”  Noorbakhsh (2012, pp. 28-29) also sees informality as tied into other Standards of 
Practice, noting how participating in a grievance hearing violates the informality standard, but 
also makes it very difficult to adhere to the confidentiality standard.  Likewise, providing records 
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on a particular individual per a legal department request may violate the confidentiality standard, 
but it also implicates the principles of impartiality and independence (Noorbakhsh, 2012, pp. 28-
29). Finally, it would be impossible to conduct a formal investigation and make judgments about 
wrongdoing without compromising independence and neutrality.    
Referring specifically to sexual misconduct, Rowe (2012, p. 13) notes that “managers 
may feel that they must immediately take control of the disputes that come to them…[and] [i]t 
has become harder for ordinary line and staff managers to permit employees with concerns to 
have a voice in deciding how to handle the concern.”   As a result interest-based options are 
often formally structured “by and around the General Counsel’s office, HR, and other 
compliance offices” (Rowe, 2012, p. 13). Rowe (2012, p. 12) argues for a spectrum of conflict 
management options as not all people are alike in how they pursue issues, thus “people need 
options—and organizations need options—for managing conflict.” As a result, “if these people 
are to come forward timely with their concerns, and if their conflict is to be managed effectively 
within an organization, it will help to have a near-zero-barrier office within the system” (Rowe, 
2012, p. 13).  In this way, an effective Ombuds can support the entire conflict management 
system by offering informal and formal rights-based options and often helping the visitor 
determine that they need to use a formal option (Rowe, 2012, p. 15). 
Patterson echoes this sentiment and describes the benefits of informality as allowing 
workers to “maintain something valuable and rare—the ability to be empowered and involved in 
creating solutions and making decisions about process changes” (2012, p. 18). This allows 
visitors “to make up their own minds about how to proceed on some concern, once the options 
are explored” (Patterson, 2012, p. 19).  This self-determination is supported, according to 
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Patterson (2012, pp. 19-20) by the informality standard that allows “non-punitive dialogue” and 
“professional and human growth.” 
In contrast with these views, Gadlin (2012, p. 31) argues that informality “is not, and was 
never meant to be, a fundamental principle of Ombudsman practice.”  Gadlin (2012, p. 32) sees 
the purposes behind the informality standard, not following fixed procedures but adapting 
interventions depending on the circumstances, as an interest in flexibility.  So instead of a 
principle, Gadlin sees this informality as a style (2012, p. 32).  Gadlin (2012, p. 33) does not 
disagree with any of the substance of the informality standard, but believes the standards of 
practice identified under the informality standard are covered within the independence, 
confidentiality, and neutrality principles.  Each of those free the Ombuds from the legal 
responsibilities to be an agent of the organization, conduct formal investigations, make official 
decisions, and accept notice (Gadlin, 2012, p. 35).  Practicing to the IOA Standards of Practice 
leaves Ombuds without control or powers behind persuasion and a relational orientation to 
effectuating their work.  This is echoed in a study of Ombuds asking practitioners about their 
perceived bases of authority.  Ombuds’ answers included using recommendations, persuasion, 
negotiation, suggestion, mediation, “clout”, persuasion and status (Hayden, 1997, p. 9).  
As a whole, the IOA Code of Ethics, Standards of Practice, and Best Practices provide 
structure and guidance to an informal process that is not subject to appeals or other forms of 
oversight, and stands in sharp contrast with the myriad rules and regulations governing the work 
of Title IX Coordinators.  The IOA standards govern an inherently informal mechanism of 
complaint handling, purposely designed to stand apart from formal processes.  The Standards of 
Practice providing guidance to Ombuds pale in comparison to the increasingly formalized and 
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prescribed OCR requirements Title IX Coordinators must navigate amidst intense scrutiny by the 
Obama Administration, the media, and various advocacy groups.  
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds are structured in sharply different ways. Title 
IX Coordinators oversee a formalized process for addressing sexual misconduct. These formal 
mechanisms include an investigation and adjudication process involving human resources, 
student conduct or judicial affairs, university general counsel, university police, student affairs or 
student life, and Title IX personnel.  Title IX Coordinators are to follow highly formal and 
prescribed grievance policies and procedures designed to efficiently resolve sexual harassment 
complaints in compliance with state and federal law.  Ombuds, by contrast, are offices that assist 
visitors in thinking through options, accessing information, and determining informal ways of 
handling disputes.  
The following chapters examine how each of these mechanisms reacted to the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter and the 2014 OCR Q&A document redefining Title IX compliance.  As we will 
see, this is a story of how these two institutional actors, facing public and increasingly legal 
pressures, depart or adhere to their archetypal models.   Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, 
needing to address and resolve sexual misconduct, seek both to help survivors and to ensure 
fairness for alleged perpetrators.  Ombuds who depart from their archetypal model want to stop a 
perpetrator or address a departmental problem; Title IX Coordinators who depart from their 
model are often concerned, in a normal human way, about a real individual’s pain and they 
decide to help the person even if this does not yield institutional enforcement.  Put another way, 
in both instances these are understandable responses to real moral dilemmas, occurring while 
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each role attempts to establish professional worth and influence in organizations pressuring them 
to ensure protection from liability.   
Navigating these individual and organizational pressures results in both mechanisms 
departing from their professional norms and becoming more formal (Ombuds) or more informal 
(Title IX Coordinators).  The resulting picture of university sexual misconduct dispute handling 
is one in which the practices of Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds converge, although not 
entirely.  The next six chapters demonstrate this convergence by examining each archetype and 
adherence or departure from the ideal in the areas of source of authority, mission, confidentiality, 
impartiality and independence, and formality or informality.   
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CHAPTER 3:  AUTHORITY  
 
Archetypal Ombuds and archetypal Title IX Coordinators operate from very different 
sources of authority.  The typical Title IX Coordinators’ authority derives from bureaucratic 
rules and law and their authority includes the power to enforce Title IX.  The standard Ombuds’ 
authority derives from the ability to develop relationships and adhere to the core principles of 
impartiality, confidentiality, informality, and independence.  These different sources of authority 
are framed by theoretic perspectives on authority and legitimacy.   
According to Max Weber, successful leaders and institutions use more than mere force to 
execute their goals.  Weber defined authority as the legitimate (normatively accepted) exercise of 
power.  Weber explored the differences between three different types of legitimate authority:  
those based on tradition (deference to customs and inherited values), charisma (personal 
relationships and reputation), and legal-rational grounds (rule creation and interpretation) 
(Weber, 1978, p. 215).  Although all systems combine these sources of authority to some extent, 
Weber’s typology is useful for highlighting a key difference between Title IX Coordinators and 
Ombuds: Title IX Coordinators’ authority is legitimated mainly by rational-legal sources, while 
Ombuds’ authority is legitimated by some elements of rational-legal sources but with strong 
elements of charisma.  Specifically, although Ombuds report to upper level administrators and 
have a role that is commonly outlined in university policy, they fundamentally rely on personal 
relationships and reputation in carrying out their roles.  
In a similar vein, the theory of procedural justice illuminates a key source of Ombuds 
authority. Tom Tyler (Tyler 2006, p. 394;  Tyler et al. 1996, p. 913; Tyler and Lind 1992) argues 
that trust in and legitimacy of those in authority are built not merely by these officials’ following 
prescribed rules but when people perceive that these officials really “hear” and “respect” their 
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views. Virtually echoing this psychological theory, the Ombuds model places little or no 
emphasis on rule-following and great emphasis on “hearing” the voice of their visitors.   
While the prominent theory of procedural justice thus illuminates a core feature of the 
Ombuds model, an equally prominent critique of this theory casts light on the Title IX 
Coordinator’s authority. MacCoun (2005), a social psychologist, cautions that Tyler’s theory is 
open to abuse, noting that “authorities can use the appearance of fair procedure (dignity, respect, 
voice) as an inexpensive way to coopt citizens and distract them from outcomes that by 
normative criteria might be considered substantively unfair or biased” (p. 189).  As a result, the 
felt need for procedural voice and dignity can “leave [individuals] potentially vulnerable to 
manipulation and exploitation by those who control resources and the processes for distributing 
them” (MacCoun 2005, p. 193).  MacCoun’s warnings are precisely the reason legalists prefer 
hard and fast rational-legal protections over looser charismatic voice processes that may lack 
substance.   
While the source of authority for the archetypal Ombuds is their ability to be persuasive 
and develop relationships and the archetypal Title IX Coordinators’ source of authority is law 
and policy, in practice each role relies, to varying degrees, on both types of authority.  Each role 
also uses authority for very different purposes.  Title IX Coordinators use authority to enforce the 
law, whereas Ombuds use authority to empower individuals by providing access to information 
and a confidential resource, by advocating for fair process, and by assisting in exploring options.   
The two different mechanisms’ bases for authority are now discussed in turn.   First the 
chapter examines the archetypal Title IX Coordinator and how Coordinators adhere to the 
archetype by relying on rules-based authority.  Next instances where Title IX Coordinators 
depart from the archetype and rely on relationship-based authority are examined.  Then the 
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chapter explores archetypal Ombuds, and discusses how Ombuds adhere to the archetype by 
using relationships, persuasion, and the field’s core principles as the primary sources of 
authority.  Finally is an examination of how Ombuds depart from the archetype, deriving 
authority from a combination of role confusion, the apparent authority granted by their superiors, 
and institutional rules.  These adherences and departures occur along a spectrum, as some 
Ombuds or Title IX Coordinators may aptly be described as “adherers” or “deviators.”  
Additionally, adherence or departure is often situational and context-specific as a Coordinator or 
Ombuds who goes by the book in one instance departs from their archetype in another.   
AUTHORITY AND THE TITLE IX COORDINATOR ARCHETYPE  
 
The main source of authority for archetypal Title IX Coordinators is Title IX itself.  Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S. C. §§ et seq., implemented by 
regulations 34 C.F.R. Part 106 prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex by recipients of Federal 
financial assistance.  This includes sexual harassment and sexual violence against students in any 
academic, educational, extracurricular, and athletic school program, whether on school property 
or not.  The U.S. Department of Education, through their Office of Civil Rights (OCR), enforces 
Title IX.  “Dear Colleague” Letters, issued through OCR specify and clarify the requirements of 
Title IX.  OCR released a Q&A document in 2014 to further provide clarification on what 
constitutes compliance with Title IX.  The 2013 reauthorization of VAWA (Pub. L. 113-4), the 
Clery Act, FERPA, and due process and administrative law all add additional legal requirements. 
As described earlier, the Obama Administration has developed new initiatives to ensure 
effective oversight of campus responses to sexual assaults.  In January, 2014 President Obama 
pledged to develop a coordinated federal response to combat campus sexual assault (Sander, 
2014a, p. A7). President Obama created a White House Task Force on Protecting Students From 
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Sexual Assault, designed to provide colleges with information on best practices, to ensure 
compliance with legal obligations, to increase the transparency of federal enforcement, increase 
the public’s awareness of individual college’s compliance with the law, and to facilitate 
coordination among federal agencies (Sander, 2014a, p. A7). 
 It is these sources, and specifically Title IX itself, that provide the Title IX coordinator 
“archetype” with the authority to carry out the responsibilities of the role.  Title IX (34 C.F.R. § 
106.8(a) requires schools to “Designate at least one employee to coordinate its efforts to comply 
with and carry out its responsibilities under Title IX.”  A school’s nondiscrimination statement 
must state:  “[I]nquiries concerning the application of Title IX may be referred to the recipient’s 
Title IX coordinator or to OCR.  It should include the name or title, office address, telephone 
number, and e-mail address for the recipient’s designated Title IX coordinator” (DCL, 2011, p. 
6). According to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter,  “The coordinator’s responsibilities include 
overseeing all Title IX complaints and identifying and addressing any patterns or systemic 
problems that arise during the review of such complaints” (p. 7).  Clarified by the OCR Q&A 
Document (2014), “A Title IX coordinator’s core responsibilities include overseeing the school’s 
response to Title IX reports and complaints and identifying and addressing any patterns or 
systemic problems revealed by such reports and complaints” (p. 11).  Specifically, this can 
include training on Title IX issues, conducting Title IX investigations, and determining 
appropriate sanctions, remedies, interim measures, and policies for working with law 
enforcement and survivor advocacy organizations (OCR Q & A 2014, 11).   
The ATIXA (Association for Title IX Administrators) Statement of Ethics and Title IX 
Coordinator Competencies (Core Job Duties and Responsibilities, 2012, §4) states the basic job 
requirement is to “Coordinate Title IX efforts including the development, implementation, and 
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monitoring of appropriate disclosures, policies, procedures and practices designed to comply 
with federal and state legislation, regulation, and case law requiring the prompt and equitable 
resolution of all complaints pursuant to Title IX” (p. 5).   The ATIXA Statement of Ethics and 
Title IX Coordinator Competencies (2012, §4) cites as a core competency “[k]nowledge of 
current state and federal law and regulations, institution-specific policies, practices and 
procedures, identified best practices and trends in the field of education related to harassment 
and other discriminatory practices that violate Title IX” (p. 6).  The Title IX coordinator must be 
given the training, authority, and visibility necessary to fulfill these responsibilities (OCR Q&A, 
2014, 11).   
Authority originating in the law is further evidenced by Title IX Coordinator job 
postings.  The South Dakota State Job posting for Title IX & Compliance Coordinator describes 
the position’s responsibilities as “critical to the development, implementation, and monitoring of 
meaningful efforts to comply with Title IX, Title VII, Equal Opportunity and Affirmative Action 
legislation, regulation, and case law“(Title IX & Compliance Coordinator Job at South Dakota 
State University, ATIXA, 2013).  Likewise, the Santa Clara EEO and Title IX Coordinator job 
posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) requires the applicant to demonstrate “[t]horough 
knowledge of federal and state laws and regulations applicable to institutions of higher 
education, including Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
ADA.”  University of Cincinnati’s Title IX coordinator job posting requires “demonstrated 
knowledge of and ability to interpret federal and state equal opportunity and nondiscrimination 
laws and regulations, including Title IX, Title VII, Title VI, sexual harassment and other 
applicable laws and regulations (Director of Equity and Compliance job, University of 
Cincinnati, 2013).   These job postings are typical of the 64 job ads reviewed for this dissertation. 
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Across these many job ads, Title IX Coordinators’ main responsibility is to ensure compliance 
with the law.  
Archetypal Title IX Coordinators’ legal authority includes the power to investigate, make 
recommendations, and enforce both the law and university rules.  Under the ATIXA Statement 
of Ethics and Title IX Coordinator Competencies (Core Job Duties and Responsibilities, 2012, 
§4) the coordinator must “consulting with relevant policy-making bodies and senior personnel 
for the purpose of advising, clarifying and identifying necessary action to eliminate sex and/or 
gender-based discrimination in all educational programs and activities…” (p. 5).   Further, the 
model Coordinator must have the “[a]bility to recommend and/or effect changes to policies, to 
revise practices and to implement equitable procedures across many departments.”  Further the 
archetypal Coordinator is expected “to manage a caseload of civil rights grievances to a prompt, 
effective and equitable remedy” (ATIXA Ethics §4, p. 6).  When issuing investigative reports, 
the report should include an assessment of credibility, the weight of the evidence, and 
conclusions and findings (Guthrie, ATIXA Tip of the Week, 1/9/14).  In a letter to Riverside 
Community College District, 2005, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) stated:  “At the conclusion 
of a case of sexual harassment or sexual assault … regardless of the outcome of the case, the 
Title IX Coordinator will review all of the evidence used…to determine whether the complainant 
is entitled to any remedy under Title IX that may not have been provided for under the 
University’s disciplinary procedures” (ATIXA Training Manual 2013, NCHERM 2011 
Whitepaper, p. 149).   
The model Title IX Coordinator requirements are echoed in Title IX Coordinator job 
postings. The examples that follow typify the duties commonly seen in Title IX Coordinator job 
postings.  The Sacred Heart University Title IX Coordinator job posting (Higheredjobs.com, 
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retrieved 6/12/14) lists as one of the job duties to “Draft investigation reports, issue findings, 
determinations and recommendations on cases.”  A Santa Clara University EEO and Title IX 
Coordinator Job posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) describes a job responsibility as 
“[c]oordinat[ing] the implementation of any necessary remedial action to meet compliance 
requirement and goals.”  The Montana State University Director and Title IX Coordinator job 
posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) also requires the Coordinator to “[d]raft 
investigation reports, issue findings, determinations and recommendations on cases.” A job 
posting for Title IX Coordinator at Cal State University- Pomona notes that the coordinator 
“reviews information and recommendations from Title IX delegates and makes final decision, 
and issues final dispositions on complaints to relevant parties; notifies all parties regarding 
disposition; and notifies all parties regarding disposition and monitors compliance of all 
requirements and timelines specified in the complaint/grievance procedures” (Title IX 
Coordinator Job Posting, Cal State University, 2014).   
The legal basis for Title IX Coordinators’ authority may be illustrated with a simple 
observation: Many job postings in this field list as a “preferred” or “highly desired” credential 
the J.D. degree. Simply put, legal authority is at the core of the qualifications for the position. 
Examples include, but are not limited to, recent job postings at Wake Forest University, 
University of San Diego, Montana State University, Sacred Heart University, and Eastern Illinois 
University (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14).   
 The archetypal Title IX Coordinator has the authority to enforce Title IX and to 
investigate, determine violations, issue recommendations, and make interim accommodations.  
This, too, is evidenced in Title IX Coordinator job postings.  The Montana State University 
Director and Title IX Coordinator job posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) requires the 
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Coordinator to “[d]raft investigation reports, issue findings, determinations and 
recommendations on cases.”  Universities, as necessary, can initiate a complaint, serve as a 
complainant, and initiate conduct proceedings “without a formal complaint by the victim of 
misconduct”  (ATIXA Training Manual 2013, University as Complainant, 43).  These 
responsibilities are echoed in the common description of the Title IX Coordinator’s role provided 
on the the University of Kansas website:  
[T]he individual designated by the University to coordinate the University’s 
compliance with Title IX, including overseeing all sexual harassment complaints 
and identifying and addressing any patters or systematic problems that arise 
during the review of such complaints.  The Title IX Coordinator is also 
responsible for providing training regarding Title IX to the University 
community. (University of Kansas, “What is the role of the Title IX 
Coordinator?”) 
 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators’ authority seems entirely founded on law and law-based 
policy. As we will next see, in practice Title IX Coordinators rely heavily on law and 
policy as their basis of authority.  Nonetheless, they also use more relational sources of 
authority.  
TITLE IX COORDINATORS’ AUTHORITY IN PRACTICE  
 
In my interviews, Title IX Coordinators echoed law and policy as the primary source of 
their authority, describing the importance of correctly and consistently applying the law and 
organizational rules in each case.  One Coordinator described their source of authority as the 
ability to correctly apply the law:   
In my sixteen years I don’t think there’s ever been someone where I made a 
decision and they went to the [Government] that [the Government’s] opinion 
differed. I’ve always found that whatever conclusion I reached. If I reached a 
conclusion that we did something wrong, then we fix it so they don’t go to the 
[Government]. But if I reached the conclusion that it’s not [a violation], I’ve 
never had one go to the [Government] and [been told] ‘Yes it is’… I’m really 
proud of that. (T12A47:31) 
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Another Coordinator succinctly described the authority derived from consistent application of 
rules and procedure: 
One thing that’s critical is that we pay close attention to precedence, [that we are] 
consistent in how we carry out these cases. Because if we just start doing things 
all over the board, people are not going to have confidence in our process, so we 
try to be very consistent with our past, the way we’ve handled cases in the past. 
Sometimes we’ll have to do something different, but we think through very 
carefully. Why are we doing this, what’s different about this case, what’s 
distinguishing this from any other case that we’ve had where we’ve handled it 
always a certain way. (T1B12:14)   
  
The Coordinator’s official title and reporting relationships, which are also key elements 
of rule-based authority, are important sources of authority for effective Title IX work.  One 
Coordinator noted, “I think there’s real authority and also reporting line helps to kind of 
engender that when you call or people know… and then your role has to be written, it has to be 
codified in the procedures and policy” (T8A39:80).  Another Coordinator echoed the importance 
of standing in the organizational structure:   
[T]he next layer above me is the vice president. I’ve been given the designated 
authority to do a lot of things that he does under his purview…and it was 
consciously done. It was invisible before [and now] it is at a level where I can 
compel a department to do something. We all understand the hierarchy of Higher 
Ed and other organizations, but you have to have that ability without having 
another layer to jump through.  (T10A43:45)   
 
Another Coordinator expressed a desire to “go somewhere where they appreciate me and elevate 
[the position] to…the political place [Title IX] needs to be, which is as close to the president as 
possible… Not because I don’t like the person who’s my boss, she’s lovely, she’s very kind. I get 
great reviews… I tried to bring it up to her once and she looked crestfallen as if I were saying ‘I 
don’t like working for you.’” (T12A47:12).   
One Coordinator talked about how credentials can be just as important as the title, 
arguing “Respect comes with the title and the credentials…I’ve learned it and with [working 
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with] faculty…if we had a law school that’s where I’d be right now…I’d be working on a law 
degree. Just for the sheer ‘[I’m] an attorney.’  I watched my first boss [who had a J.D.] and the 
difference that [faculty] show for what they consider another…terminal degree” (T12A47:4-15).  
One deputy coordinator expressed frustration at not having the authority of being the main Title 
IX Coordinator title:    
[If I could go back] I would say I would only do this work if you make me the 
[main] Title IX coordinator. You can’t have responsibility without authority.  I 
work really hard with the lead title IX coordinator to have a positive, healthy 
relationship, meeting monthly, but I can’t afford [for that person] to get threatened 
or feel like I’ve overstepped. I often need the authority in the moment to make a 
decision to direct somebody that we’ve got to move forward and give notice at 
this point… I can talk about conflicts later, but there is a role conflict, we’ve 
attempted to address it, and at this point it’s resolved from the perspective of ‘I’m 
not the Title IX coordinator.’ I am not the authority.  (T8A39:19) 
 
These quotes illustrate the importance of rules, law, policy, and organizational hierarchy in 
providing Title IX Coordinators with authority. 
TITLE IX COORDINATORS DEPARTING FORM THE ARCHETYPE  
While Rules and Title are the prescribed sources of authority for Title IX Coordinators, in 
practice they often depart from the archetype because developing relationships is just as, if not 
more, important for effectively carrying out the work.  One Coordinator noted that the “biggest 
misconception…is that we’re more powerful than we are” (T7A32:42).  Coordinators must often 
establish relationships in order to educate decision-makers about the rules:  
I deal with a lot of deans and they try to tell me what the law is all the time, and 
how…to do my investigations all the time, and I always have to bring them back 
to ‘everything you see on TV on Law and Order and on CSI, I get that, but that’s 
a criminal investigation, and that’s not what we’re doing here. It’s a civil rights or 
civil investigation, and using the word civil means that we’re going to build 
relationships and we’re going to be civil to each other and figure out what 
happened. I am not trying to nail anybody to the wall...’ (T11A54:11)  
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Another Coordinator expressed the inability to apply the rules without efforts to build 
relationships: “[I am] unable to eradicate the [negative] behavior if I don’t know who’s doing it. 
So we try to make the environment comfortable enough that they will at least come in and say 
something to me and at least give me or my investigators an opportunity to do something about 
it, even if it’s around the way” (T10A43:6).  As a result, positive relationships are essential to 
ensuring compliance, with coordinators arguing that administrators fulfill their mandatory 
obligation to report because they “have confidence in our process [because]… we’ve established 
long relationships... (T1B12:20).   
These relationships can be key to accomplishing Title IX work:  “[S]ometimes I can’t 
deal with the person who is directly accused, but I can deal with their management...[and say] 
Here’s the way we can approach this, so to get what we need and not to disrupt things more than 
we need to. At the end of the day I’m going to need your help to make sure that we fix this.  
Usually they will get on board” (T5A26:20).  Another Coordinator described the role 
relationships play in high profile situations involving sexual misconduct:   
[I]t’s really hard to do the case work without the authority because when you 
[have] a [sexual misconduct] report you realize sometimes that you’ve got to go 
forward even though the complainant doesn’t want to. You have the authority to 
say to someone ‘issue the notice,’ but if people are really worried, if it’s been a 
faculty member, a high profile athlete, you’ve got to have the confidence…of the 
athletic director or the Provost’s office…[They need to trust and believe that] I 
know what I’m talking about and to go forward… (T8A39:76) 
 
One Coordinator described the efforts necessary to re-establish good working relationships: 
When I got here, it took me a minute to figure out ‘why the heck won’t they call 
me back?’… So I had to do a little bit of digging… [and] talk to other people to 
find out that there was a conflict of personality and a conflict of working styles 
with the person that was in the role before me. I had to smooth that out.  I had to 
repair a lot of bridges and fix a lot of feelings and stroke a lot of egos in the 
beginning.  I went to deans and directors meetings where they meet on a monthly 
or bi-weekly basis. I went to faculty senate to introduce myself. Anytime there 
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was a group of folks together and there was an opportunity for me to introduce 
myself, I was there.  (T11A45:27-28)  
 
Relationship building is an important source of authority for Title IX Coordinators, in 
that they are responsible for outreach and investigation as a part of their compliance work.  As 
stated by one Coordinator, “[I]n order to accomplish [compliance with Title IX] we are 
responsible for coordinating education.  And in order to get that you have to have good 
relationships…”(T2A13:6). Another Coordinator described a campus with an entrepreneurial 
spirit that often results in turf battles over resources and authority, necessitating “a focus on 
developing a strong relationship with the primary offices that we’re investigating” (T8A39:27).   
This emphasis on relationships is also important for conducting effective investigative 
interviews:  
[W]e deal with a lot of arrogant faculty members who are not accustomed to 
being questioned about anything…so our persistence in asking questions annoys 
them…They want us to accept their first answer which was ‘no, of course I didn’t 
sexually harass them.  Occasionally we’ll have to interview a vice president…and 
we’ll get the same kind of huffy response.  It happened recently with a 
student…who came in [the] same way as some professors and deans, throwing 
their weight around saying basically that he’s somebody very important on 
campus and he would never do the things that are being alleged and ‘you just 
need to ask around and find out who I am.  (T7B33:21-23) 
 
Likewise, some Coordinators described the necessity of building relationships in order to 
overcome the challenges of navigating complex bureaucracies:  “[G]iven the kind of job that I do 
I have to know who my friends and who my enemies are… Always having to be careful and to 
look out for yourself…I think that’s true generally given the nature of the bureaucracy. There are 
people ready to stab you in the back, you know?” (T7A32:43).  As a result many Coordinators 
expressed the importance of relationship building with many different types of stakeholders, 
from students to administrators to faculty.  One Coordinator describes relationship building as a 
means of changing the paradigm: 
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I’ve sat down with football players that in the first hour they were the most 
arrogant kids I’ve ever met and then by the second hour when I’m talking about 
how would you want someone to treat your girlfriend, how would you want 
someone to treat your mom, your sister, we’re talking about where is this 
acceptable to say… and they kind of start to get it. I feel like that’s changing the 
paradigm. I think it’s more on that individualized basis where we change values, 
that we have more success. I know there’s a couple of kids that I’ve talked to, 
they’re going to be more cognizant of their behavior, more sensitive to how 
people are treated… (T9B42:23)    
 
The same Coordinator cited another example of shifting the culture one person at a time: 
We had a great example of an RA [accused of making insensitive 
remarks]…initially he was really defensive about ‘I don’t think that’s sexual in 
nature.’ But he [eventually understood and] ended up doing a whole sexual 
harassment training for the whole dorm.  We mentored him, he’s a great kid, 
[and[ I use him as one of my sounding boards…I’ll call him and say ‘what do you 
think about this,’ or ‘what’s going on,’ or we’ll have an event and he’ll come 
over. Every now and then he’ll send me an email saying ‘I heard this in the 
elevator, what do you think? Should I say something?’ So I think that’s how you 
shift [the culture], by individual connection. It takes a lot longer.   I gotta say, I 
just really love that kid and…when we first met he thought I was the biggest 
beehive in the world. (T9B42:24) 
 
Another Coordinator described the impact of developing relationships with the 
administrative offices on campus in order to prevent sexual misconduct: “[Without good 
relationships] I don’t know if we would have been able to share the information to put all of 
those incidents together…It would have been in silos and it would have been more like a 
coincidence that somebody would have recognized the situation [in order to do something about 
it]” (T8B40:18).  Many Title IX Coordinators described student turnover as the reason why their 
relationships with decision-makers were most important: “[Outreach] is one of the hardest things 
for an office like ours to do on campus, but part of it is building that rapport with the clientele 
that’s here. It’s not so much, like I said, the students, because they’re in and out of here, but 
building that rapport with the chairs, the deans, the directors, the supervisors… part of that is just 
nurturing that relationship…” (T1B12:23).  
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For many Coordinators, the lack of clarity on their role and sources of authority is a 
source of frustration.  One Coordinator described the different sources of authority when 
working for the government versus a university, and the expectations of university decision-
makers:  
I came from the federal government, and whatever we said, the institution had to 
do it. You don’t get to mess around with us. I had instant credibility and respect 
because I could cut off people’s funding. So now it’s a much more delicate way of 
trying to influence people to recognize the importance of what I’m doing. It’s 
tight budgetary times and I’m not bringing in huge dollar amounts, so the 
administrators, the provost, chancellor, vice provost, they want people who are 
going to bring in big dollars. (T9A41:49)   
 
Several Title IX Coordinators observed that in their universities there was a lack of 
clarity on expectations for how they should do their job, especially related to how they are 
evaluated. This, too, shifts the attention away from legal requirements and toward more informal 
elements of the job.  One Coordinator frankly explained, “You keep using that word 
requirement.  There’s nothing written in here ‘you need to do this.’ It’s all having a working 
relationship with your legal advisors” (T7A32:15).  Many Coordinators described not receiving 
reviews or not understanding the basis for their reviews, expressed by one Coordinator’s 
statement, “[How the Title IX is evaluated] is a really good question, nobody’s really answered 
that for me.  I don’t know” (T9A41:9).  Another Coordinator described their supervisor’s lack of 
knowledge: “I’m fortunate to have a boss that doesn’t know what [Title IX] is in order to 
evaluate it.  Am I doing all those tings in the Dear Colleague Letter?  Well, I am hoping to 
eventually…” (T12A47:8).  The process of evaluation is a source of frustration for many Title IX 
Coordinators:   
We’re not [evaluated].  When I started here, I was under the impression that I was 
going to have a six month review and a yearly review. So my six month review 
came and I said to my boss ‘um, want to do my review’ and she said ‘you get to 
keep your job, how ‘bout that?’ I said ‘fine’ and I walked away!  I thought 
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‘okay…’ and of course people on the staff side that I work with said ‘how did you 
review go?’ and I was like ‘what review? She told me I get to keep my job’ and 
they were floored…So now it’s time for my yearly review…how my boss is 
going to evaluate me, we’ll see.  (T11A45:35) 
 
 Title IX Coordinators unable to establish relationships face greater challenges in 
effectuating voluntary compliance:  
I really felt like I wanted to make a more concrete impact. I wanted to be with the 
people making the change as opposed to how I felt OCR more or less directed 
change for institutions. I wanted to be in the positive collaborative approach to 
trying to get people to recognize we’ve got to do something about these issues. 
(T9A41:1)   
 
Another Coordinator lamented not being able to do more relationship building: 
I wish I had more time for those ‘hey, let’s go get a cup of coffee’ kind of 
conversations. I think that, gosh, if you can find a Title IX coordinator that has the 
kind of time to do that, that’s the ideal job right there. You really do need to be 
able to build that kind of trust with people and it’s hard to do when you’re in this 
role.  (T9A41:21)  
 
Without positive relationships, Title IX Coordinators lack the ability to influence organizational 
stakeholders, and this may result in formal changes to their authority.  At many universities, the 
Title IX Coordinator is unable to effectuate their recommendations:   
I don’t have that kind of power, meaning I might, based on what I know of the 
case or of other cases, say ‘here’s what has happened previously under these 
circumstances in terms of discipline, counseling, what have you.’ But we can’t 
invoke discipline, that would be left to [the] department.  (T2B14:21) 
 
The disconnect between the recommended sanctions and those implemented can have negative 
consequences for Title IX enforcement: 
We make recommendations to departments. Most of the time they follow our 
recommendations. In this situation the department felt they’d followed our 
recommendations but…from the perspective of the person that complained and 
from the other faculty it looked like there was a disconnect between the 
information we found…and the department’s response.  (T3B20:2) 
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As a result of these challenges, many Coordinators described engaging in conversations much 
more like those of an Ombuds when attempting to influence a department to follow their 
recommendations:  
It is rare [for the department to] come back and say ‘we don’t agree with your 
recommendations.’ In fact, I don’t know that I’ve had anyone say ‘we don’t 
agree.’ Now, when it comes to discipline, it’s a wide open field.  I may say ‘this 
person needs to be disciplined at the level of suspension’ or ‘up to an including 
termination’ or something like that, so that division head can understand what 
we’re saying and the flexibility that they have.  But there are conversations about 
that... We meet with them, and we give them the pros and cons of doing all of it or 
doing nothing, so that they can understand ‘this is what it’s going to look like if 
you don’t take any action. This is what this is going to look like if you do.’  
(T10A43:40)   
 
The conversations can also be less relationship-based and rely more on rules-
based sources of authority, as the Title IX Coordinator continued: 
And I always make sure the department knows ‘okay, if you set the bar there and 
I’m telling you this person has sexually harassed a student and you’re saying… 
“[We] don’t want to go with [the recommendation],” don’t [later] come to me 
about [it].’  Guess what?  [Then the department] gets it. They understand … 
(T10A43:40)   
 
This sentiment is echoed by many Coordinators including one who stated, “Oh yeah, they don’t 
follow my recommendation because they think it’s too mean or too harsh or too whatever, and 
I’m like ‘fine, do what you want to do, but [you will] be back!’ (T11A45:53).  Without effective 
relationships and the support of key decision makers, many Title IX Coordinators lack the 
necessary authority to do their jobs.  One Coordinator articulated their lack of authority most 
poignantly:    
I’ve proven that I have good judgment, wisdom, and an understanding, and I have 
a clear understanding of the definitions involved. It’s just heartbreaking to be 
involved and yet be so… I’m like a eunuch! They won’t let me do anything. 
(T12B48:31). 
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Often Coordinators without relationship-based influence are unable to influence needed changes 
to rules and policies, their primary source of authority.  Coordinators described the lack of rules 
addressing faculty/student relationships as an impediment to Title IX compliance: 
I have threatened to put a policy together [banning faculty/student relationships] 
and get it approved and you would have thought that I called every faculty 
member on this campus a pedophile, the uproar about me having the nerve to do 
such a thing… because why would I do that if there’s no problem….On the flip 
side of that I have students running around here who are marking a chalkboard 
about how many professors they’ve bagged... (T11B46:20) 
 
In sum, while the archetypal source of authority for Title IX Coordinators is the law, 
university rules and regulations, and the powers granted by their positions, relationship-based 
authority and influence is an important pre-requisite for carrying out the position’s 
responsibilities.  Building relationships at all levels of the institution, with students, faculty, staff, 
and administrators, is important to developing and maintaining influence.     
AUTHORITY AND THE OMBUDS ARCHETYPE 
 
 The Archetypal Ombuds’ authority derives from the Ombuds Field’s core principles and 
ultimately from relationship building.  The University of Kansas  and Michigan State University 
are utilized as examples throughout this section, as both represent a common way for Ombuds 
offices to operate.  While there are different types of Ombuds and the role is often misunderstood 
(Gadlin 2000: 37; Levine-Finley & Carter 2010: 126), the model organizational Ombuds 
operating on college and university campuses are not established by statute but from within the 
institutional governance structure.  At the University of Kansas, for example, the University 
Senate Rules and Regulations, Article V, Section 1 provides for a University Ombuds Office 
with a Faculty Ombuds and a University Ombuds to be appointed by the Chancellor (University 
of Kansas, USRR, “University Ombuds Office”).  At the Michigan State University, the Student 
Rights and Responsibilities, Article 10, requires the President to “appoint a senior faculty 
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member or executive manager with the title of University Ombudsperson” (MSU, SRR, Article 
10:  Office of the Ombudsperson). 
 Rowat (2007: 42) notes that the American version of the Ombuds role is not legitimized 
through law and legislative appointment, but instead through organizational appointment by the 
heads of universities, hospitals, and business corporations.  Unlike Title IX Coordinators, 
archetypal Ombuds do not hold rule-based authority and do not hold formal investigative 
powers.  Instead, their authority derives from the field’s core principles and ultimately from their 
ability to build relationships.  This is echoed at the University of Kansas, as the University 
Senate Rules and Regulations list qualifications of the University Ombuds as requiring “a 
comprehensive knowledge of the university organizations and procedures and a post-
baccalaureate degree” (University of Kansas, USRR, “University Ombuds Office”).  Such 
knowledge is gained, presumably by the requirement of completing six years of service at the 
University of Kansas at the time of initial appointment (University of Kansas, USRR, 
“University Ombuds Office”). 
 The ability to build and maintain relationships is a form of power.  According to Charles 
Howard (2011b) an Ombuds has the power to check and inform organizational power because 
“[t]he freedom from management responsibility, combined with the everyday process of 
speaking with people from any and all levels or locations of the organization, give the Ombuds a 
unique perspective on how the organization is performing and what problems it and its people 
face” (p. 80).     
 A key source of Ombuds’ authority, apart from building and maintaining relationships may 
be trust-building.  As noted earlier, according to Tyler’s theory of procedural justice, trust is built 
by the experience (or perception) of being “heard” and “respected.”  Tyler and Lind (1992) thus 
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articulate a “relational” as opposed to a rational-choice theory of trust.  Tyler and Lind (1992) 
argue that relationships build trust, but they also may undermine trust if people feel they are not 
being heard and respected in the relationship.  For Ombuds, trust is built relationally, but is not 
simply a function of relationships.  It is a function of how people act towards each other, 
respecting and hearing versus not respecting and not hearing each other’s views and voice.  
Long-time Ombuds Tim Griffin (2010) describes trust as necessary for an Ombuds’ success:  
[P]ersonal trust of the Ombudsperson is a necessary pre-condition for many 
people to fully utilize the services of the office. It is not the office and associated 
documents that foster this confidence and trust; rather, it is the consultee’s (or 
potential consultee’s) belief that the human being who currently serves as 
Ombudsperson (1) can be trusted to keep sensitive matters confidential, (2) will 
provide advice that is unbiased and wise, and (3) cares about others. (p. 67)  
 
McGrath (1997: 473) notes several other types of Ombuds’ authority.  They include the ability to 
access information, to develop relationships with the administration, and to refer cases to more 
formal options.  Where archetypal Title IX Coordinators have legitimacy bestowed by their legal 
authority, archetypal Ombuds’ legitimacy is derived from their ability to build and sustain 
relationships through personal skills and credibility.  This legitimacy is often formalized in 
university governing procedures.  For example, the powers granted to the Michigan State 
University Ombudsperson include “broad investigatory powers and direct and ready access to all 
University officials, including the President (MSU, SSR, Article 10:  Office of the 
Ombudsperson).  Similarly, the powers granted to the University of Kansas Ombuds Office by 
the University Senate Rules and Regulations include access to all administrative officials and 
access (in accordance with law) to all University records (University of Kansas, USRR, 
“Ombuds Office Powers”).  Notably, the powers description specifically denies the authority to 
take disciplinary action, reverse decisions, or circumvent existing University rules and 
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procedures (University of Kansas, USRR, “Ombuds Office Powers”).   
Longtime University of Kansas Ombuds Robert Shelton (2000, 83) describes the 
traditional elements of a typical University Ombuds as: “active, significant experience within the 
community or organization; independence from power influences; impartiality and neutrality; 
investigative function to gather necessary information; community recognition of responsibility 
for recommendations to those in authority; and confidentiality in working with those who bring 
problems to the Ombudsman.”  Long-time Columbia University Ombuds Marsha Wagner (2000: 
103-105) also describes the model Ombuds as serving an educational or a training function, 
educating individuals about policies and building capacity through conflict resolution trainings. 
Ombuds in higher education may participate in networks through the International 
Ombuds Association (IOA).  The IOA is the product of a merger of The Ombudsman 
Association (TOA) and the University and College Ombuds Association (UCOA), and is now 
the primary association for individuals working as organizational Ombuds. The IOA Standards 
of Practice (2009) include Independence, Impartiality and Neutrality, Confidentiality, and 
Informality.  The Ombuds Office at the University of Kansas, like many others, specifically 
states in its Statement of Best Practices that it acts in accordance with the IOA Standards of 
Practice and Code of Ethics (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, Statement of Best Practices, 
2008). 
Where the typical Title IX Coordinators’ authority derives from the power to enforce 
Title IX, the standard Ombuds’ authority derives from the ability to develop relationships and 
adhere to the core principles of impartiality, confidentiality, informality, and independence.  The 
next section examines Ombuds authority in practice.   
OMBUDS’ AUTHORITY IN PRACTICE  
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Ombuds who adhere to the archetypal relational source of authority described their power 
originating from their ability to develop relationships and to be persuasive.  One Ombuds noted, 
“[T]he only power you have is what you can convince people to see or do” (O954:38).  Other 
Ombuds further defined the role’s persuasiveness as originating with the ability to develop 
relationships:   “[K]nowing how to build and sustain relationships [is key]. And also getting to 
know the community before conflicts emerge, because once you develop relationships with 
decision makers… [an ombuds] definitely can influence how a decision is made if they’re asking 
the right question…” (O1A8:11).  Building the relationships that sustain Ombuds’ authority can 
take time, and one Ombuds argued that while the role does not have any ascribed power, “once 
we earn it, it’s stronger than people who are given power.  When you’re given power…to really 
make it work, you’ve got to apply it so people respect it, but I think when you earn it from the 
ground up, then it’s true power” (O1C10:24).  To develop relationships, the same Ombuds 
further argued for personally meeting with decision makers: 
[I]t takes more time…but gosh, it pays such huge dividends because you have a 
relationship and you took the time to say “dean this or professor so and so, or 
administrator so and so, these kinds of things are coming out of your office.” … 
[Y]ou kind of endear yourself [as they think], “oh my…I have someone who’s 
really going to give me some information that I might not have been aware of. 
(O1A8:63-66)   
 
An Ombuds’s persuasiveness in evident in the description of “behind the scenes relationships 
where offices will usually say ‘listen, if you think that we should do it we’ll go ahead and do it, 
but we’ve got to stick to our policy and procedure [publicly]” (O6B35:9).   
Establishing relationships is an important pre-requisite for exercising such influence, but 
Ombuds must also strive to maintain and nurture relationships:     
[Y]ou never know the person you’re calling about, and this has happened to me, 
the person I call [this week] to get more information about a situation, [may] next 
week…be a visitor [in my office]. And the next week [the person] might be an 
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ally in a situation that we’re all working out together… so I can’t burn any 
bridges.  (O14A63:79)   
 
Given changing circumstances, building relationships is a never-ending task for the 
Ombuds adhering to the archetype.  “[Y]ou still have to keep finding support for your office,” 
one Ombuds noted, “because when people leave that are in the administration and they’re 
replaced by people who may not have the understanding or appreciation for the office, you have 
to get in their good graces, so it’s kind of a constant process” (O1A8:106).  Ombuds also 
discussed intervening in situations in which established relationships can get in the way of 
effectuating change: 
Tomorrow I’m going in to meet with [a] supervisor who is totally behind an 
employee…being accused...of very serious behavior, probably emotional abuse, 
and I think workplace bullying. How am I going to convince that person to look 
into the situation, take it seriously, and figure out what’s going to be done? That’s 
really hard.  (O14A63:77)  
 
This frustration is best described by another Ombuds: 
What I like least and what is most frustrating to me is that we, I know who the 
bullies and victimizers are on this campus. I know because I’ve told them… 
administrators know who these people are. And I know that these victimizers are 
going to send more victims to me this coming semester…[they] are going to be in 
my office…destroyed psychologically, educationally, professionally, other ways 
by these people’s outrageous, immoral behaviors and then the people in power 
[who can] do something about it aren’t going to do a damn thing. They could 
prevent this pain and this suffering very easily, and they refuse to do it. And that’s 
the hardest part of my job.  (O10A55:33)  
 
Ombuds also build relationships in order to use formal offices’ authority: 
The Title IX Coordinator is an attorney…[who] takes a very legalistic approach… 
[and] is not one of the people that I can go to and say ‘have you been hearing 
things about [this] department? What’s going on over there? Have we got a 
faculty member losing it over there? Do we need as an institution to think about 
stepping in and doing something over there? Would it help if I went and talked 
with the chair or you went and talked with the chair?’  [There are a few staff 
members in these offices] with whom I have a relationship like that…[but their 
bosses] don’t know it. [The staff] trust me and know that I won’t out them and 
need my input, because what’s happening in the classroom is very useful for 
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[them], who then based on what I have heard from students about this faculty 
member [can take action]. (O10A55:28) 
 
Note that the above Ombuds may be departing from the archetype’s norms regarding 
confidentiality in order to achieve results.   
Ombuds utilizing the archetypal source of authority also discussed relationship building 
to overcome barriers to change:  
We have [an older faculty member]…and the [attractive female] students in his 
course are encouraged, to come to private tutoring for free at his house.  And of 
course, once there they are subjected to being plied with alcohol and so on and so 
forth….and he’s been doing this for years.  Finally he got a new chair and I went 
to see the new chair as I do all new chairs, and not in the first meeting, but once I 
had a rapport developed and felt the new chair would be receptive and handle the 
information appropriately, I shared this guy’s pattern …and suddenly he quit… he 
now does his “private tutoring sessions” at a local off-campus [location] and 
while there invites the student to his house. But that at least in my way of thinking 
is some little baby step of an improvement. (O10B56:32)  
 
The same Ombuds also described a negative example of intervening in a situation while lacking 
a relationship or the ability to persuade:   
The tenured faculty member [says] go jump in the lake ‘It’s my life, I’ll live it 
like I want to, we’re consenting adults and there’s no university rule that prohibits 
it, so if you don’t like it tough.’ More frequently the [supervisor or department 
chair] will say, ‘well, you know, this is all third party hearsay information that 
you’re giving me. I don’t have any victim coming forward to tell me that this 
happened to them, all I have to operate on at this point is rumor, and I’m not 
going to confront one of my employees or faculty members with idle rumor and 
gossip.’ …What is really the case is they’re afraid. They don’t want 
confrontation, they know this will… put them in an uncomfortable situation of 
having this uncomfortable conversation with one of their people and they don’t 
want to do it so they don’t. They don’t have to [and I can’t make them]. 
(O10B56:33)  
 
Another Ombuds succinctly described their inability to effectuate changes: “I can't make my own 
determination about what should happen in the situation and make it happen. That's not what we 
do as an office. I just say, “I talked to the people involved and this is the answer we're getting 
and I can't make them do what you want them to do. We have to live with this. There isn't any 
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other option” (O14B64:48).  Ombuds utilizing archetypal authority frequently talked about their 
relationship building with Title IX Coordinators and other more formal compliance offices with 
the power to effectuate change: 
I had a great relationship with the [formal compliance] office…[there were] a few 
individuals that would really understand my role, and we would refer cases back 
and forth.  So a lot of times it really depends on the relationships with the office 
or the officer that you work with most.  (O8B52:15)   
 
Another Ombuds described the challenge that a lack of cooperation presents:  
[T]the word on the street is [Human Resources] are never to send anyone here, 
they’re not to talk about the office and they are to have no interactions with 
anyone in our office…They don’t want us here, they don’t appreciate us here, 
they’d like us to go away. They want to control employees. Employees will go out 
there and not be given all their options, frankly, because they don’t want to have 
to deal with employees. And the T9 coordinator is an attorney. She takes a very 
legalistic approach to her work and she is not one of the people that I can go to 
and say “have you been hearing things about [this university] department? What’s 
going on over there? Have we got a faculty member losing it over there? Do we 
need as an institution to think about stepping in and doing something over there?  
Would it help if I, you think, if I went and talked with the chair or you went and 
talked with the chair?”  [There are a few staff members in these offices] with 
whom I have a relationship like that…[but their bosses] don’t know it. [The staff] 
trust me and know that I won’t out them and need my input, because what’s 
happening in the classroom is very useful for [them], who then based on what I 
have heard from students about this faculty member [can take action]. 
(O10A55:28)    
 
In this way Ombuds who adhere to the archetype can leverage, through relationship building, the 
power of more formal offices to address trends and institutional challenges.  Another Ombuds 
noted “If I can’t get any traction…I’m going to go to the head of the college… I’ll start as low as 
I can where I think I’m going to make some headway…it’s pretty situational, but I do use the 
chain of command as kind of a starting point” (O14A63:40).  Without that authority, the Ombuds 
must relay more exclusively on their persuasiveness to convince individual visitors to step 
forward and use more formal investigatory options: 
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I might be struggling with do I go to the [formal] office that’s mandated to look 
into it?  [Yes if] there’s a pattern…but [the visitors] don’t want to go forward 
because they don’t want to make waves or they don’t want to be worried about 
retaliation, [or some of them] think they did something to bring it on…I have to 
weigh it case by case.  Most [of the] time we can get people to go to those offices 
because …they trust us.  (O1A8:75)  
 
Ombuds described struggling with how to maintain relationships while adhering to the IOA 
Standards:   
[A] very important part of being an Ombuds is to have the courage to step 
forward and say ‘This has to be resolved. We can’t let this go on anymore. 
Whether you want to hear this or not.’ So how do you balance maintaining good 
relationships with people and yet adhering to the code of ethics and doing what 
needs to be done?  (O14A63:80)   
 
One Ombuds wrestling with this distinction articulated the priority of maintaining confidentiality 
over reporting sexual misconduct:   
I would hope that I could be persuasive enough with one or more of the victims 
here that would put them in a place where they would be willing to speak to our 
Title IX coordinators or the police to go ahead and file reports about that or 
request a release from their confidentiality promise so I could do something on 
their behalf. I really do, again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I 
offer that it is confidential and would really protect that value, even at the risk of 
some others.  (O4A22:28) 
 
If an Ombuds’ persuasiveness is based on the ability to develop trusting, lasting 
relationships with organizational stakeholders, the basis for developing relationships is adhering 
to the Ombuds field’s core principles of confidentiality, impartiality, independence, and 
informality.  One Ombuds stated, “Try to establish positive relationship with the constituents 
…the important thing is to stress confidentiality and integrity and that you’re a neutral party” 
(O5A28:44). 
  Another Ombuds described relationship building as leading to trust, echoing Tyler and 
Lind’s (1992) relational theory:  “[E]very time I interact with someone and we demonstrate that 
we are confidential and neutral and informal and people feel that they can trust us and that we’ve 
	   119	  
helped them in their situation, I think that gives us more authority on campus. A lot of it’s kind 
of personally based” (O14A63:36). One Ombuds described the role as “a keeper of secrets” and 
confidentiality  as the aspect “where [Ombuds] start to [earn] trust and that’s where…power 
comes, because people…know that you keep your word and you preserve their confidences” 
(O1A8:10).   
Other Ombuds discussed their prior roles at the institution as both helpful and harmful to 
building relationships and earning trust.  One Ombuds stated, “[T]he thing that helped it go well 
was the fact that I had worked with, in my role as dean of students and [other administrative 
positions], I had worked with faculty…throughout those years and that helped facilitate my 
working relationship with them. It helped establish my integrity with them” (O5A28:1).  Another 
Ombuds saw the prior institutional experience as both a benefit and a detriment:   
The [advantages] of [having a long history working at the institution] were that I 
knew everybody, and basically knew the culture and the history of the institution. 
I knew how it worked and who were the go-to people. [If you stay around long 
enough you see] the disadvantages, which are, I already had a history here in the 
[subject] department, I already have people that I thought well of and thought well 
of me, and vice versa.  (O9A53:5)   
 
 Over time the ability to build relationships and to persuade individuals and offices with 
formal authority provides opportunities to impact the formal institutional rules and structures: 
“Because of my longevity here and my involvement with people, I frequently get draft copies of 
new policies or procedure revisions and [am] asked [informally by committee chairs or 
members] for input into those so that they don’t have to be changed later after they found 
problems the hard way” (O10A55:12).  Another Ombuds described their ability, through 
persuasion, to achieve more formal support for their role:  “I was vehemently opposed to being a 
mandated reporter [on issues of sexual misconduct]. In fact, my arguments were persuasive and 
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the university has agreed that I can be a confidential [office], even in regard to [sexual 
misconduct]” (O4A22:31).  
Relationship building and persuasion can be seen to operate on multiple levels for the 
Ombuds.  On one level, it is used to encourage individuals to comply with existing rules, 
policies, and procedures.  On another, persuasion is used to encourage institutional actors with 
the power to investigate, sanction, and effectuate change to use that power.  Third, persuasion 
and relationship building is used by the Ombuds to influence the creation, revision, or 
maintenance of policies and procedures.  Finally, persuasion can be used to protect the Ombuds’ 
role, often through the creation of rules that formalize and institutionalize the role.   
Ombuds unable to access their authority through relationship-building and persuasiveness 
often expressed frustration at their inability to effectuate change.  One Ombuds described 
meeting often with the president but wanting to present information to the board:  “I wish I had 
been able to…There are a number of issues that I think needed to be addressed. [I]t would have 
been helpful to present…information to the board so they would have had a better understanding 
of some of the problems we had” (O5A28:11).  Other Ombuds described their inability to build 
relationships and be persuasive as limiting the power of the role: 
[O]ne of the big challenges I have is that there’s not a lot of appetite for having 
this office evolve to be what it should be.  I spent time trying to take these baby 
steps around what we could be doing differently. That’s kind of not gone 
anywhere. I’m just now at the point where I’m saying to myself all I’m going to 
be doing is making people angry…let me just function within the organization as 
best I can (O7A37:8)  
 
 In sum, in keeping with the archetypal Ombuds model, many Ombuds emphasize 
how their authority is derived mainly from building relationships and establishing trust 
through hearing and respecting the views of people who bring complaints. 
OMBUDS DEPARTING FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
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I nonetheless found that many Ombuds depart from the archetypal model and use 
rules and policies for influence.  Many Ombuds rely for their authority not only on 
relationship building, persuasion, and the field’s principles but also on rules, legal 
authority, and the power that comes from reporting directly to a senior university 
administrator.  
A key reason for the slide to rule- and hierarchically-based authority is widespread 
confusion over what is the Ombuds’ role and authority. The confusion over exactly what is an 
Ombuds is both a benefit and a detriment to an Ombuds authority.  Regarding the Ombuds office 
itself, one Ombuds noted, “I hear that a lot, ‘What is that?!’” (O12A59:6).  Another became 
Ombuds when the administration asked a longtime faculty member “[D]o you want to be the 
next Ombuds?” and the person replied, “What is that?” (O9A53:3).  Yet another Ombuds stated 
“People don’t seem to listen to us when I try to set them straight, which is that we don’t have any 
power” (O14A63:34).  The role confusion extends to the reporting relationship itself.  Ombuds 
widely described confusion regarding how they were evaluated, and exasperation at rarely being 
evaluated. One noted “On paper yes [my evaluation] is stipulated to occur annually.  It has 
occurred three times in the twenty years I’ve been here” (O10A55:7).  Other Ombuds stated, 
“The way I’m evaluated is a little bit of a mystery to me” (O2A17:10), and “I don’t think [the 
way I am evaluated] is very effective, quite honestly… we track [goals] through the year, [but in 
reality] that doesn’t mean much of anything” (O3A21:14).  One Ombuds described working to 
influence the President’s perception of his influence, “even though there’s no mention of the 
Ombudsman in the [student newspaper] article, this started in [my] office, and I [told my boss]… 
I will unabashedly take credit for it” (O11B58:9).  Lack of consensus on the Ombuds role, what 
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it entails, and how to evaluate it often leads Ombuds to exercise power that is not relationship 
based.   
A key response to ambiguity for some Ombuds is to emphasize to others that the Ombuds 
reports to powerful organizational actors:  “We don’t have any power to do anything to make 
anybody do anything, but people seem to think we do because of our reporting relationship with 
the president. I think we get our authority from that…”(O14A63:34).  Another Ombuds used the 
president’s authority to increase awareness:  “[W]e asked the president to write a letter of 
introduction and send it to every employee on campus. And that actually was the one that 
initially that I think was most successful in terms of people that visited me said that, you know, 
“I got the letter from the president that’s how I learned about your office” (O13A61:18).  In other 
situations, the administrator makes specific referrals, as one Ombuds described “[T]he chancellor 
…whenever they had somebody complaining… they were turning it over to me…” 
(O11A57:15).  Another Ombuds described the provost “walk[ing] down right to my office with a 
student in hand, knock[ing[ on the door, and say[ing] ‘we have got a problem here, we need to 
resolve this.’” (O11A57:14).  Yet another Ombuds talked about the difference between reporting 
to the president instead of the vice president:  “When I reported to the president, when I called 
people’s offices people responded immediately, whereas when I reported to the vice president it 
was like ‘well, we had to go through gyrations about this that and the other…” (O5A28:30).  One 
Ombuds saw the most important factors to an Ombuds success being “[C]lear lines of authority 
reporting, and…the support of your supervisor” (O5B29:19).  Another Ombuds described the 
surprise at no longer directly reporting to the top, “The new President that came in about five or 
six years ago didn’t want as many direct reports as the older president, and so he started having 
me report to his faculty liaison” (O9A53:9). 
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 Other Ombuds derive power not only from the authority of their supervisor, but from role 
confusion relating to their prior role at the institution.  When asked if being the past Dean of 
Students provided him with some legitimacy as the Ombuds, one interview responded:  
“Definitely, and actually when I moved to this position, depending on where you look on the 
university’s website, I’m still listed as Dean of Students and a lot of people still call me the Dean 
of Students. In fact, the Student Affairs office…has talked to me recently about, “in everybody’s 
mind you’re still the Dean of Students, so I think we’re going to start calling you that again” 
(O3A21:6). In developing a research subjects list, this research identified two Ombuds at 
institutions who currently held a Dean of Students title, and multiple other Ombuds who served 
as special assistants to Vice presidents, Provosts, or Deans.  Dual roles are problematic for 
Ombuds seeking to practice to the field’s ethical standards involving independence and 
impartiality.  These issues are further discussed in chapter six.   
 While many Ombuds closely follow the IOA Standards, Ombuds departing from the 
archetype rely less on relationships, persuasion and principles, and use role confusion and 
authority presumed from reporting to institutional actors with significant actual authority.  
Ombuds use this apparent authority to enforce rules, or to favor specific preferred outcomes.  
Ombuds often expressed a frustration regarding a lack of rules and structure.  One Ombuds noted 
“folks are used to not being rule bound, that’s one of the reasons they’re earning half or a quarter 
of the salary they could earn in the private sector to be here. They don’t want rules and structure, 
they are must more used to collegiality as they call it. Now at higher level administration, in 
particular at the Provost and dean level and up, [rules/procedures are welcomed]…” 
(O10B56:37). Ombuds in using this form of authority may be doing so to maintain their 
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relationship and influence with decision-makers responsible for the continued existence of the 
Ombuds office.   
 In my interviews I learned of many examples of Ombuds using some form of rules-based 
authority.  In one example, an Ombuds described a situation in which a student was dismissed 
without reason from a work study role for being socially awkward: 
I looked at the letter that was given to the student about dismissing them.  It 
wasn’t very clear…so I asked the department ‘can you tell me why you weren’t as 
forthcoming giving concrete examples as to why you made this decision?’ … [I 
told the department] in terms of procedural fairness, the student needs to know 
more clearly why you’re asking the student to leave… they said ‘okay, okay, we 
understand’ … And so the student received a [different] letter.  (O1C10:3)   
 
In another example highlighting how Ombuds use rules to favor specific outcomes a faculty 
member meets with an Ombuds who told the person “here’s the process and this is what should 
be happening.”  The Ombuds then described what happened when the faculty member didn’t 
follow the advice and tried to back track and fix it when it was really too late:   
[At that point] I said, ‘well, now you really need to do this’ and she said ‘I don’t 
know why I need to…’ and I said ‘because… they have the option to appeal this 
decision, which is our policy’ and she’s like’ well, they’ve already confessed to 
their behavior’ and I said ‘yes, but they can appeal based on the severity of the 
sanction’ … Did I ruffle her feathers?  Probably.  (O3A21:54)  
  
There are also examples of where Ombuds are unsuccessful in their attempt to use the rules to 
pressure visitors to take certain actions.  One Ombuds described their process if they are unable 
to persuade a visitor to take formal action:   
[If a policy has been violated] I will try to get the person’s permission to take it 
forward and if I get that permission we’ll try to talk to the offending person and 
see if there was a mistake made and if they want to correct. And if they don’t 
want to correct that and we think that it was a violation of policy and we give 
them an opportunity to make it right and they don’t, then we’ll probably go onto 
their supervisor and work our way up the chain.  (O9A53:43) 
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Another Ombuds described conversations with a department chair attempting to enforce the 
rules:   
[L]ook, I know this is going to be a bitter pill to swallow because I’ve seen what 
the reality of the plagiarism charge is, but we haven’t followed our own policy 
and we are going to have to swallow it.”  The chair agreed [but otherwise] I 
would have had to take it up to the dean level and if the dean had done nothing I 
would have taken it to the Provost. (O9B54:27) 
 
These examples highlight Ombuds operating with the apparent authority to report rule violators 
to individuals with the actual authority to take action.  Using this apparent authority to pressure 
compliance may be possible due to the relationships built with university leadership, but it 
directly contravenes the field’s core principles of confidentiality, informality, impartiality and 
independence.  
 In many instances, Ombuds use their relationship and influence to formalize the Ombuds 
role in order to create a more independent basis of authority.  One Ombuds explained that 
process:  [E]ventually when we got a President that was more interested in what we were doing, 
shall we say, [and] we developed a charter that lays out what we do and how we do it, and grants 
us immunity, as far as the University is concerned, from being an office of notice” (O9A53:8).  
Another Ombuds described efforts to develop “…a draft charter or terms of reference for the 
office that addresses hiring criteria, term of office, and kind of ground rules and practice of the 
office. That is kind of going back and forth between me and Legal Counsel’s Office and Provost 
Office. I would imagine in the next couple of years [the authorizing documents] will come to be  
[controlling]” (O13A61:5).  Once established, some Ombuds rely on formalizing the Ombuds 
field’s principles into institutional rules as a basis for authority:   
The requirements on me… are stipulated in the constitution and bylaws of the 
university. When people ask [I tell them] I am responsible for providing the 
assistance required by university rules in a manner that ensures confidentiality, 
maintains neutrality, and exhibits independence from the institution. (O10A55:3)  
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Ombuds feel tension between adhering to the field’s principles and maintaining their 
ability to be persuasive within the university. Almost uniformly they aspire to adhere to the 
IOA’s Standards of Practice (2009).  The IOA provide professionalization and authority for 
Ombuds to adhere to the field’s best practices.  A certification exam provides legitimacy and 
authority for Ombuds practitioners that meet the IOA Standards.  Many Ombuds practicing 
further from the archetype expressed disappointment and frustration at the rigidity of the 
certification requirements.  One Ombuds discussed passing the examination with flying colors 
only to learn that their dual role within the university was a problem.  “They felt that there was 
sufficient enough ambiguity between my two positions that until that was further defined and 
made clear… they could not award me certification.  I even appealed the thing as [practicing to 
the letter of the standards] is almost unheard of (O11A57:22).  Another Ombuds talked about not 
receiving full IOA membership due to serving as an agent of notice (against their own 
preferences) for their university. “I feel like I’m not really legitimate because I’m not a full 
member… not a full participant, it’s really kind of sad for me” (O7A37:5).  Another Ombuds 
echoed these sentiments in stating: 
I abide by the standards of the code of ethics…[but] I don’t think there’s only one 
way to be an ombudsperson…there’s this fantasy that we’re all doing it the same 
way.  But we’re not!  Some people are saying you can’t be a[n] [IOA] member 
unless you completely abide by our code of ethics and standards… if you can’t 
you will be a second class citizen.  I think it’s too soon to say ‘this is the way it 
has to be.’ I think we should be embracing everyone.  (O14A63:11) 
 
One Ombuds expressed relief at attending an IOA conference and seeing experienced Ombuds in 
roleplays not operating to the letter of the standards: 
You’re taught the whole thing about some of the basics in terms of the people put 
out their things and then you do an affirmation: “that sounds like that must have 
been problematic for you, blah blah blah.” I happened to be in an IOA group once 
where we were doing some role playing and one of the IOA participants was from 
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an Ivy League school, [someone] I have got a great deal of respect for. He 
immediately in his role playing went from the problem to “this is how we’re 
going to solve it.”  It was so affirming inside of myself to think “okay, that’s not 
the way you do it, and even the people with some of the best credentials don’t 
always, aren’t able to always carry this out in the way that they should.  
(O11B58:10) 
 
Roughly one third of the Ombuds interviewed had never been to an IOA Conference, typically 
not attending due to “conflicts with work responsibilities and other higher education or student 
affairs conferences” (O6A34:47).  Many Ombuds provided an historical perspective on the 
development of the IOA Standards, represented best by this quote: 
When I came into it [the field], we didn't even have standards of practice. We had 
cowboys. And we had a lot of people who did things almost like learning a 
profession by folklore or something. They would come together at various 
meetings and talk about how they did things. And for the first few years, I'd come 
back from those meetings fairly confused because people would be advocating for 
very different kinds of practices and approaches. So, at this point, I feel like we've 
come a long way toward coming to standards that we all understand. Although 
there are some variations on how people apply them, these standards are 
commonly accepted and utilized.  I got to tell you, I'd pull my hair out before 
these standards because there were really wide differences, much wider than there 
are now.  The practice has become a lot more standardized, but there’s still some 
room for interpretation. (O2A17:25)  
 
   In sum, many Ombuds described deriving their authority from rules or important 
reporting relationships.  The tension between strict adherence to the Ombuds model and the felt 
need to rely on rules is further explored in later chapters that show how Ombuds often apply the 
IOA Standards of Independence, Impartiality, Informality, and Confidentiality very differently 
than prescribed.  Ombuds lack prescribed rules-based authority and must develop relationships 
and use persuasion as the source of their power.  Widespread confusion regarding the Ombuds 
role provides the context for many Ombuds to exercise a rule-based authority in their practices. 
 
Conclusion  
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Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds, according to their archetypal models, derive their 
authority from very different sources.  Title IX Coordinators’ authority is legal-rational and 
derives from the power to enforce Title IX and university rules relating to the law.  This includes 
investigating complaints, determining violations, recommending outcomes, and making interim 
accommodations.  Ombuds authority is quite different. Lacking the authority to take disciplinary 
action, reverse decisions, or circumvent existing university rules and procedures, Ombuds’ 
authority is charismatic and derives from the ability to develop relationships and truly hear and 
respect those who come with complaints (in which Ombuds are guided by the core IOA 
principles of impartiality, confidentiality, informality, and independence).  Title IX Coordinators 
use their authority to enforce the law, whereas Ombuds us their authority to empower individuals 
by providing access to information and a confidential resource, by advocating for fair process, 
and by assisting in exploring options.  Despite these seemingly distinct sources of authority, in 
practice Ombuds’ source of authority is often rules-based and Title IX Coordinators’ authority is 
also derived from their ability to build and sustain relationships.  In practice, Title IX 
Coordinators and Ombuds both rely on rules and relationship-based sources of authority.   
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CHAPTER 4:  MISSION  
 
Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators vary widely in their respective missions.  As a Title 
IX Coordinator’s authority derives from enforcing the legal requirements of Title IX, the mission 
of the archetypal Coordinator is to enforce the law.  This includes Title IX’s requirements 
regarding safety, gender equity, protecting individual rights, punishing and deterring 
wrongdoing, and educating the campus.  An additional goal arising from legal compliance is 
avoiding legal liability for the university.  The mission of the archetypal Ombuds, meanwhile, is 
to provide an informal alternative for resolving disputes by providing information and an 
opportunity for voice, and by advocating for fair processes.  
This chapter begins by examines the archetypal Title IX Coordinator whose missions 
revolve around compliance with Title IX.  Coordinators adhering to that mission are analyzed 
followed by a discussion of Title IX Coordinators who depart from their archetype with missions 
that include voice, information, and procedural goals.  Next the chapter describes the archetypal 
Ombuds’s mission.  It then explores Ombuds who adhere to the archetype with a mission of 
providing informal dispute mechanisms, voice, and fair process.  It also describes Ombuds who 
depart from their archetype with missions that are often more rules- and outcomes-based.  These 
adherences and departures occur along a spectrum, as some Ombuds or Title IX Coordinators 
may aptly be described as “adherers” or “deviators.”  Additionally, adherence or departure is 
often situational and context-specific as a Coordinator or Ombuds who goes by the book in one 
instance departs from their archetype in another.  The chapter concludes that in practice the 
missions of Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds converge more often than they diverge.     
THE ARCHETYPAL TITLE IX COORDINATOR’S MISSION 
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A Title IX Coordinator’s archetypal authority derives from Title IX, thus the mission 
includes the goals underpinning the law.  Each of these goals is now reviewed in turn.  First, the 
archetypal Title IX Coordinators seek to protect individual rights and punish and deter 
wrongdoing.  Compliance with Title IX effectively means protecting individual rights by 
punishing and deterring wrongdoing.  The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter notes that if a college or 
university determines that student-on-student harassment has created a hostile environment, they 
must “take immediate action to eliminate the hostile environment, prevent its recurrence, and 
address its effects” (p. 4).  This action may include counseling or disciplinary action against the 
harasser, remedies for the complainant, and changes to school policies (DCL, 2011, p. 15).  Title 
IX requires that interim steps to protect the complainant be taken when necessary before the 
outcome of the investigation (DCL, 2011, p. 15).  Other required activities include conducting 
periodic assessments and climate checks to assess effectiveness of school policies, investigating 
whether school employees with knowledge of sexual harassment allegations failed to respond, 
and submitting to OCR copies of all grievances and documentation related to the investigation 
(DCL, 2011, pp. 18-19).  The OCR Q&A document (2014) echoes these requirements, and 
provides universities with the ability to give its Title IX Coordinator the specific responsibility of 
“conducting Title IX investigations, including investigating facts relevant to a complaint, and 
determining appropriate sanctions against the perpetrator and remedies for the complainant; 
determining appropriate interim measures for a complainant...” (p.10).           
 The archetypal Title IX Coordinator also works to appropriately avoid institutional 
liability.  According to the ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, “the reasonableness of a college’s 
handling of a sexual harassment/sexual assault complaint will ultimately determine the extent of 
monetary liability.  As a result, the training manual recommends that Investigators/conduct 
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officers should be trained in civil rights investigations and have experience with the uniqueness 
of a college community and its governance structure” (p. 16).  The OCR Q&A document (2014) 
provides “[a] school must ensure that its Title IX [C]oordinator is appropriately trained in all 
areas over which he or she has responsibility” (p. 10).  The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual 
describes NCHERM’s reaction to the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter:  “Acting on the Dear 
Colleague letter with revised policies and practices will more effectively shield campuses from 
liability because it offers campuses a roadmap for delivering prompt and effective remedies to 
campus sexual violence” (p. 195). 
In the Bedrock Beliefs section of the 2013 ATIXA Training Manual (p. 11), effective 
sexual assault risk management practices are tied to reducing liability, including:   
• Increasing the likelihood that colleges will prevail in lawsuits if they arise 
out of incidents of sexual assault 
 
• Decreasing the likelihood of lawsuits between survivors and perpetrators  
 
• Decreasing the likelihood of successful lawsuits against colleges by 
perpetrators and survivors, as the college will be less likely to violate their 
rights. 
 
• Decreasing the likelihood of sexual assault on college campuses, thereby 
“protecting students and helping to insulate colleges from a potential 
source of litigation.”   
 
• Decreasing the likelihood of lawsuits against colleges by media seeking 
access to campus crime data.  
 
The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual, Bedrock Beliefs section indicates that where a survivor does 
not want a college to pursue a report and the threat of further harm is deemed insufficient, 
college officials “would be well advised to fully document their conclusion, supported by an 
appropriate investigation, and ask the victim to acknowledge that he/she concurs with the 
college’s conclusion, and asks that no further action be taken.  A letter to the victim should 
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indicate that his/her refusal to cooperate with investigators and campus conduct personnel may 
prevent the college from pursuing the complaint to resolution” (p. 14). 
 Third, promoting equity, the core principle underlying Title IX, becomes a part of the 
model Title IX Coordinator’s mission.  A job posting for Title IX Coordinator at Swarthmore 
typifies these missions, and states that the person “will play a key role in the College’s collective 
efforts to build and maintain an even safer and more gender-equitable campus climate for all 
members of the community” (Title IX Coordinator Job at Swarthmore College, ATIXA, 2013).  
Likewise a Sacred Heart University job posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) for Title 
IX Coordinator lists one of the duties to “[p]rovide leadership for campus-wide initiatives that 
work to transform the campus culture and advance inclusivity, gender equity, and opportunities 
for individuals from traditionally under represented populations.”  These goals are reflected in 
the Association for Title IX Administrators materials as well.  The ATIXA Statement of Ethics 
and Title IX Coordinator competencies  (§3 Statement of Ethics and Professional Standards) 
notes that Title IX Coordinators will: 
Conduct themselves in accordance with the highest levels of integrity and 
competence in pursuit of equity -- as an expression of social justice -- in the 
academic, residential, social, and athletic programs of schools and colleges, and 
in the prevention of hostile environments on the basis of sex, the prohibition of 
sexual harassment and sexual violence, the prohibition of other forms of 
discrimination and harassment on the basis of protected class membership, the 
protection from retaliation, and in remedying the effects of discrimination and 
harassment for the benefit of the schools, colleges and universities they serve.  
(p. 3) 
  
Finally, the Coordinator’s mission to prevent sexual misconduct requires these officials to 
engage in education and outreach.  The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter specified that full 
compliance with Title IX required taking proactive steps to prevent sexual misconduct.  OCR 
recommended that “all schools implement preventative programs” and suggested options for 
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educational programs during student, faculty and staff orientations, school assemblies, and for 
residence halls advisors, student athletes and coaches (p. 14).  Colleges were directed to include 
discussions about what constitutes sexual misconduct, the school’s policies and procedures, and 
the potential consequences.  Broad training of institutional constituents on these and related 
principles and practices is the best risk management (ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, p. 16).   
Further, OCR recommends developing specific materials including information about 
policies, rules, resources, where to report, and what to do if you receive a report (DCL, 2011, p. 
15).  Under Title IX, schools are required to publish a notice of nondiscrimination (34 C.F.R. § 
106.9 (a)) and to adopt and publish grievance procedures for dealing with complaints of 
discrimination (34 C.F.R. § 106.8 (b)) (DCL, 2011, p. 4).  The notice must be widely distributed 
and prominently posted on web sites and at various locations throughout the campus.  The 
ATIXA Statement of Ethics and Title IX Coordinator Core Competencies (Core Job Duties and 
Responsibilities, §4, p. 5) lists as part of the Coordinators’ duties the following education related 
activities: 
• Provide ongoing training, consultation, and technical assistance on Title IX for 
all students and employees, with specialized training content for hearing 
officers/boards, investigators, campus law enforcement and appeals officers; 
 
• Develop, implement and coordinate campus and/or school-based strategic efforts 
aimed at the prevention of sexual violence and other forms of sex and/or gender-
based discrimination; 
 
• Develop and disseminate educational materials, including brochures, posters, and 
web-based materials that inform members of the school or campus community 
(students, faculty, administers, staff, and parents) of Title IX rights, 
responsibilities and resources both within and external to school/campus 
premises. 
 
Title IX Coordinator Job postings also indicate that one of the key missions for model Title 
IX compliance offices is education.  A Title IX job posting at Kansas State University typifies 
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the requirement that the coordinator shall collaborate with “relevant campus departments/units to 
develop and conduct prevention of discrimination training, sexual harassment/sexual violence 
training, and other Title IX related presentations” (Investigator & Deputy Title IX Coordinator 
Job at Kansas State University, ATIXA, 2013).  A Title IX and Compliance Coordinator Job 
posting at South Dakota State requires applicants to have “[s]trong presentation and facilitation 
skills with an emphasis on education and training fostering positive relations with diverse 
constituencies” (Title IX & Compliance Coordinator Job at South Dakota State University, 
ATIXA, 2013).  The Swarthmore College Title IX Coordinator job posting lists as a 
responsibility, “oversee[ing], in partnership with colleagues across campus, the quality and 
consistency of training, education, and outreach programming regarding Title IX including 
gender-based inequity for the campus community” 
(Title IX Coordinator Job at Swarthmore College, ATIXA, 2013).  
While education about sexual misconduct and its handling is a key element of the 
Coordinator’s mission, the emphasis is on outcomes, not simply pro-forma education. Thus, the 
2013 ATIXA Training Manual, NCHERM 2011 Whitepaper notes that “community protection 
and remedying discrimination must become our top priorities…[with] [e]ducation, development 
and rehabilitation necessarily tak[ing] a back seat [to] outcomes…” (p. 154).  The Whitepaper 
further states that “sanctions for serious sexual misconduct shouldn’t be developmental…[but] 
should protect the victim and the community.”  Supporting this ranking of priorities, the 
Whitepaper cites David Lisak’s 2002 study on undetected campus rapists finding that 63% of the 
campus offenders were repeat offenders and that 91% of the offenses identified were committed 
by repeat offenders.  The Whitepaper (2011, p. 14) concludes that “unless you can distinguish 
whether an offender is one of the 63% of repeat perpetrators, or one of the 37% of one-time 
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perpetrators (and you can’t), can you really afford to take a chance with the safety of your 
community?”   The educational goals of archetypal Title IX Coordinators are primarily to 
support the prevention, reporting, and remedying of sexual harassment.    
 The Mission Statement of the Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access (OIOA) at 
the University of Kansas evidences these goals and represents a typical Title IX mission 
statement.  The KU office’s core mission includes: 
• Completing thorough investigations into matters of discrimination. 
• Initiating policies and best practices that remove barriers to strengthen the 
campus community. 
• Enhancing compliance, accountability and guidance on anti-discrimination 
laws. 
• Communicating commitment through training, education and assessment of 
programs. 
• Serving as a resource for the recruitment and retention of faculty, staff and 
students. 
• Leading collaborative efforts through outreach with community partners 
(University of Kansas, OIOA, Mission Statement). 
 
In fulfilling its compliance goal, the Institutional Opportunity and Access website 
includes a link providing web-based complaint reporting forms (University of Kansas, OIOA, 
File a Complaint).  In fulfilling the training and educational goal, websites managed by the 
University of Kansas Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access provide a wealth of 
information.  The main Institutional Opportunity and Access site provides a link to a sexual 
harassment training for students (University of Kansas, OIOA, Student Sexual Harassment 
Training, 2013).  Further, a main gateway website, www.sexualharassment.ku.edu, defines Sex 
and Sexual Harassment (University of Kansas, OIOA, Sex & Sexual Harassment), and provide a 
gateway for information about sexual harassment that includes definitions of sexual assault and 
sexual violence, internet links to university policies and procedures, links to Federal and State 
Laws, specific examples of sexual harassment, where to report of sexual harassment, where to 
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get support, and what to do if you receive a sexual harassment complaint.  The Sexual 
Harassment website is the highlighted first result when searching a variety of related terms from 
the main www.ku.edu website. Included on the site, the Sexual Harassment Resources page is a 
comprehensive list of university resources, local Lawrence, Kansas resources, and services that 
provide 24-hour assistance (University of Kansas, Sexual Harassment Resources).  Notably, the 
KU Ombuds Office is listed as a university resource, despite the offices’ very different goals.  
These outreach and publicity efforts described at the University of Kansas typify the efforts of 
universities nationwide to provide better sexual misconduct information and resources.   
In sum, the primary mission of a model Title IX Coordinator is rules-based investigation, 
adjudication, and discipline in response to sexual misconduct complaints.  An archetypal Title IX 
Coordinator is tasked with protecting individual rights, promoting gender equity, avoiding 
liability, and driving education and outreach.  As the role developed, the education and outreach 
piece morphed into being an educational leader on all things related to sexual harassment and 
sexual assault.  Outreach now includes enhancing “safety,” providing leadership to transform the 
campus culture, and advancing inclusivity, gender equity and opportunities for traditionally 
excluded groups.   
CARRYING OUT THE ARCHETYPAL COORDINATOR MISSION IN PRACTICE     
 
The archetypal mission of Title IX Coordinators is to “make sure that we respond in an 
appropriate way, that we follow our policy and that we’re in alignment with what our legal 
obligations are as an institution” (T8A39:17).  Primarily this means investigating and handling 
allegations of Title IX violations and violations of policy.  Many Coordinators report that they 
carry out this archetypal mission. One Coordinator noted “I get them for being in violation of the 
[consensual relationships] policy [even if I can’t prove it was non-consensual], because that’s 
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what I’m looking for…What policy did you violate?” (T11A45:51).  Other Coordinators echoed 
this mission of determining violations of law or policy.  Another Coordinator stated, “Over the 
years we sort of attracted some of the ones that don’t really need us. They have a boss who is 
hateful and mean, but he’s hateful and mean to everyone without regard to race, color, sex, 
religion, national origin, age, disability, [or] sexual orientation. So we have to tell people [we 
can’t help you] a lot…and that’s unfortunate” (T12A47:30).  Other Coordinators described often 
sitting down with complainants and saying, “I understand you being a little concerned about that, 
but that’s really not [a violation]” (T13A49:41-42).  Coordinators described a burden to be met 
by the complainant:  
We [take] a real close look at [the complaint].  Even if it were all true, [if] it’s not 
discrimination…[the person] has not met a burden of presenting a valid 
complaint….We subject all complaints to that kind of analysis.  People come in 
here all the time, they’re pissed off about something, but is it really … worthy of 
investigation? Sometimes it’s…free speech, it’s opinion, it can even be rude and 
offensive, but it’s not discriminatory, harassment, or anything else.  (T7B33:31)   
 
 In determining violations of law or policy, Title IX Coordinators provide a formal 
mechanism for resolution, echoed in one Coordinator’s description of their retaliation policy:  
“[I] talk about retaliation [and say], ‘please note that retaliation is also a form of discrimination 
that is prohibited by law and university policy. If you believe you’re subject to retaliation 
because you have filed this complaint, you have a right to file a subsequent complaint that’s not 
based upon this initial complaint of retaliation. You will need to do that with our office and let us 
know right away. A separate investigation will be conducted’” (T10A43:24).  Title IX 
Coordinators’ mission to provide a formal mechanism for complaint handling is particularly 
evidenced by the following Coordinator’s statement:  
I’m not handling informal [processes]…people who come to me and they don’t 
want to go for the jugular, I don’t deal with them as much.  I send them [to the 
Ombuds] when I ascertain [a preference] for an [informal] intervention.  I try to 
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tell them ‘[The] Ombuds is the soft touch, they’ll try to communicate and mediate 
and work it out, but when you come to me, that means you want the hammer on 
the nail.’  (T11A45:13) 
 
This sentiment is echoed by another Coordinator who described the responsibility of 
investigating all complaints:  “I tell people ‘once you sit down and start talking….’ In other 
words, this is not the office to come and vent. We have those offices. We have [multiple 
examples]. We have an Ombudsman… If you want to talk, you go there, because you’re putting 
the university on notice when you come to me” (T10A43:34).  Another Coordinator noted “I 
usually always say ‘this is my role…I do an investigation based upon the information you give 
me. My role is not to talk and give you options’” (T10A43:35).   
In providing a formal avenue for ensuring compliance with Title IX, a tangential mission 
of a Title IX Coordinator is to protect the institution against liability.  Coordinators described 
discomfort when situations were not adequately addressed:  “[If we don’t close the case] That’s 
[a] negative outcome and also makes me feel vulnerable, makes me feel the institution is 
vulnerable [to liability]…Anything that is left open is not closed, it’s not been handled, that 
makes me feel like we haven’t done all of our due diligence. That’s uncomfortable” (T6B31:7) 
 Coordinators also expressed concern by evidence of future risk: 
[Even though it was consensual and not a violation] it was important on many 
levels to communicate to the respondent ‘this is grossly inappropriate, there’s 
potential liability for the institution in the future if you continue engaging in this 
kind of behavior. Even if it is consensual, there’s reason to concern ourselves with 
the point at which it may not be. And it has an impact on the individuals who 
might have regarded [it] as consensual, but it reflects both on that person as either 
a distinguished person of note, but creates some future risks for us.  (T2B14:16) 
 
Other coordinators framed liability and compliance in terms of avoiding negative publicity.  One 
Coordinator described a complainant who brought in an outside advocacy group that threatened 
to go to the media.    
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[W]e had a meeting with them and our university attorney and chief diversity 
office just to try to do some damage control. Once we explained the situation…I 
think they realized that this complaint was not [valid], the reasons for the 
complaint were not pure… it was intended to incite a lot of chaos. We were trying 
our best to keep that from happening.  (T13B50:23)  
 
In addition to a formal process determining violations of law or policy that protects the 
institution against liability, an additional mission of Title IX Coordinators adhering to the 
archetype is to revise and improve existing policies.  Representative of the changing state of the 
law, one Coordinator noted: 
When I first started…my role was to read policies, understand policies, and do 
[racial discrimination] investigations. Period.  Within another month it was ‘we 
need you involved in some pretty serious situations that are going on…Can you 
do Title IX stuff too?  Within two and a half months my role was ‘what policies 
do we need to rewrite and update?’ (T11A45:30)    
 
Policy development also relates to education and prevention, a mission some Coordinators 
described as their greatest challenge:  “Most people really just [do] not know what [Title IX] is 
and what we’re trying to do. So part of it is educating people, [and] I think that creates the 
biggest challenge, how do you educate the campus to this level of understanding?” (T6A30:54).  
Another Coordinator described the challenge as ongoing: “We have 20,000 students and every 
year they ship us 4,000 new 18 year olds.  They’re drinking and groping and doing…oh…how 
do you stem the tide?” (T12A47:45).  Many Coordinators frame the problem as one of culture 
and diversity: 
[I]t’s far more to me than an issue of non-discrimination or that we are following 
the letter of the law. I think that someone who is responsible for Title IX really 
has a role to play in shaping the culture of the institution, because Title IX 
requires more than just non-discrimination like some of the other laws. It requires 
that women be fully included in all aspects of work and academic life, and that 
full inclusion to me relates a lot to diversity.  (T5A26:4-9)   
 
Another Coordinator articulated the difficulty of changing the climate:  
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[W]e’re trying to figure out how to get the word out more and I think…we really 
need to shift [the culture] from this idea that individuals need to report to one of 
we’re all responsible for the campus safety. We’re all responsible. So we’re 
working on that…it’s a daily process. It’s hard to keep up with it. It’s hard to keep 
up with trying to get positive messaging out there [and shift the culture], and do 
the investigative work at the same time.  I think we do that one student at a time.  
I think you melt an ice cube not shift a glacier, so that’s the way we’ve looked at 
it.  (T9B42:22) 
 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators oversee a formal process used to determine violations of 
law or policy that will protect the institution against liability.  Title IX Coordinators also aim to 
revise and improve existing policies and educate the campus and thereby prevent future incidents 
of sexual misconduct.  
DEPARTING FROM THE ARCHETYPE COORDINATOR MISSION 
In practice Title IX Coordinators’ missions often depart from the archetype by trying to 
solve problems, to help complainants feel heard, and to manage expectations.  Title IX 
Coordinators depart from the archetype to effectuate informal resolutions and provide 
opportunities for voice.  Just as Ombuds attempt to direct their visitors to the offices that can best 
be of service, many Title IX Coordinators also do the very same thing.  One Coordinator 
described this support as outside of the formal mission of their office: 
[T]here’s so much at stake for everybody, so…when I hear the concerns that the 
complaining party is saying, if there’s threats of suicide or homicide, if there’s 
been self harming behavior, if there’s drug or alcohol concerns, if there’s mental 
health concerns, I might say to the dean ‘let’s work closely with housing or with 
this department, let’s…hand deliver [the] notice of investigation, and at the same 
time leave that person, him or her, with the [information for the] Ombuds office 
or the EAP program or university counseling.’  This is not how it technically 
works, but we have to work it into the system.  (T8A39:64) 
 
Coordinators also expressed a goal of sympathizing with both sides: 
I think beyond that you have to have a real understanding of the nature of these 
kinds of situations, which are lose-lose propositions. You have to have a real 
human side that can understand and sympathize with [the] person and yet meet 
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with the other one and understand and sympathize with that one [too].  You have 
to really care about [them].  I do.  I really do.  (T12A47:3) 
 
Another Coordinator described acting as a counselor in order to build trust:  “[O]ur job is not to 
be counselors, but we are.  To a degree we continue to be counselors until we feel it’s time [for 
them] to move on.  And eventually they will, but that’s a delicate conversation to have because 
you want to continue to have that good rapport…” (T13A49:42).  Yet another Coordinator 
described the importance of providing empathy for students: 
I’m so lonely… It’s just tough work…just gut wrenching.  Strangely, I still feel 
like it’s almost a calling for me.  [I]f [student] had to go [to the alternative office] 
first, this place would be in a world of hurt because that is not an empathic 
person and I am.  (T12B48:32)   
 
In addition to the goals of providing voice, empathy, and support, Title IX Coordinators 
depart from the archetype by describing a preference for informal methods of resolution.  
Coordinators talked the negative effects of using rigid formal processes:  
I’ve had a real trouble dovetailing my process with [other offices] because they 
are very rigid, very.  And it’s process-driven, to the point of dotting the I’s and 
crossing the T’s…. And it’s primarily staff with young, ambitious professionals 
who are really more interested in making a name for themselves that [in helping] 
students.  (T12B48:7)  
 
Another Coordinator described a preference for informal resolution in describing 
instances in which “I can look at it and say ‘if this is all you want, let’s go talk to the dean right 
now. We don’t have to do an investigation on it’” (T10B44:17).  One Coordinator articulated 
frustration at a professor who refused to apologize in order to informally resolve a situation:    
[The professor] refused to apologize [to the student]…I was trying to get him to 
calm down and see what was going on, to apologize to the student so they would 
let it go.   I said to him ‘just apologize and all of this goes away’ but he told me 
there was no way in hell he would apologize. I said ‘you need to make sure that 
you [don’t] retaliate against this student [in your class].’ Term comes to an end, 
and the grade is [very low]… [and the student] appeals the grade based on 
retaliation and discrimination.  At the end of the day I have to go see the president 
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to say.. ‘If he would have just said ‘I’m sorry’ we would not be where we are 
today.’  I overturned the grade… (T11B46:16) 
 
 In addition to often preferring informal mechanisms for resolution, Title IX Coordinators, 
like Ombuds, strive to ensure that processes are fair, but in terms of relational theories (Tyler & 
Lind, 1992) of fairness.  Coordinators described their mission being about more than simply fact-
finding: 
I’m going to say the advantage that I had coming here was that I had already had 
almost 22 years of experience dealing with counseling both employees and 
employers on due process, fairness of process, why it was important to have 
procedures in place and apply them consistently. So there’s a lot more to this 
work than simply, or should be more to this work than simply being a fact finder 
and making a decision.  (T2A13:43) 
 
This observation is echoed by another Coordinator who described their goal of treating all 
respondents and complainants with respect:  “You have to have respect, no matter what they 
have done or reportedly have done or admit to doing, if they’re not treated with respect, if you 
can’t see the humanity you shouldn’t be in the room with them.” (T8B40:14).  Other 
Coordinators connected the goals of efficiency with providing fair process: 
I think that affirmation is important and sometimes people are fearful that they’re 
going to come forward and they’re just going to suffer for it and they’re going to 
be apprehensive that they’re going to be labeled as a liar, they’re going to be 
labeled as somebody who got somebody important in trouble, and so when those 
fears are allayed I think that it does make them feel good. And in a very real way 
[with our changes] they don’t have to worry about that anymore [and people will 
come forward].  (T7B33:10)    
 
Title IX Coordinators also departed from the archetype by articulating goals relating to 
empowerment, helping people think through their options, and resolving the underlying issues in 
a conflict, goals that are far from simply enforcing compliance with the law.  One Coordinator 
described individuals returning back to their office again and again: 
[W]e end up doing a whole lot of counseling after the fact because they’re 
continuing to have issues and they’ve received things, they become empowered 
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and they feel that ‘I can affect things if I go talk to [our office], they’ll change 
things.’ It is empowering to a lot of individuals and we kind of chuckle about it in 
house because we say ‘so and so is coming in again.’ Because now they feel they 
have somewhere they can go, but we want that.  Sometimes we have to hand them 
off to other groups and oftentimes they’ve developed a relationship with us and 
don’t want to go [elsewhere].  (T13A49:41-42) 
 
Title IX Coordinators, like Ombuds, also help people identify and think through 
options, as stated by a Coordinator who as a standard introduction says “I want to 
talk with you about your options, go over your resources, address any safely 
concerns you might have about housing or academic accommodations”  
(T8B40:17).  Another Coordinator described working with respondents’ goals and 
desires as a way of helping them make better decisions: 
What’s going through my mind is ‘how do I reach him? I’m trying to look at his 
beliefs, look at his attitudes, looking for a way if maybe I can affect or help him 
change an attitude or belief, he’ll change a behavior. So I’m trying to inform and 
understand… so I [say]‘You have a lot of aspirations, these attitudes and this 
behavior could get you off track and impact your ability to be successful. 
(T8B40:14)  
 
One Coordinator described their own goals as less important than the needs of the survivors:   
 
It’s not so much of an outcome that I need, it’s an outcome of the needs of the 
parties. Sometimes its where…the alleged victim need[s] to hear the full story to 
understand what had occurred [and understand their presumption about what 
happened was incorrect].  (T4B25:3)   
 
Other Coordinators, similar to Ombuds, spend a considerable amount of time managing 
complainants’ goals and preferences.  Where Ombuds manage expectations due to a lack of 
formal authority, Title IX Coordinators appear to manage expectations due to the challenge of 
definitively proving the occurrence of sexual misconduct.  One Coordinator notes that 
“[m]anaging expectations is tricky for a whole lot of reasons…[a] lot of times these cases are 
very difficult to prove” (T1A11:37).   This was also well articulated by another Coordinator who 
noted that complainants often believe, “I went to the office and [because] exactly what I said 
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[actually] happened, the only redress can be what I’m asking for… [because] this happened to 
me it has to be discrimination.  It just has to be” (T10B44:18).   
While clearly stating “[W]e [have]…to keep campus safe, we need to protect you, [and] 
stay respectful of his rights…[Title IX Coordinators] say ‘okay, what do you want to have 
happen here?’ There are some women that if you told them that we’re going to recommend that 
this kid be expelled, they would fall apart” (T9B42:19).  Another Coordinator talked about a 
standard question in the form to learn what action the complainant is seeking, noting “I kind of 
don’t even want to ask that question anymore.  In most cases the person doesn’t say they want 
them fired, but they really do… just because you put that down doesn’t mean that’s what you’re 
going to get” (T10B44:17).  Providing a dose of reality to expectations is clearly expressed:   
I always ask everyone what is it that they want out of all of this. ‘At the end of the 
day, what is it you want?’ is the standard question. And some of them will say ‘I 
want my money back!’ I say ‘that’s not going to happen, what else do you want?’ 
[laughs] And I tell them ‘I need [multiple options], don’t pin your hopes on one 
thing.’ A lot of them say ‘I want the professor fired!’ Well that ain’t gonna 
happen.  (T11A45:56)   
 
Often Coordinators manage expectations in order to avoid complaints from unhappy 
complainants.  Coordinators described educating as a part of managing expectations: 
I tell people, ‘[I]f you file a complaint [against someone]…it’s going to change 
you[r] relationship…You’re not trying to make friends with them if you file a 
complaint… [y]ou’ve got to accept that.  [W]hat you [are] tell[ing] them is you’re 
not going to tolerate that kind of behavior toward you and you’re willing to do 
what it takes to stop it.’  And that’s what we’re going to do.  We’re going to do 
what it takes to stop that behavior… That’s our job, to make sure that behavior 
stops and if it doesn’t we’ll do something else.  If it stops, then we’ve done our 
job and you have to manage how you deal with how that person treats you from 
now on.  [I tell them] ‘If they stop talking to you…don’t expect that we will say 
‘oh that’s retaliation, we’re going to do something else to them.’  So, again, 
expectations [are key].  (T13A49:40) 
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Many Coordinators’ words closely resemble what an Ombuds might say when managing 
expectations, including process description, outcome possibilities, and aligning the possibilities 
with the realities:  
[I]t’s so important to try to manage those expectations and know what people at 
least perceive as being a good outcome and then after explaining ‘this is how our 
process works, you’re probably not going to be able to achieve that, so let us 
begin the process of managing those expectations and trying to align them with 
reality. Sometimes it works and sometimes it doesn’t. Sometimes people have a 
clear sense of what they want.  (T13B50:25)    
 
In addition to overseeing a formal process to determine violations of law or policy that 
will protect the institution against liability, Title IX Coordinators also aim to revise and improve 
existing policies and educate the campus and thereby prevent future incidents of sexual 
misconduct.   
In sum, the archetypal mission of Title IX Coordinators does not tell the whole story.  In 
practice Title IX Coordinators’ missions often depart from the archetype by including goals 
relating to effectuating informal resolutions where possible, providing voice and empowering 
students, and ensuring fair process.  In this way the mission of a Title IX Coordinator often 
closely resembles that of an Ombuds.     
THE ARCHETYPAL OMBUDS’ MISSION 
 
The model Ombuds’s mission is to provide an informal mechanism for resolving 
disputes, provide information and an opportunity for voice, and ensure fair process.  Many 
organizations founded Ombuds programs as a means of providing alternatives to the formal 
grievance systems and for addressing the competing interests that give rise to disputes that not be 
well addressed by formal rules and organizational guidelines (Gadlin 2000, p. 43). Charles 
Howard (2011a) argues that organizations need confidential and anonymous channels of 
communication, and ideally Ombuds may resolve organizational conflicts that can't be resolved 
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through the standard channels.  Informal dispute resolution is a key tenet of the International 
Ombuds Association’s Standards of Practice.  The ideal Ombuds thus operates a complaint 
mechanism by which organizational members can pursue their issues informally.  Noted Ombuds 
Howard Gadlin described the value of an informal option (2011b):  
In any organization, whether it is a governmental agency, a university, or a 
corporation, innumerable opportunities for wrongdoing, unfairness, injustice, 
mistreatment, and conflict present themselves. The Ombudsman is an important 
part of an organization precisely because s/he is someone to whom members of 
the organization can come with issues that are not covered by any aspect of the 
organization’s governance mechanisms. (p. 42)  
 The University Senate Rules and Regulations governing the powers of the Ombuds Office 
at the University of Kansas provide a typical restriction in noting that the Ombuds “shall 
supplement, not replace, other means, where they exist, for redress of grievances” (University of 
Kansas, USRR, “University Ombuds Office”).  In order to provide clarity for potential visitors, 
Ombuds offices typically include Frequently Asked Questions segments that differentiate types 
of disputes handled.  Michigan State University’s Ombuds office provides dozens of frequently 
asked questions on issues as wide ranging as grade appeals to study abroad policies to disruptive 
conduct.   The office also differentiates academic versus non-academic disputes.  The University 
of Kansas Ombuds Office website describes the catch-all safety net function of its office in 
answering the question, “What should be taken to the Ombuds Office?”:   
If you have a reason for not wanting to go through official channels, a talk with an 
Ombuds may help to identify alternative courses of action. For many problems, a 
normal procedure or route of appeal is set out in university policies and procedures. 
Academic advisors, department chairpersons, deans and directors are all, by virtue 
of their office, experts at handling specific types of problems, and should normally 
be consulted first. If you don't know whether there is a procedure that fits your 
situation, contact the Ombuds Office.  (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office)  
 
	   147	  
Providing information and an opportunity for voice is another mission of the archetypal 
Ombuds.  Referring specifically to sexual misconduct, Rowe (2012) notes that “managers may 
feel that they must immediately take control of the disputes that come to them…[and] [i]t has 
become harder for ordinary line and staff managers to permit employees with concerns to have a 
voice in deciding how to handle the concern” (p. 13).  As a result interest-based options are often 
formally structured “by and around the General Counsel’s office, HR, and other compliance 
offices” (Rowe 2012, p. 13).  IOA Standard 4.1 articulates empowerment as an Ombuds’s goal, 
stating that “[w]hen possible, the Ombudsman helps people develop new ways to solve problems 
themselves.”  Howard Gadlin notes (2000) that “[a]ll Ombudsman give voice to people who 
might otherwise be disadvantaged in their dealings with the management and bureaucracy of the 
institution...” (p. 38).  Representing a common statement by Ombuds offices that they are a place 
to go for a confidential conversation without fear of retaliation, the Ombuds website at the 
University of Kansas describes the office’s purpose as to “act as ‘an ear to the people’ so every 
voice at The University of Kansas can be heard and receive impartial attention without fear of 
retaliation and loss of privacy” (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, Mission/Purpose).  
Further, the office website includes a statement that is typical of Ombuds offices that an Ombuds 
“provides information,” including “maintaining resource files on campus policies, procedures, 
services” and “referrals to other resources” (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, “What Does 
An Ombuds Do?”).  Michigan State University’s Ombuds also includes links on University 
policies, grievance procedures, student rights, and student responsibilities (MSU, Office of the 
University Ombudsperson) 
 Yet another mission of the archetypal Ombuds is to be an advocate for fair processes 
generally.  Section 2.2 of the International Ombudsman Association Standards of Practice states, 
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“The Ombudsman strives for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the treatment of people and 
the consideration of issues...” This includes not advocating on behalf of any individual within the 
organization, and advocating for processes that are fair and equitably administered.  Neutrality as 
fairness is a concept explored by many authors.  Avgar (2011) argues that “[t]he ability of the 
Ombudsman to perform her tasks is, to a large extent, contingent on the belief that procedures, 
interactions, and decisions are all conducted in a manner that upholds basic notions of fairness.” 
(p. 7).  As a result an archetypal Ombuds can provide for greater perceptions of interactional 
fairness within the organization (Avgar, 2011, p. 16).  
Harrison and Doerfel’s 2006 study of Ombuds demonstrated that perceptions of 
unfairness can lead to escalation of grievances and negative evaluations of the organization. 
As advocates for fairness of process, the ideal Ombuds may resolve organizational conflicts that 
can't be resolved through the standard channels.  Noted former Ombuds Robert Shelton equates 
the Ombuds role in advocating for fair and equitably administered processes as consistent with a 
restorative justice approach (2010, p. 24), and more broadly agrees that justice is a pre-eminent 
value of an archetypal Ombuds.  Restorative justice “seeks to build partnerships to reestablish 
mutual responsibility,” and “[r]ather than privileging the law, professionals and the state, 
restorative resolutions engage those who are harmed, wrongdoers and their affected communities 
in search of solutions that promote repair, reconciliation and the rebuilding of relationships” 
(Suffolk University, Center for Restorative Justice, What is Restorative Justice).  The Ombuds 
website for the University of Kansas describes as the mission of the office “[T]o ensure that all 
members of the university community receive fair and equitable treatment” by “receiving and 
attempting to resolve individual grievances on a confidential, informal basis” and “supporting 
systems change that advance the goal of a fair conflict management system” (University of 
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Kansas, Ombuds Office, Mission/Purpose).  This is echoed by the Michigan State University 
Ombuds’s website, which notes, the [O]mbudsperson seeks processes that are fair and equitable 
to all parties” (MSU, Office of the University Ombudsperson).  In sum, the model Ombuds’s 
mission is to provide a confidential, informal resolution mechanism that provides information 
and an opportunity for voice.  Model Ombuds also aim to provide feedback to decision makers 
regarding trends and processes that need improvement.    
OMBUDS’ MISSIONS IN PRACTICE: ADHERENCE TO THE MODEL  
 
In practice, most Ombuds try to faithfully serve the archetypal mission. This includes 
providing visitors with an opportunity for voice. For example an Ombuds said “the first thing is 
getting [visitors] to feel comfortable, convey to them that they’re being heard, what their concern 
is…and we’re acknowledging what they’re feeling or what they’re saying” (O1A8:18).  Another 
Ombuds noted, “[S]ometimes I’ll come out of the end of a case thinking it didn’t go as well as I 
thought it would, and that person was perfectly happy that I just listened to him” (O8B52:19).  
Ombuds described “students who come in who just want to be heard, who just want to vent” 
(O3A21:31).  One Ombuds provided an excellent example:   
After we went through the basics, I never said another word... She went through 
the full range of emotions while telling her story. She went through crying, and I 
simply used my hand and pointed at the tissue box sitting next to her…she went 
through laughter, she went through everything. Then at thirty-five minutes into 
the appointment, her cell phone goes off, and she announces that it’s her daughter 
and…she takes the [call] and says “I am just talking to the nicest [person] in the 
world…you’ve got to meet…I feel like we’ve known each other our entire 
lives…” [K]eep in mind, I’ve not said one darn word. So finally she ends the 
phone conversation…[and] goes back to talking about her situation…and at this 
point I started smiling…but I still didn’t say anything. At one hour and ten 
minutes she gets up and says “I feel much better. Thank you very much. When do 
we meet again?” I had not said one darn word after the introduction the entire 
time, and I actually had to…follow her down the hall to simply…get some time 
sensitive information into her hands in case she wanted to make some decisions, 
but in essence it was simply one of empathic listening.  (O11B58:12) 
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A second goal articulated by Ombuds who adhere to the archetype is to help visitors who 
do not know where else to go to resolve their issues.  One Ombuds commented, “I’m the avenue 
of last resort. When a client does not know how to resolve an issue or a problem, cut through the 
red tape, where to go from here, then I would traditionally be the person that they would come to 
see” (O11A57:12).  Another Ombuds noted, “I am the master troubleshooter for students on the 
campus…that is the role that I feel that I play…if you feel that something is not right, you don’t 
know what it is, come see us first. Come see us because we will then help to facilitate those 
conversations or get you to where you need to go” (O6A34:12).  
A third goal articulated by Ombuds adhering to the archetype is to empower their visitors 
to resolve their own problems informally.  One Ombuds noted “We want to give you the power 
to decide how you want to resolve this without it being given to someone outside of you and the 
other party like a formalized process or a legal process” (O1A8:16).  In describing the limits of 
formal processes, one Ombuds talked about a visitor that could have gone through the formal 
process, “although that limits things to the one equity issue, and this is a much bigger problem 
that we can address informally” (O8B52:3).  Another Ombuds described the goal of 
empowerment in stating, “I do not solve the issue, I do not solve the problem, my purpose is to 
help them explore options and empower them to resolve their own issues” (O11A57:12).   
Many Ombuds expressed visitors expecting them to act on their behalf: 
[M]any students come to me with a kind of vague expectation that I will solve 
their problems. That they only have to dump it onto my plate and I’ll take it from 
there and everything will come out fine…They’re sometimes disappointed when I 
don’t leap into the effort to solve their problems but help them explore things that 
they can do to solve their own problems.  (O4B:23:6) 
 
Ombuds who try do empower visitors do so by providing information to visitors and helping 
them explore options, as stated by an Ombuds who said “I think it always empowers people to be 
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educated of what their options are. I don’t ever want to be deciding for anyone”  (O8B52:27).  
Another Ombuds described information as empowerment:    
I operate under the philosophy that the ideal outcome in most cases will be to give 
the [visitor] some information…they don’t currently have that will sort of 
empower them to go forward and solve their own problems.  Oftentimes they 
haven’t tried…and don’t know that they actually have that right and 
responsibility, really, to try to solve their own issues.  (O4A22:18) 
 
One Ombuds described empowering visitors by encouraging them to ask for what they want: 
The phrase I use is ‘if mommy said no, go ask daddy until you get the answer that 
you want.’ I think I’m the person more likely than not to say ‘if you’re not getting 
the answer that you want, it doesn’t hurt to ask. You might be told no, but it 
doesn’t hurt to ask.’ Whereas other people might just say ‘don’t even bother 
asking.’ (O3A21:31)    
 
In addition to providing an informal mechanism for informing and empowering visitors, 
Ombuds adhering to the archetype seek to advocate for fair processes and procedures.  This 
included, “letting decision makers know what policies are working and not working, where the 
organization needs to make some structural changes in the way that they run the organization” 
(O1A8:30).  The Ombuds continued to relate fair process to efficiency: “We’re trying to help the 
organization become more efficient in how it exercises its policies and procedures. Because 
some [policies] are archaic and so it creates problems to try to solve problems, but [decision 
makers] don’t know it until someone tries to point it out” (O1A8:30). 
Overall, Ombuds who adhere to the archetype articulate a goal of working within the 
guidelines set forth by the IOA Standards of Practice.  One Ombuds stated, “I think one of the 
important parts of being an Ombuds is figuring out the culture of your organization and how to 
work within that and still be effective and still adhere to our code of ethics” (O14A63:69).  
Another Ombuds noted, “You have to…be able to fulfill whatever role that the situation calls for 
while not breaking your principles when it gets political” (O1A8:14).  Yet another stated, “I 
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always attempt to remember … what the basics are supposed to be, from starting out the thing 
about going through the confidentiality tenants, the basic tenants of what an Ombuds does…if 
you stick with the basics for the most part, your interactions, even when the outcome is 
unfavorable, they are going to be… the interaction itself for the office is going to be a good one” 
(O11B58:11).  One Ombuds described a visitor who wanted her to resolve their issue formally:   
I talked about [formal options and told her] ‘there are plenty of people on campus 
that can do that’ …and [I] referred this person to some of those people if she 
wanted to exercise that option. There is nobody else on campus that has 
confidentiality, independence, and neutrality, so if I [handle complaints formally], 
not only am I duplicating an existing service, I am negating the unique and 
essential function of my role.  (O10B56:14)   
 
Due to their lack of formal authority, managing expectations is a goal shared my most 
Ombuds.   This statement represents the standard practice in which Ombuds “reality test” their 
visitors’ beliefs and help them to make decisions about what they would like to happen:  
[A] lot of this is related to, you know, for a lack of a better word, “managing 
expectations” or preparing them for some of the potential difficult conversations 
in terms of understanding the full dimensions…[thinking through] their 
perceptions of the likelihood of success of various strategies. And success [is] 
defined by them according to what their goals are. Really I have to say sometimes 
people have unrealistic goals, more often than not, they have ill-defined goals and 
I think talking with us often helps them to get closer to understanding their own 
goals.  (O2A17:38)  
 
It took me a while to realize that one of our roles as an office is to give people the 
courage to do what they know they should do but they haven’t been able to get 
themselves to do it. It’s very difficult.  (O14A63:81) 
 
In sum, many Ombuds faithfully follow the role’s stated mission to provide an informal 
mechanism, consistent with the principles of confidentiality, informality, impartiality, and 
independence, for handling problems.  In doing so, these Ombuds advocate for fair processes, 
strive to provide visitors with voice, and try to empower them to resolve their own problems.   
DEPARTURES FROM THE ARCHETYPAL OMBUDS MISSION 
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Ombuds depart from the archetypal mission in order to access authority more commonly 
reserved for formal mechanisms. As a result, Ombuds departing from the archetypal mission 
often prefer to use rules and formal processes, to determine policy violations, and to actively 
resolve problems.  These departures also occur along a spectrum, with some Ombuds adhering 
closely to the IOA Standards of Practice, and others more closely resembling Ombuds.  In 
departing, Ombuds articulate a mission that is often more like that of a Title IX Coordinator.  For 
example, often Ombuds stated a preference for formal rules and processes.  One Ombuds 
lamented that “in a research university [academics] are used to not being rule bound…[t]hey 
don’t want rules and structure…[and] are much more used collegiality as they call it” 
(O10B56:37).  Multiple Ombuds expressed preferring formal mechanisms for resolving sexual 
harassment or racial discrimination complaints: 
Whenever we get into something that looks like it truly is sexual harassment or 
borderline sexual harassment or racial discrimination, I always try to involve [the 
formal office]. I try to get the person in my office to walk over …and file a 
complaint with them, because as much as I’m willing to entertain people’s 
complaints about that and will promise them confidentiality, if they insist on it, I 
really think that everybody’s better served by going on the record with all that. 
(O9B54:2) 
 
Another Ombuds described willingly participating in formal processes if necessary: 
 
[After learning about the various options] the visitor wanted to have a meeting 
with our Title IX coordinator and…we all met together. Once the visitor started 
telling what happened, she was putting the organization on notice, saying that 
there was sexual harassment. I was part of that. Our professional association, 
IOA, does not approve of that, but I am willing to do whatever it takes to get one 
of these cases to come forward.  (O14A63:43) 
 
Yet another Ombuds sounded very much like a Title IX Coordinator in describing the steps they 
would use in order to convince a potential reporter of sexual misconduct to make a formal 
complaint:   
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[T]he first approach would be to try to help the reporter, the victim of the abuse or 
the assault or whatever it is, recognize that we’ll protect that person from 
retaliation, that they came here because they wanted this thing to stop, and the 
way to get the thing to stop is to expose the perpetrator. Kind of basically 
convince the person that it’s okay to come forward, it’s safe to come forward, and 
it’s in everybody’s best interest…there could be other victims out there that we 
want to make sure that they are protected.  Another Ombuds told me that we 
would never do nothing, we would keep moving forward until this thing got 
addressed.  That would be my commitment.  I would do whatever it would take. 
(O7A37:35)  
 
In addition to often preferring rules and utilizing formal processes, many Ombuds also 
depart from the archetype by making judgments regarding policy violations, albeit on an 
informal basis.  Sounding very much like a Title IX Coordinator, an Ombuds noted, “A lot of 
what comes in here talking about discrimination is really just I’ve been treated badly or I’ve been 
treated unfairly.  It really isn’t discrimination” (O9B54:21).  The Ombuds continued, “A lot of 
times…I’ll wind up educating people about what discrimination really is…that it’s not just 
rudeness and incivility and disdain for people” (09B54:16).  Another Ombuds explained, “It 
never even crossed [the visitor’s] mind that it was sexual harassment and one of the roles we 
play for students is that we've labeled the behavior for them. They come in and they describe and 
we say, ‘You know that sounds like sexual harassment,’ they go ‘Really?’” (O14B64:33). 
One Ombuds noted, “A lot of times we have to check the policies and get information on what 
policies are and try to make sure whether anything has actually been violated.  That’s really the 
first step” (O9A53:16, 32).  Often in attempting to make that determination, it conflicts with the 
visitor’s goals:  
[The visitor] came in with [a] conclusionary [sic] statement…but I wanted to 
probe some more to get more factual stuff…and I never got to all of that because 
she wanted something that she wasn’t getting from me.  I …felt uneasy [when the 
visitor left suddenly] because I wanted to know more so that I [could] really 
comfortably conclude that it really was not in violation of university policy. 
(O7B38:13)   
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The effort to determine legitimate concerns is echoed by another Ombuds in describing their job 
to visitors:  
I explain to them that my job is to sift through what you share with me or what is 
a legitimate concern, a concern that really needs to be addressed and attended to, 
and that gives me something to have a conversation about and around, and I say, 
this is where I can be an advocate.  (O1B9:25)    
 
The line dividing advocating for enforcement of university policies or for individuals’ interests 
can be a fine one, and is further explored in chapter six.  Beyond determining the existence of 
policy violations, Ombuds who depart from the archetype often express a preference for directly 
solving problems themselves.  For example, one Ombuds described the challenge of helping 
visitors to reach their own conclusions: 
[I]’m letting them do their spiel, affirming them…and this is probably where I’m 
not as successful because I want to jump in and go to the next step, but the whole 
thing of…asking questions in such a way that prompts the client to answer their 
own questions.  That I still work on…  (O11B58:11)  
 
Other Ombuds more closely resemble Title IX Coordinators in directing the visitor on which 
steps to take, or simply taking the action themselves.  For example, one Ombuds noted, “We 
[will generally] discuss [the issue] and I [say] to them ‘based on the information you gave me I 
need to contact this person, or we need to do this.’  [I]f we [can] resolve [the issue] by calling the 
instructor… I [do it]… [I]f I [do not] have a good relationship with the instructor I…call the 
department head” (O5A28:22, O5B29:1).  Similar to a Title IX Coordinator, many Ombuds are 
more directive in terms of the options available and what might be achieved.  Ombuds often 
described efficient resolution as the goal:   
[My initial goal] I’m hoping number one to make it our last meeting! So my goal 
in any session is to basically short circuit all the other stuff …affirming their 
feelings, their emotions, whatever, but [at] some point while we’re doing the 
affirmation… [we need to ] get to the point of saying ‘this is the bottom line. 
These are your options, these are the things that can be tackled in terms of trying 
to address this issue.’  (O11A57:27-28) 
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Many Ombuds expressed frustration at not being able to effectuate change: 
[I]n order to get the administration to move on something they’re going to do it 
really slowly and they’re going to do I in a face saving way.  So they’re going to 
wait until a good juncture to give [the person] a soft landing, regardless of what 
he did.  (O9B54:11)    
 
The same Ombuds described their least favorite part of the job as “dealing with situations where 
it’s obvious that people don’t really want to fix the problem… they just want to get in there and 
be right, they don’t want to actually problem solve…[I]t becomes a frustrating matter when 
people on either side refuse to work in good faith to fix the problem” (09A53:20).  This is 
echoed by another Ombuds in describing how they handle difficult visitors: 
I was very idealistic.  I thought if you can get people to talk then they would 
really try to work to work things out, and in some cases that was true, but I found 
out for the ones that are a little more crafty, the ones that wanted to not 
compromise and get everything that they wanted at the expense of someone 
else…[I needed to] put them on the ropes, don’t let them off as the saying goes. 
(O1C10:28)   
 
Ombuds often learn to reframe their goals and their mission in order to align their 
work with their preferences: 
[T]he person who was in the position before me was kind of miserable in the role, 
and I think that actually help[ed] me to not approach [this job in] the same way 
and…always say “all I’m ever doing is dealing with problems.”  [M]y 
perspective…is I’m not always dealing with problems, I’m dealing with 
resolutions...[and] there’s always a positive outcome…[e]ither you resolve the 
situation to the benefit of the visitor or [the person] learn[s] why it happened [to 
avoid] do[ing] it again.  (O3A21:50)   
 
Ombuds who depart from the archetype are similar to Title IX Coordinators in that they 
often take active, directive steps in working towards resolution.  This becomes difficult when 
Ombuds must also navigate conflicting organizational goals.  For example, one Ombuds 
described resisting administrators’ preferences for student retention.   
	   157	  
I know that from a certain standpoint there may be the expectation of 
administrators that we would try to keep people here, but that's not really realistic 
and we'll say that to them, ‘that's not our role.’  Our role is to help the people 
come here and figure out what options they have and what they want to do, and if 
leaving winds up being in their best interest, or at least they believe it is, we’re not 
about trying to persuade them that they should stay.  (O2A17:50)  
 
In contrast, other Ombuds directly articulate the administrators’ goals as their own.  One 
Ombuds noted, “I really see my role as a retention role.  That’s a big part of it” (O3A21:60). 
Yet another Ombuds described frustration at retention not being part of the faculty’s goals: 
To be honest my favorite part [of my work is] challenging the faculty. The faculty 
has somewhat [of a] privileged mentality. They act as if the sun rises and sets on 
[them], and their particular course is the only course of value at the institution. 
[O]ur faculty needs to be more flexible in how they teach [and in] 
understanding…the complex issues facing the students….if retention and 
graduation is important then providing the support to the students to be able to do 
that is part of what should be part of the mission.  (O5A28:41) 
  
Both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds work for organizations that seek to avoid 
litigation and liability.  In this context, Ombuds who depart from the archetype see the 
administration’s goals of liability-avoidance as consistent with their own.  One Ombuds noted a 
goal of bringing concerns to administrators “before people start leaving, quitting their jobs, 
before morale goes right down the toilet, before formal grievances start getting filed, or lawsuits, 
worse yet” (O10A55:29).  This is echoed by an Ombuds who described “very public, very 
painful [sexual misconduct cases that led to] a determination as a campus [that] we were going to 
do everything possible to prevent [future incidences]” (O14B64:34).  Yet another Ombuds 
described their goals, in order, as “[g]iving the organization a second opportunity to get it right, 
preserving people’s reputations, minimizing litigation, [and] educating people within the 
organization on how processes and policies work” (O1A8:29). 
Other Ombuds more directly describe a goal of protecting the institution from negative 
publicity: 
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Being preventative. Preventing potential problems that can go to the press, that 
can be embarrassing to individuals. So prevention is something that’s valued and 
people… I think they don’t say it, but I think it’s an expectation that they would 
like us to prevent problems that are extremely sensitive from going outside of the 
organization. Decision makers prefer that it is contained and dealt with 
accordingly.  (O1B9:19).  
 
The same Ombuds also described the interests behind the goal of informal resolution:  
 
[I want to] resolve problems at the lowest possible level, and that’s really key 
there, because organizations prefer that an issue, if appropriate, gets resolved at 
the lowest possible level to minimize formals processes, or lawsuits for that 
matter, or people going to the press and saying not so nice things about people 
within the organization.  (O1A8:23) 
 
The Ombuds also notes a goal of making sure the administration is aware of problems 
that could cause damage to the institution: 
[T]here are three [exceptions to confidentiality}. One is any time somebody 
discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can’t keep that in confidence, or any 
disclosures of child or elder abuse, that can’t be kept in confidence, and then the 
other, the third area is if someone was to disclose that they had knowledge of 
somebody’s life or health being at risk, then we would have to disclose that to the 
appropriate authorities. Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If 
something doesn’t falls in those domains but if I think about it and over time it’s 
going to do significant damage to the institution I might decide to do something 
with that information. But I have to be careful, because people didn’t give me 
express permission to go forward.  [So] if I [go forward it is] because I weighed it 
and I said ‘you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause 
significant damage to the institution’…[S]o part of my job as an Ombudsman is to 
give decision makers a head’s up.  (O1A8:32 35)  
 
 As noted above, Ombuds’ stated goal of managing expectations is largely a result of 
lacking the authority to effectuate change.  As stated, Ombuds manage expectations by helping 
the visitor to determine their best options.  In practice, Ombuds managing expectations in ways 
more similar to Title IX Coordinators, by evaluating the likelihood of receiving a favorable 
outcome:  
[A] lot of times I’ll ask them what do you perceive as your preferred outcome for 
this, where do you want to go? And let them know if that’s a possibility or not or 
if it’s a good possibility or a remote possibility.  (O3A21:29) 
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Some Ombuds go further and manage expectations by clearly stating their own preferences.  For 
example:    
I find myself doing this more so now, managing expectations.  I’ll say to [visitors] 
‘I need you to understand [my three values]: [First] given my role as an 
Ombudsman, I value the collaborative process.  [T]he [s]econd value is 
compromise,’ and then on the tail end of compromise I [articulate the third value 
as] sacrifice, and then I also say ‘I need everybody involved to be adult and 
mature.’ (O1C10:26)   
 
Other Ombuds work to help visitors understand the obstacles to effectuating change.  One 
Ombuds described their standard speech for visitors with academic concerns: 
[I say]‘[B]efore we even get started here in terms of looking at options, I want to 
give you a standard spiel that I give to many students. This is not meant to 
discourage you, it’s not meant to diminish your hopes for resolution, but it is 
mean to give you an accurate appraisal, an accurate assessment of what the 
playing field is.’ And then I launch into ‘This is what we call a faculty governed 
university. What that means is that the faculty run the show, they have the power. 
‘Many times when students or clients have concerns or problems, they go 
immediately to the Chancellor or the President or the Provost, thinking they can 
resolve it. In reality, those individuals actually work at the behest of the faculty.’ 
Then I specifically say ‘From your perspective you’re saying ‘what power do 
[administrators] have?’ The power that they have is one of the pocketbook. In 
other words, they can’t order a faculty member to change their grade, they can’t 
say ‘you need to do this or that.’ The only thing they can do is impact their 
budgets.’  So I lay [it] out to them very clearly that that’s what they’re up against 
[and to avoid] any illusions that it’s something other than what it is, because it 
isn’t.  (O11A57:29)  
 
This is echoed by another Ombuds in providing a dose of reality about power and the 
opportunity for change:   
[Y]ou may not like how things are done, or you may see things you think [are] 
just downright wrong, but if that person doesn’t have…moral integrity and 
professionalism and ethics to do what’s right, then they’re going to run their 
organization in the manner that they see fit.  He who has the gold makes the rules.  
The question becomes, can you find a way to function, to get what you need so 
that you can move on…[b]ecause that’s the ugly reality.  I wish I could paint a 
picture where somebody comes charging in on a white horse and save[s] the day, 
but we’re talking about the real world and people have power, and…unless [the 
	   160	  
leadership has] an internal transformation or epiphany…you’re always going to 
be wondering “am I going to be given a fair shake?  (O1C10:16) 
 
In sum, some Ombuds depart from the archetype by articulating a mission that is often 
more like that of a Title IX Coordinator.  
CONCLUSION 
While the missions of the archetypal Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds are sharply 
distinct, in practice many Coordinators and Ombuds adopt elements of each other’s missions. 
The archetypal Title IX Coordinator is charged with enforcing the underlying aims of Title IX, 
including protecting individual rights, ensuring safety and gender equity, and conducting 
education and outreach.  A secondary goal is to avoid liability by correctly administering the 
requirements of the law.  The goals of the model Ombuds, meanwhile, is to provide an informal 
process that is alternative means of addressing institutional problems, to provide an opportunity 
for voice, and to ensure fair organizational processes.  Ombuds in practice often depart from the 
archetype by carrying out missions that are much more in line with goals stated by Title IX 
Coordinators. Departing Ombuds articulate preferences for utilizing rules and formal processes, 
evaluating situations to determine policy violations, and actively seeking to resolve problems on 
behalf of their visitors.  Similarly, Title IX Coordinators often in practice pursue a mission more 
like an Ombuds.    Title IX Coordinators often express preferences for effectuating informal 
resolutions, for providing voice and empowering students, and for ensuring fair processes in line 
with a relational theory of authority.  Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators end up pursuing similar 
goals in order to practically solve problems and to assist survivors and alleged perpetrators to 
handle personally devastating situations.  They depart from their archetypal missions by using 
relational and legal-rational strategies in handling university sexual misconduct.   
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CHAPTER 5:  CONFIDENTIALITY  
  
 The Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator archetypes differ in how each handles 
confidentiality and reporting.  The model Ombuds is not an office of notice, meaning that any 
communications made to the Ombuds would constitute making the university officially aware of 
the complaint and thus responsible for remedying the misconduct.  The principles of the Ombuds 
model require that these offices maintain the confidentiality of visitors’ identity and any 
information that could lead to their identification.   In contrast, the model Title IX Coordinator is 
an office of notice.  As we will see in this chapter, for Title IX Coordinators confidentiality is a 
relative concept and is not given priority over the goal of identifying and resolving sexual 
misconduct on college campuses.  This chapter examines each model’s different approaches to 
confidentiality and reporting by first examining each archetype, and then how Title IX 
Coordinators and Ombuds adhere and depart from their respective models.  These adherences 
and departures occur along a spectrum, as some Ombuds or Title IX Coordinators may aptly be 
described as “adherers” or “deviators.”  Additionally, adherence or departure is often situational 
and context-specific as a Coordinator or Ombuds who goes by the book in one instance departs 
from their archetype in another.   
CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE OMBUDS ARCHETYPE 
The archetypal Ombuds model specifies that providing confidentiality to visitors is 
necessary in order to allow students and employees to feel comfortable asking for help or making 
a complaint.  Noted Ombuds Brian Bloch, David Miller, and Mary Rowe believe that promising 
confidentiality helps people come forward (Bloch, et al., 2009): 
Our experience is that only a relatively small proportion of the population is 
comfortable with formal actions (although importantly, some in this group are 
satisfied only by formal investigations and formal action).  But most people, most 
of the time, are quite reluctant to act on the spot, or report unacceptable behavior, 
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if they believe this will result in formal action.  This is one of the reasons why 
options are needed in a complaint system.  (p. 241)  
 
Patterson (2012) describes the benefits of confidentiality, provided by informal options, 
for encouraging the reporting of medical errors within a hospital.  She argues (2012) that 
“[f]ormal channels punish and lock out both the workers’ ownership—reducing accountability—
and suppress reporting, thereby suppressing the data needed to make improvements for the 
patients’ good” (p. 18).  By contrast, in her view informal processes support patient safety by 
eliciting reports of medical errors in order “to eradicate the systemic weaknesses that promote 
them” (Patterson, 2012, p. 18).    The informal channel allows workers to “maintain something 
valuable and rare—the ability to be empowered and involved in creating solutions and making 
decisions about process changes” (Patterson, 2012, p. 18). The informal channel empowers 
visitors “to make up their own minds about how to proceed on some concern, once the options 
are explored” (Patterson, 2012, p. 19).  This self-determination is supported, according to 
Patterson (2012) by “non-punitive dialogue” that allow for “professional and human growth” 
(pp. 19-20). 
 As described in earlier chapters, some research shows that many people will not file a 
complaint without being promised confidentiality.  Recognizing these deterrents to coming 
forward, the archetypal Ombuds model favors adherence to a strict principle of confidentiality in 
all communications. The IOA Best Practices (2009) states that if issues cannot be raised in 
confidence, individuals may be unwilling to raise them, thereby “depriving the organization of 
an opportunity to address issues and rectify misconduct that has not yet surfaced through other 
channels” (p. 7).  Howard (2011a) argues that organizations need confidential and anonymous 
channels of communication to resolve workplace conflict and help people report misconduct.  
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IOA Standard 3.1 requires that Ombuds hold communications in strict confidence by not 
revealing, nor being required to reveal (without express permission), the identity or information 
that could lead to identification of any visitors contacting the office.   Further, the Ombuds only 
takes action with the individual’s express permission.  The visitor is incapable of forcing the 
Ombuds to reveal any information, and the discretion of whether to report is held by the 
Ombuds.  Describing this confidentiality as a privilege, the standard provides an exception where 
there appears to be imminent risk of serious harm. This assessment is to be made by the Ombuds.  
IOA Standard 3.2 specifically states that communication between the Ombuds (while serving in 
that capacity) and others is privileged, with the privilege held by the Ombuds and the Ombuds 
office, not any other person.  As a result, no one else can waive the privilege.  
The IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 6) states that the Ombuds may negotiate with the 
organization to be exempt from mandatory reporting requirements, and imminent risk of serious 
harm should be construed as narrowly as possible.  Further the IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 6) 
recommends that the Ombuds publicize its promise of confidentiality, be situated in a location 
designed to protect visitors’ privacy, and that permission to reveal information should not be 
provided once the issue is being handled in a formal process.  Often visitors will grant 
permission for an Ombuds to reveal their identity or other information as they work to help them 
resolve the issue.  Once a visitor uses a formal process, an Ombuds should not agree to release 
any information learned while working with that visitor.  
IOA Standard 3.3 extends the principle of confidentiality to prohibit Ombuds from 
testifying in any formal process within or outside the organization.  This prohibition operates 
whether the individual provides permission or requests the Ombuds come forward.  The Ombuds 
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may provide, in accordance with IOA Standard 3.3, “general, non-confidential information about 
the Ombudsman Office to the Ombudsman profession.”  
Other IOA Standards regarding confidentiality include 3.4, requiring that the Ombuds 
safeguard individuals’ identities when providing general reports to the University administration; 
3.5, requiring the Ombuds to keep no records on behalf of the organization containing 
identifying information; 3.6 requiring the Ombuds to maintain information such as notes, phone 
messages, calendars, in a secure location, protected from inspection, and to maintain a standard, 
consistent practice for destroying these records.  The IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 7) suggests 
that record-keeping systems and databases should be separated from the organization’s 
technology system.  Technology questions pose a particular challenge for the Ombuds archetype, 
given the dramatic increase in electronically stored information.  Mousin (2011) recommends a 
re-evaluation of the model Ombuds’s confidentiality and exploration of “proportionality in terms 
of balancing access and working in partnership with one’s institution and [v]isitors to clearly 
express what can be kept fully confidential and what can be reasonably protected” (p. 26).     
IOA Standard 3.7 requires the model Ombuds to prepare reports and data in a way that 
protects confidentiality.  IOA Standard 3.8 addresses notice directly, stating that communications 
made to the Ombuds are not considered notice to the organization.  IOA Standard 4.8 provides 
that the Ombuds shall not serve as the organization’s agent.  Specifically, “notice to the 
Ombudsman is not notice to the organization.” Standard 4.6 specifies that if the Ombuds reports 
trends or issues about policies and procedures, this must be done without breaching 
confidentiality or anonymity.  
The IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 8) specifies that even in situations in which the visitor 
provides permission to the Ombuds to discuss a concern with a manager, the model Ombuds 
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should only discuss the issue in general terms and should not specify names, dates, or events.  If 
allegations of wrongdoing are communicated, the IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 8) recommends 
that the Ombuds emphasize that the allegations are not confirmed as accurate.  Further, adverse 
action should not be taken by the organization on the basis of Ombuds-provided information.  
The IOA Best Practices (2009, p. 8) does state that the Ombuds may elect to place the 
organization on notice, but should waive confidentiality regarding the specific communication 
made for purposes of notice.  Notice occurs via the conversation between the Ombuds and the 
organizational representative, not when the visitor communicates with the Ombuds.  As a result, 
there are “no circumstances…[in which] the original communication to the Ombudsman 
[becomes] part of the notice communication” (IOA Best Practices, 2009, p. 8).  
Many particular Ombuds offices emphasize the principle of confidentiality in their 
documents or statements of practice.  For example, The University Senate Rules and Regulations 
at the University of Kansas specifically provide confidentiality as a power granted to the 
Ombuds Office:  “All proceedings in individual cases shall be held confidential by the 
Ombudsman unless otherwise authorized by the complainant” (University of Kansas, USRR, 
“Ombuds Office Powers”).  Notably, this contravenes IOA Standard 3.2, which specifically 
states that communication between the Ombuds (while serving in that capacity) and others is 
privileged, with the privilege held by the Ombuds and the Ombuds office, and not any other 
person.  The 2008 Statement of Best Practices for the University of Kansas Ombuds Office 
provides that the office has no power to receive notice for the University, and “all 
communications with an Ombuds are made with the understanding that communication is 
confidential, off-the-record, and that no one will be called to testify in any formal or legal 
proceeding to reveal confidential communications, unless compelled by judicial subpoena or 
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court order” (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, Statement of Best Practices, 2008).   
Michigan State University’s Ombuds website echoes this view, and notes “Information 
concerning any visit will not be disclosed without the visitor’s permission, absent compelling 
reason (e.g. , a court order or potential risk to safety)” (MSU, Office of the University 
Ombudsperson).   Regarding notice, the Michigan State University Ombuds’s website states: 
The Office of the University Ombudsperson does not accept formal complaints, or 
notice, for the University.  The University ombudsperson may assist in the 
informal resolution fo concerns regarding  a variety of issues, including sexual 
harassment and discrimination.  Talking to the University Ombudsperson does not 
constitute notice to the University, since the purpose of the Unviersity 
Ombudsperson’s Office is to provide a confidential forum where different options 
may be considered (MSU, Office of the University Ombudsperson).   
 
Nonetheless, the legal basis for protecting the confidentiality of communications made by 
an Ombuds is far from settled.  No U.S. State embraces the Ombudsman privilege as envisioned 
by the IOA (Van Soye, 2007, p. 128).  Four states (Alaska, Arizona, Hawaii, and Nebraska) 
grant the Ombudsman a privilege not to testify, but no cases have been brought in any of these 
jurisdictions addressing the issue (Van Soye, 2007, p. 129). But these state statutes allow 
claimants or witnesses to testify if they choose.  Thus the model Ombuds in these states can 
refuse to testify but is unable to stop anyone else from talking about their own communications 
(Van Soye, 2007, p. 129).  Oser (2005, pp. 295-96) notes that the promise of confidentiality is a 
large problem for Ombuds, as there is little case law protecting the confidentiality of 
communications with Ombuds, and often the level of confidentiality is controlled by the 
organization itself.  Further, the fact that the Ombuds archetype is employed by the organization 
and may be fired by it creates potential problems of conflicts of interests and potential breaches 
of confidentiality (Oser, 2005, p. 296).   
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Howard (2011b, pp. 289-309) provides a detailed explanation of what the archetypal 
Ombuds office must do to avoid legal challenges to confidentiality and notice.  As described 
above, the courts in certain circumstances will recognize a common law privilege that must be 
raised and defended in each instance.  In order to avoid imputed notice and affirmatively argue in 
favor of a confidentiality privilege, Ombuds programs must publicize certain facts, specifically: 
1- Ombuds claim a confidentiality privilege, owned by the Ombuds, who is the 
only one who can waive it.   
2- Ombuds do not serve as agents for purposes of receiving notice.   
3- Communications with the Ombuds are confidential.     
4- Ombuds will create and make available a chartering document that provides 
for and articulates the items in this list and more.   
5- Ombuds practice to the IOA standards.  
6- Ombuds are independent from the administrative structure. 
7- Ombuds do not conduct formal investigations. 
8- Ombuds have no decision-making power.  
9- Ombuds will not participate, and cannot be called, in other proceedings, both 
administrative and judicial (pp. 252-253).   
 
The office should be well publicized and state what the office does and does not do, using, for 
example, brochures, posters, the website, internal newsletters and magazine articles. There 
should be no ambiguity and all materials should be consistent, uniform, and clear (Howard, 
2011b, pp. 252-253). Howard (2011b) argues that these publications may form the basis for an 
“implied contract” as a means of maintaining confidentiality (p. 252-253).  While the visitor does 
not sign anything, it is “implied” that using an Ombuds program is conditioned on acceptance of 
the principles upon which the office was established (Howard, 2011b, p. 252-253).   
Proponents of formal reporting mechanisms see the archetypal Ombuds model’s 
informality and confidentiality as a band-aid for the failures in formal processes and prefer to 
solve the problem at its source, by improving the formal process.  For these critics, the ultimate 
weakness of the Ombuds archetype’s confidentiality system occurs when individuals decide not 
to pursue their complaints.  While many conflicts do not involve allegations of legal wrongdoing, 
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other complaints (for example sexual harassment) involve activities that go beyond mere conflict 
and can involve organizational liability and the violation of individuals’ rights.  To what extent 
does the Ombuds archetype’s principle against reporting such behaviors and lack of notice to the 
institution exacerbate efforts to elicit complaints of, and prevent, illegal behavior?   
Noted Ombuds Mary Rowe observes (2011) that “there are options other than a) keeping 
silent or b) breaching confidentiality” (p. 40). These options include discussing the facts, laws 
and rules, and in doing so encouraging the visitor to decide to act responsibly to prevent future 
harm to others (Rowe, 2011, p. 41).  Further, many visitors may be willing to come forward after 
time has passed and circumstances have changed (perhaps they have a different job).  Other 
visitors may be willing to provide an anonymous note to a senior manager or a compliance 
manager.  Another option is for the model Ombuds to be given permission to act in place of the 
visitor, as long as the visitor’s anonymity can be maintained (Rowe, 2011, p. 42).  Rowe also 
notes that with the visitor’s information, the model Ombuds may be able to instigate a generic 
approach, like a routine safety audit and follow-up training, and catch the problem (2011, p. 42).  
Another option includes helping the visitor prepare for the conversations and aid them in 
learning the skills necessary for acting effectively.  Further, understanding whistleblower 
protection laws and policies against retaliation, and finding an accompanying person who shares 
their concerns may make the visitor more likely to come forward (Rowe, 2011, p. 42). 
Ombuds like Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin (2009, p. 57) believe that zero tolerance policies 
requiring everyone to report certain behaviors may actually discourage reporting.  This is 
because many people do not wish to be tattletales and are expected by the manager to directly 
deal with problems. Not wanting to get other people fired or in trouble, and not trusting the 
employer to do a fair investigation, “zero tolerance policies may inhibit reporting” (Rowe, 
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Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 57).  They also note that fear of retaliation is a common reason to 
avoid reporting, but that forbidding retaliation is not very effective because “few people 
understand or trust such a policy” and retaliation is hard to prove and prevent where “delayed, 
indirect, diffuse, outside the workplace, or covert” (Rowe, Wilcox, and Gadlin, 2009, p. 47).   
Archetypal Ombuds are thus offices of informal deliberation and confidentiality that use 
the principle of confidentiality to provide self-determination to visitors as they consider whether 
or how to invoke more formal organizational processes that typically promise much less—or 
no—confidentiality.    
OMBUDS WHO ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY  
Ombuds who follow the archetype are not offices of “notice” or compliance, and 
maintain visitors’ confidentiality and the confidentiality of information that may lead to 
identifying a visitor.  Adherence to these principles includes maintaining confidentiality in 
difficult environments in which others are violating confidentiality, maintaining the 
confidentiality of e-mail and phone communications, and reporting responsibly according to 
archetypal model.  Ombuds practicing to the archetype also provide their visitors with control 
over whether and how to report allegations of sexual misconduct.   
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype face a series of dilemmas in maintaining the 
confidentiality standard.  Ombuds must subordinate other values in order to maintain 
their commitment to confidentiality, and Ombuds are very aware of the required tradeoff.  
For example, Ombuds who adhere to the confidentiality standard are unable to report a 
sexual misconduct violation, even when it is egregious and done by a repeat violator who 
is a professor and is preying on vulnerable students.  One Ombuds described maintaining 
confidentiality, even at the expense of the Ombuds’s preference for reporting:  
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I would hope that I could be persuasive enough with one or more of the victims 
here that would put them in a place where they would be willing to speak to our 
Title IX coordinators or the police to go ahead and file reports …or I’d request a 
release from [my] confidentiality promise so I could do something on their behalf. 
I really do, again, think that it is a critical part of the service that I offer that it is 
confidential and would really protect that value, even at the risk of some others… 
If someone were the victim of a sexual assault and came here, I assume they came 
here because I was obligated to keep that confidential. If they wanted [someone to 
be] more active in terms of a response [the visitor] would have gone to the police 
or they would have gone to the Title IX coordinator, neither of whom are 
obligated to keep that confidential and both of whom are obligated to be more 
active in investigating that claim.  So I really would encourage…and work with 
[the visitor] in terms of what it is they’re so afraid about to actually [report].  [I]f 
they’re a victim of sexual assault I would say go to the police first. I’d be happy to 
support them in doing that, I would even go with them if they needed me to. I’d 
walk them over, I’d call for them, something. Same with the Title IX coordinator 
if that’s the way they wanted to go. I would really encourage them as strongly as I 
could. [But] [a]t the end of the day, if they came here because of the protection of 
confidentiality, I would honor that.  (O4A22:22-28)  
 
Another Ombuds’s example provides a comprehensive view of how Ombuds who adhere 
to the archetype must do as at the expense of other values.  The Ombuds first described the 
situation:   
[O]n any…research university campus there are a number of faculty who take 
advantage of their positions to…develop amorous relationships with 
their…graduate students.  One [in particular had] a habit of inviting students to 
co-author [something] which…is going to look really great on their resume when 
they [are on the job market].  [This offer always came with an] invit[ation] to 
engage in sexual acts…[that created] the perception on the part of the graduate 
student, ‘[I]f I say no, I will lose this professional opportunity.’  I have had any 
number of [this faculty member’s] students come to me...  (O10B56:16)   
 
Next the Ombuds described their own preferences:    
 
I would have loved…to [have any of them be] the first one to step forward, I 
would have loved to say if she says ‘oh, no, I don’t want to go through all that, I’ll 
just find another job,’ ‘You realize that by doing that you are sealing the fate of 
somebody else that’s going to be in here, and the next person he’s going to 
proposition, you realize that, right?’… I’d like to be able to say that, but I can’t in 
my role.  (O10B56:30)   
 
Then the Ombuds explained when it is possible to raise the issue:   
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I have been to both the chair of [the] department and the dean and I have told 
them, not during the time that anyone that I’m aware of is actively being solicited, 
but I’ll wait for the last person to see me to leave, and then I’ll go [talk to the 
department chair and the dean].  (O10B56:31)  
 
What the Ombuds communicated to the chair or dean is next described:   
  
[L]ook, over the last [number of] years I’ve had [a number of] different people 
come to me and tell me this general kind of story about [this faculty member’s] 
behavior…Now I don’t do investigations, I don’t apply lie detector tests, but 
[those numbers of people] telling me an almost identical pattern of behavior…?  I 
am concerned and I hope that you are too…that sooner or later one of these 
people is going to take one of the formal options I’m [telling] them [about] and 
[that will result in] an investigation, embarrassment, and hassle that could be 
avoided if this…behavior were to be altered.  So whether there’s any truth to 
these allegations or not, and I’m not saying there is, I’m just saying that even if 
they’re all made up, my job is to tell them that one of their options is to go to the 
[formal] office and file a charge and ultimately to the [government]…and [that 
will result in] federal investigators poking around…and I assume that you would 
prefer to avoid that. So I just thought you’d want to know.  (O10B56:31)    
 
Finally the Ombuds noted how they maintain confidentiality and also impartiality in the face of 
very difficult circumstances:   
The hardest part of this job is knowing that in the next year or two there will be 
another one of [the faculty member’s] victims in my office, and there’s an 
innocent person out there who may not be in the program yet who’s going to be 
victimized…if somebody doesn’t stand up and stop it.  The only people that 
have…[the] standing to do that is a victim.  I will tell people, ‘[I]f you choose to 
leave…you’ll be out from under this person’s control, please consider writing 
down your experiences and sending them to the dean or appropriate individual so 
that some kind of record exists’…but frankly, that almost never happens…[T]hey 
want to start a new chapter in their life and put this behind them... But yeah, my 
preference is that these people stand up to these victimizers and call them out for 
what they are and put them and the people responsible for their behavior on notice 
so that we can reduce the chances of future innocent victims. Do I ever make a 
consultee aware that that’s my preference? Absolutely not. That would not be 
being neutral on my part.  (O10B56:22)   
 
Ombuds who want to stop egregious sexual misconduct may only report under an 
exception for danger of imminent harm.  One Ombuds who noted, “I would not be comfortable 
with [reporting while keeping the visitor’s identity anonymous], unless there [is] imminent risk 
	   172	  
of harm to somebody” (O11A57:33).  Sexual misconduct in particular presents a significant 
challenge to Ombuds’ confidentiality and determining when there is imminent risk of harm.  
Again following the archetypal model, an Ombuds noted that risk of serious or imminent harm 
must be understood narrowly: it “can be harm to oneself or someone else [but] typically we are 
more concerned about…someone hurting themselves.  [T]hey will mention they’ve thought 
about suicide and those sorts of things and you have to quickly coordinate [support for them]… I 
have [also] had someone make a terrorist threat in my office…” (O8A51:12).   
When Ombuds maintain confidentiality they often also must sacrifice the goal of 
stopping misconduct.  One Ombuds described educating his or her visitor about their options but 
secretly wanting the person to report the misconduct: 
[W]hen a difficult case comes forward, and I would say that sexual harassment is 
to me the hardest, I want it to be reported. I want the behavior to stop and I do 
everything I can to educate my visitors about what their options are... That’s 
problematic in our field because if you take sexual harassment as an example, if 
we report it, or we come forward with the information or even part of the meeting 
where someone else talks about it, we’re part of putting the organization on 
notice. From a purist[‘s] point of view, Ombuds are not supposed to do that. 
(O14A63:42)   
 
Ombuds who adhere to the confidentiality standard also must make a tradeoff in terms of 
providing access and in communicating efficiently.  Given the tenuous ability to maintain the 
confidentiality of electronic communication, many Ombuds do not use e-mail or even 
communicate with visitors by phone, both common ways to have quick and effective 
communications.  Here an Ombuds described the challenge of utilizing e-mail and adhering to 
the IOA Standards:   
One of the great conundrums of our profession right now is the use of e-mail [and 
it is] underappreciated by many in our profession as a gross violation of 
confidentiality…[A]ny email that has ever gone through one of our servers on this 
campus still exists in its entirety and is available to any number of IT personnel 
who are conducting maintenance or otherwise have clearance to get at it, and 
	   173	  
available to be subpoenaed by the court as evidence in any kind of [proceeding]. 
So every time we use email we can no longer ensure confidentiality. We certainly 
have an obligation, therefore, not only to discourage [the use of e-mail] but to 
inform our users…and I think we need to give some more thought very deeply as 
a profession to whether we [use e-mail] at all, because it is not consistent with one 
of the four main pillars of our code of ethics and standards of practice. 
(O10A55:18) 
 
Another remarked: 
[E]-mail [is] not confidential, if anybody wants to pull records later, if they go 
through a grievance later they can [access that information] so I discourage them 
from [e-mailing me] unless they’re just going to shoot me an email to say 
‘[W]hat’s a good time we can meet?’ But even then, [that creates] a record…that 
they [visited] my office. Even in my calendar I try to just put first names.  
(O8A51:24)    
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype often develop special arrangements for handling e-mail:   
We’re part of the university email system, but our system is not backed up by the 
university…so our emails are not backed up, but our emails go through the 
campus system. We tell people all the time ‘we can’t guarantee the 
confidentiality’ of [e-mail as] [w]e don’t have control... people give us their 
private email addresses, but it doesn’t matter.  (O14A63:56)  
 
I’ve eliminated the email address from all our communications because people 
start spilling their guts in writing electronically and then that record never dies. 
(O7A37:14)  
 
Many Ombuds discussed the lack of confidentiality of e-mailed communications.  One noted, 
“[A]lmost all the time, we’ll say ‘[W]e need to talk by phone or meet in person.’  We won’t give 
any information by email” (O14A63:54).   
Other Ombuds who adhere to the archetype will not speak by phone with individuals 
about their concerns.  One noted, “There [is] absolutely no way for me to know [whether or not a 
conversation] is being recorded so the only exception I’ll make [and speak by phone] is if 
someone [lives far away]…but I make it very clear that I’m making an exception” (O11A57:25).  
Ombuds adhering to the standards must preference confidentiality over the access and efficient 
communication that occurs through phone or e-mail.   
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Ombuds who resist organizational efforts to encourage reporting even must subordinate 
their professional reputations to their commitment to the Confidentiality standard.  They also 
potentially endanger the perceived usefulness of their Ombuds offices.  With increased pressure 
favoring a collaborative institutional approach to identifying and addressing sexual misconduct, 
protecting confidentiality is increasingly a challenging for Ombuds:   
It’s really rare that I feel that I can go to my colleagues around campus and allied 
offices and talk about a situation because, again, I would have only had one or 
two visitors and I just don’t feel comfortable [being able to protect 
confidentiality], so it [does not identify anyone]… actually in one of our worst 
campus situations it was a specific department that was a problem. I heard one 
complaint about it. It turns out that my colleagues had also heard complaints. If 
we had sat around in a room and talked about it we would have all said ‘yes, this 
department’s a problem’ But I don’t feel comfortable initiating that.  
(O14A63:46)   
 
Other Ombuds also described the difficulty of collaborating and protecting confidentiality: 
Even if I don’t use [the visitor’s] name on the phone, the [visitor] is going to go 
right over [to that office] and engage in that procedure.  [The personnel in that 
office will] assume it was that [visitor] that I called about…[and]…that 
compromises confidentiality.  (O10A55:22)   
 
Given the lack of certain protection for confidentiality, Ombuds are often dependent on their 
institutions’ acting in good faith to uphold the promise of confidentiality:  “[My] [u]niversity 
basically says ‘[Y]ou are not an office of notice and the University is allowing you to offer 
confidentiality to the extent permitted by law’” (O9A53:14).  Often Ombuds practicing to the 
archetype must defend against being required or mandated to make specific reports that will put 
the institution on notice:  
I was vehemently opposed to being a mandated reporter. In fact, my arguments 
were persuasive and the university has agreed that I can be a confidential [office], 
even in regard to [sexual misconduct].  (O4A22:31)   
 
Because the…cornerstone of ombudsing is confidentiality…[i]f you don't have 
confidentiality and you’re not off-the-record and informal there's no reason to 
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have an Ombud[s] Office…So I honestly would resign in protest if I had to [be a 
mandatory reporter on issues of sexual misconduct].  (O12A59:29-30) 
 
Ombuds also subordinate their professional reputations to the confidentiality standard by 
not speaking publicly to counter incorrect statements or misperceptions.  Ombuds described the 
challenge of not being able to speak publicly about cases:    
[By]	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  the	  work…the	  only	  time	  you	  get	  [press]	  is	  when	  something	  
goes	  wrong…because	  if	  things	  go	  well	  and	  you	  solve	  the	  problem	  most	  people	  don’t	  
hear	  about	  it.	  If	  you’re	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  something	  and	  it	  blows	  up,	  then	  everybody	  
hears	  about	  the	  bad	  stuff	  that	  blows	  up….	  	  But	  I	  can’t	  say	  to	  everybody	  on	  campus,	  
‘[T]hat’s	  not	  what	  I	  [said]!’	  	  [If	  people]	  say,	  ‘So	  and	  so	  told	  me	  that	  someone	  in	  
particular	  has	  been	  to	  see	  you	  and	  [this	  is	  what	  you	  told	  that	  individual]…,	  I	  can	  only	  
say	  ‘I	  can’t	  confirm	  or	  deny	  that	  I’ve	  talked	  to	  [anyone],	  but	  if	  somebody	  came	  to	  me	  
with	  that	  problem,	  here’s	  probably	  what	  I	  would	  say	  to	  that	  person.’	  (O9A53:15-42)	  
 
Further, because of Title IX requirements and the resulting institutional interest in 
reporting all known instances of sexual misconduct, Ombuds who refuse to report 
violations may be viewed by other administrators as an impediment to stopping sexual 
misconduct.  Ombuds who adhere to the confidentiality standard and who do not serve as 
an office of notice often must sacrifice their professional reputations.  One Ombuds 
described helping a visitor think through the confidentiality of a situation and how the 
administration might see the conversation:    
 [I will say to visitors] ‘Is there a risk of retaliation?  What might happen to you if 
he or she can put two and two together’… We’re not an…office of notice [and] I 
think our [administrators] would say, ‘Oh no, don’t say anything that might 
discourage [visitors] from coming forward.’  (O1B9:39) 
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype do, however, make some reports to the university.  
The question of when and how an Ombuds may reveal communication is fundamental to the role 
itself.  Ombuds who follow the archetype draft an annual report detailing numbers of cases 
falling into general categories specified by the International Ombuds Association.  These reports 
may not provide any information that would identify a visitor, for example: “[Any] 
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things…specific to a particular procedure or particular office [are] not report[ed] publicly in my 
annual report… I do report the number of [cases by type] but I do not specify…what individuals 
or departments were involved” (O10A55:5).  Another Ombuds noted “[Not using] any intake 
form for visitors to complete, and in terms of [personal] demographics it is visual, whatever I see 
[to avoid records and maintain anonymity]” (O7A37:43).  Many Ombuds adhering to the 
archetype also provide periodic feedback to administrators on trends and potential process 
improvements.  For example, an Ombuds described “meeting with [the president] quarterly 
to…talk about the state of the campus [but] [w]e don’t [provide] any information about our cases 
at all” (O14A63:31). 
Ombuds who give priority to Confidentiality often must do so as a detriment to 
developing relationships.  One Ombuds described being careful in conversations not to breach 
confidentiality as any communication from the Ombuds to university agents capable of receiving 
notice does put the institution on notice:   
I think that an Ombuds always needs to be aware that unless they're talking to 
another Ombuds person, talk[ing] with [others] may [constitute] … notice if they 
talk about certain things.  (O12A59:25)   
 
Another Ombuds noted the challenge of working at a big university in a small town:   
I think I’m excellent at confidentiality, [but here it is] a situation where I have 
neighbors on my block who work at the university, everyone I meet is affiliated… 
there’s no one I [can] talk to about anything I’m doing other than [with] people 
[who work] in my office. I…get questions about it all the time…even[from] 
people who [understand] the [functions of an Ombuds] office [but still] say ‘Can 
you tell me about this case?’ Someone [will] read an article in the paper and say 
‘Are you involved in this?’ Constantly people [are] asking me if I [know] 
something about [a] situation and I’ve got to figure out appropriate ways of 
responding.  (O14A63:14) 
   
This observation is echoed by another Ombuds who stated, “When they see [me] walking 
around…the[y] look [at me and seem to say]…‘I wonder what [he or she] knows.’ And if they 
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did something they know [was wrong]…they’re wondering “I wonder if [he or she] knows about 
something that I don’t want them to know” (O1A8:42).   
 While maintaining confidentiality requires tradeoffs, Ombuds who adhere to the 
confidentiality standard also protect impartiality and informality and support other values, such 
as trust, safety, reputation, and self-determination.  An Ombuds described their informal process 
providing confidentiality and control as key to establishing trust with visitors:  
I think…she felt like it was a place she could trust, that it was a place she could 
go, have a confidential, off the record discussion, and brainstorm with someone 
who knows the university policies and procedures and could advise her on the 
policy and what to expect and that type of thing. And I think it really helped her to 
be able to talk to someone without fear that it would not be confidential. I think 
she did fear [a lack of] confidentiality…[and] it meant a lot to her that she had a 
place to go…without giving up that control, and that that she had time to 
decide…to process and decide what she wanted to do…. It felt safe to her and she 
didn’t have to feel like by coming to me it would automatically get reported…I do 
think the brainstorming process and just letting her have some time was 
beneficial.  (O12B60:11)  
 
Another Ombuds clearly articulated the same benefits, but by distinguishing the informal 
Ombuds practice from more formal processes:   
You can’t have it both ways. If you’re not going to be an agent of notice, and 
you’re going to participate in formal [processes]… you start crossing lines, you 
do not have the right to claim no notice and you are not really Ombudsing…Many 
of the people who come to me to talk about sexual harassment or racial 
discrimination come to me first and foremost for a reality check. “This happened 
to me. It feels like that. Does that make sense? Is that rational? Do you think 
someone else to whom this had occurred might feel that way?” Those are what 
draw people here, and if they have to compromise their confidentiality and 
provide notice and [be forced into] formal [processes], just to get those questions 
answered, they’re not going to come. They want a safe place to come and discuss 
first, to use the words that some of them use: “Am I crazy, or is this sexual 
harassment?” And then a safe and trusted place to come to say, “Ok, if I wanted to 
do something about it, what are the kinds of things I might consider doing?” 
Without obligating themselves to do any of them. And those are two functions 
that we as ombudsmen can perform only because we are not agents of notice and 
we are confidential.  (O10A55:31) 
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Many Ombuds described safety as the reason they would only report on an individual 
situation if the visitor provides them with permission:    
[I]f someone came to me about a sexual harassment issue and didn’t want to deal 
with it until they left the organization, either graduated as a student or got another 
job or something like that, and then they gave me permission to go forward, I 
would figure out a way to do that even if it’s just one person. Sexual harassment, 
you don’t peck at numbers, ‘it’s just one.’ But if I [do not have permission, and I] 
have to maintain… anonymity, I’m never going to be able to go forward 
[because] the situations are too unique. It’s really…99.9% of the time, all I can do 
is try to work with my visitor to try to see if there’s a way that they’re 
comfortable going forward themselves…I just feel like that person is very 
vulnerable and I can’t do anything to endanger them.  It really ties my hands… I 
don’t think I’ve ever been in a situation where I felt I could provide enough 
anonymity for my visitors that I could go forward with those issues.  
(O14A63:39-48-49)  
 
Ombuds widely discussed their views on how and when they might share confidential 
communications, with many discussing the level of anonymity necessary in order to make a 
disclosure.  One Ombuds commented, “[T]he only way we can [report], and I think it would 
almost never happen with racial discrimination or sexual harassment, is if we had enough 
complaints that we felt we could go forward with the report without identifying any individual 
visitor. It’s extremely rare that that happens in my experience…because typically it’s only one 
person who’s being affected at a time” (O14A63:38).  Another Ombuds who adheres to the 
archetype indicated only reporting on general trends:  
[I would report] by provid[ing] upward feedback to the [administration] about 
trends and patterns…without revealing any information…about the visitors or a 
potential respondent” (O12A59:18).   The same Ombuds further notes, “If it’s an 
isolated incident, I won’t report it.  And I don’t know where that line is honestly, 
but when I feel it’s a trend, [and] I feel like I’ve heard enough of the 
complaints…I can say to the Dean, ‘I’ve had several students come to me and 
here is the theme that I’m hearing.  This…might constitute a pattern or trend, 
and…you might want to look into [the situation].  But know that I have not talked 
to the [unit director].’  And saying it in that way, there’s no way that the Dean 
would know who came to see me, and who they came to see me about.  Especially 
in a big unit, you know, that deals with students from all over the university. 
(O12B60:36) 
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Reporting on general trends becomes even easier for the adhering-to-the-archetype Ombuds 
when the issue is one of policy or procedural irregularity:   
I would certainly bring [a systemic issue] to the attention of the people I report to 
or to the unit… even if it’s sexual harassment.  If it is a problem with the policy 
and it’s not a problem with a certain person…I would certainly bring [it] up to the 
person who deals with sexual harassment…  (O12A59:26)   
 
An Ombuds described confidentiality and the trust and safety it engenders as a 
motivating factor that leads people to seek out the office:    
Well, I know why they came to me; they came to me because I’m trusted. They 
knew it was  a safe place to come and that they wouldn’t be outed and that their 
confidentiality would be honored here, and there [is nowhere else] on campus 
where that is the case.  (O10B56:8) 
  
I’ve said this to our Title IX Coordinator:  There are issues out there that you’re 
never going to find out about because people are afraid to come forward because 
they can’t go someplace and just talk about it and feel safe about having that 
conversation.  (O7A37:58)   
 
Maintaining Confidentiality and building trust is also a way for Ombuds who adhere to the 
archetype to develop reputations as safe, reliable offices to bring concerns.  This is especially 
important given misconceptions about confidentiality are commonplace, as indicated by an 
Ombuds who explained, “There are misconceptions about confidentiality. A lot of people think 
that we automatically call the supervisor involved or [other formal office] and we’ll report 
things” (O14A63:75). Another Ombuds discussed the importance of building a reputation for 
maintaining confidentiality:   
[I]f you’re one step removed from the back channel that has a lot of control over 
information going upwards or not at all, then you’re not compromised by it. But 
it’s dangerous because this is where knowledge is power, and people want to 
know what you know, because if you maintain your confidentiality, your 
principles and your self-discipline, you don’t divulge who comes to your office, 
what is said, [and] people know that’s your function. And they know you’re not 
one to talk.  Using backchannels can risk all of it.  (O1A8:41) 
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Maintaining confidentiality can also be a means of ensuring impartiality, as indicated by 
one Ombuds:   
I explain [to visitors] that I don’t keep records and if they want me to read 
something I will, but [afterwards] I’ll either shred it or give it back to them.  So 
I’m really clear about that.  And I explain one of the reasons is because we are 
neutral and I don’t want to have documents that could result in having to become 
a witness in [a formal process]. That would mean I’m not a neutral person.  I 
would have to be on one side of a case or another.  I don’t want to do that.  
(O7A37:42)    
 
Another Ombuds echoed the advantage to impartiality of maintaining confidentiality:   
I would not report…without their permission, nor would I name the individual 
about whom a complaint has been made multiple times… I’d use…the generic 
option…[of] going to an administrator with responsibility over the alleged 
harasser, and suggest that some sort of training effort might be advantageous for 
the entire unit.  But I think it’s important that Ombuds remain neutral and not be 
in [a] leading the lynch mob kind of role.  (O2A17:19-22) 
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype provide the visitor with control over 
confidentiality and support the value of individual self-determination.  Remaining 
impartial while providing the visitor with control is described by an Ombuds:   
I [have] never…reported something [to send it through a] grievance procedure 
[because I have] never seen anybody win their case.   I don’t want to say that I 
deter people from [formal options], what I do is I’d recommend that they talk to 
the [formal personnel] confidentially to get a feel for what that process might be 
like, and then decide if that’s something that they’ll want to do or if it’s something 
that I can help them out with. [Right now the formal process is]…a system of 
frustration for students and staff and faculty to utilize [as] I’ve never seen 
any[one] [win a case against a victimizer].  (O8A51:40)   
 
Another Ombuds echoed providing the visitor with control over confidentiality:   
[T]here are times when students feel like ‘[I] can’t talk to my professor about this 
because of retaliation.’ [I]t really depends on the circumstances as to how I 
respond... [m]any times…I might even suggest ‘[O]kay, can you live with it for 
the rest of the semester and then at the end of the semester if [you feel] you [were 
not treated] fairly, we can pursue [options] then.’ If that’s what[the visitor] feels 
more comfortable with…I’m not going to force anybody to do anything they 
don’t want to do.  (O3A21:42)   
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Helping visitors explore potential options without requiring them to pursue any particular avenue 
is a common activity of Ombuds who follow the archetype:   
I’m really showing [the visitor] ‘[L]ook, I’m not…naïve, I understand [that the] 
politics and people…can get nasty. The institution can only protect you to a point. 
So I want to make sure that if you want me to go forward, and I’m more than 
happy to go forward, … you’re thinking about all the other angles that you may 
not have thought about.  (O1B9:39)   
 
Another Ombuds noted, “I just talk it through with the visitor to see if they have any other ideas 
about how [they might come forward in a way that is acceptable to them]…so I do hypotheticals 
[but] I do not have any kind of rules written down or anything like that” (O7A37:45).  Ultimately 
the same Ombuds concluded:  “I find that…a lot of people…are bothered by something but they 
[are not exactly sure what it is].  [Visitors] just [want] a place to figure [it] out… without 
worrying about having to [take the issue further] if they don’t want it to” (O7B38:4).  
For Ombuds who comply with the archetype, discussion about options includes both 
informal and formal methods.  The following Ombuds described how confidentiality impacts the 
ability of Title IX Coordinators to provide informal coaching: 
One distinction, one important distinction is that in the course of [a] conversation, 
if [you] say for example, ‘[H]e made a sexual gesture towards me,’ [the Title IX 
Coordinator] may be obligated…to respond to that [and force you into a formal 
process].  Well, I can hear [those things] and have [a] conversation about options 
[but] leave [you] in control of how…to proceed.  (O13B62:8)    
 
For many visitors, deciding whether or not to use a formal process is not an easy 
decision.   One Ombuds described having hypothetical conversations with the Title IX 
Coordinator about whether a situation might be handled through informal means.  The visitor 
then agreed to meet with the Title IX Coordinator with the Ombuds present to talk about formal 
versus informal resolution options.  The Ombuds described talking with the visitor prior to that 
meeting and the outcome of the situation:   
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I told [the visitor]... ‘[The Title IX Coordinator is] not guarantee[ing] an informal 
resolution. No one could do that and the best guess [of the Coordinator]…hearing 
my hypothetical about the situation was that…there is a reasonable chance that 
[the situation] could be handled informally.’ So [the visitor] knew there was a risk 
[and] we discussed this over the course of [a number of] weeks because [the 
visitor] was very, very leery about going forward... If someone can't move on 
from a bad experience then I feel like it [is an Ombuds’s] role to help [the visitor] 
figure out what they need to do so they can move on, and [this visitor] couldn’t let 
it go.  You know, lots of tears and it was really affecting [the person’s] health…to 
[the] point where [the visitor] was willing to take the risk of talking to people who 
could do something about the situation. [We met with the Title IX Coordinator 
and after hearing the situation] they forced [the visitor] into the formal [process].  
It’s really hard.  (O14B64:10) 
  
In sum, Ombuds who adhere to the archetype seem deeply committed to the 
principle of confidentiality, even though maintaining this commitment requires a tradeoff 
of other values like relationships, access, efficiency, reputation, and stopping egregious 
behavior.  Maintaining confidentiality also protects other standards like impartiality and 
informality and supports values like trust, safety, reputation, and self-determination.    
OMBUDS WHO DEPART FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
Ombuds who depart from the archetype often serve as notice to the institution, both in 
their ability to receive notice and in reporting in ways that violate confidentiality and anonymity.  
Sometimes these departures arise from misconceptions about Ombuds’ confidentiality 
obligations.  For example, one Ombuds noted:   
[A high level administrator] “walk[s]s down…to my office with a student in hand, 
knock[s] on the door, and say[s] ‘[W]e have…a problem here, we need to resolve 
this.’  You [have] a problem then because you [have] a [confidentiality] violation.  
They are supposed to say ‘[H]ere’s [information about] the Ombuds…he or she 
may be able to assist you,’ and they should never know that the student has 
actually visited me or not.  (O11A57:14)   
 
One Title IX Coordinator, when asked if the Ombuds ever brings “hypothetical 
situations” to their attention noted, “No, I think they’re pretty experienced so they know when 
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they need to [bring something directly to our office]” (T4A24:24).  Ombuds also described 
visitors’ expectations about confidentiality:   
Most	  people	  think,	  almost	  invariably,	  when	  people	  come	  to	  me	  about	  discrimination,	  
that	  they’re	  coming	  to	  get	  something	  on	  the	  record.	  	  In	  fact,	  about	  a	  third	  of	  the	  
people	  that	  come	  through	  the	  office	  think	  they	  [are]	  putting	  something	  on	  the	  
record,	  even	  if	  it’s	  not	  discrimination	  or	  harassment.	  They	  want	  me	  to	  make	  note,	  
put	  it	  on	  the	  record,	  put	  it	  in	  [my]	  files	  because	  down	  the	  road	  when	  they	  are	  fired	  
or	  something	  else	  happens	  [someone	  will	  know]	  what	  happened	  from	  their	  
perspective.	  	  What	  I	  tell	  them	  is	  ‘[I]	  don’t	  keep	  records,	  and	  I’m	  not	  going	  to	  be	  able	  
to	  corroborate	  your	  version	  of	  events,	  [but]	  if	  you	  want…	  this	  information	  on	  the	  
record	  but	  not	  in	  the	  public	  domain,	  put	  it	  in	  a	  letter	  and	  send	  it	  to	  yourself	  certified	  
mail,	  and	  don’t	  open	  it.	  And	  there	  you’ll	  have	  the	  events	  recorded	  and	  dated	  if	  you	  
need	  documentation	  in	  the	  future.	  (O9B54:6)  	  
 
 Sometimes universities require Ombuds to report any instances of sexual 
harassment that they learn about. This policy directly violates the norm of confidentiality 
and places the Ombuds in a difficulty position: 
[Mandatory reporting is] the nightmare for an Ombuds Office, and there are 
[many] Ombuds offices who have to deal with this… if a sexual harassment 
complaint is reported we have to report it [and] put the campus on [notice]. So 
basically the university is being put on notice…by the visitor coming to us.  I am 
willing to live with [not having options for sexual misconduct because] we can 
still be helpful to someone who has experienced sexual harassment by giv[ing] 
them information…and support[ing] them in all sorts of ways…It does put 
limitations [on the office] but frankly given the alternative [of having no office at 
all], that’s fine…it’s not a perfect world here.  (O14B64:37-44) 
 
The Ombuds continued describing the situations in which the office may informally handle 
issues of sexual misconduct: 
[W]e cannot [resolve sexual harassment issues informally] without asking 
permission from the Title IX Coordinator.  We must call [the Title IX 
Coordinator] and [give]…a [hypothetical] description of [the] situation.  We don’t 
have to give names or identifying information but we could just say, ‘Here is the 
situation, would you be comfortable if we try to resolve it informally?’  The last 
positive outcome…was several years ago before [these policy changes] because I 
wasn’t required to call [the Title IX Coordinator] at that point.  (O14B64:29-30)   
 
A policy requiring even the Ombuds to report all instances of sexual misconduct appears 
to be common.   One Ombuds noted:  “I know some Ombuds offices have to report sexual 
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harassment but to me that's against the standards of practice and what's the point of having an 
Ombuds office if it's going to be treated like a formal office” (O12A59:28).  Another Ombuds 
described their general counsel as “not feel[ing] good at all about the privilege of the 
Ombudsperson, and of course most forms of harassment are not illegal…but you’ve got to go 
with [what] each organization and general counsel feels comfortable with” (O8A51:12).  This 
observation is echoed by other Ombuds who have an organizational obligation to report issues of 
sexual misconduct.  For example, a Title IX Coordinator explained when a visitor’s statements 
must be reported:   
[I]f it’s something that I really do need to know about, [the Ombuds] will advise 
[the visitor] that they…speak to me or, depending upon the nature of it, there’s a 
duty for [the Ombuds] to report it if it [is] something…illegal or immoral or 
indecent the Ombuds [has] to report it.  (T4A24:23)    
 
Another Ombuds described telling visitors: 
 
[I]f you tell me something that suggests risk of imminent harm to yourself or to 
another person I’ll have to…do something about that.  If you told me something 
that triggered a legal obligation for me to report, I don’t use the words ‘agent of 
notice’…I have no other alternative and there’s no way I can surface the issue 
without identifying the person who disclosed it to me.  [C]onfidentiality is really 
important to this office and I would do everything in my power not to reveal that 
information if I could.  (O7A37:35)   
 
An Ombuds added, “if there’s anything that comes to me that is sexual…or that is clearly 
reportable, I need to report [it and] I do contact our [Title IX Coordinator] to let them know 
(O6A34:14).  Ombuds who are required by their universities to report instance of sexual 
misconduct often seek to limit this obligation: 
I used the hierarchical arrangement as my justification for not reporting [sexual 
harassment].  I didn’t want to [report] unless I absolutely had to.  If push came to 
shove and for some reason we ended up in litigation or something like that I 
would have taken the position that I didn’t tell anybody because I didn’t see it 
as… [involving a] power disparity.  (O7B38:6)   
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Other Ombuds depart from the archetype by participating in informational meetings with 
other formal offices.  A Title IX Coordinator described periodic meetings with general counsel, 
Title IX, other formal offices, and the Ombuds where everyone “[J]ust…[go]es around the room 
and talk[s] about what’s going on, cases in a general sense, just kind of bounce things off [one 
another] so we’re in the loop on what’s going on” (T13A49:15).  Other Ombuds discussed 
working with formal offices “to direct each other to get the information that we need, if it’s 
something we feel we can’t technically share…how can we work together to say ‘[I]s this 
someone who you’ve made claims of before?  [T]hat’s when the offices work best…when they 
work together” (O8A51:46).  Another Ombuds noted: 
I can go to [the formal office] and say ‘are you hearing from the staff in this 
department too?  Is there anything we can do, maybe we can go talk to the 
director of that area.  Which one of us has the best rapport with that person to give 
them a head’s up that there’s something brewing…that they might want to look 
at.’  (O10A55:29)   
 
Some Ombuds report to an upper level administrator and have administrative functions, 
but yet do not see themselves as offices of notice.  For example, one Ombuds, despite reporting 
directly to a member of the President’s Cabinet and having a “very close knit” relationship, 
stated that “[N]otice would have to go either through our Dean of Students office or through our 
legal counsel” (O6A34:25).  The Ombuds then clarified that “[t]he privilege of confidentiality 
belongs to the office rather than the client or me.  When I’m acting as the Ombuds, I have the 
privilege but it belongs [technically] to the office” (O11A57:35).   
Many of the examples discussed above illustrate how Ombuds respond to pressure from 
superiors to give a report, thereby violating the archetype by breaching confidentiality or failing 
to protect the anonymity of their visitors.  For example, one Ombuds noted formal offices “call 
me…and they ask me if somebody’s come to [my] office [and] I…let them know…which 
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completely goes against the standards of practice.  If I would say ‘I can’t tell you, I’m not going 
to tell you,’ that would not go over very well” (O7A37:27).  Another Ombuds explained, “If 
there’s something going on that looks like it’s going to escalate in a college or a department, [the 
president] likes a heads up... [i]f it doesn’t violate confidentiality, ‘Five people have come to us 
from [this] department” (O9A53:18).  One Ombuds talked about situations in which a professor 
does inappropriate things in class, which creates an uncomfortable environment:  “[W]hen that 
has happened, and it’s been reported to me by more than one student, or even [a] faculty member 
with very specific information, I’ve shared that with the chair of the department” (O3A21:23).  
For another example, a Title IX Coordinator reported hearing rumors from faculty members, but 
“I didn’t know who and I didn’t know what exactly…[T]hen the Ombuds came to me and gave 
me the who and the what and I took it…from there” (T11A45:60).   
In many such situations the practical question is how many complaints constitute a trend 
so that an Ombuds may feel comfortable reporting the trend without compromising the identity 
of any particular visitor.  As we have seen, Ombuds who follow the archetype often navigate this 
key question by utilizing non-specific hypotheticals when seeking information from formal 
offices.  Ombuds who depart from the archetype give priority to stopping misconduct or 
adhering to organizational directives for reporting, rather than confidentiality and visitors’ 
anonymity.  For example, Ombuds described providing hypotheticals: “[W]hen I 
have…conversation[s] with our [Title IX Coordinator], I’ll [provide] a list of three hypothetical 
offices, with one of them being the actual office… [The Coordinator] may have already heard 
which one it is, but either way [The Coordinator] tells me that it’s very helpful” (O13B62:20).  
Another Ombuds noted the point at which they value stopping misconduct over adhering to the 
archetype:  
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[W]hen multiple people have reported to me…when I see the same thing from a 
few different perspectives, I’ll begin to believe that there might be something 
going on, and I might say to a department chair, ‘[Y]ou know, I don’t know that 
this is really true, but you might want to sensitize yourself to this, there might be 
something out there.  (O3A21:21)  
 
Other Ombuds described wanting “to make sure it’s a pattern first, not an individual incident” 
(O8A51:18), and then telling [the Title IX Coordinator] “You’ve got to investigate” (O9A53:58).   
Ombuds also talked about breaking confidentiality after the fact:   
For the most part I have absolutely no idea how many of these things have [been] 
resolved, and from that angle I will occasionally follow up behind the scenes…to 
see whether there was some type of resolution…  (O11A57:30)  
 
Another noted breaking confidentiality to take credit for a successful outcome and thus build 
their professional worth: 
 
[E]verything that I had recommended to the student, unbeknownst to me, the 
student followed through [with] in terms of…making [it] happen. I specifically 
[told] my boss, ‘[E]ven though there’s no mention of the Ombudsman…this 
started in [my] office and I will unabashedly take credit for it.’  (O11B58:9)   
 
 Perhaps paradoxically, examples indicate Ombuds often breach confidentiality in order to 
build relationships: 
[L]istening to some of these things [and] not being able to share confidences… 
although I [have] follow[ed] up with the [Title IX Coordinator] to say, ‘this 
student brought [an issue] to my attention that your office handled, [because the 
student was upset] that there was no response that was helpful.’  I [try not to be 
critical because I] need them to want to send things to me.  (O8B52:22) 
 
What I find to be most effective is if there’s certain issues that I see as a trend, 
instead of putting it in the report, I’ll go to that person and say ‘You know, 
Professor so-and-so or Dean so-and-so, over the last six months or so, these are 
the trends that I’m seeing that impacts your department.’ You have a captive 
audience because you’re speaking to them.  And I just see the value of, it takes 
more time to do that, but gosh, it pays such huge dividends because you have a 
relationship and you took the time to say… ‘[T]hese kinds of things are coming 
out of your office.’ And when you walk away…you kind of endear 
yourself…they feel like ‘[M]y God I have someone who’s really going to give me 
some information that I might not have been aware of.’ (O1A8:63-66)   
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The Title IX Coordinator is an attorney…[who] takes a very legalistic approach… 
[and] is not one of the people that I can go to and say ‘have you been hearing 
things about [this] department? What’s going on over there? Have we got a 
faculty member losing it over there? Do we need as an institution to think about 
stepping in and doing something over there? Would it help if I went and talked 
with the chair or you went and talked with the chair?’  [There are a few staff 
members in these offices] with whom I have a relationship like that…[but their 
bosses] don’t know it. [The staff] trust me and know that I won’t out them and 
need my input, because what’s happening in the classroom is very useful for 
[them], who then based on what I have heard from students about this faculty 
member [can take action].  (O10A55:28)  
 
As the following quotation illustrates, Ombuds often wrestle with the boundaries of when it is 
appropriate to share confidential information in cases of sexual misconduct or discrimination: 
All we can do is try to encourage the person to go forward to [the responsible] 
offices.  We’re not [mandated to send cases there but] that’s a dilemma that I 
sometimes struggle with…if a name keeps coming up, then that’s when 
I…struggl[e] with do I go to the office that’s mandate to look into it?  I hear 
[concerns about retaliation] a lot.  And so…[I] wonder, should I say something?  
Should I do something?  And I have to weigh it case by case.  Most times we can 
get people to go to those offices, because they trust us.  (O1A8:68) 
   
Other Ombuds are clear about their confidentiality boundaries, “As far as sexual [misconduct], 
which I would consider a serious crime, I say I can’t guarantee confidentiality” (O8A51:52).    
The lack of certainty regarding confidentiality and the lack of control provided to visitors was 
often cited as a reason for declining numbers of visitors.  For example:    
We’re not getting as many people coming to this office because we can’t provide 
them with a level of confidentiality that would ensure that if they don’t want the 
information disclosed if they were to report sexual harassment, for example, that 
we would be duty bound to respect that.  I believe that’s one of the reasons…they 
don’t come to our office because we can’t offer them that blanket confidentiality 
that they’re looking for.  (O7A37:22, O7B38:1) 
       
Ombuds who depart from the archetype undermine visitors’ self-determination as to 
whether to use formal processes.  Many Ombuds do not offer a choice and directly refer visitors 
to the Title IX Coordinator.  Other Ombuds attempt to secure their visitors’ permission to report 
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or to report the information anonymously.  Often in doing so this “anonymous” information 
makes it possible to identify the individuals involved.  All of these activities breach 
confidentiality and do not adhere to the archetype.     
For example, an Ombuds noted, “Any time I’ve dealt with [sexual misconduct] I’ve 
worked to get [the individual] to the [Title IX Coordinator] and file a complaint (O3A21:21).  
Another Ombuds explained, “[I]f it was a [sexual misconduct ] case…I would direct them to the 
[Title IX Coordinator], but I would also say to them ‘[I]f you would like for me to contact them I 
will …let them know you will be coming” (O5A28:16).  Ombuds also often expressed this view: 
“Certainly if I think [a case] should be going through the [Title IX Coordinator] I would send 
them over there…” (O8A51:34).  This is echoed by another Ombuds: “We [can] explore the 
different ways to surface the issue, but ultimately I would make it clear [to visitors] that [sexual 
misconduct] did have to [be reported] for [everyone’s] benefit” (O7B38:11).  Often Ombuds 
make decisions about when to report that fall outside of their reporting requirements: 
[W]hat we can’t keep in confidence, there are three basic areas. One is any time 
somebody discloses bodily harm to self or others, we can’t keep that in 
confidence, or [Second is] any disclosures of child or elder abuse that can’t be 
kept in confidence, and then the third area is if someone was to disclose that they 
had knowledge of somebody’s life or health being at risk, then we would have to 
disclose that to the appropriate authorities. Sometimes I have to make an 
executive decision. If something doesn’t falls in those domains but if I think about 
it and over time it’s going to do significant damage to the institution I might 
decide to do something with that information. But I have to be careful, because 
people didn’t give me express permission to go forward, then if I did because I 
weighed it and I said [to the visitor] ‘[T]his [formal] office needs to be aware of 
this [because] it may cause significant damage to the institution and so part of my 
job as an Ombudsman is to give decision makers a head’s up.  (O1A8:32-35)   
 
Another Ombuds similarly described subordinating confidentiality to anything that would cause 
“massive disruption” to the institution: 
[E]verything is confidential unless there is any sort of self harm that is reported or 
anything that would cause any massive disruption to the institution  So those are 
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the things that I often say to a student, ‘I won’t go forward unless you give me 
permission to use your name, but if there is any talk of [those] particular things, 
then I do have to report it [regardless of your permission].  (O6A34:14)  
 
Ombuds who want to take a visitor’s information to a formal office handle it in various 
ways.  As indicated above, many break confidentiality or describe confidentiality exceptions to 
their visitors.  Other Ombuds described attempting to make anonymous reports:   
Well, if I don’t get permission then I will try to raise the problem in a way that 
protects their anonymity. If it’s something that’s been done that doesn’t point to 
them individually, then I can try to raise it as “I understand that this is routinely 
being done and this rule is being violated, but I can’t tell you who pointed this out 
to me.  (O9A53:44)  
 
Ombuds frequently described seeking the survivor’s permission to take such an anonymous 
approach, but many expressed ultimately doing whatever is necessary to get the complaint filed:   
[If I were unable to convince a potential victim of sexual misconduct to come 
forward] The [next step] would be [to say] ‘[O]kay, so you’re not willing to do 
this, can you allow me to, in an indirect way, go to the department chair and say 
‘[Y]ou need to go to the [Title IX Coordinator] and let them know that there are 
allegations that this faculty member is engaging in this kind of behavior.’ Kind of 
going in an indirect way.  Another Ombuds told me that we would never do 
nothing, we would keep moving forward until this thing got addressed. That 
would be my commitment. I would do whatever it would take.  (O7A37:35) 
 
Here an Ombuds explained their response to a student who said “I do not want to make a report”: 
I [told] the student I must report this to the campus police. I don’t have to give 
[your] name, but I have to say a student came to my office saying [this about a 
sexual assault or sexual misconduct], particularly if it’s a rape because of the 
Cleary situation.  (O5A38:17) 
 
Another Ombuds described trying to marshal multiple complaints, not for the purpose of 
protecting each individual’s confidentiality, but to provide proof of what might be occurring:  
[U]nless some other people come and tell me the same thing I’m not going to be 
able to go to [anyone] and have a lot of influence, because I’m going to be saying 
‘one person told me this and I can’t tell you who it was, and I can’t offer you any 
proof without identifying this one person.’ [I tell the visitor], ‘[I]f you’ve got 
other [individuals who have experienced this], have them call me and tell me that 
they would like to be included as part of a class who are complaining about this, 
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then I can go to the [administration] and say ‘well, I’ve had [multiple] people tell 
me the same thing.’  (O9B54:9) 
 
While many Ombuds may not be making a deliberate tradeoff, some Ombuds decide that 
keeping records or communicating by email or phone are sufficiently important that they 
outweigh the potential violation of confidentiality in these things.  Either way, Ombuds depart 
from the confidentiality archetype by maintaining records that make communications susceptible 
to discovery or indicate who visited the office.  This includes maintaining intake forms, 
communicating via e-mail, and requiring signed waivers for purposes of reporting information.  
Some Ombuds maintain detailed records of cases.  This was made abundantly clear to me when I 
asked one Ombuds about prior cases and he replied, “Okay, I will go through my archives” 
(O6A34:48).  The same Ombuds also noted that Ombuds should be good writers, “because 
you’re going to have to synthesize all of this information, you’re going to have to be able 
to…pretty much capture in a well-documented way this person’s experience” (O6A34:11).  
Another Ombuds described explaining to the general counsel’s office about why it is dangerous 
for an Ombuds to maintain records:   
[A] lot of times I only hear one side of the story, and that side of the story is 
invariably not a good one for the university. Why in the world would you want 
me to keep those records? If anything it’s going to hurt you.  (O7A37:25)  
 
Ombuds who depart from the archetype also commonly use e-mail to communicate with 
visitors.  Ombuds explained that most issues get to the office “by e-mail or telephone, [but] a lot 
of e-mail” (O9A53:31).  E-mail is commonly used by Ombuds in their work, including handling 
the details of situations:  “They…e-mail me and if we [can] handle it through e-mail I…do that” 
(O5A28:23).   
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When handling new cases, Ombuds often require visitors to fill out intake forms that 
create records that can be used to identify visitors.  These forms sometimes employ online 
technologies, which are doubly susceptible to breach.  An Ombuds explained the intake process:   
Typically what happens is I ask them to do an intake form, like I said either that’s 
done online or via paper, and then on that intake form I ask them for demographic 
information as well as their college, if they’ve spoken to anybody before about 
this situation, what has been the process that they’ve taken to resolve. I ask those 
questions because I want to have an idea of how many people know about the 
case, who can I contact, am I starting from scratch, have they already been told no 
and they’re coming to me to try to find yes, that gives me that sort of information. 
(O6A34:31) 
 
Another Ombuds described their intake as “formal”:   
 
There is a formal intake process. The student…comes to my office and [fills out] 
intake forms…. Basically their basic information. We…ask them what the [type] 
of complaint [it is], academic, judicial, which department, which faculty person, 
was it personal, was it a hostile evasion…we have many things for them to fill in. 
(O5A28:24)  
 
Ombuds who depart from the archetype also often require visitors’ sign written waivers of their 
confidentiality rights:   
Sometimes students will waive their right to confidentiality, and I have them sign 
a specific waiver…that says [the visitor] allow[s] [and permits] me to speak to 
person X and Y, sometimes it’s as specific as a name, [and] I can speak to that 
person and that person alone. Sometimes they don’t know [who I should talk to], 
they just say ‘anyone over in the department,’ or ‘anyone you need to [speak 
with] to fix this.’ So I’m willing to sort of work with that if they do offer that kind 
of permission. If they do not offer that kind of permission, then the only cases in 
which I feel comfortable, not comfortable, but allowed to violate their 
confidentiality is the typical exceptions: homicide, suicide, child abuse, sexual 
misconduct, [or] imminent harm.  (O4A22:21)    
 
Ombuds who require visitors to sign a waiver of confidentiality often do so during the intake: 
[W]hen a student [comes] in to see me I ask them to first sign a waiver … and I 
would tell them ‘based on whatever you tell me, based on your particular situation 
I may need to talk to people,’ and I would ask them to sign off, giving me 
permission to talk to particular people or offices about their situation.  
(O5A28:16)  
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In sum, my interviews with Ombuds thus reveal a complex tug of war between 
competing impulses. On the one hand, the archetypal Ombuds model motivates many 
Ombuds to strictly honor their visitors’ confidentiality and interest in self-determination, 
even when doing so seems deeply frustrating as abusive sexual predators seem to get 
away with misconduct again and again.  On the other hand, many Ombuds find ways to 
get information to responsible authorities within their institutions—or are required by 
their institutions to do so—even though this sometimes exposes their visitors to the loss 
of confidentiality that they sought to avoid by coming to the Ombuds. 
CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE TITLE IX COORDINATOR ARCHETYPE 
There are distinct detriments to Ombuds’ commitment to confidentiality.  Confidentiality 
impedes the public’s right to know (Kotkin, 2006, p. 947), contravenes the transparency of 
courts, keeps critical information from people who most need to know, and shields the institution 
from needing to provide oversight and accountability (Dore, 2006, pp. 466, 518-19).  For these 
reasons, among others, Title IX Coordinators typically do not promise confidentiality to 
complainants.  The archetypal Title IX Coordinator model ensures compliance with Title IX, and 
reflects a compliance regime that seeks to prevent, elicit reports of, and eliminate instances of 
sexual misconduct. All of this, in the view of the Title IX model, requires disclosing information 
about complaints to those who can act on this information.  
 As Title IX Coordinators are a key element of the formal mechanism for ensuring 
compliance with Title IX, the archetypal Title IX Coordinator model treats confidentiality very 
differently than the model Ombuds.  Instead of utilizing confidentiality to encourage reporting, 
Title IX law and policy works to strengthen protections for complainants from retaliation and to 
educate potential complainants about where confidentiality can and cannot be maintained.  As 
	   194	  
opposed to the model Ombuds, who through confidentiality provide their visitors with control 
over the extent of the intervention, the Title IX Coordinator archetype must be informed of all 
reports raising Title IX issues, even if originally filed with or handled by another individual or 
office (OCR Q&A, 2014, pp. 10-11).   
In order to ensure that no incident goes unattended, many colleges impose mandatory 
reporting requirements on all faculty, staff, and employees (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Title 
IX Mandates, p. 15).  Title IX requires reporting from “responsible employees” or those with the 
authority to address and remedy gender based discrimination, those with responsibility to report 
sexual misconduct to a supervisor, or those a student would reasonably believe must do either of 
the above (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, 2013 White Paper, p. 107). As an example of 
mandatory reporting requirements, the Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process at the 
University of Kansas specifies that all “unit heads and others who serve in leadership roles in the 
university” are required to report discriminatory actions (University of Kansas, Discrimination 
Complaint Resolution Process, Who Must Report).  All Deans, Directors, administrators, 
supervisors, faculty members, graduate teaching assistants, and academic advisors are required to 
contact the Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access to initiate an investigation if “they 
know or have reason to believe that discriminatory practice(s) may have occurred” (University of 
Kansas, Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, Who Must Report).  Similarly, 
Pennsylvania State University requires that “[a]ll incidents involving sexual harassment, sexual 
misconduct, sexual violence, gender based discrimination and harassment, or any other alleged 
conduct which may violate Title IX… of which any University staff or faculty member becomes 
aware should be forwarded to the [Title IX Coordinator] for review (Pennsylvania State, Title IX 
Procedures).  Harvard University notes that all “University officers, other than those who are 
	   195	  
prohibited from reporting because of a legal confidentiality obligation or prohibition against 
reporting, must promptly notify the School or unit Title IX Coordinator about possible sexual or 
gender-based harassment, regardless of whether a complaint is filed”  (Harvard,	  ODR,	  
Procedures	  for	  Handling	  Complaints	  Involving	  Students	  Pursuant	  to	  the	  Sexual	  and	  
Gender-­‐Based	  Harassment	  Policy,	  4). 
Reporting requirements are waived for employees who are in a recognized counseling 
relationship with a potential complainant (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 22).  Mandatory reporting 
requirements put pressure on faculty members, resident advisors, and others lacking a privilege 
yet who promise privacy or confidentiality to students approaching them for assistance.  The 
2013 ATIXA Training Manual (2013 White Paper, p. 108) recommends that all employees 
report incidents of misconduct to the Title IX Coordinator within twenty-four hours.  Some non-
supervisory or non-responsible employees may be able to make anonymous (Jane/John Doe) 
reports initially but may need to provide details later at the direction of the Title IX Coordinator.  
OCR considers this category of reporter as “non-professional counselors or advocates,” and 
describes them as individuals who work or volunteer in on-campus sexual assault centers, victim 
advocacy offices, women’s centers, or health centers, including front desk staff and students 
(OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 23).  These individuals are required to “report only general information 
about incidents of sexual violence such as the nature, date, time, and general location of the 
incident and should take care to avoid reporting personally identifiable information about a 
student” (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 24).   
Notably, the 2013 ATIXA Training Manual (2013 White Paper) states: 
[N]o employee should ever promise absolute confidentiality,  
though some (such as licensed counselors) are better able to  
protect information than others (though even licensed counselors,  
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etc. have some situations where they must report if they have a 
duty to warn).  Ombuds are not exempt from expectations of 
reporting.  (emphasis added) (pp. 108-109)   
 
The 2013 White Paper further states that all employees should be trained that “reports are 
private, but not confidential (unless made to a confidential resource)” and how to “convey this to 
victims without chilling the victim’s willingness to report.  It takes tact, but it can be done” (p. 
109).  As a result the model Title IX Coordinator is a private, but not necessarily confidential, 
office of notice and investigation.  Complainants wishing to report but not participate in the 
ensuing investigation (or avoid an investigation altogether) may not have a choice to not 
participate.  The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual (Bedrock Beliefs, 14) notes that colleges are 
required “at minimum [to conduct] an investigation in all cases, to determine the extent of the 
harassment, the acuity of the threat it represents to students, and what might be necessary to put 
an end to it.”  Confidentiality is thus a secondary goal to following and complying with the law.  
The ATIXA Statement of Ethics and Title IX Competencies (2012, §3) addresses confidentiality: 
As the custodian of many types of sensitive information, including that 
which may be confidential and/or private, be responsible stewards of that 
information, be familiar with and comply with applicable laws, 
institutional policies, directives and agreements pertaining to access, use, 
protection and disclosure of such information including the electronic 
transmission of records and adherence to privacy laws. (p. 3) 
 
This emphasis on being “responsible stewards” of information reflects the fact that Title IX 
Coordinator archetypes are offices of notice, which officially makes the institution they represent 
aware of, and thus responsible for, any complaints or reports of sexual misconduct.  The ATIXA 
2013 Training Manual (p. 15) describes these confidentiality responsibilities as a “conundrum” 
because “[i]nstitutional authorities who have notice of alleged sexual assaults/harassment are not 
likely to be able to keep those incidents completely confidential, as a result of the institution’s 
affirmative obligation to investigate and act to resolve the incident.”  This tension between 
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protecting confidentiality and fulfilling the obligations of Title IX is evident in the ATIXA 
Training Manual.  ATIXA 2013 Training Manual (p.  31-32) states, “[t]he privacy of all parties 
to a complaint of sexual misconduct must be respected, except insofar as it interferes with the 
university’s obligation to fully investigate allegations of sexual misconduct.” 
The OCR 2014 Q&A document states, “OCR strongly supports a student’s interest in 
confidentiality in cases involving sexual violence…[but] [t]here are situations in which a school 
must override a student’s request for confidentiality in order to meet its Title IX obligations…” 
(pp. 18-19).  Such instances should be “limited and the information should only be shared with 
individuals who are responsible for handling the school’s response to incidents of sexual 
violence”  (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 19).  Schools are responsible for limiting any information 
shared even where a student does not specifically ask for confidentiality (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 
19).  OCR mandates that universities “notify students of the information that will be disclosed, to 
whom it will be disclosed, and why… [in order] [t]o improve trust in the process for 
investigating sexual violence complaints” (p. 19).  Recognizing the detrimental impact of 
breaching confidentiality, the OCR 2014 Q&A document notes,  “A school should be aware that 
disregarding requests for confidentiality can have a chilling effect and discourage other students 
from reporting sexual violence” (p. 19).      
The 2014 OCR’s Q&A document provides guidance on how to balance these conflicting 
goals.  First OCR directs universities to “make clear to all of its employees and students which 
staff members are responsible employees so that students can make informed decisions about 
whether to disclose information to those employees” (Q&A, 2014, p. 15).  Second, the 2014 
Q&A document requires responsible employees to provide an initial warning and  “make every 
effort to ensure the student understands…[b]efore a student reveals information that he or she 
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may wish to keep confidential” (p. 16).  Information that should be shared includes the 
employee’s reporting obligations (including the names of the survivor and perpetrator and 
relevant facts regarding the incident), where the employee must report, and the individual’s right 
to request confidentiality (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 16).  The responsible employee must specifically 
inform the student of their ability “to share the information confidentiality with counseling, 
advocacy, health, mental health, or sexual-assault related services (e.g., sexual assault resource 
centers, campus health centers, pastoral counselors, and campus mental health centers)” (OCR 
Q&A, 2014, p. 16).     
If a complainant insists that their identifiable information not be disclosed, “the school 
should inform the complainant that its ability to respond may be limited” (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 
19)  The 2014 Q&A document (p. 19) instructs the school to inform the complainant of the Title 
IX prohibition against retaliation and that the school will take steps to prevent it and respond to it 
if it occurs.  If the complainant still does not want their name or identifiable information revealed 
the 2014 Q&A document instructs the school to “evaluate that request in the context of its 
responsibility to provide a safe and nondiscriminatory environment for all students” (p. 17).  
Specifically, the school may weigh confidentiality requests against the seriousness of the 
allegations, the complainant’s age, other complaints about the same individual, among other 
factors (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 21).  Because the Title IX Coordinator must have knowledge of all 
complaints, OCR notes that this individual is in the best position “to evaluate a student’s request 
for confidentiality in the context of the school’s responsibility to provide a safe and 
nondiscriminatory environment for all students” (OCR Q&A 2014, 11).   
ATIXA’s 2013 Training Manual also provides guidance to Title IX Coordinators on how 
to handle requests for confidentiality.  Where survivors are reluctant to make formal complaints, 
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or withdraw a formal complaint, the 2013 ATIXA Training Manual, Investigation Protocol 
Checklist recommends honoring that request, but that the efforts be made “to persuade (not 
coerce) the alleged victim to reconsider” including reminding the person that 1) The institution 
will vigorously enforce its retaliation policy, 2) If he/she does not act, the perpetrator may harm 
someone else, 3) They can take time to consider and come back to make a decision, and 4) 
Interim accommodations can be used to make reporting easier (pp. 53-54).  If a survivor refuses 
to file a formal complaint or will not allow their name to be revealed, the 2013 ATIXA Training 
Manual Investigation Protocol Checklist recommends sharing this information with the 
responsible administrator to make a decision “on whether sufficient threat is present to warrant 
an investigation independent of the cooperation of the alleged victim” (p. 54).  
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter directs schools to “inform the complainant if it cannot 
ensure confidentiality” (p. 5). A directive in the University of Kansas Discrimination Complaint 
Resolution Process echoes:   
The Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access will handle all  
discrimination and harassment complaints discreetly but cannot guarantee  
confidentiality or anonymity because the University has an obligation  
to investigate complaints of discrimination and harassment and to maintain 
a safe environment, free from harassment and discrimination.  Because of  
its obligations under the law, KU will not be able to honor all requests for 
confidentiality or all requests that a complaint not be pursued.  (University of 
Kansas, Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, Confidentiality) 
 
The Pennsylvania State University Title IX reporting guidance similarly notes, “Information 
shared…are kept as confidential as possible, but some information will be shared with the Title 
IX [C]oordinator who is expected to be made aware of all reported Title IX violations” (PSU, 
How do I make a report?, 2014).  Harvard’s Title IX procedures note “information will be 
disclosed…oly to those at the University who, in the judgment of the Title IX Officer…have a 
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need to know (Harvard,	  ODR,	  Procedures	  for	  Handling	  Complaints	  Involving	  Students	  
Pursuant	  to	  the	  Sexual	  and	  Gender-­‐Based	  Harassment	  Policy,	  4). 
Confidentiality is related to the Title IX Coordinator archetype’s Title IX reporting 
requirements.  The ATIXA Statement on Ethics and Title IX Coordinator Competencies (Core 
Job Duties and Responsibilities, 2012, §4, p. 6) states that Coordinators are to “[o]rganize and 
maintain grievance files, disposition reports, and other records regarding Title IX compliance, 
including annual reports of the number and nature of filed complaints and the disposition of said 
complaints, data collection, climate assessment, pattern monitoring.”  This compliance is echoed 
in job postings, such as the Santa Clara University EEO and Title IX job posting 
(Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14), which requires the Coordinator to “[o]rganize and 
maintain investigative files, disposition reports and other records regarding complaints of 
unlawful discrimination, harassment, and/or sexual misconduct as appropriate.”  A posting for 
Director of Title IX and Equal Employment Opportunity Programs at the University of San 
Diego (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) notes that the position is responsible for “statistical 
and narrative reporting.”  The Goucher College Title IX Coordinator job posting 
(Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) states the position is responsible for “delivering 
appropriate notices of change and outcomes, and providing a repository for and source of 
institutional recordkeeping.”  Further, the Coordinator will “organize and maintain complaint 
files; compile annual reports of the number and nature of filed complaints, and the disposition of 
said complaints; manage data collection, climate assessment, and pattern monitoring; and serve 
as principal contact for government inquiries pursuant to Title IX.”  
This reporting and data collection requirement affects the confidentiality of shared 
information, and requires formal record keeping relating to confidentiality.  For example, the 
	   201	  
Investigation Protocol Checklist (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, p. 53) notes that interviewers 
should not promise absolute confidentiality, that complainants should sign a statement that they 
understand the process, and should sign a consent statement acknowledging that the complaint 
may be revealed to the accused student and to witnesses as necessary.  The Checklist notes that 
the person making the complaint should sign this consent, and “If s/he does not, s/he is not 
entitled to view the complaint” (p. 56).  Further, the intake officers “should stress the need to get 
the complaint in writing, and can write the complaint, solicit the written complaint from the 
complainant, or assist the complainant in writing the complaint” (ATIXA Training Manual, 
2013, Investigation Protocol Checklist, p. 52).  
   Where the individual’s privacy is not absolutely protected by the model Title IX 
Coordinator, it will be controlled on a “need-to-know” basis (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, 
pp. 31-32).  Report of an allegation that includes evidence that a felony has occurred must be 
reported to the local police (although this does not mean that charges will automatically be filed 
or that the survivor must speak with police)(ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, pp. 31-32).  Where 
there is not conclusive evidence of a felony, the ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, Statement of 
Rights of the Alleged Victim states “[v]ictims have the right to be informed of available options 
to notify law enforcement but also the right not to report” (p. 46).  This right not to report does 
not include the institutional requirement to report any incidents, without personally identifiable 
information, in its campus crime report (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, pp. 31-32).   
 In situations where the survivor does not want the institution to pursue an investigation, 
the threat must be low enough to not require adjudication.  Nonetheless, ATIXA guidance 
cautions:  “college officials would be well advised to fully document their conclusion, supported 
by an appropriate investigation, and ask the victim to acknowledge that he/she concurs with the 
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college’s conclusion, and asks that no further action be taken” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, 
Bedrock Beliefs, p. 14).  Further, a letter to the survivor “should indicate that his/her refusal to 
cooperate with investigators and campus conduct personnel may prevent the college from 
pursuing the complaint to resolution” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Bedrock beliefs, p. 14).   
 Recent changes in Title IX compliance are designed to reform formal complaint systems 
that are not seen as safe, accessible, and credible, or that ignore “ugly behavior that is not overtly 
illegal” (Rowe, Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 56).  This includes bullying, hazing, or any activities 
that may be seen as “traditional high jinks,” “everyone does it,” or “no harm was intended” 
(Rowe, Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 56).  Further, Title IX compliance efforts now seek to reform 
systems that require immediate and conclusive proof and by doing so may discourage people 
from making complaints.  Common complaint system problems also include confidentiality 
violations, requiring written complaints, lengthy time periods to resolve complaints, officials 
with little understanding of the law or inadequate training on proper procedures, perceptions that 
important people are treated differently, or that the system itself is overseen by the people seen 
as the source of the problem (Rowe, Wilcox, & Gadlin, 2009, p. 57).   
In contrast to the Ombuds archetype that uses informal, optional conversations as a 
chance to “problem solve,” the Title IX Coordinator model uses formal, documented 
investigations per law and policy as a mechanism to draw out complaints and remedy issues of 
sexual misconduct.  The Title IX Coordinator archetype does not promise absolute 
confidentiality because there is a responsibility to address known problems, requiring sharing 
information with others who can address the problem. The model Title IX Coordinator addresses 
complainants’ interest in confidentiality by seeking as much as possible to respect complainants’ 
wishes and to provide privacy—but where these interests conflict with addressing a known and 
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serious problem, the Title IX Coordinator archetype is to give priority to addressing the problem.  
Ultimately, the model Title IX Coordinator would agree with David Miller’s (2011) claim that 
the Ombuds model’s strict adherence to confidentiality is irresponsible:  
Knowledge is responsibility, and those in the know must also be held 
responsible for not acting on what they know if not acting betrays the 
public trust… [F]or some, Ombudsman informality offers too much 
ambiguity, and confidentiality is seen as conspiracy to preserve the 
interests of such perpetrators against the exercise of justice…“Who could 
not want to see perpetrators of sexual violence (or any other kind of 
violence…exposed to the full consequence of their actions, along with 
those who knowingly abet their horrible behavior? (p. 6)    
    
In sum, although both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator models presumably share a 
preference for eliminating sexual misconduct, the archetypal offices reflect very different 
philosophies and mechanisms for handling complaints.  Where Ombuds see absolute 
confidentiality and the self-determination it provides as a necessary condition for eliciting and 
handling complaints in the face of retaliation, Title IX Coordinators reflect a compliance regime 
that seeks to elicit formal complaints, and then discipline, prevent, and eliminate instances of 
sexual misconduct. 
TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF REPORTING  
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype act as offices of notice and 
investigation and require employees who are designated as mandatory reporters to provide the 
office with information.  These Title IX Coordinators also prioritize compliance over 
confidentiality and maintain and use records necessary to ensure a quality investigation.  First, 
these Title IX Coordinators emphasize their role as offices of notice: 
I tell people ‘[T]his is not the office to come and vent. We have those offices.  If 
you want to talk, you go there, because you’re putting the university on notice 
when you come to me [and I need to do something about it]. So I make that 
distinction upfront.  (T10A43:34)   
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As ‘notice’ to the institution, Title IX Coordinators following the archetype communicate with 
university counsel and administrators about complaints: 
I work really closely with university counsel. We pretty much review all our final 
reports with them. They’re aware of all of our cases, obviously, because it could 
have liability implications for the university, but I don’t ever feel like they’re 
trying to impose upon us any sort of outcome.  (T1A11:12)    
 
Another Coordinator described reporting to the president and other administrators “[E]verything 
and anything that could be a potential embarrassment to the institution, that could be a headline 
tomorrow morning. I don’t want them being blindsided by anything. It’s what any good 
subordinate does for his boss” (T7A32:12).  For example:  
I am careful to keep legal [counsel] abreast of any situation in my office that may 
turn into a lawsuit or a legal battle.  I always try to give them a head’s up.  If I get 
a request for records, if I get wind that an attorney has been contacted by one of 
the folks I’m investigating, I always let legal affairs know so they are [aware].  
And that has worked.  (T11A45:40)    
 
As an office of notice and investigation, the Title IX Coordinator oversees or conducts 
investigations.  One Coordinator described providing information as a part of the process:  
Once I get the information there’s a preliminary investigation [in which] I contact 
the folks that are involved.  I contact the dean because I’m coming to his college, 
let him know what happened, but I don’t give them too much detail like names or 
anything like that, other than the name of the professor I need to talk to, and I ask 
them if the issue is something that is known, have they heard this complaint. 
(T11A45:47) 
 
Heading an office of investigation, Title IX Coordinators’ goal in the interview is to 
determine whether there is a violation of law or policy, and not necessarily to provide voice: 
[I]f [the person] starts to ramble I will then say ‘let’s get back on track, why are 
you here? What happened to make you come here.’…And during that time I ask 
‘give me specific evidence that it is on the basis of your race, or give me specific 
evidence that you’re being sexually harassed.’  We really try to make sure we’re 
in the world of [compliance]. As a result of that, either I can tell right then or 
there or the person will admit ‘I really don’t think it’s [harassment or 
discrimination], I’m just not being treated well.’ Then we know it’s not [in the 
compliance] world.  If they say something else, then we could say ‘it looks like 
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there’s enough to at least do an investigation to prove or not prove your case.’  
Then I explain to them the investigation process: ‘During an investigation we can 
conduct witness interviews from people that either know or may know about your 
situation. Please give me some names of people who I should talk to and give me 
names of people who you don’t want me to talk to.’  (T10A43:22) 
 
 Second, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require other 
university employees to provide their office with information about violations. In order to 
comply with Title IX, Coordinators must actively seek to elicit reports about any and all 
incidents of sexual misconduct.  This requires that all employees who are required to 
report information about sexual misconduct must be informed of this obligation.  For 
example, a Coordinator described mandatory reporters as “Anybody with any 
information, including an Ombuds, on anything associated with discrimination [or] 
sexual misconduct, it’s required [by law] that they report it” (T4A24:25).  Title IX 
Coordinators described these reporting requirements as required for an effective 
institutional response:   
If [a complainant] start[s] at the police department, [the police] have a connection 
and work very closely with us to make sure we get the information we need once 
that person makes contact with them…[A]nd my office does the same, [and the] 
dean of students does the same [for the police]. So we have a very good 
collaborative working relationship that all of us at some point will be notified of a 
concern so that we can all do what we need to do to resolve it.  (T13A49:35)   
 
Title IX Coordinators observed that there is growing interest and reporting on their campuses due 
to the increasing importance of the issue. Thus, one said:   
Every time anybody says anything that just is remotely connected to some sort of 
Title IX issue, [administrators had] all read the Dear Colleague letter, [but now 
they] know what we [are] doing [and] it just put everyone in a tizzy…[I]t’s sort of 
been interesting politically because some higher ups…you can feel a political tug 
there where they really want to be in charge of it. Kind of… because it’s a new 
and scary frontier and that’s a career maker if you’re 35[years old] and have your 
PhD and you’re looking to move up in the organization... But they have been 
respectful and worked with me well in spite of it, but I have just noticed… they 
	   206	  
call me about the slightest thing that any young woman says…on any little thing 
they’ll say, ‘We just thought we should refer this you.’  (T12A47:44) 
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype do not exempt anyone from reporting unless it 
is required by law—and this includes Ombuds.  For example, an Ombuds noted a requirement to 
call the Title IX Coordinator and say, “’Here is the situation, would you be comfortable if we try 
to resolve it informally?’ And if [the Title IX Coordinator] thinks that it’s okay, we can do it and 
if [the Title IX Coordinator] doesn’t, we can’t…” (O14B64:30).    Another Ombuds noted the 
lack of a good working relationship with the Title IX Coordinator because “[T]hey think we’re 
on their turf and they think they should be handling it all” (O9B54:29).   
 Coordinators following the archetype prefer anonymous complaints to not reporting. As 
one observed: 
Technically, no one should make an anonymous complaint, because if [that 
happens] the only thing I can do is to check to see if there’s any veracity to the 
issue, but I can’t investigate and make a report to the complaining party because I 
have no idea who sent it.  (T5A24:31)   
 
Another Coordinator described creating a system that allows for anonymous reporting and how 
the Title IX office investigates anonymous complaints: 
We’ll go as far as we can go [investigating anonymous complaints], and if we 
receive information and we think we have enough information to take some action 
in terms of looking into some of the concerns, we’ll definitely do that. And we’ll 
go as far as we can go. It’s very difficult not having the person [who complained], 
so, in terms of resolution there may not be very much that can be done, but 
certainly we’ll investigate it, we’ll look into it and we’ll see if there’s any 
evidence to suggest that what the person has claimed has validity. If so, we’ll 
maybe try to take some action [even if only] some education…[t]alking to some 
folks, making folks aware that there are concerns. (T13A49:24) 
 
Other Coordinators who adhere to the archetype prefer detailed rather than general information.  
For example, an Ombuds described the Title IX Coordinator’s preferences:  
The Coordinator just wants the facts.  I can’t single out three departments with 
one being the potential culprit.  When the Coordinator asks me how come they 
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got singled out, what am I going to say?  The Coordinator tells me, ‘[E]ither we 
give training to the whole campus or we don’t, and we don’t have the resources to 
do it for the whole campus so it ain’t gonna happen.  Now, if you have a victim, I 
want to see them, you send them to me and we’ll start an investigation and we’ll 
follow the numbers, but in the absence of that I don’t want to hear about it. 
(O10B56:35)   
 
As a part of the effort to gather any information relating to sexual misconduct, Title IX 
Coordinators often oversee periodic meetings, for example: 
[T]he purpose is for us to make sure they have a record of all the allegations of 
sexual harassment  misconduct that have arisen across campus.  So we meet to 
discuss cases [of a very sensitive and often private nature]. (O7A37:38-39)  
 
Third, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype give priority to compliance 
over confidentiality because they must, above all else, comply with Title IX law and policy.  
Compliance requires that they give priority to compliance over confidentiality.  For example, a 
Coordinator said she tells visitors “What you say here is confidential to the extent allowable by 
law” (T10A43:20).  Another Coordinator explained:     
[It’s important to inform the person that you’re not a confidential resource and 
there are times when the institution has to act or chooses to act even if it’s not 
what he or she wants. I do my best to explain why and keep their concerns at the 
center of what our plan is so they can inform [our approach] as we move forward. 
(T8A39:16) 
 
Another Coordinator echoed the above observations:    
 
I tell people that I cannot guarantee confidentiality, but I can promise them 
discretion and that only those with a need to know will know, that we have 
confidential records, [and] that I take their privacy very seriously.  But because 
there are some issues involved I cannot guarantee that I will not have to tell 
someone.  (T12A47:36) 
 
Many Coordinators attempt to provide a “warning” to visitors about the Coordinator’s obligation 
to conduct an investigation. Thus, one observed:   
‘I do an investigation based upon the information you give me. My role is not to 
talk and give you options.  Unless there is nothing in your conversation to suggest 
that you’re being subjected to discrimination, and it is just bad behavior that you 
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don’t like and it doesn’t rise to the level of protected activity, of course I won’t do 
anything.’ But, for students who come in and say ‘I’ve been sexually harassed in 
the last month but I don’t want you to say anything,’ I stop them and say ‘I can’t. 
This isn’t the place for you.’  (T10A43:35)    
 
Another Coordinator likewise reported: 
We let them know that we have an obligation to the institution to conduct an 
investigation if we learn something that we think needs to be investigated, 
whether they want to file a complaint or not. It’s very common for people for 
people to come here and say ‘I want to tell you about something but I don’t want 
an investigation done.’ We stop them in their tracks and tell them ‘[L]ook, it’s not 
up to you whether we conduct an investigation or not.’ So it’s very clear to them 
what the obligations [are] on our part. Sometimes people walk away. We try to 
have them not walk away, we want to investigate if something’s wrong, but 
sometimes we have no choice. We give them whatever general information we 
may be able to give them and encourage them to talk to us, but it’s their choice. 
(T7A32:31)  
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype require participation in the investigation. As 
one observed: 
We have in our policy that failure to cooperate with an investigation can be 
viewed as a disciplinary action. And that is in there for people who either falsify 
information and flat our refuse to cooperate with an investigation that is critical. 
So if someone with information… refuses to cooperate…and I have a way to 
prove that, then you’re going to be disciplined for it. In other words look, this is a 
responsibility…I just want…you cooperating and giving me the information and 
giving me true and accurate information. Then you’re done. We’re going to 
protect your information as much as we can, but you’re going to give me that 
information. If you don’t give me the information, and you’re just refusing to do 
that, I’m going to discipline you because you’re not going to put a spoke in the 
wheel of this process.  (T10A43:44)    
 
This observation is echoed by other Coordinators. There are, of course, exceptions 
to the requirement to participate in the process, but these illustrate the general rule 
described by a Coordinator: 
[I]f a person is named in any way in an investigation, yes, they are required to 
participate in the process….[although] sometimes we make exceptions for the 
complainant, it depends on the situation…[W]ith Title IX cases if we do an 
investigation, there is the possibility that the investigator can go to the hearing and 
testify based on their investigation and their findings, which would not force the 
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complainant to have to testify. So there are ways, depending on the situation…in 
which the complainant may not have to participate in the [formal]process if they 
do not wish to. Of course, if they don’t want to pursue a case, then we are bound 
to support their wishes unless there’s some threat to the campus why we must 
move forward.  (T13A49:25)    
 
Another Coordinator sums up the priority of investigation over confidentiality:    
I never promise them confidentiality. But I still investigate as much as I possibly 
can, with or without their cooperation, because if they tell me, and I do nothing, 
then they can come back and say ‘hey, she’s the office of notice and I told her, 
and whether I participated or not, she’s showing deliberate indifference to my 
complaint. She didn’t check to see if I was telling the truth, she didn’t check to 
see if there were other people,’ so I’m not going down that road. I’m not going to 
jail for anybody.  (T11A45:24)  
 
Coordinators who adhere to the archetype find ways addressing the problem even when 
the complainant will not make an official complaint:   
I’m dealing with one now where I’ve said to the chair of the department ‘students 
have come forward, they have concerns, they’re afraid to put their name on the 
complaint, but we need to address the situation.’ So sometimes I can’t deal with 
the person who is directly accused, but I can deal with their management...[and 
say] ‘here’s the way we can approach this, so to get what we need and not to 
disrupt things more than we need to. At the end of the day I’m going to need your 
help to make sure that we fix this.’ Usually they will get on board.  (T5A26:20)   
 
This observation is echoed by another Coordinator who described moving forward without a 
complainant by confronting the respondent “about their behaviors in general…but not [in 
relation to the] complainant specifically…we try to make sure that there’s education provided 
directly to the person” (T5A26:20).  
 Fourth, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use and maintain records in 
order to ensure a documented investigation that provides for due process: 
First hand written accounts [are] the best way.  The [complainant then] 
understand[s] our process… [that they are] giving me the right to conduct an 
investigation, to talk with people. And [complainants] need to know ‘this is what 
you have signed up for, there’s no surprises, you’re not going to be retaliated 
against, but it’s going to be out there because that person that you’re charging 
with this offense has the right to defend themselves.  I have to tell [the 
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respondent] who filed it, what you’re saying, so that they can defend themselves 
on those charges. So it’s important that you know that’s what I’m doing.’  When 
we don’t [have a first hand account and have an informed complainant, [we] put 
[ourselves] in a predicament, if I calls [a respondent] and say ‘you know what, 
we’ve got a complaint against you by somebody’ [they will say] ‘Oh really, 
who?’ [and I will answer] ‘I can’t really tell you that right now’ [and they will 
say] ‘Well, what did they say I did?’ [The respondent] doesn’t have to answer any 
questions because I’m basically violating [their right to] due process. 
(T10A43:19) 
 
Another Title IX Coordinator described effective record keeping as necessary to ensuring 
correct information:  “[W]e summarize [the complainants] statement and send them a summary 
of their allegations and ask them if they agree with them, if they have anything they want to add” 
(T13A49:31).  A similar process is used by other Coordinators, who “write down the allegations, 
type it up, send it out, and ask the respondent to please make any corrections” (T10A43:25).  
Typically the name of the complainant and the summary of the complaint are then provided to 
the alleged offender, to make them “fully aware” of the situation (T10A43:23).  Another reason 
for making extensive written reports is to ensure the accuracy and reliability of the information 
learned in investigative interviews.  Several Coordinators expressed frustration at the gossip and 
breaches of confidentiality that make investigating difficult:  
[E]ven though the campus is huge, it’s still small [and] people hear everything.  
There is no confidentiality on this campus.  Let me repeat that:  None.  None at 
all.  As soon as a phone call is made, as soon as somebody makes a complaint, 
every-fricken-body on campus knows about it.  It makes my investigation hard 
because I have to figure out what is it you know and what it is you were told and I 
have to separate opinion from fact.  (T11A45:48-54)       
 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetypal model give priority to the 
organizational interest in investigation and enforcement over the complainant’s interest in 
influencing the course of the process and confidentiality. They may politely inform complaints of 
this priority and may even try to soften the harsh reality of it, but they do not waver in their 
commitment to this priority.   
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TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO DEPART FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
Some Title IX Coordinators respect the Ombuds commitment to confidentiality and do 
not insist that this office must provide the Coordinator with information about complaints.  In 
doing so, this departs from the archetypal Title IX Coordinator model.  For example, a 
Coordinator notes:  “[I]f anyone contacts the Ombuds for assistance, that information is 
not…shared with our office, because [visitors] are going there for confidential counseling, so to 
speak” (T10A43:49).    This observation is echoed by another Coordinator who noted, “Ombuds 
don’t have the legal [confidentiality] privilege, but they have that code and our campus 
completely respects that” (T12B48:10).  Yet another Coordinator explained: 
[W]e recognize  [the Ombuds office] as being a place where employees or 
students can come and get things off their chests, share with someone, and maybe 
get some good advice where they will know that the information that they share 
doesn’t necessarily have to be acted upon. That’s important for individuals who 
are afraid to go through the process. The [formal] process can be very 
intimidating, depending on the circumstance, so again I think that’s a valuable 
outlet for employees and students.  Years ago when we established [the Ombuds] 
office there was a ground swelling of support from staff and students to say ‘we 
need something like this on our campus’ so it was established. So I think it 
definitely serves a great purpose but I think those individuals have to be very 
knowledgeable [about] the campus in order to give people really good advice. 
(T13A49:16) 
 
Some Title IX Coordinators both over- and under-protect confidentiality and, in doing so, depart 
from the archetype.  Many Title IX Coordinators reveal more information to more officials than 
may be absolutely necessary to ensure effective enforcement.  For example, an Ombuds critically 
described the university’s Title IX Coordinator: 
Well, they don’t keep confidentiality. I mean, they always say “of course we keep 
confidentiality except on a need to know basis,” but their idea of who needs to 
know is wide and broad, so you can be fairly certain that if you go to [the Title IX 
Coordinator] that everybody will know that you went and what you said. If you 
go you can [also] be fairly certain that their bias will be for the University, no 
questions asked.  (O9A53:26)   
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Another Ombuds criticized her institution’s Title IX Coordinator for releasing a copy of the 
Coordinator’s report on an incident to the complainant:   
[T]hey were more upset by the report than the actual complaint they filed in the 
first place.  [T]he problem is these reports are confidential but they get out [and] 
people share them. They are not supposed to [share them], it's very clear…[I]t 
was ironic because the investigation result was in their favor and it was still 
upsetting.  (O14B64:46)   
 
Such instances of breaches of confidentiality may lead to a negative reputation and a lack of trust 
in these Title IX compliance offices.  However, over-protection of confidentiality also can lead 
to a lack of trust: 
Only when asked will I tell a complainant that they may never know the full 
extent of the result of the investigation.  If they say ‘I just want to know,’ we’ll 
talk about why they can’t know.  (T10B44:18)   
 
In another example, a department believed they followed the Title IX Coordinator’s 
recommendations following an investigation, but “other staff members were unsatisfied because 
they were not able to know the exact steps taken, so it looked like nothing happened” (T3B20:2). 
Paradoxically, both those Title IX Coordinators who breach confidentiality and those who 
release too little information are, in fact, departing from the Title IX Coordinator archetype.     
Title IX Coordinators understand that gaining complainants’ trust will lead complainants 
to be more willing to participate in the formal process. Some of these Coordinators depart from 
Coordinator archetype in ways that are aimed at building complainants’ trust.  For example:  
[I]f the information comes to us and they’ve not shared the name of the accused 
with the first responder, meaning if it happens on campus and they share that 
information with one of our resident assistants but they don’t give a name…[and] 
they haven’t told the police…they’re not going to tell us. Sometimes they might 
[if we establish a relationship]. You want to see if you can build enough trust in 
the conversation or support in the conversation that the person will see this as a 
safe place to report, but it isn’t easy to present it that way.  (T2B14:8)   
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Often a Coordinator may truly want to provide the visitor with control.  In the clearest 
example, a Title IX Coordinator described conversations with students but taking no notes: 
[I] take no notes and make no record of the conversation.  So in that way it’s kind 
of like the Ombuds experience.  I give people an opportunity to state their case.  
What is the problem, what do they think the problem is, how do they want to 
resolve it?  I do not provide any initial statement before students start talking, I’m 
just letting [the student] get it off [their] chest and see where it takes 
them….Because a lot of times they just want to vent.  They just want somebody 
else to hear what’s going on and tell them whether or not they’re crazy.  If they 
are serious about it, I have a formal intake form to fill where they can file a 
complaint. It’s pretty simple and straightforward.  If it’s sexual in nature there are 
some key things that a person will come in and tell me that will lead me to believe 
that something was not consensual and now we’ve got to do something.  I tell 
them, ‘I need to stop you.  I need to review what I’ve heard, and I need you to 
know that this is no longer a ‘what do I do conversation, this is a ‘what are we 
going to do’ conversation.  There’s just too much information, there’s too many 
things going on making my skin crawl, and now we’ve got to address it.  I don’t 
care if they tell me they want to investigate it or not, if I’ve got evidence, I’m 
investigating, especially sexual harassment. There are no ifs, ands, or buts about 
it. If they have evidence to prove that something unseemly was going on and it 
wasn’t consensual, I’m checking it out.  (T11A45:14-23-42-43)   
 
Other Coordinators also depart from the archetype by not documenting visitors’ statements:   
 
We have a complaint form, but…I am loathe to require that they complete it until 
we talk. And I’m also loathe to tape record, because it changes the tenor of a 
meeting when you put that thing between the two of you, and the general 
counsel’s office disagrees with me on that.  (T12A47:22)    
 
Still other Title IX Coordinators provide complainants with control over whether the Title 
IX Coordinator will investigate, a clear departure from the archetypal model.  For example, a 
Coordinator noted, “[T]he goal of the meeting is to give [visitors] their options and to help them 
make a decision about a complaint and what they want us to do with it.  What do they want to 
have happen? (T8A39:52).  Another Coordinator described the decision to go forward with a 
complaint as a “collaborative decision” in which anything said by the visitor could be used for 
their detriment (T8A39:55).  Other Coordinators described telling visitors their options:  
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Do they want to use the Ombuds, Title IX Coordinator, deal with it on their own, 
or do they just want to drop it?  They always have options.  Once they tell me 
where they want to go with it, because some of them are adamant about ‘no, I 
want to nail him to the wall, so you’re the person I want to talk to.’ I tell them 
‘here’s the form’ because I never want them to make a decision in the heat of the 
moment. ‘Here’s my complaint form, my intake form.’ And I ask them to write 
out or type up their complaint, which requires them to go away, think about what 
they’ve said, what they want to do, and come back.  Sometimes I never see them 
again because once they put it in writing and they see it they change their minds. 
(T11A45:20) 
 
Still other Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype by making pre-conversation 
statements that provide basic information but not enough to educate visitors about their options:   
[W]e try to explain this before we’ve heard the complainant’s entire story, so it 
allows the complainant to kind of decide how much they’re going to share with us 
and how detailed we’re going to get…that’s where we can give them some 
control.  I say, “[W]e will [make decisions] about what to do depending on what 
you tell us…for example, if what you tell us on its face violates a policy, then we 
will do a full investigation, but otherwise we may not.  (T1B12:56)  
 
Another Coordinator noted: 
 
In our office we generally don’t use a form. We just collect basic information, 
name, if the person was a student, faculty, or staff, the nature of their complaint, 
who the witnesses may have been, if there were any witnesses, what the 
complaint is in reference to. Usually we’ll have a conversation even before we get 
started, before the person starts talking we’ll talk to them a little bit about our 
office and what we do and let them know our obligations to move forward if we 
have enough information to indicate that something is potentially a violation of 
our policy we have an obligation to investigate. So if a person feels that they don’t 
want to engage in that we say you can give us a hypothetical. We try to advise 
them on the front end before they begin to share information and try to gain their 
confidence in our process and explain how our process works.  We would still 
need to investigate the hypothetical.  (T13A49:27)     
 
A very different type of departure occurs when a Coordinator gives priority to the individual 
complainant’s wellbeing and preferences rather than to investigation and enforcement: 
[P]eople that don’t want an investigation, we encourage them to talk in 
hypotheticals. A couple of times I’ve actually taken anonymous phone calls. What 
we can do with that is limited, but I’m willing to take them because if I can give 
somebody who’s in a bad situation some sort of useful information, that’s better 
than nothing.  (T7A32:33) 
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We don’t require them to have to fill out a form.  Maybe it depends on how 
traumatized the person may be or how upset they may be. It may be that we don’t 
want to get into what happened at that point. We might just want to give them 
some support. We might want them to go to the counseling center, that kind of 
thing. They may not be at a place where they want to formally complain or go 
through the complaint process. Certainly we want to get whatever information we 
can, but again, it would just depend on the state of the individual at that particular 
point in time, but certainly we would want to make sure that we follow up with 
that person to make sure that we get a statement at some point...  (T13A49:31) 
 
In sum, in sharp contrast to the Title IX Coordinators who strictly adhere to the 
archetypal model by giving top priority to investigation and enforcement, some Coordinators 
grant more—or less—confidentiality than the archetype demands, seek to build trust but only to 
entice complainants into divulging more information than they seem to be willing to provide, or 
provide complainants with control over whether to investigate that directly undermines the 
commitment to investigation and enforcement.   
CONCLUSION 
Although Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators presumably both share a preference for 
eliminating sexual misconduct, the archetypal offices reflect two very different philosophies and 
mechanisms for handling complaints.  Where Ombuds see absolute confidentiality and the self-
determination it provides as a prerequisite for encouraging people to bring them complaints and 
for handling complaints in the face of retaliation, Title IX Coordinators reflect a compliance 
regime that seeks to prevent, elicit reports of, and eliminate instances of sexual misconduct.  
While some Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators adhere strictly to their respective 
archetypes on the matter of confidentiality, many depart considerably from these commitments.  
These Ombuds breach confidentiality in the interest of nabbing a perpetrator or reforming a 
departmental environment.  The Title IX Coordinators naturally depart in the other direction.  
Some give priority to the individual complainant’s wishes or feelings over the institutional 
	   216	  
interest in investigation and enforcement.  Others misleadingly give the impression of being 
prepared to maintain confidences, but only to draw the complainant into letting down her guard 
to reveal information that she might not otherwise divulge.  As a result, confidentiality illustrates 
the tension between individual self-determination and broader organizational interests.  The next 
chapter examines the impartiality and independence of Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators.     
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CHAPTER 6:  IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE 
The archetypal Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds models view impartiality and 
independence very differently. In practice, however, many Coordinators and Ombuds depart 
from their respective models in ways that make them more alike than different.  This chapter 
briefly describes how these different archetypal models treat the important values of impartiality 
and independence in very different ways. As we shall see, while some Coordinators and Ombuds 
try to remain faithful to these guiding principles, some Coordinators and Ombuds depart from 
them in ways that make them come to resemble one another.  These adherences and departures 
occur along a spectrum, as some Ombuds or Title IX Coordinators may aptly be described as 
“adherers” or “deviators.”  Additionally, adherence or departure is often situational and context-
specific as a Coordinator or Ombuds who goes by the book in one instance departs from their 
archetype in another.   
The Title IX Coordinator archetype is a model similar to a police investigator or 
prosecutor, but with a mission to enforce compliance with civil rights law.  In doing so, they are 
to be impartial, but a Title IX Coordinator’s impartiality relates both to following prescribed 
procedure and to the quality of the investigation.  A Title IX Coordinators’ investigation must be 
impartial, with the investigator unbiased towards either the complainant or the respondent.  This 
also includes having no other job responsibilities, such as general counsel or a disciplinary 
hearing board member that may create a conflict of interest.  While Title IX Coordinators must 
have no bias with regard to the facts or guilt in any particular investigation, they are expected to 
advocate for policies that prevent sexual misconduct.   
Independence is closely related to impartiality.  In order to maintain independence, 
Ombuds must operate outside of the official organizational structure in order to be able to avoid 
	   218	  
undue influence and to access information throughout the organization.  They do not represent 
the organization or serve to advance the organization’s goals but instead are advocates for fair 
process generally. As opposed to Ombuds, Title IX Coordinators represent the organization.  
Title IX Coordinators, unlike Ombuds, use university general counsel as their counsel.  While 
Ombuds operate independently of the organizational structure, Title IX Coordinators work 
within the organizational structure.  Title IX Coordinators are representatives of the organization, 
and Ombuds serve the value of fair process more generally.  For Title IX Coordinators, 
independence and impartiality are related concepts, as alignment with administrative interests 
can affect a Coordinator's impartiality.  While technically not independent, Title IX Coordinators 
must have the freedom to advocate for compliance with Title IX law and policy in order to 
maintain their impartiality and ability to be effective.   
Where the Title IX Coordinator is an advocate for compliance with law and policy 
similar to a prosecutor or police investigator, the Ombuds form of impartiality is more like that 
of a Rabbi or a Priest, a role that serves as an advocate for overarching principles, such as fair 
process.  Neutrality and impartiality also requires that the Ombuds reports to the highest possible 
level within the organization rather than some subordinate unit, operates independent of ordinary 
organizational structures, and is not involved with any formal investigation or organizational 
compliance function (IOA Standard 2.3).  IOA Standard 2.4 requires that the Ombuds serve no 
additional organizational role that may compromise the office’s neutrality.  This requirement 
includes not aligning with any formal or informal associations to create actual or perceived 
conflicts of interest, and having no personal interest or stake, and incurring no gain or loss from 
the outcome of any issue.  Practically this stricture means the Ombuds may not conduct formal 
investigations, receive notice on behalf of the organization, serve as a voting member on any 
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search committees not related to the Ombuds office staff, handle formal appeals, keep case 
records for the organization, or have any authority to make, change, enforce, or rescind any 
policy, rule, or administrative decision (IOA Best Practices, 2009, p. 4). IOA Standard 2.1 
requires Ombuds to be neutral, impartial and unaligned, while “striv[ing] for impartiality, 
fairness and objectivity in the treatment of people and the consideration of issues” (IOA Standard 
2.2).   
TITLE IX COORDINATORS:  THE INVESTIGATOR/PROSECUTOR MODEL 
 
A key responsibility of Title IX Coordinators is impartial investigation.  The 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter requires a school’s inquiry in each case to be “prompt, thorough, and impartial” 
(p. 5).  But what does it mean to be impartial?  The Title IX office at the University of Kansas 
provides a typical example of how these university offices attempt to achieve impartiality.  The 
University of Kansas Office of Institutional Opportunity and Access states that it is a “neutral 
fact finder conducting investigations” (University of Kansas, OIOA, About IOA).  This 
statement is followed by a list of complaints the office will investigate, including complaints of 
discrimination by race, color, ethnicity, religion, sex, national origin, ancestry, age, disability, 
status as a veteran, sexual orientation, marital and parental status, gender identify, gender 
expression, and genetic information.  In this light, impartiality can be inferred to mean the 
investigator will not be biased towards either the complainant or the respondent. The 
Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process also declares that “investigators assigned to 
conduct an investigation will be impartial” (University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint 
Resolution Process, Investigation). This view is echoed at Pennsylvania State University, where 
the Task Force on Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Report noted that an impartial 
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investigation required that “any real or perceived conflicts of interest between the fact-finder or 
decision-maker and the parties should be disclosed” (2014, 12).   
Impartiality is complicated for the Title IX Coordinator who, as opposed to Ombuds, 
must work within the organizational structure, represent the institution, and use university 
general counsel as their counsel.  A South Dakota Title IX and Compliance Coordinator position 
describes the position “working in conjunction with the AVP of Human Resources and Office of 
the President to ensure compliance” (Title IX & Compliance Coordinator job at South Dakota 
State University, ATIXA, 2013).  The Santa Clara University EEO and Title IX Coordinator job 
posting (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) requires the person to “[s]erve as a consultant and 
partner with the Office of Diversity and Inclusion and with Human Resources with regard to 
federal and state laws that prohibit sex discrimination, sexual harassment and sexual 
misconduct.”  Title IX Coordinators thus operate within and represent the organization in its 
responsibilities to enforce civil rights law and policy.   In doing so, Title IX Coordinators must 
remain faithful to the dictates and requirements of Title IX law and the resulting institutional 
policies.  Independence and impartiality are related concepts for the Title IX Coordinator 
archetype, as the appearance of serving administrative interests can erode the appearance of 
impartiality.   
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter clarifies that impartiality can be defined as avoiding 
conflicts of interest.  Title IX coordinators “should not have other job responsibilities that may 
create a conflict of interest.  For example, serving as the Title IX coordinator and a disciplinary 
hearing board member or general counsel may create a conflict of interest” (p. 7).  Other job 
positions whose job responsibilities may conflict with Title IX obligations “include Directors of 
Athletics, Deans of Students, and any employee who serves on the judicial/hearing board or to 
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whom an appeal might be made” (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 12).  The investigative/adjudicatory 
division of roles is not a requirement of Title IX or OCR, and Title IX Coordinators at many 
institutions make “judgments” regarding outcomes despite either conducting or directing the 
investigation.  The OCR Q&A (2014) provides that the Title IX Coordinator does not necessarily 
have to be the person who conducts the investigation (p.25).  If the Title IX Coordinator does 
conduct the investigation there must not be a conflict of interest in carrying out this investigation 
(OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 25).  This conflict of interest definition suggests that Title IX does not bar 
the Coordinator from making the initial determination of guilt or innocence, as long as they do 
not oversee the appeal.   
Administrative law provides additional guidance for Title IX Coordinators.  Under 
Federal Law (Administrative Procedure Act, § 554(d)(2)):   
An employee or agent engaged in the performance of investigative or prosecuting 
functions for an agency in a case may not, in that or a factually related case, 
participate or advise in the recommended decision, or agency review pursuant to 
section 557 of this title, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings… 
 
As a result, under Federal law the functions of investigator or prosecutor and Administrative 
Law Judge or hearing officer must be kept strictly separate.  When the procedure occurs under 
state law, however, the separation need not be so strict, but it still must be there.  In Withrow v. 
Larkin (1975), the Court held that a combination of investigative and adjudicative functions in a 
state agency is not per se impermissible.  The court did suggest, however, that the combination 
of these functions in a single individual official would raise more serious concerns.  When the 
procedure is governed by state law, constitutionally protected property interests trigger the 
required separation.  
Motivated by liability concerns, at least one major education insurer recommends that 
university officials who investigate student-perpetrated sexual assault should not include a 
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determination of guilt or innocence in their the investigators report, as these conclusions may be 
seen as a judgment that is not within the authority of investigators to make (United Educators 
Powerpoint, 2012).  As a result, a minority of Title IX Coordinators in this study were limited to 
investigating and determining whether sufficient evidence (or probable cause) existed to trigger a 
hearing to determine Title IX violations and punishment.  The remaining Coordinators were able 
to include recommendations and findings in their reports.  Likewise, the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter notes a university’s investigation and hearing process must be impartial in order to be 
equitable, thus “any real or perceived conflicts of interest between the fact-finder or decision-
maker and the parties should be disclosed” (p. 12).   
Title IX Coordinators’ impartiality obligation also requires objectivity.  Similar to an 
investigator or prosecutor, Title IX Coordinators must objectively examine the facts to determine 
violation of civil rights law or policy.  According to Brett Sokolow (ATIXA Training Manual, 
2013, Civil Rights Investigation Model), “[S]tudent conduct administrators have to be cautious 
about wearing too many hats in the process so as to negatively impact this objectivity.  You 
cannot be chief investigator, presenter of the complaint, custodian of the conduct process, and 
implementer of sanctions for the same complaint without an appearance of impropriety or 
potential compromise of objectivity” (p. 60).  
Objectivity requirements are echoed in recent job postings. The Director and Title IX 
Coordinator position posting at Montana State University (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) 
requires a “[d]emonstrated ability to investigate, analyze and resolve complaints, while 
maintaining objectivity and fairness.”  Goucher College (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) is 
seeking a part-time Title IX Coordinator with “the ability to build relationships that balance the 
multiple, varying, and sometimes conflicting interests of diverse stakeholders around a 
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politically charged subject matter are essential.”  In practice Title IX Coordinators do often carry 
dual roles, such as directors of offices of institutional equity, diversity, human resources, or 
student services.   
In terms of goals, Title IX Coordinators are advocates for compliance with law and 
policy similar to a prosecutor or police investigator.  The ATIXA Statement of Ethics and Title 
IX Coordinator Competencies (2012, §3) states that “No unlawful or unethical practice or any 
practice at odds with these standards can be justified … if doing so would deprive a member of 
the community of civil rights which a reasonable administrator would have known were owed” 
(p. 3).   
TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO ADHERE TO THE ARCHETYPAL MODEL 
 
 Title IX Coordinators who follow the archetypal model see their role as a formal one of 
determining the facts and ensuring compliance with the law.  One Coordinator described their 
office’s policies as “[F]air and unbiased” and their “role is to get to the truth, we are not 
advocates on this campus.  [We want to know] what actually happened, so I don’t really see us 
advocating [for] one side or the other” (T1A11:36).  This sentiment is echoed by another 
Coordinator who described the impact of only having one side’s cooperation: 
[A] lot of time they’ll come in and say ‘I’m not going to cooperate, you can’t find 
me guilty of anything.’ The response to that is ‘yes, we can! We’re going to 
weigh the evidence that we have and we’re going to make a decision based on hat 
evidence, so if you don’t cooperate we’re just not going to have your version of 
what happened.’  (T9A41:33) 
 
In determining facts and ensuring legal compliance, the Title IX Coordinator following 
the archetype seeks to remain impartial to the interests of both the respondent and the 
complainant.  One Title IX Coordinator reflects this impartiality goal in noting “[R]ecently 
there’s been a lot of stuff about ‘gosh, everybody’s taking the female’s word and who’s 
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protecting the respondents,’ [but] [w]e’re trying to do a very balanced approach here where we 
say ‘[W]e want to make sure both sides have resources and [be] very neutral in terms of what’s 
going on’” (T9B42:16).  The same Coordinator described working with a complainant who 
“trusted us until we didn’t find in her favor…[but because] we are neutral fact finders…if its not 
sexual harassment, it’s just not” (T9B42:8).  Another Coordinator echoed remaining impartial to 
both sides:  “I’ve talked to the complainant, now I’m going to talk to the respondent and get their 
statement. All along the way I am assessing credibility. I’m trying to be as bias-free and 
judgment free as possible. Taking it seriously, but I’m not taking sides” (T11A45:49).  Often 
Title IX Coordinators following the archetypal model must navigate others’ differing 
assumptions about their role: 
[There is an] immediate conclusion that [the process is] going to be a heavy-
handed, legalistic process and that all [I am] interested in [doing] is protecting the 
university… and so people don’t have a lot of trust coming into [the] process. 
This may be the first time they’ve had this experience, they’ve never had to visit 
your office before or have reason to enquire about your office. Then they find out 
you’re a lawyer and that adds a dimension to it ‘oh my gosh…’ I think it’s also 
the culture of an office and the culture that I try to create is to reassure both 
parties and witnesses that we’re objective and we’re not pre-judging, and that 
takes a lot of work to get people to understand.  (T2B14:43) 
 
Title IX Coordinators who follow the archetypal model do not see their role as one of 
advocacy, as indicated by one coordinator who noted, “It is not an advocacy role, it is more of a 
policy development or administrative role” (T10A43:3).  Impartiality can be challenging when 
complainants and respondents are seeking advocacy, for example: “Some people do what I call 
‘shopping.’ They’ll shop me, they’ll shop diversity, they’ll shop Ombuds, they’ll shop legal 
affairs, and they’ll shop around to see who’s going to give them the answer they want to hear” 
(T11A45:51).  Another Coordinator explained, “We explain to people what we do and we 
explain to them what our obligations are and also that we’re not their representative. Sometimes 
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people come in here thinking that we’re their lawyers or advocates or representatives, and we 
disabuse them of that right away” (T7A32:31). 
Another Coordinator noted the challenge of remaining impartial in the face of 
expectations to the contrary by individuals with power:   
[W]e’re not advocates for anybody, but they expect us to behave as other people 
behave towards them in the bureaucracy. They have a place in the bureaucracy 
and goddammit, this office is not respecting it…I think the word is deference. 
Whether we respect them or not, they want us to defer to them…and then 
sometimes they’ll complain to our bosses that an investigation was 
unfair…because we ask them questions that make them uncomfortable.  [S]o 
when they come here and we don’t back off that pisses them off…they want us to 
accept their first answer which is ‘no, of course I didn’t sexually harass anyone.’ 
(T7B33:14, 21, 24) 
 
Title IX Coordinator who follow the archetypal model do, however, advocate for the goals of 
law and policy: 
[W]e try to blend this sense of reasonableness, some sense of advocacy for right, 
for the policy, with protection and due process for the alleged perpetrator, alleged 
defender. You have to have all that in front of you in making a decision. That’s 
why I say it’s not a pure advocacy role, because a pure advocacy role is different. 
And that’s not what we do. We have that at the university, [but] that’s not my 
role.  (T10A43:7) 
 
Likewise, another observed,  “[W]e let [visitors] know that we have an obligation to the 
institution to conduct an investigation if we learn something that we think needs to be 
investigated, whether they want to file a complaint or not” (T7A32:31). In order to ensure that 
law and policy is correctly applied, impartiality for the Title IX Coordinator adhering to the 
archetype requires protecting each side’s rights to fair process, as described by another 
Coordinator:   
I take very seriously [both respondents’ and complainants’ right[s] of having a 
process that’s fair and objective, but also giving them the same opportunity to be 
heard and feel that they’ve been heard without drawing conclusions. And that’s a 
struggle because sometimes the story that you’re being told by the complainant is 
so compelling and the circumstances that gave rise to them being here are very 
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difficult. And so it would be easy to jump to a conclusion that the person’s that’s 
the accused is a bad actor.  (T2B14:42) 
 
 Title IX coordinators describe working closely with university legal counsel so as to 
interpret the law correctly. Title IX Coordinators, unlike Ombuds, use university general counsel 
as their counsel.  One Coordinator noted the importance of examining each situation from 
multiple organizational perspectives:  “Then you have to look at how things are being handled 
inside, from the standpoint of what if this goes outside, what will this do? How might this be 
viewed by opposing counsel? I’m not an attorney but I review everything I do with our general 
counsel’s office” (T4A24:11).  Another Coordinator described their relationship with legal 
counsel as “very close… [w]are probably in conversation at least once or twice on a daily basis. 
We’re constantly working with them to tweak our policies and procedures. We’ll get our 
protocols, obtain advice on cases that we might be working on, just to make sure that we’re 
getting sound legal advice before we take action. So yeah, it’s a pretty fluid working 
relationship” (T13A49:14).  Other Coordinators echoed the close relationship with legal counsel: 
It’s rare, I can’t think of one situation where either office disagreed with the 
findings. It may be a word or two or ‘you need to amplify on this issue, talk more 
about the evidence that supports how you arrived at this conclusion,’ that sort of 
thing. But that’s the understanding that we have and what we’ve communicated 
both to the joint communities, faculty, is that our work is done in consultation 
with general counsel.  (T2A13:19) 
 
Another  Coordinator likewise described having a close relationship with university counsel due 
to the liability implications, stating “We pretty much review all our final reports with them. 
They’re aware of all of our case lists, obviously, because it could have liability implications for 
the university, but I don’t ever feel like they’re trying to impose upon us any sort of outcome” 
(T1A11:12).   
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In keeping with their reliance on legal advice from the office of general counsel, Title IX 
Coordinators who adhere to the archetypal model view their position as reporting to, and 
representing, the university’s leadership. The posting for Chief Diversity Officer and Title IX 
Coordinator at Claremont McKenna College (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14) notes the 
position reports to the President with dotted-line reporting relationship to the General Counsel 
and Chief Compliance Officer.  Yet another Coordinator described “report[ing] up through 
academic affairs, and…that’s my loyalty, if you will, because it’s my reporting line” 
(T11A45:37).  Generally Coordinators describe sharing in the goals of the administration: 
As it concerns my boss, the president, and maybe the provost, I will report to 
them everything and anything that could be a potential embarrassment to the 
institution, that could be a headline tomorrow morning. I don’t want them being 
blindsided by anything. It’s what any good subordinate does for his boss. 
(T7A32:12)  
 
In this organizational context, many Coordinators described the challenge of maintaining 
independence and remaining impartial but at the same time nurturing much needed relationships 
with the general counsel and top university officials.  One Coordinator noted, “I have to be very, 
very, very careful [to protect my freedom]. So because I am proactive and because I am about 
relationships, I try to keep legal abreast of any situation in my office that may turn into a lawsuit 
or a legal battle. I always try to give them a head’s up, but technically I don’t need to.  If I get a 
request for records, if I get wind that an attorney has been contacted by one of the folks I’m 
investigating, I always provide the courtesy of letting legal affairs know so that they’re not 
blindsided” (T11A45:40).   
Ultimately, although Title IX Coordinators report to the university leadership, those who 
adhere to the archetypal model give priority to doing what is required by Title IX, even when this 
might conflict with what is preferred by the organization.  In this way impartiality and 
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independence are consistent in terms of application of law and policies required by Title IX.  
One Coordinator noted that the office must “make sure that we respond in an appropriate way, 
that we follow our policy and that we’re in alignment with what our legal obligations are as an 
institution” (T8A39:17).  Tension often results, as indicated by one Coordinator who described a 
conversation with the university president:   
I got called to the president’s office and he asked me ‘do you have enough 
information and evidence that I can fire [the professor]?’ That was his question to 
me. And I tell him ‘I’ve got enough evidence that a lot of stuff can happen, but 
you can’t fire him with it. He’s a jerk, but there’s no law against being a jerk. 
He’s trampled on the student’s civil rights, but we can fix that.’  (T11A45:38) 
 
Maintaining independence and impartiality requires effective communication with administrators 
regarding the shared interest in compliance with Title IX.  For example: 
I think one of the issues that you see when you really get into the nitty-gritty of 
this work is sometimes the outcome of our investigation is not in the interest of 
the university’s administration...[in terms of] the university’s liability interests. I 
do think at the end of the day it’s in the interest of the university, and I think 
being able to stand up and help them see that [it is important].  (T1A11:15)    
 
In addition to navigating administrative preferences, the Title IX Coordinator who follows the 
archetypal model is able to retain independence from control by university legal counsel.  For 
example, a Title IX Coordinator described their interest in advocating for policy versus the 
university’s interest in defending against potential lawsuits: 
I think we have a lot of independence, pretty much total independence in how we 
do investigations and make determinations, and [general counsel is] appreciative 
of that and they can say ‘this office made a completely independent determination 
about the situation.’ Now naturally there’s going to be times where there’s a little 
bit of tension because they’re defending the university and we’re advocates for 
the policy and not necessarily thinking about defense all the time, but it naturally 
comes into your brain as a lawyer. I think sometimes we tend to be a little more 
proactive about the environment where they might be a little more defense 
oriented. Where we know we’ve made a finding of sexual harassment against 
someone who remains in the department…we consider that to be more 
problematic because it feels like we’re just waiting for the next complaint. I think 
they have more of a case-by-case view of it.  (T3A19:45)   
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Another Coordinator noted, “I tend to say ‘gosh, I want to make sure I’m not causing more 
problems than I’m helping solve,’ so I tend to look at it very collaboratively and say ‘what do 
you think about this?’ We talk about it, sometimes we agree... But there are times that we 
haven’t agreed and I can do what I want to do and I’ll hear ‘hey, if you want to go out there on 
that limb, go for it!’” (T9A41:43).   
The perception of independence is important, as one Coordinator noted, “I think some 
people perceive us as being an arm of the regent or an arm of the administration, and I don’t 
think that’s a fair perception at all. I think we are [here] to promote and enforce Title IX on the 
campus, but I think some people see us as we’re just keeping the campus safe from lawsuits” 
(T1A11:48).   
Remaining impartial and independent is important for maintaining legitimacy and trust, 
as indicated by the below Title IX Coordinator describing an interaction with a parent.  While the 
parent viewed the Coordinator’s remarks as a preference for a particular outcome, in reality it 
was a Title IX Coordinator’s view of reality based in experience and expertise:    
We had a case early on where the mom was like ‘yeah, this guy is going to go to 
jail for being a rapist,’ and the fact of the matter was that wasn’t going to happen. 
So she initially was very angry at me because I told her that that probably wasn’t 
going to happen and that if there was a criminal prosecution, if the prosecutor 
didn’t decline the charges, it would probably be six months to a year before it was 
resolved, he would probably plead to a lesser included offense, and get probation. 
And she went ballistic on me. Ultimately all of that came true and she ended up 
recognizing that I had given her the straight story on everything and she’s become 
one of our greatest allies.  (T9A41:32) 
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetypal model often describe managing expectations 
regarding their role as a fact finder:  “We have to [manage expectations].  That’s why I 
always…let them know…they may not like [the truth] I find in the end, and therefore I know they 
may not like me either!” (T4A24:39).    
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 The archetypal Title IX Coordinator must act impartially to the facts, to the potential 
outcomes, and to any one side, necessitating that the Coordinator play an impartial role within 
the investigative process.  Investigative impartiality is clearly stated by one Coordinator in 
saying “[I]f there’s a higher level decision I need to be making it objectively and if I am too 
connected to each case I think…it compromises me a little bit…I am more interested in the 
process, the protocols, the rights, the responsibilities… if the university is not following the 
protocol that is best for us, that’s a problem for me”  (T6B31:7). Note that the previous comment 
reflects an implicit belief in the Coordinator’s role as an advocate for the quality of the process.  
Likewise, another Coordinator observed:    
I don’t think I can do [investigations] and the [punishment] piece and adequately 
have the confidence of my investigators or law enforcement… there’s just, there’s 
a natural… there’s suspicion between the different roles. I mean, a coordinated 
campus response is based on understanding what your roles are and where there’s 
inherent conflict in your roles.  (T8A39:11) 
 
Another Coordinator described holding an advocacy role at one point and then moving into the 
Title IX Coordinator position:  “[T]he [early] assumption when I walk into the room is…that I’m 
going to be harsher on the accused or somehow biased, that I’m going to be harsher in 
recommending a sanction or somehow aggressive in my response. I’ve had to prove that I can be 
reasonable and an aggressive response or a biased response isn’t really going to help the 
complainant either” (T8A39:24).   
In sum, while the archetypal Title IX Coordinator is a representative of the institution and 
reports to the administration (while collaborating to some extent with the general counsel), he or 
she must remain an advocate for compliance with and correct application of law and policy.  As 
a result Title IX Coordinators who follow the archetypal model see their role not as advocacy for 
any one side but as advocacy for compliance with law and policy.  
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TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO DEPART FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
 
 Title IX Coordinators adhere and depart from the archetypal model along a spectrum that 
depends on the Coordinator’s preferences, the organizational interests, and alleged incident, and 
the complainant and respondent’s preferences.  Many Title IX Coordinators who depart from the 
archetype do so on the basis of understandable concerns about a real individual’s pain, and they 
decide to help the person even if this does not yield institutional enforcement.  In doing so, Title 
IX Coordinators depart from the archetypal model’s impartiality requirements.  Other Title IX 
Coordinators, needing to address and resolve sexual misconduct, depart in the opposite direction 
and favor organizational interests at the expense of impartiality.  Some Coordinators depart from 
the archetype by holding multiple roles that undermine their ability to be impartial.  Yet other 
Coordinators depart from the archetype do so because they are unable to establish enough 
independence to do the preventative work required by Title IX.  
First, often Title IX Coordinators advocate for one side or another or express partiality.  
One Coordinator noted “end[ing] up in more of an advocacy role than I should be” by “help[ing] 
[the parents] make an appointment to see [medical professionals] and develop evidence…[and to 
a lesser degree by] recommend[ing] a local psychologist…but what do you do when they’re in 
your office and everybody’s weeping and dad’s ready to punch someone out and put a whole in 
the wall?” (T12B48:18).  Another Coordinator described attempting to manage expectations and 
maintain impartiality: 
Reasonable outcomes I listen to. Irrational, I try to manage. When the professor, 
instructor says ‘what’s the big deal?’ I try to explain to them what the big deal is, 
because a lot of it has to do with freedom of speech, the [rights held by] a student 
that they’ve [violated]. [I try to] [g]et them to understand [that if] they don’t want 
[their own rights violated], why is it okay when they [violate a student’s rights]? 
I’m trying to get them to understand the seriousness [of their offense]. I really 
don’t try to nail people to the wall unless they really are being jerks about it. 
(T11A45:57) 
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For another example, consider a Coordinator who described asking the complainant what 
outcome they want:  “We want to be able to make an outreach call to [the potential victim], [to] 
make sure they’ve got any resources like meeting with our office of victim’s assistance or any 
other advocacy groups on campus that could help them…we want to make sure they’ve got that 
support. Then we work with our complainant to figure out what outcome they’re looking for” 
(T1A11:18).  Indeed the line between assisting individuals in accessing resources and advocating 
on their behalf can be a fine one.  One Coordinator described situations in which the 
administration may want to go forward with an investigation without the potential survivor’s 
consent, in which case the Coordinator tells the person “to share [with the administration] why 
they don’t want to go forward or what their concerns are…” (T839:55).  The Coordinator then 
explained to the potential survivor to “say what you want, but remember to say why and that 
anything you share could be used, so keep that in mind”—but then he/she immediately 
acknowledges “that’s the role of an advocate, [and] I can’t coach you” (T839:55).   
 Second, Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetypal model often advocate for 
particular outcomes that may favor one person over another.  One Coordinator reported a 
problematic pattern in which “We’re firing all our classified people who violate the policy but 
our tenured faculty…[are] getting [treated] a little bit different[ly] sometimes (T1B12:32).  The 
Coordinator continued: 
You won’t find many cases…[or] university campuses where a student can take 
an action that will result in that faculty member leaving the university…It’s 
extremely rare [and while] [s]exual harassment is one of those areas where you 
can get that outcome…[e]ven then…it’s pretty rare when you’re talking about a 
tenured faculty member.  (T1B12:12)  
 
Another Coordinator described an instance where a woman reported sexual misconduct but the 
Coordinator effectuated an informal resolution instead of an investigation:  “[T]he [respondent] 
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said ‘I may have done that, but I in no way intended it to mean that.’ [Seeing] where we could 
resolve the matter through mediation, [t]he matter was positively resolved resulting in a beautiful 
card sent to me by the alleged perpetrator” (T4B25:3). 
 Coordinators often described their role as one of advocacy. For example, one said,    
I would emphasize that in…my office…all we’ve done [is] pretty much…reacting 
to somebody telling [us] that something may be amiss and…open[ing] 
investigation[s] and look[ing] into it…but I think being a Title IX Coordinator 
goes beyond that and I [have] said ‘[With] me, you’re [getting] an advocate, and 
that means being more than reactive.’ If I’m an advocate in this kind of an 
institutional setting, I believe my job is to find the envelope and push it…I’m 
going to have to do much more affirmative advocating for 
[complainants]…[S]ometimes that pisses people off.  (T7A32:5)  
 
 Third, Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype lack the independence 
necessary to craft policies that will lead to greater compliance with Title IX law and policy.   
Many Coordinators described efforts to craft the authority and independence necessary to enact 
much needed educational programming.  One Coordinator described their efforts to get in front 
of students, but was told “sexual violence and sexual harassment [is] too negative, [and you] 
[cannot] be part of…orientation because that would just scare people away” (T9A41:13).  Thus, 
a Coordinator described needing to act quickly to respond to pushback against implementing 
mandatory training: 
When you start seeing patterns and trends, you want to nip that crap in the bud 
and address it, so that it doesn’t become a volcano that just explodes.... This 
campus was extremely reactive. When I suggested, as an example, that we do 
sexual harassment training for everyone, make it mandatory, including 
students…I was told that “if we did that, that I would get more sexual harassment 
complaints. Why on earth would I want to do that?  (T11A45:31)  
 
The same Coordinator then described frustration at not being able to work towards education and 
prevention:   
[Initially] I was pissed off… in my prior role… I had more independence, I had 
more power, I reported directly to the president…so I had more support…when I 
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came into this role, I assumed that it was going to be the same situation… I had 
created policies before, I had done the [diversity] work before, that was part of my 
job...[and] I bring those talents [here only] to find out …’oh no no no, we don’t 
need all that stuff, we just need an adjudicated investigation officer on this 
campus because we have all these investigations going on.  (T11A45:31)   
 
Fourth, Coordinators who depart from the archetype often assume multiple roles in the 
investigative and adjudicative process.  One Coordinator expressed concern about acting as a 
witness in hearings:  “[H]ow am I supposed to be fair and thorough and impartial when I’m 
called by one side and not another [to testify]…I feel funny about that” (T12B48:15).  Another 
Coordinator described playing a role past the investigation and recommendation phase: “[After 
the recommendation] [w]e become witnesses at the student conduct hearing and…testify, but we 
are not cross-examined by anybody” [T9A41:39).  Coordinators also described hearing about 
Title IX Coordinators holding a dual role in the legal counsel’s office [T11A45:3]. Other 
Coordinators describe frustration at efforts to separate their roles in order to avoid liability:   
I think [we are] passing the liability around.  If we…do an investigation, get all of 
this information to do nothing…but pass it on to someone else who is going to 
make the decision…[u]ltimately I don’t know that it’s going to prevent anything.  
Anybody who doesn’t agree with the outcome will just go to the person who did 
the investigation and say either it was flawed or the person making the 
recommendation was wrong.  So having one office that’s going to be on the hook 
for [an external complaint] for the investigation and [another for the] 
recommendation…how [does] that solve anything….[they will say] [o]kay, we’ll 
sue you both!  (T10B44:27)  
 
 Fifth, Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype tend to care less about the 
quality of the process as it relates to impartiality.  One, for example, observed,   
[P]reviously [I was] advised not to go near the general counsel’s office…[our 
administration] didn’t like all the investigative reports we [authored] because 
whenever we had findings of discrimination or sexual harassment, those 
reports…became attachment A to the lawsuit against the institution.  I’ve been 
given the green light to…identify cases that maybe can reach an informal 
resolution without having to go through a full investigation.  [I]nformal resolution 
sometimes also means [we can more easily] bump somebody out of the 
institution…give them an opportunity to resign.  (T7A32:44) 
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The same Coordinator noted ambushing respondents by speaking with the respondent last: 
 
[T]hey often feel ambushed, and sometimes we do ambush them because we 
frequently ask questions that we already know the answer to…but they don’t 
know that we know…so when we confront them with conflicting information 
they get pissed off because we ambushed them.  (T7B33:22)  
 
Finally, while the Title IX Coordinator archetype’s office is located with formal 
administrative units such as human resources, legal counsel, or the executive administrative 
offices, Coordinators who depart from the archetype are located elsewhere as a means of 
implying that they are independent of the university administration.  Thus, one noted, “we’re in a 
little non-descript building, which I think is good. I don’t think we should be in the main 
administrative building, I think that’s just intimidating to students in accessing us” (T9A41:22).  
Another Coordinator stated, “we thought about putting the office in the student union but were 
concerned that it would be forever [perceived as aligned] as being [only] for student use” 
(T8A39:34).  Similar to an Ombuds, another Coordinator described the importance of being in a 
high traffic area that also provided for privacy:  “We thought it was important that we be in a 
location where there is a lot of traffic…but wouldn’t be obvious necessarily that [visitors] are 
there coming to see us, but they could be coming to a professor about a class” (T13A49:19). One 
Coordinator reported specifically following the model of the Ombuds’s independent location:   
[T]he reason that we chose the building is we kind of looked at how the Ombuds 
was situated kind of in this neutral off the path kind of place, but a place where 
both students and employees could find you [in a] central [location]…An 
administrator saw the location and felt it was  unacceptable and why? I said, ‘I 
don’t need to be in the president’s suite.’ That’s going to impact whether people 
are comfortable walking in [and working with us].  (T8A39:36) 
 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators often depart from the archetypal model in ways that violate the 
stated tenets of impartiality and independence.     
OMBUDS:  THE PRIEST OR RABBI OF FAIR PROCESS  
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If Title IX Coordinators are similar to a principled public prosecutor, Ombuds take a 
view of independence and impartiality that is akin to that of a religious leader. Ombuds serve as 
an advocate for fair process as an overarching principle, with fair process defined both as 
sociological conceptions of voice and as legal conceptions of due process.  Like a religious 
leader, the Ombuds has no authority enforce decisions, is in principle completely committed to 
the confidentiality of those seeking his or her advice, and is bound by ethical or psychological 
conceptions of listening to people’s “voice.” Ombuds, like priests and rabbis, serve as practical 
mediators, but with very informal procedures. Ombuds, like priests and rabbis, have no authority 
other than their legitimacy to ensure compliance; they can only make recommendations.  In some 
ways the analogy breaks down: Ombuds have no religious authority of any kind, and the people 
coming before them are not from a shared faith community (and so their moral authority may be 
more attenuated).   
Impartiality first requires that the Ombuds maintain their independence.  The 
International Ombuds Association Standards of Practice list Independence as Standard number 
one.  Independence requires that the Ombuds and the Ombuds office are independent from other 
organizational entities (IOA Standard 1.1), the Ombuds holds no other organizational position 
that might compromise independence (IOA Standard 1.2), the Ombuds holds sole discretion with 
how to act regarding specific concerns or observed trends (IOA Standard 1.3), the Ombuds has 
access to all organizational information and individuals as permitted by law (IOA Standard 1.4), 
and the Ombuds has the authority to select their own staff and manage their budget and 
operations (IOA Standard 1.5).  Independence also requires that the Ombuds report directly to 
the highest level of the organization, with an employment status indicating that they are not 
subordinate to other senior officials who report to this highest level.  Functionally, independence 
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means operating independently from “control, limitation, or interference” (IOA Best Practices, 
2009, p. 2).   
IOA Standard 2.3 requires the Ombuds to report to the highest possible level, operate 
independent of ordinary organizational structures, and most importantly not to report to or be 
structurally affiliated with any organizational compliance function.  Further, IOA Standard 2.4 
requires that the Ombuds serve no additional organizational role compromising neutrality.  IOA 
Standard 2.4 includes a prohibition on aligning with any formal or informal associations to create 
actual or perceived conflicts of interest, having no personal interest or stake, and incurring any 
gain or loss from the outcome of any issue.   
While the Title IX Coordinator is advocating for specific policies, the Ombuds is more 
generally advocating for fair process.  Obtaining the ability to act with impartiality and neutrality 
requires the Ombuds act with independence.  According to Erbe and Sebok (2008, p. 30), leaders 
must be educated about the Ombuds’ standards of practice, specifically “how honoring them will 
serve the organization so that they will understand the reasons for not pressuring Ombudsmen 
into compromising activities or misperceive Ombudsmen as betraying the organization with their 
disclosures.”  One 2007 International Ombuds Association Survey respondent noted, “This is 
difficult to do unless you have built up trust and confidence over time.  It…requires exquisite 
interpersonal sensitivity and communications skill to say ’No’ to those in power in a way that 
does not damage your reputation, and to give those in power critical feedback about their own 
negative contributions to a situation in a way that does not alienate them” (Erbe & Sebok 2008, 
p. 30).   
For Ombuds, there is a tension between maintaining independence and the need to 
establish effective organizational relationships in order to protect that independence.  Former 
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Ombuds Tim Griffin (2010) notes that while Ombuds strive to maintain formal independence 
from their organizations, “[O]ur interpersonal relationships with people within our organizations 
can significantly impact the accomplishment of our professional goals. The familiarity and trust 
that can be established through these relationships provides us with easier access to people and 
information than would be otherwise possible” (p. 66).  Griffin (2010) also notes that the 
principle of independence is in tension with the practical need to develop relationships with 
university leaders so as “to ensure the continuation of Ombuds services despite economic and/or 
political conditions that may create pressure to reduce institutional budget” (p. 68).  Former 
Ombuds Helen Hasenfeld describes the value of building organizational relationships with the 
Title IX Coordinator in her early experiences at Cal Tech (2011):   
[When the] Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) came on  
campus to investigate a sexual harassment complaint…[legal counsel] Sandi  
[Cooper] asked me what…I could share with her about sexual harassment on  
the campus…She knew of one case, I knew of six complaints.  She was 
impressed.  Rather, she was shocked … From then on, all Ombuds were friends of 
Sandi’s… (p. 16)      
 
The IOA Best Practices supplement (2009, p. 4) also explains that the Ombuds should not 
participate in any formal management functions or serve in any role that creates the perception 
of, or any actual, conflicts of interest.  This prohibition extends to any role requiring that the 
Ombuds conduct formal investigations, receive notice on behalf of the organization, serve as a 
voting member on any search committees not related to the Ombuds office staff, handle formal 
appeals, keep case records for the organization, or have any authority to make, change, enforce, 
or rescind any policy, rule, or administrative decision (IOA Best Practices, 2009, p. 4). In order 
to avoid serving as notice to the institution, this effectively eliminates the Ombuds from holding 
any organizational role that includes management responsibilities.   
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While Coordinators are committed to objectivity in judging the facts, Ombuds are to be 
committed to fairness and impartiality more generally.  IOA Standard 2.1 requires Ombuds to 
“strive for impartiality, fairness and objectivity in the treatment of people and the consideration 
of issues.”  Similar to a priest or a rabbi, an Ombuds is unaligned with either side and must not 
advocate on behalf of any individual within the organization, and instead must advocate for 
processes that are fair and equitably administered.  The Statement of Best Practices of the 
University of Kansas Ombuds Office notes that an Ombuds “shall not act as an advocate for any 
party in a dispute, nor shall it represent management or visitors to the Ombuds Office” 
(University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, Statement of Best Practices, 2008).  Michigan State 
University’s Ombuds office website notes “[t]he University Ombudsperson also assists all 
parties involved in academic grievance or disciplinary hearings or academic grievance 
hearings…” (MSU, Office of the University Ombudsperson).  As Jan Morse clarifies (2010), 
“the Ombudsman does not serve as a ‘champion’ of a cause, but instead acts as a catalyst — 
serving as an equal member of a group of knowledgeable and committed stakeholders who 
worked collaboratively to develop and implement a cultural change effort” (p. 35).  Tim Griffin 
(2010) agrees: 
[I]f the Ombudsperson is not perceived as able to offer a neutral and independent 
perspective to issues, constituents will assume that the options offered by the 
Ombudsperson will instead reflect a particular bias.  Consultees who perceive 
such a bias might suspect that the Ombudsperson’s suggestions are somehow 
designed to achieve some purpose other than the outcome desired by, and in the 
best interest of, the consultee.  (p. 67)  
It is for these reasons that the Ombuds’s office location should be chosen to as to 
symbolize independence and “must not give any impression that the Ombuds is somehow part of 
management” (Levine-Finley & Carter, 2010, p. 123).  Ombuds Mary Rowe notes that when her 
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office was across the hall from the MIT president and chancellor it “inhibited many people” from 
visiting (Levine-Finley & Carter, 2010, p. 123).  Likewise, independence requires that Ombuds 
offices have sufficient resources for space, equipment, staff, and materials, and be selected and 
evaluated by committees representative of various institutional constituencies (IOA Best 
Practices, 2009, p. 3).  This is directly opposed to Title IX Coordinators who typically have one 
direct report for purposes of evaluation.  To be independent, Ombuds must also be protected 
from retaliation by serving a defined renewable term, and may be terminated only for neglect, 
misconduct, or medical incapacity, and assurances of access to outside legal counsel (IOA Best 
Practices, 2009, p. 2).   
Having legal counsel that is different from the university’s is especially important. 
Howard (2011a, p. 12) notes that the detrimental impact of not having independent counsel can 
be significant.  He illustrates this point with an example of a situation in which university 
counsel filed for a protective order of confidentiality for the Ombuds office and the plaintiff 
opposed the motion on the grounds that the office was not truly independent of the defendant 
university if they were represented by the same attorney.  In order for the court to grant the 
motion for a protective order, the court required separate counsel.  Where there is a discovery 
request or a subpoena, Howard (2011a, p. 14) cautions Ombuds to “realize that there will be 
great pressure by lawyers and others in the organization …[that] the Ombudsman must disclose 
all known facts so that the organization can defend the claims and the Ombudsman in a 
deposition.”  Howard (2011a, p. 14) argues that such disclosures “seriously undermine… the 
chances for a successful defense of a claim of confidentiality.”  Instead, the Ombuds office must 
reaffirm its commitment to the IOA Standards of Practice and must work with the larger 
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organization to oppose attempts to seek information or testimony from the Ombuds office 
(Howard, 2011a, p. 14).  
 The differences between Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators can also be seen in terms of 
goals.  Where the Title IX Coordinator is an advocate for compliance with law and policy similar 
to a prosecutor or police investigator, the Ombuds is more like a priest or a rabbi in terms of 
serving as an advocate for fair process as an overarching principle. Effective impartiality requires 
“multi-partiality” or a commitment to fairness and everyone’s best interests (Erbe & Sebok, 
2008, p. 31).     
OMBUDS WHO ADHERE TO IMPARTIALITY IN PRACTICE 
 
 Ombuds who adhere or depart from the archetypal standards of impartiality and 
independence, like Title IX Coordinators, also do so along a spectrum.  Ombuds who adhere to 
the archetypal image of an Ombuds do not participate in any formal process and advocate for fair 
process in general. They avoid advocating for the university or any particular person or outcome.  
In discussing whether impartiality can ever truly be achieved, one Ombuds noted, “I don’t think 
you can teach [the ability to be impartial]. I think you can make people become aware of it, and 
then once people are aware of their own biases they acknowledge it, they’re in a better position 
to put it on the shelf so they can be impartial as much as one can be. But they are also aware of 
the fact that they have their biases” (O1A8:5).   
 An Ombuds described how he came to realize that participating in formal processes 
violated the principle of impartiality:   
I used to go to hearings as a neutral non-participating observer. People would say 
‘[T]here are going to be three or four people on the other side of the table and I’m 
all alone[at the disciplinary hearing], will you come along just so I have someone 
there?  I used to go, and say ‘As the Ombudsman I am a neutral party. My 
presence here should not be construed as support to any particular person or 
position in this matter.’ I was out at one such employee hearing and I stood up to 
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say my introduction and before I could even finish, the hearing officer told me to 
‘shut up and sit down, we know who you’re here for!’ I was stunned. I shut up 
and sat down, it was his hearing. But I never went to another hearing because it 
occurred to me, that what stunned me was of course, the assumption’s going to be 
made that it was the employee who asked me to go there and that I am there in 
support, at least morally, of that employee.  [First] that’s not going to be 
perceived as neutral, [second] It was wrong…the perceptions engendered from 
such activities are very risky when it comes to the standards of practice…and I 
quit doing it.  (O10A55:25)   
 
Other Ombuds refuse to maintain documents, records, or notes of any kind for the same 
reason.  An Ombuds observed, “because we are neutral… don’t want to have documents that 
could result in having to become a witness to litigation if it ever [happened]…[t]hat would mean 
I’m not a neutral person, I would have to be on one side of a case or another [and] I don’t want to 
do that” (O7A37:42).    An Ombuds even views the mere act of contacting someone on behalf of 
another as to similar to an investigation:   
I rarely, in less than one percent of cases, will contact someone, and here is why: 
The act of contacting someone on campus on behalf of a consultee…inevitably 
engenders a perception of advocacy and/or constitutes legally an 
investigation…[a]nd neither of those is consistent with the standards of practice 
of our profession.  (O10A55:20)  
 
Likewise, regarding the principle against advocating for anything other than fair process, 
an Ombuds explained, “[Y]ou don’t identify with the institution, you identify with equity, 
fairness, [and] just asking practical questions” (O1A8:6).  Another Ombuds noted, “I'm 
impartial, which means we're an advocate for any side but we are an advocate for fair process” 
(O14B64:48).  The Ombuds explained:  
[W]e need to maintain good relationships with everyone on campus because you 
never know –[whether] the person I call to get more information about a situation 
[today] the next week might be a visitor…[a]nd the next week might be an ally in 
a situation that we’re all working out together…so I can’t burn any bridges. 
(O14A63:79) 
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Another Ombuds noted, “[W]e can be advocates for fairness…if we see a policy or procedure 
has been violated, we can certainly become an advocate for fixing that”  (O9B54:35).  The 
Ombuds continued, “I explain…that my role is just …to try to help them solve the problem and 
not to be their advocate, per se” (O9A53:33).  Determining the line between support and 
advocacy is not always clear in practice.  For example, an Ombuds observed: 
What follow up I do…much more often looks like [what] I just did this morning, 
where I met with a student who’s appealing a judicial sanction who wanted me to 
look at his appeal letter. I don’t write them, but I will look at a draft of your letter 
and give you suggestions about things you might want to be more clear about or 
something you told me about that I think… you might want to consider including 
that point.  (O10A55:24)  
 
Likewise, another Ombuds noted, “I will arm them, I will say ‘in order to get the answer to that 
question you need to talk to so and so, here’s that person number, here’s the kind of approach 
that works best with that person, here’s how to frame the question’” (O10A55:21).  Another 
Ombuds stated:  
I figure if I’m doing more to resolve a problem than my visitor is, then that’s too 
much.  I think that’s kind of a good measure, because sometimes you know that 
you can help them, but if they just won’t let you there’s a certain point at which 
you have to say ‘you’ve got a few options, but I can’t help you with anything 
else,’ or refer them to someone else for counseling if they’re willing to go. 
(O8B52:32) 
 
Ombuds often hear from visitors who want and need advocacy.  An Ombuds noted:  “Honestly, I 
think they’re looking for advocacy and I feel as though they are disappointed when I say that 
we’re neutral. [Although] [s]ometimes they’ll…say ‘good, I’m glad to hear that’” (O7A37:46).  
Another Ombuds noted:  “Typically when they say they want advice, they want you to tell them 
are they right or wrong. It’s hard to guide them, but I think not matter how neutral you try to be 
there’s always a few folks that will just assume that you have a stake in the outcome of what 
they’re doing or you have an opinion about it…” (O8A51:56).  Another Ombuds echoed, 
	   244	  
“Oftentimes what they want and what they get are two differed things. Oftentimes what they 
want is a magical solution where I’ll just wave a wand and fix it.  They’re sometimes 
disappointed when I don’t leap into the effort to solve their problems but help them explore 
things that they can do to solve their own problems, with the understanding that this is part of 
what it means to take responsibility for your adult life” (O4A22:19, O4B23:6).  Another 
observed:  “There’s definitely a misconception about neutrality. Some people think that whoever 
gets to us first gets us on their side, it’s like hiring an attorney. So we are constantly explaining 
that” (O14A63:75).   
Many Ombuds are careful to draw a sharp line between supporting an individual and 
advocating for them. Thus, an Ombuds observed,  
I rarely, in less than one percent of cases, will contact someone, and here is why: 
The act of contacting someone on campus on behalf of a consultee…inevitably 
engenders a perception of advocacy and/or constitutes legally an 
investigation…[a]nd neither of those is consistent with the standards of practice 
of our profession.  (O10A55:20)   
 
Other Ombuds navigate these conversations by clearly stating the purpose for reaching out to an 
individual other than the initial visitor.  An Ombuds observed: 
If they have a good reason for not wanting to talk with the professor then we talk 
about [the option of me calling]…[W]hen that happens I call those secondary 
contacts [and] I give them the same spiel [that] I'm a neutral, confidential resource 
for that person as well as the person who came to see me…I make it clear that I'm 
not taking sides and that I’m calling to get their perspective.  (O12A59:45)   
 
The above quote places the Ombuds in a position of evaluating the visitor’s reasons, e.g. “If they 
have a good reason for not wanting to talk with the professor,” in order to determine the extend 
of the Ombuds’s role.   
A fundamental question for many Ombuds is how to draw the line between advocating 
for fairness (as embodied in an individual’s situation) and advocating for a specific individual or 
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specific outcome.  Many Ombuds practice in a way that adheres to the archetypal “ideal” that 
avoids indicating personal preferences to the visitor.  Thus, an Ombuds noted, “I think it always 
empowers people to be educated of what their options are… [but] I don’t ever want to be 
deciding for anyone” (O8B57:27).  Another Ombuds said, “I don't tell them what to do. 
Sometimes they want me to tell them what to do but I don't and, but we do discuss options [and] 
weigh pros and cons.” (O12A59:44).  The same Ombuds explained, “I never tell anyone what to 
do because I think that impedes impartiality, but what we do is talk about options and then it's up 
to the individual to decide what options work best for that person” (O12A59:8).  Perhaps the 
toughest situations to navigate are those described by the following Ombuds, who described 
maintaining confidentiality and thus impartiality and independence in a situation in which 
members of the community are being victimized by a sexual predator:   
The hardest part of this job is knowing that in the next year or two there will be 
another one of his victims in my office, and there’s an innocent person out there 
who may not be [here yet] who’s going to be victimized by this guy if somebody 
doesn’t stand up and stop it.  The only people that have…standing to do that [are 
the] victims.  I will tell people, ‘if you choose to leave…you’ll be out from under 
this person’s control, please consider writing down your experiences and sending 
them to the dean or appropriate individual so that some kind of record 
exists’…but frankly, that almost never happens.  They…want to start a new 
chapter in their life and put this behind them so they don’t do [tell anyone].  I 
would love to be able to say ‘You realize that by doing that you are sealing the 
fate of somebody else that’s going to be in here, and the next person he’s going to 
proposition, you realize that, right? That if nobody does anything and stand up to 
this guy he’s going to keep rolling on in his happy merry way just as he has and 
there’s going to be [someone] like yourself that’s going to be subjected to this in 
the future if you don’t do anything about it.’ [M]y preference is that these people 
stand up to these victimizers and call them out for what they are and put them and 
the people responsible for their behavior on notice so that we can reduce the 
chances of future innocent victims. Do I ever make a consultee aware that [this is] 
my preference? Absolutely not. That would not be…neutral on my part.  I’d like 
to be able to say that, but I can’t in my role.  (O10B56:22-30)  
 
The same Ombuds also described avoiding partiality towards any one outcome when meeting 
with visitors: 
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[O]ne of the benefits of being neutral is you don’t have to make good judgments 
and take a side on things, even in your mind, in cases…[b]ut I will admit that 
when I have had several individuals over time, unrelated and unknown to each 
other, come and tell me similar stories…it’s hard for me internally not to assume, 
‘yeah, it’s probably true’ [but] that doesn’t change my response, the options are 
the same and my demeanor is the same, but it is an important qualitative part of 
what happens within me.  I have to be cognizant of, aware of, and make sure that 
[my bias] doesn’t in any way out in the course of my dealings with the 
person…which isn’t an insignificant thing.  (O10B56:27) 
 
 Finally, following the archetypal model, many Ombuds strive to remain independent 
from and impartial to the goals of the institution.    One Ombuds noted that Ombuds “can 
influence how a decision is made if they’re asking the right questions and they’re asking it from 
a place of non-identification with the organization.  You’re going to have a fresh 
perspective….[t]hat’s our real power, our ability to be independent and…take it up to the highest 
office within the organization and there’s no office inbetween” (O1A8:15).  Another Ombuds 
described this independence as also providing for access, noting “I think access is what’s most 
important [and] if I feel like I need to meet with [the president] then I do….[i]t’s pretty rare, and 
I don’t bother [the president] unless I absolutely have to…” (O12A59:15).  Yet another Ombuds 
talked about access and independence working together at “quarterly meetings with the president 
to just kind of talk about the state of the campus…[w]e don’t give him any information about our 
cases at all” (O14A63:31). 
In practice there is considerable confusion regarding the independence of an Ombuds.  
Thus, an Ombuds observed:   “People are confused about independence and say ‘well, who pays 
your salary? How can you be independent if your salary gets paid through the university?’ 
There’s so many misconceptions I don’t think I can put them in a hierarchy for you” 
(O14A63:75).  Other Ombuds address note that independence relates to title: “You know, we all 
work for the University, so some people question how independent we can be. I guess I’m lucky 
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in that I’m a tenured professor. I’ve always felt very free to do what I need to do. I can imagine 
staff members wouldn’t always feel as free” (O9A53:60).   
One Ombuds described being questioned about his/her office’s independence from the 
institution and whether the office was truly not biased in favor of the institution’s goals. He/she 
said she responded, “[I[f this office had a reputation of being an agent for the institution [no one 
would utilize our services] because this community is small enough that word [would] get out 
that you can’t go to that office because they are in bed with the administration… ”  
(O12A59:15).  Often the reporting relationship aids in reducing this perception of being aligned, 
as indicated by the same Ombuds:  “I just think [our structure] really helps the office maintain its 
independence… I report to two different entities and so I think that just helps with perception as 
well as…it also helps [everyone] realize that they don’t have full control over us” (O12A59:15).  
OMBUDS WHO DEPART FROM THE ARCHETYPE  
 
 Some Ombuds, however, depart from the archetypal model of impartiality. They do so 
for a variety of reasons, among them wanting to stop a perpetrator or address a departmental 
problem.    
First, some Ombuds participate in formal processes.  Thus, an Ombuds articulates a 
preference for working with the Title IX office, describing a process in which they ask the Title 
IX Coordinator, ‘[I]s this someone who [has] made claims before?  Give me some very general 
information’… they do have some security with their files but I’ve always been able to…at least 
direct each other to get the information that we need, if it’s something we feel we can’t share 
directly…that’s when the offices work best, is when they work together” (O8A51:46).   
Another Ombuds described being subject to the Title IX Coordinator’s approval for some 
activities:  “[W]e used to have the option to resolve [issues of sexual harassment] informally, 
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which of course is what we do as an office. Now, we cannot do that without asking permission 
from the Title IX Coordinator” (O14B64:29).  Asked about a positive outcome in a case of racial 
discrimination or sexual misconduct, the same Ombuds noted a situation “several years ago 
before all these [changes] happened because I wasn’t required to call[the Title IX Coordinator] 
about that one” (O14B64:30).  Many Ombuds described required meetings with the general 
counsel, the Title IX Coordinator, and other formal offices.  A Title IX Coordinator described 
meetings to “talk about what’s going on…just kind of bounce [situations] off [one another] so 
we’re in the loop on what’s going on.  Of course, [the Ombuds] does not share a lot of 
information…they do share…if they think there’s some issues or some things that may be 
bubbling up that we need to pay attention to…” (T13A49:15).  
Other Ombuds find creative ways of justifying their work with formal offices:  “[I]f the 
Title IX Coordinator said to me, "I want, I'd like your help in dealing with this." I would do it 
because the Title IX Coordinator is a party to the situation” (O14B64:27).   By seeing the 
Coordinator as an individual in conflict, like any other university stakeholder, an Ombuds 
justified working with them and maintaining independence.  
More frequently, Ombuds express being required to report to the compliance 
offices like the university general counsel’s office:   
[E]ven though we’re supposed to be independent, we’re not independent, because 
we are required to be involved with Title IX Compliance.  I have to coexist with 
the offices with responsibility for compliance, and if I don’t [I am] out of here.’ 
(O7A37:25)    
  
Some Ombuds violate IOA Standard 1.2, which prohibits Ombuds from holding another 
organizational position that might compromise independence.  One Ombuds holding two 
positions was denied IOA certification due to sufficient ambiguity between roles.  The Ombuds 
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appealed, noting, “look at what goes on [around the country], half of the ombuds out there are 
lawyers” (O11A57:22).  Another Ombuds frankly disagreed with the principle::  
[T]here’s a lot of discussion amongst Ombuds about who’s a true Ombuds or not 
and it’s kind of silly, but I think some of the perception among full time Ombuds 
is that it’s difficult to represent yourself as being an Ombuds if you’re doing it 
part time…I really strongly disagree with that.  Ombuds who are faculty part time 
and ombuds part time are very conscious about making people understood the 
different role.  They must say ‘Are you coming in to [see] me as an Ombuds or as 
an administrator, because they’re two very different things, with different 
reporting requirements’… There’s a lot of associate Ombuds that are half time 
faculty, half time Ombuds, and I think they’re very clear about separating their 
roles when someone comes in, they spend a little extra time explaining their role, 
letting them know what they can and can’t do.  (O8A51:8)   
 
  In fact, three Ombuds interviewed held multiple roles.  One served both as Ombuds and 
as an assistant to a high level administrator with whom s/he described having a “close-knit 
relationship” (O6A34:4-25). Another, as described in the following quotation, previously served 
as the Dean of Students:   
Definitely [previously being Dean of Students provided legitimacy], and actually 
when I moved to this position, depending on where you look on the university’s 
website, I’m still listed as Dean of Students and a lot of people still call me the 
Dean of Students. In fact Student Affairs has said to me recently ‘in everybody’s 
mind you’re still the Dean of Students, so I think we’re going to start calling you 
that again,  Dean of Students/Ombudsman.’  I think that would reinforce what a 
Dean of Students should be, which is the person who is there to help students 
succeed as opposed to what it has turned into- the one you get sent to when you’re 
in trouble.  (O3A21:6-10)   
 
A third Ombuds, as noted earlier, had previously served as the Dean of Students, and noted 
“[t]he problem I [have is that] faculty automatically assume when I call them [that] I am siding 
with the student, which isn’t true (O5A28:1).  Title IX Coordinators also noted irregularities, 
including one institution where the “current Ombuds reports to the dean of students” 
(T4A24:23).   In another instance mentioned by a Coordinator, the role of Ombuds and Dean of 
Students was held by the same person, with the Coordinator noting that person as responsible for 
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overseeing student sexual misconduct cases…”[I]t’s a direct report so you have all that 
communication already built into that relationship” (T6A30:35).   An Ombuds job posting for 
Dartmouth College (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 1/15/15) describes the Ombuds as holding a 
“secondary role working with the Office of General Counsel to ensure compliance with federal 
and state laws and college policies regarding minors on campus.”  In those examples, the lack of 
independence undermines impartiality in both perception and reality.   
Maintaining the support of the administration is not an easy task, as described by an 
Ombuds:   “[Y]ou still have to keep finding support for your office, because when people leave 
that are in the administration and they’re replaced by people who may not have the 
understanding or appreciation for the office, you have to get in their good graces, so it’s kind of a 
constant process” (O1A8:106).   
The perception of independence also relates to location, with Ombuds preferring to be 
located away from formal offices but in an accessible location.  In reality, Ombuds are often 
located next to other administrators. For example, an Ombuds observed:  “I’m [located] in the 
Administration Building, so it’s somewhat central. It’s not a high student traffic area, but they 
find their way here” (O6A34:29).   
 Another departure from the archetypal model is advocating for the organization’s 
interests.  Thus, an Ombuds described how his/her office expanded its influence by achieving the 
desired goals of the administration: 
[I]nitially [we] only handling student issues, but the administration expanded the 
scope, stating ‘[w]e have some faculty [and] staff issues and the fact that you’re 
an informal office, if you can minimize people filing grievances, going to the 
union, or wanting to retain an attorney, we’d like for you to also extend your 
success beyond just the student communities.’  (O1A8:84)    
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S/he went on, “My boss says to me…the more problems you can keep off my desk, the more I’m 
going to appreciate what you do for the organization” (O1A8:84).  Another Ombuds described 
assisting a visitor with drafting a letter for an administrator and noted “if somebody sends a very 
vitriolic letter will [the administrator] look at it and [think], ‘this is kind of a waste of time…’ 
and reflect on the Ombuds office and think ‘aren’t you supposed to keep these kinds of disputes 
away for me, not necessarily bring them to me?’ (O2B18:9).  In yet another example of this sort 
of compromising position, an Ombuds described how the university’s general counsel controlled 
the wording on some key matters in the Ombuds’ annual report: 
At [a previous organization] I could not use the word ‘harassment’ [in my annual 
report] because from their perspective, if anything fell under ‘harassment’ then it 
would have been bumped to the [formal office] and it would have been illegal, not 
something that I could deal with… Of course you and I both know that in most 
cases the harassment was not illegal, and yes of course I did deal with them, but I 
didn’t mark them that way… They gave a little [and eventually were] just fine 
with me calling things whatever they are.. .you’ve got to go with [what] each 
organization and general counsel feels comfortable with.  (O8A51:17) 
 
Other general counsel use the Ombuds office as a mechanism for avoiding litigation. Thus, an 
Ombuds expressed frustration at not resolving a case due to the university’s due process 
preferences:  
I had a really interesting case in which our [general counsel] wanted me to deal 
with it because I could have conversations about what [the person[ wanted out of 
all of this that legal couldn’t have… Our [general counsel] didn’t want to talk 
with the person’s lawyer and they thought it would be an easier route and wanted 
to resolve it informally and come to an amount and avoid litigation…I think we 
would have agreed on money, but they wanted something in the file and [the 
school] is overly protective of employees and claim it’s a due process thing, a ‘he 
said-she said’ thing and we’re not going to admit liability by putting something in 
the file… so it did not get resolved.  (O9B54:32) 
 
Some Ombuds come to frankly advocate for the institution’s interests. Thus, an Ombuds 
acknowledged violating confidentiality:   
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Sometimes I have to make an executive decision. If something [is] going to do 
significant damage to the institution I might decide to [go forward] with that 
information. But I have to be careful because people didn’t give me express 
permission to go forward [and so] I [do it] because I weigh [the situation] and I 
[conclude] ‘you know, this office needs to be aware of this, it may cause 
significant damage to the institution.’ [P]art of my job as an Ombudsman is to 
give decision makers a head’s up.  (O1A8:32-35)   
 
Ombuds also echoed the organization’s preferences, as typified by the Ombuds who noted: 
 
[My goal] is to resolve problems at the lowest level…[O]rganizations prefer that 
issues [are] resolved at the lowest possible level to minimize lawsuits or people 
going to the press and saying not so nice things about people within the 
organization.  Prevention is something that’s valued…they don’t say it, but I think 
it’s an expectation that [the administration] would like us to prevent problems that 
are sensitive from going outside the organization.  Decision makers prefer that 
[issues like that] are contained and dealt with accordingly.  (O1A8:23-25)    
  
Beyond advocating for the organization’s preferences, some Ombuds also advocate 
specific outcomes in particular cases.  As one Ombuds noted, “For many offices [I resolve 
issues] because I know what their perspective is:  ‘[J]ust let us know what you want us to do and 
that’s what we’ll do’” (O6B35:18).  
An Ombuds acknowledged crossing the line in helping a visitor and, in the process, 
becoming “invested” in the outcome:  
I felt like I then had an interest in having this communication be something the 
[administrator] can hear and understand and use.  I did not want to see [the 
visitor] write [a] letter that was flaming and threatening and that kind of stuff…I 
am unneutral about the outcome of whatever happens here, [and] in the process I 
have now become, I think, somewhat invested in the process going well… 
(O2B18:9) 
 
Like the Ombuds who offered the previous observation, Ombuds who depart from the archetypal 
model are partial toward their visitor and try to achieve the results articulated by the visitor.  
Thus, an Ombuds stated, “Personally speaking, I feel very bad when I’m not able to give them 
the outcome they’re looking for [and] I tell them upfront…we will try to help you resolve things 
in your best interests but sometimes that may not be the case” (O5B29:18).  Other Ombuds who 
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depart from the archetypal model are advocates for settlement, regardless of the visitors’ 
preferences. Thus, one said s/he tells visitors that “my role is to solve the problem [but] not to be 
[your] advocate, per se” (O9A53:33).  Another acknowledged trying to “challenge” some people 
more than others in the interest of reaching an accommodation:  
I was very idealistic.  I thought if you can get people to talk then they would 
really try to work to work things out, and in some cases that was true, but I found 
out for the ones that are a little more crafty, the ones that wanted to not 
compromise and get everything that they wanted at the expense of someone else, 
that’s when I realized ‘you’re really going to have to develop your game in order 
to, in a respectful way, to challenge those kinds of personalities.’  So now 
I…[p]ut them on the ropes, don’t let them off as the saying goes.  (O1C10:28)      
 
While the Ombuds archetype is an advocate for fairness, some Ombuds take this commitment 
too far, to the point where they sit in judgment, assessing what is a “legitimate” part of a 
complaint and what is not, as an Ombuds acknowledged:   
I explain to them…’my job is to sift through what you share with me for what is a 
legitimate concern, a concern that really needs to be addressed and attended to,’ 
and that gives me something to have a conversation about and around.  I want 
them to know right out of the gate, ‘I can’t be your advocate, but I definitely can 
be an advocate for the elements of your story that [are] legitimate, that we need to 
explore deeper.  [That] is where I can be an advocate.’  (O1B9:25-29)   
 
Likewise, another Ombuds observed: 
 
I tell [faculty] ‘[I]f a student has a disagreement with your syllabus…they will 
come to me [and] I will contact you and ask you for some information to either 
help the student understand why you’re making the decision, or I’ll try to 
convince you that the student has a legitimate concern and try to get you to see 
their point and solve the issue satisfactorily their way.’  (O5A28:6) 
 
The goal of advocating for equity and fairness assumes the Ombuds is qualified to 
determine when these standards are not met.  An Ombuds who struggled with this issue noted 
“The trick is often in finding what reasonable means in terms of reasonable accommodations 
[and after I made the third try for the visitor] I decided it was not in the realm of reasonable” 
(O4B23:14).   
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Another Ombuds explained:  “I tell the visitor ‘[I]f your concern has legitimacy and 
something was done where it wasn’t fair or it wasn’t equitable, and we have…concrete proof, 
we’re going to be an advocate for fairness and equity.’ That’s not saying we’re going to be their 
advocate, we’re going to be an advocate for…fairness…we’re going to be very fierce [about] 
being an advocate for those principles” (O1A8:19).  At the same time the same Ombuds 
described managing visitors’ expectations regarding justice and the Ombuds responsibility to 
press for equity in every situation:   
Sometimes as an Ombudsman…you have to ask yourself ‘[I]f I’m going to be 
pursuing justice for justice’s sake, and it’s barbed with so many politics, [should 
I] pursue it or [should I] wait for the [correct] timing?’ Like that old saying, ‘fools 
rush in’ I think sometimes you have to be smart about how you fight for fairness 
and justice.  Sometimes I’ll tell [visitors] wanting fairness and equity, ‘[L]et’s 
look at the landscape…at the players…at the politics…at what can change, what 
might change, and what’s not going to change.’  And they say, ‘but you advocate 
for fairness and equity’ and I say ‘absolutely, and the reality is what it is, the 
justice you’re seeking, in the form…in the timing of the justice…may not happen 
[and] it goes back to being realistic and not idealistic…’  [As an Ombuds] you 
don’t want to throw yourself on the sword seeking justice.  (O1A8:55)  
 
It is true that there is a fine line between advocating for specific outcomes because that is 
consistent with the principle of fairness and advocating for specific individuals who desire 
specific outcomes.  Thus, an Ombuds noted “[W]e can be an advocate for those principles 
without compromising our impartiality.  Impartiality is tricky because…people…have their own 
[definition] of fairness and equity and if your [definition] and theirs don’t align, and you’re still 
fighting for the fairness, then [the other side will] say ‘[Y]ou’re being their advocate because 
you’re not letting this go’” (O1C10:25).   
According to one Ombuds, the most frequent misconception that people have about the 
work of an Ombuds is “that we’re advocates for them personally” (O9A53:28).  Ombuds who 
depart from the archetypal model are often partial toward specific individuals, particular those 
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with power in the organization.  For instance, an Ombuds told me s/he provides administrators 
with information so as to be seen as helpful and valuable:    
[I]f there’s [a] certain issues that I see…instead of putting it in the report, I’ll go 
to that person and say ‘You know…Dean … over the last six months or so, these 
kinds of things are coming out of your office.’  You have a captive audience 
because you’re speaking to them. And when you walk away…you kind of endear 
yourself…they feel like “oh my God, I have someone who’s really going to give 
me some information that I might not have been aware of.’  (O1A8:63-66)  
 
Other Ombuds show partiality toward faculty when in routine disputes with students. Thus, an 
Ombuds reported:  “No, we don’t get involved in grade disputes [because] [w]e’re not going to 
interject ourselves into…second guessing a faculty member… who are above reproach here, as 
they are at many institutions” (O7A37:59).  Ombuds also often show partiality towards the 
individual visitor seeking their assistance.  For example, an Ombuds noted:   
It is amazing how many students come in and I’ll role-play with them [and I will 
say] ‘You need to talk to your professor about this. What are you going to say?’ 
And they come out with something that is so adversarial that it’s like ‘[O]kay, 
what do you think that’s going to do?”  Twice this week at least I went online 
when a student was sitting here, went to a website listing elements of a good 
apology – and printed it off for them and said ‘here, read this.’  I’ll try to work 
with them on how to ask and who to ask and how likely it is that they will get the 
response they want.  (O3A21:37)   
 
The same Ombuds noted that “if I have somebody here that needs it I might even outline it for 
them on a piece of paper and say ‘here it is, this is what you need to do’ (O3A21:34-38).   
In fact, many Ombuds engage in direct advocacy.  For instance, an Ombuds described saying to 
a visitor:  “[Following our discussion] I will have to speak with [the administrator].  It’s still up 
to them to make the final decision, however I will share your concerns and hopefully have a 
discussion that will allow them to understand your side.  Then it’s...up to them to determine what 
the decision will be” (O6B35:13).  Although the Ombuds just quoted seemed oblivious to the 
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fact that he had compromised his independence by engaging in advocacy, others are aware of 
doing so but believed it was justified. Thus, 
I always ask the student first ‘[O]kay, can I talk to this person about this? While 
you’re sitting here can I make this phone call on your behalf?’ They have the right 
to say ‘No, I’ll do it myself’ but [rarely do they object] then I’ll [call the other 
office and] say ‘okay, I’m going to send the student over to you, here’s the 
situation, see what you can do for them.’ And maybe in that case I am acting as an 
advocate…But I have about four or five students a semester walking in who when 
you get into it [the issue is] really because of an issue at home, their parents have 
thrown them out, their mother’s a drug addict, their father’s abusive, something 
like that.  (O3A21:39)  
 
Another Ombuds described a situation involving multiple instances of advocacy:   
 
I spoke on [the visitors’] behalf and then said [to them] “[L]ook, I can go back 
and talk to the  again, but I can’t change his mind… and the Dean is not interested 
in removing him as chair so you really don’t have any options’  The visitors were 
very unhappy and so I said ‘I’ll talk with them again, but I don’t think it will 
change anything.”  I think that led them to complain about me but there was 
nothing else I could do.  (O9B54:18)   
 
The Ombuds just quoted described hearing about a situation in which a faculty member 
and student were in a dispute and another Ombuds went with the student to meet with faculty 
member. S/he said:  “[To do so] was entirely inappropriate [and] totally goes against the 
neutrality [principle].  I think [Ombuds] have often been thought of as more of a consumer 
advocate and that might be the problem, [we need to] refine people’s understanding of what [an 
ombuds] should be” (O7A37:47).   
 Other Ombuds draw distinctions about when they will contact someone on a visitor’s 
behalf and when they will not.  Thus, an Ombuds noted:  
I would be more likely to get involved if the person has made legitimate, good 
faith efforts to solve the problem on their own. If the first two or three steps I 
would suggest are steps that they’ve already taken, then I might be more likely to 
take the fourth and fifth step to move this along. I also think I would be more 
likely to try if they were just so completely beaten by the experience and it would 
be somehow cruel to send them back out to try again without giving them 
something to work with, to work from.  (O4B23:34)  
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Contacting someone on a visitor’s behalf is often seen as advocacy for the visitor:  
A visitor will come to us [and] say ‘I have a problem with this person, will you 
contact them,’ and a very common misconception when we make the call is for 
that person to feel that we’re calling because they’re in trouble…[for them] it 
feels like we are coming out of the blue.  We’ve been likened to being the 
principal’s office and they’re getting called to the principal’s office and we have 
to say to them ‘[W]e’re not making a judgment about what’s happened here. We 
don’t know. We’re telling you that we’ve been given permission to talk to you to 
get information from you to see if we can better understand what can help resolve 
the problem.’ So that’s a very common misconception.  (O14A63:74) 
 
In sum, many Ombuds expressed concern regarding perceptions of partiality and 
remaining independent. Some scrupulously adhere to the archetypal model’s prescriptions. 
Others, as we have seen, cross the line in many ways, large and small. Perhaps the best way to 
punctuate the importance of this line to many Ombuds is to close with an observation of one who 
agonized over having lunch with old friends: “I actually do have friends on campus on the 
faculty, staff, whatever, that I [will] have lunch with…once in a while. I know that kind of 
violates the rule…” (O7A37:56).   
CONCLUSION 
The archetypal Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds models view impartiality and 
independence very differently.  The Title IX Coordinator archetype holds a role similar to a 
police investigator or prosecutor, but with a mission to enforce compliance with civil rights law.  
In doing so, they are to be impartial to both sides.  The Ombuds archetypal model is closer to a 
religious leader and maintains independence by not participating in any formal process, and by 
being an impartial advocate for fairness and not any one person, outcome, or the organization.    
While some officials in each office adhere to their respective models, many depart from it 
by holding multiple roles, and advocating in ways that show bias towards organizational goals, 
specific individuals, or particular outcomes.  On its face, impartiality and independence appear to 
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relatively straightforward concepts.  In reality, it is not always easy to determine when Ombuds 
or Title IX Coordinators are advocating for fair process (Ombuds) or compliance with Title IX 
(Coordinators) versus advocating for outcomes or individuals unconnected to the goals of each 
role.  Further, both roles require a determination of what is “compliance” or “fairness.”   
In reality, navigating impartiality and independence are complicated, given the 
conflicting interests of survivors, alleged perpetrators, and the organization itself.  Both roles are 
torn between helping survivors, ensuring fairness for alleged perpetrators, and establishing 
professional worth and influence in organizations pressuring them to ensure protection from 
liability.  One role seeks to stop a perpetrator and address a widespread culture of sexual 
misconduct. The other is concerned about easing and addressing an individual’s pain, often at the 
expense of institutional enforcement.  What is striking is that sometimes the Title IX Coordinator 
is in practice playing a role more like the archetypal Ombuds, and vice versa.  
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CHAPTER 7:  TITLE IX COORDINATORS AND FORMALITY 
 
The Ombuds and Title IX Coordinator archetypes operate using very different processes: 
while Ombuds operate informally Title IX Coordinators act formally.  The ideal Title IX 
Coordinator directs formal and timely investigations that provide for notice, due process, and 
other features common of formal processes.  The model Ombuds uses flexible, informal 
processes that empower visitors in achieving their goals.  This chapter describes the Title IX 
Coordinator achetype’s preference for formality and examines Coordinators who depart and 
adhere to the model.  These adherences and departures occur along a spectrum, as some Ombuds 
or Title IX Coordinators may aptly be described as “adherers” or “deviators.”  Additionally, 
adherence or departure is often situational and context-specific as a Coordinator or Ombuds who 
goes by the book in one instance departs from their archetype in another.   
FORMALITY AND THE TITLE IX COORDINATOR ARCHETYPE    
 
The Title IX Coordinator archetype operates a formal office for handling disputes that in 
many respects is similar to a police or prosecutor.  Like the police or a prosecutor, the Title IX 
Coordinator archetype uses a formal process designed to identify, via formal investigation, 
whether the facts indicate compliance with Title IX law.  The Coordinator must be impartial to 
following prescribed procedure and to the quality of the investigation.  The process described 
below is a “hybrid” of the Investigation and Hearing Models outlined by the Association for 
Student Conduct Administration (ASCA, 2014, p. 15).  Regardless of model, Title IX 
Coordinator archetypes operate a formal office akin to a police or prosecutor.  
The ATIXA Statement of Ethics and Title IX Coordinator Competencies (2012, Core Job 
Duties and Responsibilities, §4) states that Coordinators are to “[o]versee prompt, effective, and 
equitable intake, investigation, processing, issuing of findings of fact, and timely resolution of all 
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instances of sex/gender discrimination made known to responsible employees and/or reported or 
filed by students, faculty, employees, third parties, or by members of the broader community” (p. 
5).  Chapter two outlines the process requirements outlined by OCR.  This section reviews many 
of those requirements but focuses on the formal and informal models articulated by the 2013 
ATIXA Training Manual. It then describes the hybrid process used at the University of Kansas. 
In a nutshell, the ATIXA 2013 Training Manual (p. 39) describes a Model Investigation 
Process that places the Title IX Coordinator archetype as the centralized receptacle for 
complaints and also the locus of complaint handling, whether formal or informal.  The Model 
requires the Coordinator or their investigator to conduct an immediate initial investigation to 
determine if there is reasonable cause to charge the accused individual, meet with the 
complainant to finalize the complaint, and prepare the notice of charges.   
Unlike an archetypal Ombuds process, the ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, NCHERM 
2010 White Paper argues that every sexual misconduct complaint should be investigated without 
exception (p. 139).  There is a preference for official complaints.  For example, where survivors 
are reluctant to make formal complaints or seek to withdraw a formal complaint, the 2013 
ATIXA Training Manual, Investigation Protocol Checklist recommends honoring that request, 
but trying “to persuade (not coerce) the alleged victim to reconsider” (pp. 53-54).   
After finalizing the complaint and the notice of charges, the Title IX Coordinator or their 
staff will then “commence a thorough, reliable and impartial investigation by developing a 
strategic investigation plan, including a witness list, evidence list, intended timeframe, and order 
of interviews for all witnesses and the accused individual, who may be given notice prior to or at 
the time of the interview” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, p. 39).  Brett Sokolow describes 
notice as one area in which this investigation model provides an advantage over a hearing model.  
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In a hearing model a complaint is received and then the accused is promptly given notice of the 
complaint.  Sokolow notes: 
“[The accused] then have time to fabricate a story and find friends to 
swear to it before they respond.  This does not allow notice to be strategic.  
It should be.  In an investigation model, we often interview the accused 
person last.  We don’t want any party to taint the witness pool by playing 
on loyalties.  It is not just the parties who lie to us, but their partisans as 
well.  Getting statements from witnesses in advance of interviewing the 
accused student minimizes the potential for coordination of stories, and 
also gives us the ability to share conflicting accounts with the accused 
person once we have collected them” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, 
Civil Rights Investigation Model, p. 64). 
 
The ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, Investigation Protocol Checklist, notes that in some 
circumstances it may be best to notify the accused immediately after receiving a formal 
complaint, but in others “interviewing witnesses and accumulating evidence first may be the best 
practice” (p. 55).  The checklist recommends that investigators “strategize notifying the accused 
student of the complaint” by “[o]nly inform[ing] the accused student of the purpose of the 
meeting in advance if doing so will support your strategy, or if asked” (p. 55).  Specifically the 
checklist notes “Sometimes, unanticipated interviews can be unfair.  In other cases, unanticipated 
interviews could be an important advantage.  They should be used with discretion.  If your goal 
is to build rapport and trust with the accused student, unanticipated interviews may undermine 
that.  Unanticipated interviews can be used when appropriate for interviewing witnesses, or for 
follow-ups with the complainant to test veracity or accuracy of descriptions” (p. 55).  Notice is 
thus a strategic tool the Title IX investigator archetype has as they proceed with an investigation. 
In terms of investigation techniques, Daniel Swinton (ATIXA Tip of the Week, 8/15/13) 
notes that the goals of questioning the parties and any witnesses goes beyond “to learn the truth 
of what happened” to also include learning background information, establishing a timeline, 
understanding each party’s perceptions, gathering sufficient information to determine facts and 
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their relative importance, trying to determine what happened, ascertaining appropriate remedies, 
and learning whether there are other, related events requiring investigation. OCR’s 2014 Q&A 
document (2014) notes that “[I]n all cases, a school’s Title IX investigation must be adequate, 
reliable, impartial, and prompt and include the opportunity for both parties to present witnesses 
and other evidence” (p. 25). 
Without unreasonable delay, the Title IX investigation must be completed and the Title 
IX Coordinator will make a finding of a policy violation if the preponderance of the evidence 
supports such a finding.  The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual, Investigation Tips, suggests the 
investigator “[s]tate a conclusion resulting from [the] investigation, if possible” (p. 51).  
According to ATIXA Advisory Board member Belinda Guthrie, The investigation report is one 
of the most important aspects of your Title IX investigation (Guthrie, ATIXA Tip of the Week, 
1/9/14).  A comprehensive investigative report should summarize the nature of the complaint, the 
investigation, interviews with the parties and relevant witnesses, information collected, a 
timeline of events, and the investigator’s assessment of credibility, the weight of the evidence 
and conclusions and findings (Guthrie, ATIXA Tip of the Week, 1/9/14).  The 2013 ATIXA 
Training Manual (Investigation Protocol Checklist) recommends the investigator’s statement of 
findings “1) List the evidence and what is shows; 2) Assess credibility; 3) Make a determination 
as to whether the evidence (facts, opinions, circumstances) establishes a violation of policy is 
more likely than not to have occurred, and 4) Cite concretely the reasons for this conclusion in a 
written report” (p. 57).  
These findings are then presented to the accused, who may accept the findings in total, 
accept the findings in part, or reject all findings.  Finally, the Title IX Coordinator or their staff 
shares the findings and updates the complainant on the status and outcome of the investigation 
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(ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Model Investigation Process, p. 39).   If the accused accepts the 
finding of a policy violation, “[a student conduct office for students, or an administrative or 
human resources office for faculty or staff] will impose appropriate sanctions for the violation, 
after consultation with the Title IX Coordinator” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Model 
Investigation Process, p. 39).   
If the accused rejects the findings (in whole or in part), it is typical in universities using 
the hybrid model described here to offer a hearing to determine whether it was more likely or not 
that the accused individual is in violation. The findings of the investigation will be admitted at 
the hearing, and the investigator may give evidence, but neither is binding on the deciders of fact 
(ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Model Investigation Process, p. 40).   Colleges are strongly 
discouraged from allowing parties to cross-examine or question one another during the hearing 
to avoid perpetuating a hostile environment (DCL, 2011, p. 12; OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 31).  The 
Office of Civil Rights does not require that schools allow parties to include their lawyers in this 
process, but if they do permit legal representation, both sides must have the same opportunity 
and their counsel shall be equally constrained or allowed to participate (DCL, 2011, p. 12; OCR 
Q&A, 2014, p. 26).  The ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, Statement of Rights, states that 
survivors and accused students have “[t]he right to have the university compel the presence of 
student, faculty and staff witnesses, and the opportunity (if desired) to ask questions, directly or 
indirectly, of witnesses (including the accused student), and the right to challenge documentary 
evidence” (pp. 47, 49). 
Accused students or complainants may appeal the hearing outcome in writing. If the 
accused engages in an appeal, his or her appeal will then be shared with the other party to 
provide an opportunity for response.  These “appeals and responses are then forwarded to the 
	   264	  
appeals officer/committee for initial review to determine if the appeal meets the limited grounds 
and is timely” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Model Investigation Process, p. 41).  According 
to the model (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, p. 41), the appealing party must demonstrate 
either 1) A procedural or substantive error significantly impacting the hearing’s outcome; 2) 
New evidence, unavailable during the original hearing or investigation, that could substantially 
impact the finding or sanction, or 3) Sanctions disproportionate to the severity of the violation.  
The decision of the appeals committee or officer is final (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Model 
Investigation Process, p. 42).  Following the process, a prompt and effective remedy must be 
instituted to “end the discrimination, prevent its recurrence and address its effects” (p. 37). 
In addition to overseeing all formal processes used for handling sexual misconduct 
complaints, The Title IX Coordinator archetype also is responsible for overseeing any informal 
processes.  This is echoed in a Wake Forest University Title IX Coordinator job posting 
(Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14), which states that the person oversees “the University’s 
response to and investigation of alleged violations of Title IX, including implementation of 
formal and informal resolution procedures...” Additionally, The Swarthmore Title IX 
Coordinator job posting requires that the individual “be available to advise any individual, 
including a complainant, a respondent or a third party, about the courses of action available at the 
College, both informally and formally” (Title IX Coordinator Job at Swarthmore College, 
ATIXA, 2013). 
Despite the ability to use informal processes, the Title IX preference for formal 
procedures extends to discouraging the use of mediation to resolve complaints.  Although the 
2011 Dear Colleague Letter does allow for including voluntary informal mechanisms like 
mediation for resolving some types of sexual harassment complaints, the use of mediation is to 
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be limited and carefully overseen.  The Letter notes that it is improper for complainants to be 
required to work out problems directly with the alleged perpetrator, “certainly not without 
appropriate involvement by the school” (DCL, 2011, p. 8).  Complainants must understand that 
they have a right to end the informal process at any time and begin a formal complaint process.  
OCR notes that mediation is never appropriate, even on a voluntary basis, for cases involving 
allegations of sexual assault, and that schools should state in their grievance procedures that 
mediation will not be used in such cases (DCL, 2011, p. 8).   
There are arguments both for and against using mediation in cases involving sexual 
assault.  In university settings, Chanda (2001) concludes that mediation is an appropriate dispute 
resolution process from the assault survivor’s perspective.  Analyzing various processes in terms 
of their ability to meet the goals of 1) deterrence, 2) education, 3) encouraging reporting, and 4) 
avoiding re-victimizing survivors, Chanda (2001) argues that it is superior in many ways to the 
current available processes and thus should be one of the available processes from which 
survivors can choose (p. 270).   
Chanda’s conclusion is not shared by either Oser (2005), Hippensteele (2006), or Conley 
and O’Barr (1998).  Relating mediation to relational versus rules-based frames, Conley and 
O’Barr (1998) note “it should come as no surprise that women should at once like mediation and 
fare badly in it” (p. 132) because women are socialized to seek relational strategies instead of 
rights-based strategies for resolving disputes.  Oser (2005) argues that the use of informal 
alternatives in sexual harassment claims may inhibit the development of an evolved body of 
sexual harassment case law.  Specifically companies responding to sexual harassment complaints 
with informal mechanisms circumvents the legal system and avoids precedent, deprives the 
public of pertinent information, and empowers more powerful institutional players.  Hippensteele 
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(2006, p. 68) argues that mediation, under the guise of protecting women, enables sexual 
harassment to go unpunished by regulating sexual harassment rather than correcting it.  The use 
of mediation is one way in which Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators attempt to navigate the 
tension between formal and informal processes.  
The ATIXA 2013 Training Manual, Statement of Rights of the Alleged Victim, p. 46, 
states that survivors have “[t]he right not to have any complaint of sexual assault mediated (as 
opposed to adjudicated)”  The 2013 ATIXA Training Manual, NCHERM 2011 Whitepaper 
notes, “Campuses can offer victims mediation (or even better--restorative justice) opportunities 
subsequent to and in addition to the normal resolution processes to which the complaint should 
be subjected, but not as a substitute for them” (p. 150).   
Despite Title IX Coordinators’ authority regarding formal and informal resolution of 
sexual misconduct, the Ombuds archetype may hear sexual harassment complaints, placing the 
two roles in opposition.  The ATIXA Training Manual acknowledges this tension and attempts to 
address it from the Title IX Coordinator’s perspective by utilizing a coordination and referral 
system designed to keep the Title IX Coordinator informed.  It states, “Where grievances are 
handled separately by separate bodies, a coordination and referral system should be put in place.  
This would allow, for example, an Ombuds person who has investigated what was brought 
forward as a sexual harassment complaint, to refer that complaint and investigation to the 
college’s conduct office, for more appropriate resolution as a sexual assault” (ATIXA Training 
Manual, 2013, Bedrock beliefs, p. 13).   
This coordination and referral system is consistent with the OCR requirement that “Title 
IX coordinator[s] must be informed of all reports [subject to the counseling exception] and 
complaints raising Title IX issues, even if the report or complaint was initially filed with another 
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individual or office (OCR Q&A, 2014, pp. 10-11).  This obligation is also echoed in the ATIXA 
Formal Grievance Process requirement that the grievant provide documentation of all informal 
efforts pursued to resolve the issue.  “This includes names, dates and times of attempted or actual 
contact along with a description of the discussion and the manner of communication made in the 
course of each effort” (ATIXA Training Manual, 2013, Formal Grievance Process, pp. 38-39). 
The model Title IX Coordinator views their office as the only correct place for issues of sexual 
misconduct, and any informal resolution must correctly originate with their office.   
 The process described above is modeled on a police-prosecutor model in which an 
investigator investigates and determines the existence of violations of law and policy and makes 
a recommendation as to the appropriate sanction. The archetypal Title IX process often then 
includes the ability to accept the findings or to seek a hearing, followed by a potential appeal to 
an upper level administrator.  The formal processes used by the Title IX Coordinator archetype 
can be contrasted with the informal Ombuds model which provides for considerably greater 
flexibility and informality.   
TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO ADHERE TO THE FORMAL MODEL 
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere or depart from the archetype do so along a spectrum 
from complete adherence to complete departure.  Coordinators adhering to the archetype use a 
formal process in which they enforce mandatory reporting requirements and compel certain 
individuals’ participation, conduct at least an initial investigation of every complaint, and issue 
an investigative report.  Coordinators adhering to the archetype are consistent in their policy for 
providing notice to respondents and for ensuring appropriate hearing protocols are followed.   
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First, Coordinators who adhere to the archetype are wholly committed to its formality and 
see considerable benefits in this formality. Several Title IX Coordinators celebrated the benefits 
of formal processes. For example: 
The more formal the more you have a very, very clearly defined investigative 
process, the more you’ve figured out exactly what your intro to anybody you meet 
with is about confidentiality, outcomes, what you will be able to share, what you 
won’t, the more you set all that up and have frankly a very legally sound final 
written report on the back end, the more I think people at least know what to 
expect when they come to your office and that it’s not going to be all over the 
board. I do think, so in that sense having a very clearly defined formal process 
resulting in a formal report at the end does set you up for less legal challenges, 
less procedural challenges, etc., on the back end. Which, frankly, all goes to your 
reputation of the office on the campus. It all comes back to that.  (T1B12:33) 
 
Other Coordinators indicated a lack of interest in handling informal resolutions: 
 
I’ve built a relationship with the Ombuds, for them to understand that I’m not 
handling informal, people who come to me and they don’t want me to go for the 
jugular, so to speak, I don’t deal with them as much.  I send them [to the Title IX 
Coordinator immediately] when I ascertain at what level they want some sort of 
intervention. I try to tell them ‘Ombuds is the soft touch, they’ll try to 
communicate and mediate and work it out, but when you come to me, that means 
you want the hammer on the nail.’  (T11A45:13) 
 
Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype claim a monopoly on addressing sexual 
misconduct complaints, even informal resolutions of these complaints.  In their view, the role of 
the Ombuds is limited to complaints in which there clearly is no violation of Title IX law or 
policy.  For example, a Coordinator noted: 
[M]y view of the Ombudsman office is that they’re dealing with non-civil 
rights/discrimination issues. They’re dealing with… ‘I’ve got a bad boss, I’m not 
being treated fairly, but it’s not necessarily because of my status…’  [We refer 
cases to them when someone] isn’t happy, and it really isn’t because of any kind 
of discrimination issue…  (T9A41:46) 
 
Other Ombuds indicated that the Title IX Coordinator preferred to handle things 
themselves, using a formal mechanism.  One Ombuds stated, “Our [formal offices are] 
just not helpful to people, and they see us as interlopers on their turf, that they’re 
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supposed to solve [people’s] problems” (O9A53:26).  Coordinators who adhere to the 
archetype see their office as a mechanism for investigating and preventing sexual 
misconduct, not necessarily to provide options or maintain confidential communications.  
For example, a Coordinator says he tells visitors:  
I usually always say ‘this is my role. I do an investigation based upon the 
information you give me. My role is not to talk and give you options.’ Unless 
there is nothing in your conversation to suggest that you’re being subjected to 
discrimination, and it is just bad behavior that you don’t like and it doesn’t rise to 
the level of protected activity, of course I won’t do anything. But, for students 
who come in and say ‘I’ve been sexually harassed in the last month but I don’t 
want you to say anything,’ I stop them and say ‘I can’t. This isn’t the place for 
you.’  (T10A43:35) 
 
Second, Coordinators who adhere to the archetype enforce mandatory reporting 
requirements and encourage all university employees to notify the Title IX office of any 
suspected sexual improprieties.  For example: 
We’ve got a student counseling center where there are psychologists. One of the 
things they do is encourage them to bring it forward to my office for official 
processing so that… I don’t know what they tell them, but I assume they tell them 
‘protect other women as well.’  (T12A47:19) 
 
This assumption extends to the Ombuds office, as indicate by another Title IX Coordinator: 
 
Well, no [I do not interact with the Ombuds].  That office pretty consistently will 
and should refer any complaints that they get that are about discrimination or 
harassment to us, so in that sense we interact.  (T3A19:23) 
 
Survivors are never required to participate, but witnesses and other individuals may be 
compelled to provide information.  In sharp contrast with Ombuds who never require 
cooperation, policies requiring participation are often used by Title IX Coordinators to gain 
cooperation, as indicated by a Coordinator:   
We have in our policy that failure to cooperate with an investigation can [result 
in] disciplinary action. And that is in there for people who either falsify 
information [or] flat our refuse to cooperate with an investigation.... So if 
someone [has] information, [and] I know they have information, [and] they refuse 
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to cooperate or come in and don’t provide full cooperation and I [can] prove [it], 
then you’re going to be disciplined for it. In other words…this is a 
responsibility…it is to make sure the process works. So if you’re not going to be 
part of the process, then we’re going to have to deal with that.  I don’t want to 
have to deal with…discipline, I just want…you cooperating and giving me the 
information and giving me true and accurate information. Then you’re done. I’m 
giving you the word that no one is going to know what you told me until and 
unless it is subpoenaed. I rarely [have that happen as]…most attorneys…want to 
do their own depositions and everything… We’re going to protect your 
information, but you’re going to give me that information. If you don’t give me 
the information, and you’re just refusing to do that, I’m going to discipline you 
because you’re not going to put a spoke in the wheel of this process.  
(T10A43:44)    
 
Another Coordinator echoed, “[I]f a person is named in any way in an investigation, yes, they are 
required to participate in the process [at least in terms of providing information], yes” 
(T13A49:25).  Where an attorney advises their client not to share information, Coordinators do 
their best to gain their cooperation. Coordinators adhering to the archetype do not need to allow 
attorneys to be present for interviews, as long as the policy is consistent for both respondent and 
complainant.  Thus:   
[T]he attorney was basically told ‘this person either cooperates in the 
investigation or I go on the basis of what I have. My advice is allow your client to 
talk to me. Oh, by the way, you’re not entitled to be in the interview.’ (T2B14:36)    
 
Multiple Title IX Coordinators, adhering to the archetype, described the complainant’s 
participation in a hearing as voluntary: 
The Complainant and Respondent have the opportunity to appear… If they don’t 
want to… they don’t have to but if [the complainant] doesn’t come and we don’t 
have any other way of getting the evidence in, that case might fall apart. 
(T9A41:39)   
 
[S]ometimes we make exceptions for the complainant, it depends on the situation, 
particularly with Title IX cases if we do an investigation, there is the possibility 
that the investigator can go to the hearing and testify based on their investigation 
and their findings, which would not force the complainant to have to [participate]. 
So…depending on the situation, there are ways in which the complainant may not 
have to participate in the process if they do not wish to. Of course, if they don’t 
want to pursue a case, then we are bound to support their wishes unless there’s 
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some threat to the campus, some other reason why we must move forward. 
(T13A49:25) 
 
We never require participation. I couldn’t… we have never required participation 
and I can’t imagine where we would. We might impose an accommodation or an 
interim sanction where parties might not be in agreement, but we do go forward 
without participation and we would tell the alleged victim what we’re going to do 
and to the greatest extent why and hear what their concerns are and again invite 
them to participate.  (T8A39:51)  
 
To avoid the complications when a complainant does not want to appear, Title IX Coordinators 
who adhere to the archetype prefer written complaints from individuals who understand the 
process and the implications of making a complaint:      
First hand written accounts are the best way. You are understanding our process, 
you’re understanding what you’re giving me the right to do, to conduct an 
investigation, to talk with people. And people need to know that, you need to 
know ‘this is what you have signed up for, there’s no surprises, you’re not going 
to be retaliated against, but it’s going to be out there because that person that 
you’re charging with this offense has the right to defend themselves.’ So I have to 
tell them who filed it, what you’re saying, so that they can defend themselves on 
those charges. So it’s important that you know that’s what I’m doing. 
(T10A43:19). 
 
Title IX Coordinators’ formal processes are clearly defined to allow survivors and alleged 
perpetrators to clearly know what to expect.  For example:     
If we’re interviewing the complainant…we make sure it’s done in the context of 
they have full notice of what to expect, because it is true that once we know who 
the respondent is and what happened, we’re going to have to move forward.  I 
think that’s absolutely critical. And we revisit it all the time, we tweak it when we 
see something that didn’t go well. It’s really, I think it’s very critical to being fair 
to the complainant who often doesn’t want to tell their story, doesn’t want to be 
brought into a length[y] process, so we make sure they know what they’re getting 
into before they talk to us. I actually think it goes to our credibility on campus. It 
would be hard to do this job if you didn’t… I think that’s what builds the trust. 
(T1A11:25) 
 
This is echoed by another Title IX Coordinator:    
[W]e’ve got a checklist that we use that covers all of this, and that checklist, we 
go through the process with them, we make sure that they understand that if it is a 
sexual assault or a rape that they have the option to pursue both the administrative 
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process and the criminal process. We explain to them the difference, which is a 
big thing. I think that’s probably been the biggest area that we’ve made some 
difference in terms of the educational knowledge of our students and faculty, but 
if you’re raped you can, there is a university process that can do things on campus 
that the police, the criminal prosecution can’t do…[W]e tell them the names of all 
the resources that there are [available, including counseling]…We talk to them 
about our complaint resolution process, what it looks like. Make sure that they 
understand what their rights are…We have a [similar] checklist that we go 
through with the respondent.  (T9A41:28) 
 
Third, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use a police/prosecutor model 
in which every complaint, without exception, must receive an initial investigation to determine if 
further steps are needed. For example,    
You really need to know the law…because the Title IX coordinator role falls right 
in line with the way the law is read, the way that the law is interpreted, the way 
the law is applied, as well as the way investigations are done. Title IX 
investigations are done just like a civil rights investigation. They’re not a willy-
nilly let me talk to a couple people and see what comes up, it’s a very formalized 
process.  (T11A45:8)     
 
This initial investigation begins within the initial interview as Coordinators interview the 
complainants to determine whether further action is needed.  For example,  
Then if [the visitor] starts to ramble I will then say ‘let’s get back on track, why 
are you here? What happened to make you come here.’ And then they will explain 
‘well, I was not selected to go to a conference that I’ve always gone to, and this 
person, I heard it was because of the color of my skin or I believe it was.’ ‘Okay, 
why do you believe it was?’ And during that time I ask ‘give me specific evidence 
that it is on the basis of your race, or give me specific evidence that you’re being 
sexually harassed.’ We really try to make sure we’re in the world of [compliance]. 
As a result of that, either I can tell right then or there or the person will admit ‘I 
really don’t think it’s discrimination, I’m just not being treated well.’ Then we 
know it’s not the [compliance] world. If they say ‘it’s because my counterpart is a 
white female, she did the same thing I did but she’s being treated better, she was 
being treated better in this regard, this regard, this regard…’ then we could say ‘it 
looks like there’s enough to at least do an investigation to prove or not prove your 
case.’ Then I explain to them the investigation process…  (T10A43:22) 
 
Fourth, Coordinators who follow the archetype always provide notice to the respondent 
after receiving the initial complaint.  However, Coordinators select the timing of that notice on a 
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case-by-case basis.   For example, a Coordinator described typically interviewing the 
respondent immediately after the complainant: 
So I usually, not always, but usually interview the alleged harasser or 
discriminator next. Give them a copy of the policy, explain to them that we are 
impartial and have not reached any conclusions, but this person has come forward 
and made a complaint about you. We want to get your side of the story. I try not 
to give away too much at first because I really would like to hear what they had to 
say before I drill down to the nuts and bolts of ‘here’s what she said you did.’ I 
get there eventually, but I start with ‘tell me how it is you came to know X. What 
happened on such and such or when you all were at such and such restaurant or 
this event’ or something like that and get them to sort of ramble  (T12A47:33)  
 
Other Coordinators described why and when they will not immediately notify the respondent:  
 
Sometimes I will immediately notify the respondent that there is a complaint. 
Sometimes I don’t immediately notify the respondent, sometimes I talk to some of 
the persons who may have witnessed what took place before I approach the 
respondent. We certainly won’t take any action until the respondent receives 
notification of the complaint. Sometimes getting information from other witnesses 
helps to inform how we approach the respondent. So, and I know some 
investigators say we need to notify the respondent early on in this process, let 
them know that they have a complaint, and then we start talking to the witnesses. 
I do that sometimes, sometimes I don’t. Because sometimes gathering that 
information helps me in terms of how I approach the respondent to get some 
truthful answers…if I have enough information then maybe I can know what 
questions to ask to make sure I get the right, the truthful response. (T13A49:36)    
 
Yet other Coordinators described a norm of talking to the respondent within a few days of 
receiving the complaint: 
Usually [I discuss the situation with the respondent] within the first few days of 
getting the complaint in.  [I’m not gathering information ahead of that]…what we 
typically do is we talk to the complainant and respondent first, we give them both 
the opportunity to get whatever documentary evidence they think we should look 
at, and we also tell them ‘please let us know what other witnesses we need to talk 
to.’  (T9A41:37) 
 
Some Coordinators even go line by line through the complaint with the Respondent:   
 
Once we get [confirmation that the  written complaint we sent is correct] back 
[from the complainant] we talk with the alleged offender and we go through the 
same thing. ‘Here’s my name, this is what we do, we’ve received a complaint.’ 
We usually send it to them in writing, they make an appointment to come see us. 
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And then we talk about it. ‘Here’s what we have, let’s go point by point,’ and we 
get their response. If they respond in a way with evidence to show that either A, 
recently: ‘yeah, I said it.’ That ends the investigation. If they’re defending it and 
we need to have more information to determine whether or not it’s more 
reasonable or not to think the probably did it or didn’t do it, we then ask them for 
witnesses to talk with and then we have our witness list.  (T10A43:26)   
 
Coordinators described the reasons for treating the complainant and respondent equally:   
 
[Respondents] want to have their day and they want to be heard and you’ve got to 
treat them respectfully, you can’t just go in the door and say ‘you did this,’ no, 
you’ve got to give people the respect and listen to them and work through that.  
(T6A30:48) 
 
I think that respondents deserve the same kind of, I think it helps keep everybody 
safer if we were able to give notice to a respondent or share the outcome in the 
same way we do with a complainant.  (T8A39:64)   
 
Another Coordinator described the danger of waiting to provide notice: 
 
[Respondents] often feel ambushed, and sometimes we do ambush them because 
we frequently ask questions that we already know the answers to and how they 
answer the question is important. We may already know the facts, but they don’t 
know that we know that, so when we confront them with conflicting information 
they get pissed off because we ambushed them…in many instances… people who 
are not accustomed to having their authority challenged.  (T7B33:22)    
 
The impact of this tactic is then described by the same Coordinator: 
 
Well, people file complaints on us. They allege that they were mistreated in the 
investigation, they allege that we were biased, they allege that we spoke to them 
harshly, they allege that we harassed them, all kinds of things.  And then 
sometimes short of that they’ll complain to our bosses that an investigation was 
unfair or that we individually spoke to them harshly or something was unfair.  We 
ask them questions that make them uncomfortable.  (T7B33:14)    
 
Coordinators described needing the complainant to make a direct report in order to appropriately 
provide respondents with notice, as indicated by a Coordinator who observed: 
It saves a step. If I get [a complaint] through a third person I have to go back to 
the [alleged victim] and say ‘we got this complaint, talk to me.’ We have to then 
make them comfortable to do that before I can even get out the gate to go and talk 
to the alleged offender.  When we don’t do it that way and you put yourself in this 
predicament [where I am calling a respondent to say] ‘you know what, we got a 
complaint by somebody’ [and they will respond] ‘Oh really, who?’ [and all I can 
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say is] ‘I can’t really tell you that right now.’ [They will want to know] ‘Well, 
what did they say I did?’ [Respondents] don’t have to answer any questions 
because I’m basically violating…due process.  (T10A43:19) 
 
Fifth, Coordinators who adhere to the archetype use the correct “preponderance of the 
evidence” standard of proof, not the more stringent “beyond a reasonable doubt” or “clear and 
convincing” standards.  Title IX Coordinators described attempting to educate campus members 
regarding the correct standard. Thus, 
I deal with a lot of deans and they try to tell me what the law is all the time, and 
how I need to do my investigations all the time, and I always have to bring them 
back to ‘everything you see on TV on Law and Order and on CSI, I get that, but 
that’s a criminal investigation, and that’s not what we’re doing here. ‘It’s a civil 
rights or civil investigation, and using the word civil means that we’re going to 
build relationships and we’re going to be civil to each other and figure out what 
happened. I am not trying to nail anybody to the wall, I’m not calling the police 
unless I uncover some criminal activity, but we need to look at this a little bit 
different.’ I don’t use proof beyond a reasonable doubt, I’m about preponderance 
of evidence. Now in the faculty side, they want me to use clear and convincing, 
which I refuse to do because for me, clear and convincing weights it in the 
professor’s favor. It’s not a balance.  (T11A45:11) 
 
Following an investigation, Title IX Coordinators who adhere to the archetype issue a 
formal report akin to an indictment, but one that goes further in describing policy violations and 
making recommendations.  As noted in chapters one and two, there is considerable debate 
regarding what due process requires and what constitutes a “hearing” under Title IX law.  While 
OCR recommends an appeal in certain situations, the “hearing” requirement is satisfied by the 
Coordinator’s investigation and by providing both sides with the opportunity to provide 
information, evidence, and suggest witnesses (OCR Q&A, p. 24-26).  These requirements must 
be read consistently with federal due process rights (OCR Q&A, p. 13) and potentially also 
administrative law requirements.     
As education is not deemed a fundamental right, there is no requirement to use an 
elevated burden of proof in student cases, such as clear and convincing evidence, or to provide a 
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right to cross-examine witnesses (Goss v. Lopez, 1975, p. 583).  Faculty and staff with 
contractual rights do have constitutionally protected property interests that trigger higher due 
process standards  (Perry v. Sindermann, 1972).   Administrative law, however, requires keeping 
the functions of investigator or prosecutor and judge or hearing officer separate (Administrative 
Procedure Act, § 554(d)(2)).   If the Title IX Coordinator does conduct the investigation, OCR 
requires taking steps to guard against a conflict of interest in this role (OCR Q&A, 2013, p. 25).   
Specific examples of a conflict of interests include where the Title IX Coordinator is also the 
Athletic Director, Dean of Students, or “serves on the judicial/hearing board or to whom an 
appeal might be made” (OCR Q&A, 2014, p. 12).  This conflict of interest definition suggests 
that Title IX does not bar the Coordinator from making the initial determination of guilt or 
innocence, as long as they do not oversee the appeal.  In some instances the Title IX Coordinator 
does not personally investigate but it is done by a staff member in the Title IX compliance or 
other office, providing some separation between the investigative and adjudicatory functions.   
At a minimum, Title IX Coordinators’ reports include a recommendation regarding guilt 
and potential sanctions.  In some situations the report goes to a panel or to an administrator who 
makes the ultimate determination regarding guilt and sanctions.  This arrangement is described 
by one Coordinator: “[A] final report is drafted for my review or for my boss’s review if I’m 
doing the investigation, and then recommendations are sent out with the findings” (T10A43:29).   
In other situations, the Title IX Coordinator’s report determines whether there is a Title 
IX violation and a panel or administrator determines the appropriate sanctions.  A Coordinator 
described that situation:   
For students the hearing board determines [punishment].  Again, it’s all about 
consistency. We just want to make sure for certain violations we’re consistent in 
terms of how we implement those.  (T13A49:51)  
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Alternatively, the Title IX Coordinator’s report serves as an indictment, stating probable cause to 
proceed with charges, with the case then proceeding to a more formal hearing.  For example:  
[S]o what we wind up doing is writing a summary of the investigation and 
providing findings of fact to the student conduct office with a recommendation, 
and it’s only a recommendation, as to whether further proceedings are warranted 
or not.  And then that office decides whether they will engage their disciplinary 
proceedings or not. But we do an initial set of findings, of fact, without a 
conclusion as to whether a policy has been violated or not.  [S]o we become the 
investigative arm of [another office]…Yeah, but we work together with the 
[administrators in the other office] because we basically attend the same 
interviews and we produce a memo. They’re actually free to disregard it, but that 
doesn’t usually happen.  (T7A32:23)  
 
Another Coordinator noted:  “Beyond our [report], we [then] become witnesses at the student 
conduct hearing” (T9A41:39).  At the hearings, Title IX Coordinators adhering to the archetype 
also ensure that the complainant is not subjected to direct cross-examination.  For example, a 
Coordinator noted that questions can be asked to the panel, but “our process does not provide for 
cross-examination” (T9A41:39).  
 This question of what constitutes a “hearing” is evident in the student and faculty 
processes used at the University of Kansas.  For students, The Title IX Coordinator 
conducts an initial evaluation to determine if a more complete investigation is necessary 
(University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, Evaluation).  
Written notice of the complaint is provided to the respondent and an opportunity to meet 
with the investigators in person or to respond in writing (University of Kansas, 
Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, Procedure).  Both the complainant and 
respondent have the opportunity to identify witnesses, present witness statements, and 
offer any other evidence, but the investigator(s) have the discretion to determine which 
individuals will be interviewed (University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint 
Resolution Process, Procedure).   Following the investigation, the complainant, 
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respondent, and appropriate administrators are to be given a written summary of findings 
and recommendations.  The appropriate administrators will then determine an appropriate 
resolution.  (University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint Resolution Process, 
Procedure).    
 If there is a finding of discrimination or retaliation and discipline is imposed, the 
respondent may request a hearing (University of Kansas, Discrimination Complaint 
Resolution Process, Procedure) “conducted with more formal procedures” including the 
chance to present evidence, and ask questions of any witnesses or the other students involved 
(University of Kansas, Informal v. Formal Hearings).  An appeal from the panel’s 
determination is possible on the grounds of 1) Failure to follow procedures, 2) Inconsistency 
with applicable provisions of other rules or state or federal law, 3) Factual determinations not 
supported by the record, and 4) Arbitrary and capricious decisions (University of Kansas, 
Appeal Process).  The appeal policy notes that “[a]ppeal requests may be denied in cases not 
having sufficient grounds in one or more of these areas” (University of Kansas, Appeal 
Process).  The process just described comports with the Hybrid Model in which an 
investigation occurs, followed by the ability to have a hearing to appeal the findings.  
 The process is the same if the accused is a member of the faculty, only the step 
between the administrative determination and the appeal is omitted. Faculty may appeal an 
initial determination that involves a suspension to a Faculty Rights Board (University of 
Kansas, Governance Procedure, Jurisdiction).  The grounds for appeal are limited to 
“allegations that action by an administrative authority violated established University 
procedures and adversely affected faculty rights” (University of Kansas, Governance 
Procedures, Procedures of the Faculty Rights Board, III.A).  The rules note that “On review 
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of the written information filed in the appeal, the Board may decide that it possesses 
sufficient information in the written record to make a decision without a hearing (University 
of Kansas, Governance Procedures, Procedures of the Faculty Rights Board, V.C.).  If the 
Board initiates a hearing, it “shall serve as a fair opportunity for the appellant and opposing 
parties to present their cases and arguments before the Board (University of Kansas, 
Governance Procedures, Procedures of the Faculty Rights Board, VI.A.).  As a result, for 
faculty the University of Kansas follows the Investigation Model in which there is no right to 
a hearing.  As previously described, most Universities use a Hybrid Model in which a 
hearing is utilized if findings are contested.     
 These procedures at the University of Kansas are a matter of dispute. In Zamir Bavel 
v. The University of Kansas, (No. 14-111404-A), Bavel asserts that the university failed to 
follow its prescribed procedures to provide a hearing on the merits when his request for an 
appeal against the initial administrative determination was denied.  In their response brief, 
the University of Kansas argues “’hearing’ does not mean a formal adversarial evidentiary 
proceeding” (p. 13)  Effectively, the position of the University of Kansas is that the sexual 
harassment investigator and the employee’s supervisor (who determines punishment) become 
“hearing” officers for the purposes of satisfying the legal requirements of a due process 
hearing.  Any “appeal” from those determinations is limited to an appeal on grounds of 
procedural error.  The question of what the law requires for a “hearing” remains unsettled 
and is further addressed below, but the relevant point here is that universities face ongoing 
legal pressure to increase the formality of their investigation and hearing procedures..   
 Regardless of the process used to determine guilt and sanctions, Title IX Coordinators 
who conform to the archetype use a formal investigative procedure that begins with 
	   280	  
mandatory reporting, continues with formal investigative techniques that mirror those of 
police and prosecutor, and conclude with an investigative report that is similar to an 
indictment (along with recommendations for resolution of the complaint). Where the analogy 
to the criminal justice process breaks down is in the character of the hearing process, which 
is clearly based on the model of a trial in court but is considerably less formal than an actual 
trial.       
TITLE IX COORDINATORS WHO DEPART FROM THE ARCHETYPE 
 
 Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype use or prefer more informal 
mechanisms for resolving sexual misconduct.    Departures occur primarily to address the needs 
of survivors or alleged perpetrators, out of frustration with the inefficiencies of excessive 
formalism, or to address the organization’s interest in resolving disputes and avoiding liability.  
These departures from the archetypal model often do not meet standards of legal compliance or 
risk exposing the university community to further sexual misconduct.   
First, many coordinators use informal mechanisms in order to serve organizational 
interests in preventing litigation.  One Coordinator, for example, observed, “[W]hat I do is not 
advocate, I look at the interests of the university as a whole, so we want to get issues resolved, 
taken care of, redressed at the lowest level possible” (T4A24:49).   Another, describing a change 
in university policy regarding Title IX, echoed:   
I had previously been advised not to go near that by [the general counsel’s] office. 
We had a change of president here who didn’t like all the investigative reports we 
were turning out because whenever we had findings of discrimination or sexual 
harassment, those reports, they always become attachment A to the lawsuit 
against the institution. Now I’ve been given the green light to sort of identify 
cases that maybe can reach an informal resolution without having to go through a 
full investigation. Now that informal resolution sometimes also means can we 
bump somebody out of the institution on the base of which you already know 
without having to go through a full investigation. That’s usually what that means, 
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because we’re not looking to coerce anybody, [but just] give them an opportunity 
to resign.  (T7A32:44) 
 
S/he continued, “Especially if we discover early on that there is serious evidence of serious 
misconduct, [the administration] may not want us to go to a full report because maybe they’re 
going to negotiate a departure of somebody, and it will not be necessary to produce a full blown 
report. That happens and that’s why it’s necessary to be in touch with supervisors and the like” 
(T7A32:11).   
Many Coordinators described examples of their use of informal mechanisms.  In one 
situation, an apology was unsuccessful but was seen as a means of resolving the issue:  
 
[And now instructor became] determined that he was also going to sue the student 
for defamation of character.  [Everyone] got lawyers.  All of this could have been 
avoided had he said ‘I’m Sorry’ but I couldn’t make that happen…  (T11B46:17)     
 
Other Coordinators expressed frustration at what they saw as efforts to avoid institutional 
liability in ways that benefited respondents (the alleged perpetrators).  For example:   
[T]he point that was also negative and very frustrating to me was that this student 
conduct board makes a recommendation to [the vice president], who issues a 
decision. Then that decision can be appealed by either party to the president. So 
what happened was it took the [VP]… twenty plus days to review it [and we were 
mid semester].  I believe he was dragging his feet on purpose to let the 
[respondent] finish the semester. Close to the end of the semester he concurred 
with the panel, [and then there is an appeal to the president].  The president is on 
vacation, and did not leave it with somebody else to handle. So this guy got to 
finish the semester, go back home to another state and enroll in another university 
without ever having a record on his transcript that he had any issues.  It was too 
late to notify them. He was already in another place and taking classes when [the] 
decision [was made in January].  The registrar told me she didn’t know if we 
could notify the other school.  When they took him he was a student in good 
standing. I honestly believe that the VP and president conspired to kill time to 
allow him to do that. I really do. Because the students only have 15 days from an 
event to file a student conduct report, but that vice president took 20+ days to 
make a decision. Is that fair?  (T12B48:17)  
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Alternatively, many Coordinators depart in the other direction by failing to consistently 
provide notice to respondents in an effort to gain better information and serve organizational 
interests in compliance.  To be sure, under their police/prosecutor model, the Title IX 
Coordinator archetype has some discretion, in exceptional cases, to determine whether more 
accurate information can be obtained from the respondent if part of the investigation is 
completed before the respondent is questioned.  Coordinators depart from the archetype when 
they fail to provide notice routinely.  For example:   
We typically start with the complainant. Then we allow that person to tell their 
story, identify any evidence and witnesses. We will then interview their witnesses 
…and then we’ll notify the respondent.  (T2A13:25) 
 
Second, many Coordinators use less formal processes than what is required by Title IX 
out of frustration with what they see as excessive formalism.  For example, a Coordinator noted: 
I’ve had a real trouble dovetailing my process with the [formal office] because 
they are very rigid, very process-driven, to the point of dotting the I’s and 
crossing the T’s…. You know what I’m saying? And it’s primarily staff with 
young, ambitious professionals who a really more interested in making a name for 
themselves [than in] cur[ing] students, in my personal opinion.  (T12B48:7)   
 
Another Coordinator noted preferring situations where everyone wins:  “I like win/win. I just do. 
I prefer win/win situations. I think there always should be dignity in the process” (T11B46:26).  
Coordinators expressed strong dissatisfaction with the formal process, for example:  “Knowing 
what our adjudication process is like… when they first come [in], I just dread it. Because I know 
what’s coming. I just think ‘oh my God, how can I do this to this person?’” (T12B48:23).  Other 
Coordinators expressed understanding the value of having informal, confidential conversations:   
There are times…I have to admit, where stuff is just so dumb and crazy that I go 
into [the Ombuds] office and I shut the door and I say ‘okay, I just need to spill 
my guts and then I’m going to go away. I don’t need you to say anything, I don’t 
need you to do anything, but just hear what I’m saying, nod in the appropriate 
spots, and then I’m going to go away.’ I proceed to then throw up on [the 
Ombuds] shoes, [the Ombuds] will laugh because nine times out of ten [the 
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person] thinks that everything I [say] is funny, because it is because it’s so dumb, 
and then I walk away.  (T11A45:66)   
 
As a result, often Coordinators relax their commitment to formality in order to encourage people 
to share information and cooperate.  For example: 
Often they [give] us…resistance at first, but through careful conversation with 
them and offering the resources we have on campus and trying to work with 
them… one of the first conversations we have is ‘what outcome are you looking 
for? What do you want to see happen here?’ So that they get to play a role and 
have some control about how we proceed. It’s through that gentle process that we 
often can [convince them to] go forward. I don’t think it’s because the students 
have heard of [our reputation], I think it’s more that we sort of have to coax them 
along.  (T1B12:19)  
 
Coordinators also depart from the archetype to avoid the formal requirement of 
investigating and reporting within 60 days.  For example, a Coordinator expressed “sometimes 
the handling of some [cases] takes longer than others, so you try to handle them within 60 days 
or less, and I don’t look at the 60 days, I just want to handle them” (T4A24:49).  Many 
Coordinators indicated an incorrect understanding of the time limitations to complete an 
investigation and issue findings:  “[W]e allow ourselves now 120 days to complete all of this. So 
it’s 90 days for the investigation, 30 days for the report” (T2B14:24).  Other Coordinators do not 
seem to understand or ensure the use of the proper legal standard for guilt.  For example, a 
Coordinator described a hearing in which the wrong standard was used: 
The investigat[ion] found that the more likely than not the policy was violated and 
recommended a hearing. [A]n adjudicator [is appointed]…and the victim’s very 
anxious, does not want to go forward, does not like the process, just wants it to be 
over.. and in the end the adjudicator finds the respondent not responsible.  The 
adjudicator failed to understand the [appropriate] standard…  (T8B40:27)  
 
Title IX Coordinators also depart from the archetype’s formality by relaxing the formality 
of reporting requirements.  Specifically, departure occurs when Coordinators do not ask for 
specific information about a complaint, do not require other offices to have the Title IX 
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Coordinator’s permission before handling complaints, or do not have or enforce a policy 
requiring others to report incidents. For example, one Coordinator described their relationship 
with the Ombuds:   
I think it’s a close relationship and [the Ombuds] will call and say ‘can I run 
something by you without any identifying information,’ and then they’ll go back 
to their visitors and share information.  (T8A39:32) 
 
Another Coordinator described the Ombuds office as a good place for determining 
whether an issue needed to be reported.  For example:   
[The Ombuds office is a] good place for students to go and get information about 
the various options available on campus, but also the process, how it works, and 
to talk through their issue, to make sure and determine that the issue is a real 
issue.  (T10A43:51)   
 
 The Coordinator continued:  
I think [the Ombuds office is] a great advisory [function], I think that’s 
what, it may not have the teeth that we have, but it’s critical for students to 
have that first place to go. Students don’t sign up to be infused in the 
formalized process of a grievance structure, that’s not why they’re here. 
They’re here to study and to learn and to have the greatest four years of 
their life, so it’s important to have those touch points that can redirect 
them if they need to be redirected and make sure that they understand 
what’s important and what’s not important and let these other processes 
that [investigate], let us handle that. I think once you’re into a process 
such as a Title IX process, it’s so formal at that particular point, and the 
requirements are so different that it’s hard to maintain that sense of safety 
and security of why you came to university. I’m always hesitant…I really 
try to make it as non-intrusive as I can when we’re doing complaints with 
students. That’s not what they really signed up for, so we try to get 
through them quicker than the employees, let’s get in there, let’s find out 
the facts and get out so that they can finish their studies.  (T10A43:51)    
 
Coordinators noted having discretion, much like a prosecutor, and engaging in informal 
conversations that contravene the requirements of the formal role.  For example:     
[D]epending on the facts they provide, because clearly, if this is something that 
smells like sexual harassment, we’re going to investigate, but if it’s feeling like 
‘well, someone is telling some off-color jokes, they seem to be targeting, they’re 
just kind of that equal-opportunity tell a bad joke’…it’s one of those situations 
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like that, then we can either talk with the supervisor, we can say ‘you know what, 
we’ve caught wind of… you need to get that person under control.’ I don’t have 
to tell them a name. And there are times when I will say ‘I’m not going to share 
the name with you at this point, I don’t think that’s as important as it is you 
stepping in and dealing with what’s going on here.’ Then I’ll ask ‘are you aware 
of this.’ Some will say ‘I wasn’t aware of this, but I’ll take care of it.’ (T2A13:34) 
 
Nowhere is frustration with excessive formalism more evident than in growing 
limits on the Title IX Coordinator’s authority to make judgments and 
recommendations.  As detailed in chapter one, in order to more clearly separate 
the investigation and adjudication functions, many universities now prohibit 
Coordinators from making recommendations about or determine whether or not 
there was a violation of university policy.  Coordinators expressed frustration at 
this lack of authority and the requirement of additional formal hearings. For 
example:   
What we used to do, and we still do with employees, is that this office had the 
authority to make the decision about whether or not the policy had been violated. 
In the wake of the Dear Colleague letter, our attorneys had decided that we can’t 
make that decision [or even a recommendation], we can only decide if it’s worthy 
of a hearing…[I]t’s insulting…[it goes] in front of a hearing panel [of students 
and faculty], who ironically can’t serve on those panels until they’ve had two 
hours of training on Title IX from me, [and I’ve had]…years of training. 
(T12B48:5)  
 
The same Coordinator continued to describe the rationale for not allowing the 
Coordinator to make recommendations, arguing it contravenes OCR’s intent:   
General Counsel said that they have a due process right to an adjudicated hearing. 
Don’t know if that’s true or not.  In every other way and in every other situation, 
we are allowed to make decisions and recommendations. If they’re harassed by an 
employee, if they’re harassed by a third party, all of those scenarios, we conclude, 
we make decisions, we make recommendations for action. But it’s in this 
situation, and I think it’s a liability thing. We went from a two page, non-
discrimination policy for all protected groups for students to… we have drafted 
now a ten page…sexual harassment policy for students, and we’re carving that 
out of the non-harassment policy that’s more general for all the other protected 
classes. And it’s procedure and… the good part is it has definitions in it too, 
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which are consistent with the Dear Colleague letter like consent, those kinds of 
things. ATIXA just did a webinar and it says ‘recommendations: do not let the 
Title IX office make the decision. Put it in front of an adjudicator.’   
But it is… we have just legalized this thing to death and it is not what OCR 
meant, in my opinion.  (T12B48:12, 48:8)  
 
The above Coordinator is correct that OCR guidance does not require the Coordinator to 
limit their report to findings of fact and not conclusions about potential violations.  OCR 
requirements must be read consistently with federal due process rights (OCR Q&A, p. 
13) and potentially also administrative law requirements.     
Third, Title IX Coordinators who do not follow the archetype do so out of a desire to 
serve and address the needs of survivors or alleged perpetrators.  As a result, departing Title IX 
Coordinators favor informal resolution in ways that hurt their impartiality.  Often that means 
giving priority to providing voice to visitors’ over learning relevant information about 
misconduct.  Sounding very much line an Ombuds, a Coordinator described the challenge of 
keeping conversations focused:   
But usually my first meeting is lots of real thick wrinkles right above my 
eyebrows because I do a lot of empathetic looking and face-making. I don’t mean 
that I don’t feel, I do feel, but I just try to let them feel safe and secure in telling 
their story and I listen and write and ask questions where I feel I need to. Then 
when they sort of wind down and I’m not good at letting people stop, keeping 
people brief. I’m very not good at that at all. I believe they need to get it out. 
(T12A47:26) 
 
Another Coordinator noted the same phenomenon: 
 
I am the complaint department. People hear that I’m here or what I do, what they 
think I do, and they immediately say ‘oh, I’ve got a problem, I need to go talk to 
her.’ So I try to explain to them ‘my job is to ensure that your rights haven’t been 
trampled on, understand what it is you want out of your complaint, and/or direct 
you to the right person to hear your complaint.’ Sometimes people come and talk 
to me and it has nothing to do with what I do.  (T11A45:12)  
 
Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype often described using informal means of 
resolution to help survivors.  For example:   
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[I]f we’ve got an especially fragile complainant, let’s say, rather than proceeding 
through our formal, full investigative process, we might figure out a way to 
handle it informally. We have a couple of options in terms of handling it 
informally. Typically…we sit down with the respondent, we explain how they’ve 
impacted the complainant, we hear their side of the story, but we’re not making 
findings, we’re really trying to educate the respondent on how their behavior was 
coming across and making sure they understand that the behavior has to stop. 
(T1A11:28)    
 
Other Coordinator described using informal mechanisms to help alleged perpetrators.  One cited 
an example in which there was an investigation, evidence of clear misconduct, but with an end 
result where “the [respondent] wrote a letter of apology and it was accepted.”  The Coordinator 
continued:     
The [respondent] wanted to write the letter, so the alleged victim, if you will, the 
complainant agreed.  I think [the respondent understood] needing to do 
something. It was definitely needing to do something. [a realization that] ‘oh my 
gosh, I’ve got to do something to show that I’m not like this by any stretch of the 
imagination.’  [The same person] has actually come in and conducted a workshop 
[for us].  (T4B25:15) 
 
For survivors who do not want to use a formal process or are not willing to participate, 
Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype often provide the complainant with control 
in ways that may undermine protections for the broader community.  One Coordinator described 
an example of relaxing the commitment to formality: 
[T]he complainant came to us…with some pretty strong concerns about 
retaliation…[so] we wrote a letter to the department…communicating her 
concerns and telling them, ‘[We] reserve the right to investigate at any point, but 
we think at this time it would make more sense for them to think of strategies to 
address her concerns internally.  (T3A19:30)   
 
One Ombuds noted referrals from the Title IX Coordinator in order to satisfy a complainant’s 
wishes:  “They realize that when things go to their office and they can’t file the grievance 
completely the way that a [complainant] would need, sometimes it comes as a problem [and they 
refer the case to me]” (O8A51:46).  Another Coordinator put it frankly: 
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The goal of the meeting is to give them their options and to hear if they made a 
decision about a complaint. What do they want to have happen? What views do 
they have at that moment?  (T8A39:52)   
 
Coordinators described providing complainants with control very similar to that provided by an 
Ombuds.  For example: 
Once I hear their story and I tell them what their options are… Ombuds or me, or 
if they want to deal with it on their own, because that’s always an option, or do 
they just want to drop it? They always have options.  Once they tell me where 
they want to go with it, because some of them are adamant about ‘no, I want to 
nail him to the wall, so you’re the person I want to talk to.’ I tell them ‘here’s the 
form’ because I never want them to make a decision in the heat of the moment. 
‘Here’s my…complaint form, my intake form.’  It has some basic questions: who 
are you and what’s your complaint. And I ask them to write out or type up their 
complaint, which requires them to go away, think about what they’ve said, what 
they want to do, and come back.  Sometimes I never see them again because once 
they put it in writing and they see it they change their minds. I also tell them ‘[I]t 
needs to be the truth. If I find out in my investigation or in the course of having a 
conversation with them that things are not quite right, that I reserve the right to 
report them back to student code of conduct for an illegal complaint.  
(T11A45:20)    
 
Granting the complainant this degree of control often comes at the expense of the university 
community, as the result is a failure to effectively document violations.  One Coordinator 
described not utilizing an intake form or recording the conversation, to the dismay of the general 
counsel:   
We have a complaint form, but I am… loathe to require that they complete it until 
we talk. And so because I’m also loathe to tape record, because it changes the 
tenor of a meeting when you put that thing between the two of you, and the 
general counsel and I have gone round and round on that issue.  (T12A47:22)   
 
The same Coordinator described why it is important not to require the complainant to complete 
an intake form:   
I was trained differently. If you have a potential victim, you don’t know their 
state. You make the process as easy for them as you can without cheating. Still, I 
do it for the other side too. I interviewed the young man or whoever it is, I take 
notes, we assume that they’re telling the truth until we hear otherwise. The same 
kind of thing. I just was not trained that way.  People like doing that. They really 
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enjoy the process and it’s very cathartic for them and all that. Or they’re just sort 
of Type A kind of people who like that sort of [formality, they] want this to be 
[an] official thing. That’s fine! But we don’t ever require it.  (T12B48:21) 
 
Other Coordinators, like Ombuds, engage in informal conversations that help complainants think 
through their options.  For example:  
[We might say] ‘you know, this probably doesn’t rise to the level of sexual 
harassment or violation of gender discrimination or anything  like that,’ but we 
can go through this process and we can investigate, but even assuming everything 
[is true]…it probably won’t be [a violation]. So let’s talk about what might be 
other interventions. Sometimes people want to talk about that. Sometimes people 
will just say ‘look, I just want this person stopped. I think I can handle it. What 
ways can I do that?’ They want to talk about strategies.  (T2A13:32) 
 
Another observed:   
 
A lot of times we’ll work [with] a complainant to say ‘your case is right on the 
line.’ Some are so egregious that we have to do a formal [investigation], but there 
are a lot of cases that are kind of right in the middle and then we’ll try to give the 
complainant some say. ‘Do you want to go through the formal process which is 
going to be lengthy and difficult or would you just as soon try to solve this 
informally, which will be much more quickly handled, but it’s not likely going to 
result in a policy violation.’  (T1B12:54)   
 
Yet another Coordinator sounds very much like an Ombuds: 
[M]y office I open to anybody, I’ll talk to anybody…very open, very informal in 
the first meeting trying to help guide people where they need to go. I’m a 
proactive person, I don’t respond well to having to react to stuff. I’d rather know 
what’s going on or suspect what’s going on, nip it in the bud, give people some 
tools they can use to help themselves and recognize when they should report and 
what they should report, than be caught unawares all the time.  (T11B46:24) 
 
An Ombuds noted the danger to survivors of engaging with formal offices in informal 
conversations: 
I suspect, I happen to believe that our [Title IX Coordinator] does a lot of that 
informal coaching when somebody doesn't want to file something. One 
distinction, one important distinction is that in the course of that conversation [is] 
if the visitor would say to me, ‘here's what he said to me.’  [The Title IX 
Coordinator] may be obligated…to respond to that…[T]hose are the sorts of 
behaviors that I [can] informally approach. Well, I…hear [what is going on there] 
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and leave [the Title IX Coordinator] in control of how…to proceed but [Title IX 
Coordinators] …[h]aving heard [certain things], may have to act… (O13B62:8) 
 
Further, Some Title IX Coordinators depart from the archetype because they see the 
formal process as too confrontational and thus harmful to survivors.  For example: 
You don’t know how it’s burdened [me]. I often see them right after, the day 
after. They’re traumatized. They cry…they [are often] furious at the panel.  
Furious.  [They say] everyone over there was incompetent, unfeeling… our 
process is so victim unfriendly.  (T12B48:13, 23, 19)  
 
The same Coordinator continued: 
[T]he part that makes [it] really difficult is that the…conduct hearing is very 
formal [and] the victim is expected to mount her own defense. She must call her 
own witnesses, she must question her own witnesses, she must answer questions 
from the panel. It’s very problematic, and I will tell you… [The conduct panel 
gives the complainant] X number of days to get their documentation in while [a 
complainant may be] grieving over the loss of her virginity and feeling frightened 
for her physical safety and all these things are going on. The dad [is] trying to 
help get the paperwork together and gather the names of the witnesses and get 
witness statements. There’s all these requirements... Here, we don’t even make 
you fill out a form. You come in, we take notes…I struggled when you said 
positive outcome because there’s not a young woman that’s been through this 
process that has not said to me ‘the process was worse than what happened to 
me.’ It is re-victimization. The one that went [to the next step] said ‘I don’t want 
money, I just don’t want another girl to have to go through this.’  (T12B48:5, 8, 
20)   
 
Title IX Coordinators who depart from formal processes often use mediation and further 
blur the line between formal and informal.  The decision to use mediation is motivated by a 
combination of the factors described above:  To best serve the institution, to help individual 
survivors or alleged perpetrators, and out of frustration with excessive formalism.  Thus, one 
Coordinator who described using mediation in “situations where both parties actually met 
because they wanted to go into full-fledged mediation, [and] that worked wonderfully well on a 
couple of occasions” (T4A24:33).  Another Coordinator described allowing “the complainant 
and respondent to choose to mediate their differences. We have definitely used that mechanism 
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at times” (T1A11:41).  While these examples illustrate how deviations from formality are done 
in order to help the survivor, other Coordinators described early settlement options as beneficial 
to the organization: “[Our process] has a remediation piece built into it as well, so that prior to 
even going into the full-fledged investigation, there’s an opportunity to resolve it at a preliminary 
stage” (T11A45:8).   Another Coordinator described a similar situation:    
So in the particular instance [there was touching but] the [respondent] said ‘I may 
have done that, but I in no way intended it to mean that.’ After questioning both 
parties I saw where we could resolve the matter through mediation. The matter 
was very positively resolved, resulting in a beautiful card being sent to me by the 
alleged perpetrator.  (T4B25:3) 
 
Other Coordinators described sometimes using mediation because their university had no 
Ombuds to offer a less-formal option.  For example, “At [a prior university] I would mediate, 
here I don’t… because we have an Ombuds here, [but] we didn’t [there]” (T11A45:58).   
Another reason for choosing  mediation is to allow thee Title IX Coordinator to gain 
control over the outcome or monitor the agreement.  For example:   
[W]e don’t [use mediation for Title IX] cases… but just recently I had a race case 
where I think it was more or less personality styles and things of that nature, so 
we didn’t find discrimination, but the person needed to work with this person to 
move forward, there was nobody else that they could effectively work with, they 
had to work together. And [the mediation] went well, they ended up shaking 
hands and we worked out a plan, we put it in writing, put it in both of their hands 
and said ‘okay, this is the road map that we’re going to use. If anybody departs 
from that you talk to me, give me a call’…[O]ne of the things I think oftentimes is 
when a third party’s involved, that person in the power position knows that they 
just can’t do anything, because somebody’s watching, [they think] ‘I’ve got to 
watch myself.’  (T13A49:47) 
 
In sum, Title IX Coordinators who depart from the archetype do so for a variety of 
reasons: to better serve survivors and alleged perpetrators, as a result of pressure to serve 
organizational interests in avoiding liability, and out of frustration with what they see as 
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excessive formalism.  In deviating from the formal model, Title IX Coordinators become more 
akin to Ombuds, whose archetype’s preference for informality is examined in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 8:  OMBUDS AND INFORMALITY 
 
Where the Title IX Coordinators’ archetype prescribes formalized processes, the 
Ombuds’ model is highly informal and flexible.  This chapter describes the Ombuds achetype’s 
preference for informality and examines Ombuds who depart and adhere to the model.  These 
adherences and departures occur along a spectrum, as some Ombuds or Title IX Coordinators 
may aptly be described as “adherers” or “deviators.”  Additionally, adherence or departure is 
often situational and context-specific as a Coordinator or Ombuds who goes by the book in one 
instance departs from their archetype in another.     
INFORMALITY AND THE OMBUDS ARCHETYPE  
 
The Ombuds archetype uses a process that is much less regimented than that used by the 
model Title IX Coordinator.  IOA Standard 4.1 describes the informal basis in which the 
Ombuds functions, including “listening, providing and receiving information, identifying and 
reframing issues, developing a range of responsible options, and – with permission and at the 
Ombudsman discretion—engaging in informal third-party intervention.” The IOA Best Practices 
(2009, p. 9) further expands on the ways that options may be individually tailored, with Ombuds 
options including third-party interventions like shuttle diplomacy, facilitating communication, 
and informal mediation.  Mediation is described as voluntary; it may or may not produce a 
written document.  Even if used, these written agreements should not be maintained by or within 
the Ombuds office. 
The Ombuds archetype celebrates the value of informal resolution that is separate from 
the university’s formal processes and draws a sharp boundary between the two types of process.  
IOA Standard 4.2 states that the Ombuds is an informal and off-the-record resource for pursuing 
resolution of concerns, examining procedural irregularities and identifying broader systemic 
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problems.  Informality relates closely with the impartiality and neutrality standard, as indicated 
by IOA Standard 4.3, which notes that the Ombuds does not mandate policies, formally 
adjudicate issues, or make binding decisions for the organization.  Illustrative of most Ombuds 
offices, The University of Kansas Ombuds Office’s Statement of Best Practices (2008) declares 
that the Ombuds “shall not have authority to adjudicate, impose remedies or sanctions, or to 
enforce or change policies or rules.”  The Charter of the Office of the Ombudsperson at 
Michigan State University notes the University Ombudsperson does not make policy, participate 
in the formal grievance process, or compel any individual to implement the University 
Ombudsperson’s recommendations (MSU, Charter, 2014).  IOA Standard 4.4 indicates that the 
Ombuds is a supplemental channel that does not replace formal channels.  The use of the office 
is voluntary and is not a required step in any policy or process.  IOA Standard 4.5 articulates the 
idea that the Ombuds does not participate in any adjudication or formal investigation, which 
should be conducted by others and to which the Ombuds will refer visitors when requested. 
Rowe (2012, p. 8) describes informality as the fourth pillar of Ombuds practice in 
addition to the standard emphases on independence, confidentiality, and impartiality. Although 
the importance of informality was recognized belatedly only long after the others, Rowe (2012) 
asserts that it is just as essential. Without it, an Ombuds practice “could not function in today’s 
legal climate…[as] many managers would find [Ombuds] to be interfering with their authority” 
(p. 8).    
So, what is informality? Rowe (2012, p. 11) discusses several meanings for informality, 
including not putting complaints in writing, conflict management without a written record, and 
having no management decision-making power.  Rowe also mentions the principle against the 
Ombuds serving as a witness or conducting investigations for the purpose of administrative 
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decision-making (2012, p. 11).  Sebok (2012) operationalizes the IOA Standard on Informality 
by explaining to visitors that he does not give legal advice nor does he: 
1) accept formal notice for the organization about a problem…2) arbitrate, 
adjudicate, or formally investigate complaints; 3) make official determinations 
for the organization about violations of rights, performance failures, or who was 
right or wrong in a given situation; 4) maintain written records on behalf of the 
organization; 5) participate in—let alone administer—formal procedures such as 
grievances, hearings, or disciplinary proceedings, or appeals; 6) sanction anyone; 
or 7) meet with people who do not want to meet with me.  (p. 38) 
 
The commitment to informality is inevitably in tension with the university’s more formal 
processes, and defenders of the Ombuds model try to defend its role in this increasingly 
formalized context. Referring specifically to sexual misconduct, Rowe (2012) notes that 
“managers may feel that they must immediately take control of the disputes that come to 
them…[and] [i]t has become harder for ordinary line and staff managers to permit employees 
with concerns to have a voice in deciding how to handle the concern” (p. 13).  Interest-based 
options are thus often formally structured “by and around the General Counsel’s office, HR, and 
other compliance offices” (Rowe, 2012, p. 13). Rowe (2012) argues for a spectrum of conflict 
management options as not all people are alike in how they pursue issues, and therefore “people 
need options—and organizations need options—for managing conflict” (p. 12).  Rowe (2012) 
points out that “there are employees and managers who heartily dislike formal channels,” cannot 
be persuaded to use them, and will not use them “even in the presence of illegal behavior” (p. 
13).  As a result, “if these people are to come forward timely with their concerns, and if their 
conflict is to be managed effectively within an organization, it will help to have a near-zero-
barrier office within the system” (Rowe 2012, p. 13).  In this way, Rowe argues that the Ombuds 
archetype can support the entire conflict management system by offering informal and formal 
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rights-based options and often helping the visitor determine whether or not they would benefit 
from a formal option (2012, p. 15). 
As the legal environment has changed, it increased the pressure in favor of formal versus 
informal mechanisms for resolution.  Effectively the question becomes, how do universities 
address the potential tension between these two mechanisms’ overlapping and potentially 
competing jurisdictions?  Where Ombuds view the informal channels of reporting as more likely 
to draw out complaints and thus are beneficial to the system as a whole, Title IX Coordinators 
view formal, mandatory and direct reporting requirements as necessary for discovering and then 
addressing sexual misconduct.  The standard Title IX Coordinator thus believes having informal 
processes alongside formal ones will expose the organization to liability and erode the legitimacy 
of the formal mechanisms. 
The archetypal Ombuds’s informal process differs considerably from a Title IX 
investigation.  First, the Ombuds model attempts to defuse situations before they become larger 
problems by informally helping individuals to think through their options, clarify their goals, and 
improve their communication.  The Ombuds archetype is not to tell people what to do but to 
endeavor to listen without judgment. The Ombuds archetype recommends providing information 
about the organization’s formal and informal processes but not getting involved in the formal 
process and instead are only working to informally resolve disputes. Under the “ideal” model, an 
Ombuds should not duplicate any of the formal services provided by the university but should 
provide a place for people to turn if they don’t know where to go. 
Second, the archetypal Ombuds’ standards require Ombuds to be impartial and not 
advocate for any individual or organization.  While impartiality for Title IX Coordinators is an 
ancillary value requiring compliance with Title IX law and avoiding conflicts of interest, for 
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Ombuds this concept is more fundamental.  For Ombuds, impartiality requires treating all 
visitors equally and not preferencing the organization’s objectives or any one person’s goals.  
 
While Ombuds are employed by the university and required to report to the president, 
they sit outside the formal administrative structure.  As a result they are impartial and not vested 
in the outcome of any issue.   This impartiality relates to informality as it requires sharp limits on 
their authority.  Ombuds may not have administrative power and are unable to change grades, 
sanction, punish, change policies, etc.   
Third, informality is related to confidentiality as the model Ombuds must provide 
confidentiality and anonymity to visitors, and must remain informal in not keeping records for 
use in formal processes.  The model Ombuds is thus a confidential resource for anyone with an 
issue both with and within the organization, including staff, faculty, or students.  The University 
Senate Rules and Regulations (USRR) at the University of Kansas specifically provide 
confidentiality as a power granted to the Ombuds Office:  “All proceedings in individual cases 
shall be held confidential by the Ombudsman unless otherwise authorized by the complainant” 
(University of Kansas, USRR, “Ombuds Office Powers”).  While the majority of Ombuds follow 
the IOA standards on the matter of confidentiality, not all universities have formal rules granting 
Ombuds offices the right to confidentiality.  Ombuds must provide confidentiality to individuals 
in order to retain the office’s informality and thus protect their institutions from legal notice. 
Fourth, in sharp contrast with Title IX Coordinators’ formal reporting requirements, the 
Ombuds archetype provides informal feedback to the organization on general trends or generic 
information about the types of issues brought to their attention. No specific information about 
any case is to be reported and any information shared must be done anonymously in order to 
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protect confidentiality.  Through feedback, improvements can be instituted, but any changes are 
not administered by the model Ombuds.  The University of Kansas Ombuds Office, as is typical 
for most Ombuds, is required to be available “to recommend procedural changes within the 
University…” (University of Kansas, USRR, “University Ombuds Office”) and to “at least 
annually make reports to the University community at large” (University of Kansas, USRR, 
“Ombuds Office Reports”).  Michigan State University’s Ombuds is also charged “with 
identifying MSU policies that might need revision” (MSU, Office of the University 
Ombudsperson).  The limited, informal feedback function of an Ombuds stands in sharp contrast 
with the formal reporting requirements of Title IX Coordinators.   
Howard (2011b) sees the Ombuds archetype as having many roles, including as “an 
institutional response to curb wrongdoing or unethical behavior, a facilitator of appropriate 
conduct by both individuals and the organization itself, and an agent for promoting systemic 
change where necessary” (pp. 80-81).  Long-time Columbia University Ombuds Marsha Wagner 
argues (2000, pp. 101-103) that Ombuds can best be described as change agents, and through 
their caseloads they effectively identify opportunities for preventive improvements.   Wagner 
notes “[i]t is not surprising that some Ombuds spend one-third or one-half of their time working 
on system change” (2000, p. 108).  Wagner also argues (2000, pp. 103-105) that Ombuds also 
serve an educational or a training function, educating individuals about policies and building 
capacity through conflict resolution trainings. 
Notably the University of Kansas Ombuds website, as is typical of most Ombuds offices,  
provides a list of things that an Ombuds does not do, including to advocate for specific 
outcomes, breach confidentiality, determine guilt or innocence, make binding or administrative 
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decisions, participate in formal grievance procedures, make university policy, maintain official 
records, or give legal advice  (University of Kansas, Ombuds Office, Not do). 
 Where the ideal Title IX Coordinator directs formal and timely investigations that 
provide for notice, due process, and other features common of formal processes, the model 
Ombuds uses flexible, informal processes that empower visitors in achieving their goals. Thus 
the sharpest area of distinction between the two models is that Ombuds operate informally and 
Title IX Coordinators operate formally.    
OMBUDS WHO ADHERE TO INFORMALITY IN PRACTICE 
 
Some Ombuds work hard to adhere to the archetype. Ombuds often described their 
preference for informal resolution.  For example:     
I’ve never seen anybody win their case. I don’t want to say that I deter people 
from that, what I do is I usually recommend that they talk to the [Title IX 
Coordinator] confidentially to get a feel for what that process might be like, and 
then decide if that’s something that they’ll want to do or if it’s something that I 
can help them out with.  So [formal dispute resolution mechanisms are] just kind 
of a system of frustration for students and staff and faculty to go through that, 
[and] I’ve never seen anything [be resolved to the visitor’s satisfaction].  
[T]here’s a saying that in order for a tenured faculty member to have any kind of 
consequences for their behavior they have to not just be sleeping with a student, 
but the student has to be dead at the time. It’s a horrible saying, but [at some 
organizations] it’s true. Something has to be that bad and that documented and 
that obvious for something to go through the processes for the claimant to see a 
positive outcome, an outcome in their favor.  (O8A51:40-53) 
 
S/he continued: 
 
At this school [the Title IX office has] a very black and white approach with the 
law…they [are] very thoughtful on the initial intake and ask all the right 
questions, and I believe [they]…tell people up front that you can put in a 
complaint, but we don’t know what the outcome will be.  But I don’t think the 
[visitor] understands, they feel so strongly that they’re in the right, that they’ve 
been harmed in some way, that they feel willing to take the chance, but [they are 
not ready for] the consequence of getting one of those letters that says, we did our 
investigation[and we found against you]. In my experience…[the outcome is] 
always in favor of whoever was in a position of power, and their job was to 
protect the organization. I think there’s a little of a bias there. You can’t say that 
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about every campus, in other places…they would refer things over to an Ombuds 
[if it wasn’t right for the formal process].  (O8B52:26) 
 
Other Ombuds expressed a preference for informal resolution because it provides visitors with 
control:   
We want to give you the power to decide how you want to resolve this without it 
being given to someone outside of you and the other party like a formalized 
process or a legal process, we can create the environment to have that 
conversation that you haven’t had and you need to have.  (O1A8:16) 
 
Many Ombuds described informal resolution as a way of avoiding the negative effects of 
retaliation.  For example: 
I think if people can handle things at the lowest possible level, that’s great. And 
usually relationships can be enhanced or at least protected and issues can get 
resolved and people [can] move on. But sometimes especially when there is 
power involved in the differences between party A and party B there is always 
that risk of retaliation.  (O2B18:52) 
 
Another Ombuds echoed this view: 
 
[R]acial [or] sexual harassment [disputes are] so hard to prove, and if they do go 
through the [formal] process it’s so adversarial, it’s such a predicament. 
Especially if it’s a student or an entry level staff member where there’s a bit 
power difference between them and the person who might be giving them a grade 
or being their supervisor. There’s so many indirect ways to retaliate, it just sets 
them up for failure. So I think other means are better.  (O8A51:44) 
 
Other Ombuds described informal options as a way to handle more complex issues, for example: 
 
You know, it’s really rare that cases come in that just have one narrowly defined 
issue, and I think that’s why people choose an Ombuds office over just going 
directly to [a formal office] because there’s many things going on [that may 
have]... a larger cultural and organizational component to it.  (O8B52:10) 
 
Another benefit of informal options noted by Ombuds was the greater likelihood of people 
coming forward. Thus, one observed, 
[O]f course we always want informal options and one of the roles of this place is 
advocating for informal options and policies. We want that to happen because we 
know from experience the people are more likely to address their situations if they 
know there is an informal option.  (O14B64:44) 
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Another Ombuds echoed this view: 
 
Many of the people who come to me to talk about sexual harassment or racial 
discrimination come to me first and foremost for a reality check. “This happened 
to me. It feels like that. Does that make sense? Is that rational? Do you think 
someone else to whom this had occurred might feel that way?” Those are what 
draw people here, and if they have to compromise their confidentiality and 
provide notice and kick in all those formal things, just to get those questions 
answered, they’re not going to come. They want a safe place to come and discuss 
first, to use the words that some of them use: “Am I crazy, or is this sexual 
harassment?” And then a safe and trusted place to come to say “Ok, if I wanted to 
do something about it, what are the kinds of things I might consider doing?” 
Without obligating themselves to do any of them. And those are two functions 
that we as ombudsmen can perform only because we are not agents of notice and 
we are confidential.  (O10A55:31) 
 
In providing an informal mechanism for resolution, Ombuds who adhere to the 
archetype say they value providing their visitors with an opportunity for voice and 
expression.  Thus, one noted: 
I want for [visitors] to feel safe, first and foremost…I let them drive the course of 
the conversation and the pace.  I provide them with a little information about the 
office and just listen.  [I] [a]sk some questions, I don’t take notes.  I just listen. 
(O8A51:26) 
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype also assist visitors by providing or facilitating access to 
information.  Thus, one noted: 
I will, while the person is here, sometimes call to clarify a policy or procedure if 
I’m unclear about it and can’t find it on paper or online. I might call a department 
secretary and say “is it your office that people need to go to start this particular 
process?” But that would be the extent of the kind of follow up I typically would 
engage in…  (O10A55:20-23) 
 
Another Ombuds distinguished their information gathering from investigation: 
 
It might sound like it's investigation work but it's very informal inquiries that are 
really pre-emptive types of information. In other words, someone's not, someone 
might decide to file a formal complaint if they knew such and such was the case 
and “I suspect such and such is the case but I don't want to file a complaint if I 
might be wrong about that but is these are a way you could look into that. It’d be 
real easy for an Ombudsman to walk into this office and figure out whether if this 
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grant got submitted because it was plagiarized, if it was and if it is then I'm going 
to file a formal complaint, if you could find out that information for me. 
(O13A61:38) 
 
Another observed: 
[Visitors] come to me also because they know I tell them the truth, and the 
perception on campus is that formal offices won’t tell anyone what their rights 
are… and I don’t think, unfortunately, this is unique among campuses or 
workplaces. So there aren’t a whole lot of places to come.  (O10B56:9) 
 
In addition to providing information, Ombuds who adhere to the archetype also help 
visitors think through their options. Thus, one explained: 
Sometimes people come in for coaching, They want to have a difficult 
conversation with someone ‘well, how do I do that?’ So we look at what their 
conflict resolution strategies are, I give them some tips on how to communicate 
differently, do some reframing. We talk about how time and place are important 
to where they meet.  Sometimes things are more educational.  (O8A51:37) 
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype provide visitors with both formal and informal options, as 
indicated by an Ombuds: 
[W]e do listen to sexual harassment complaints, but we always try, if we think 
there is any legitimacy to them, even if we don’t think there is, we offer the option 
of walking those people to the [formal] office.  (O9A53:16) 
 
Another Ombuds echoed this view: 
 
[W]hen people come to see me, as is the case with most, in my opinion, good 
Ombuds… they are given their full range of options from informal to more 
formal. They are encouraged to begin with the least formal options and progress 
to the more formal options only as the less formal options fail to resolve their 
concerns.  (O10B56:12) 
 
She/he went on: 
 
I always start with the less formal ones. We talk about ways…[to] respond…and 
try to work it out in a way that minimized the chances of retaliation and see if that 
might work. I’ve even role-played with people where I’ve played the other party 
and given them words to use and approaches to make and to attempt to see if they 
can work it out directly with the individual to some amenable and acceptable end.  
Another option would be…to talk with [someone]…who might intervene on [the 
person’s] behalf…[and] perhaps…help protect [the person] against retaliation.  
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Another option would be to go to the program head or department chair to discuss 
concerns and request intervention, another option would be to go to [a] dean to 
request intervention and discuss other options. Another [option] would be to go to 
a person outside [the] academic chain of command, [in a student advocacy role] 
who might be willing to go with her or on her behalf, [these are] other kinds of 
informal options that we discussed before we talk about more formal options. 
(O10B56:21) 
 
Another observed: 
 
[T]he process is not nearly as linear as one might think…[F]irst I listen and then 
we talk about options, or we identify their goals and then we talk about options. 
And yes, that is the ground I'm trying to cover but it's not necessarily in [a] linear 
fashion. As a matter of fact, once we get into talking about options, sometimes we 
then sort of circle back to what are really your goals? Sometimes when we start 
talking about options, it becomes apparent that things they had presented or at 
least my impression of what their goals were [are] incomplete or sometimes even 
inaccurate. And other times we could just proceed ahead that way because it's 
very clear. So just the conversation does cover that ground and sometimes in a 
somewhat linear fashion, sometimes in a [way that it] kind of circles back. 
(O2A17:34) 
 
Other Ombuds who adhere to the archetype help visitors to see all sides of the situation, 
as discussed by an Ombuds: 
During these meetings I’m listening usually for what it is they really want. What 
they really think happened. I’m looking for hidden agendas. I’m thinking about 
what might have happened that’s different from what they perceived happened. 
I’m thinking how I can ask questions that might help them entertain the 
possibility that what they think happened and why they think it happened might 
not be the only explanation.  (O9A53:34) 
 
Ultimately Ombuds who follow the archetype help visitors to make decisions about what they 
want to do.  An Ombuds explained: 
[T]here are times when students say ‘I can’t talk to my professor about this 
because of retaliation.’ Similarly I’ve had faculty members say ‘I don’t want to 
address this issue with another faculty member or with my department chair or 
with a student’ for that same reason. Many times if it’s a student saying ‘I think 
the faculty member will retaliate against me if I bring this issue up’ I might ask 
the student ‘If it is possible to live with it for the rest of the semester and then at 
the end of the semester if there’s some perception that they didn’t treat you fairly, 
we can pursue the remedies then.’ It’s all about what they feel most comfortable 
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with…I’m not going to force anybody to do anything they don’t want to do. 
(O3A21:42) 
 
Ombuds who follow the standards of practice strictly avoid participating in formal 
processes: 
[D]espite what we say to people when they come in to see us and what we put in 
our literature, our website, our brochure and all that about not having the power to 
make changes, people don't expect that. They come in thinking that we're more 
like a judge than an Ombuds and we're going to determine who’s right or wrong, 
we're going to do an investigation and we're going to make a finding. 
(O14B64:54) 
 
An Ombuds explained why participation in formal processes is inappropriate: 
I used to go to hearings as a neutral non-participating observer. People 
would say ‘[T]here are going to be three or four people on the other side 
of the table and I’m all alone[at the disciplinary hearing], will you come 
along just so I have someone there?  I used to go, and say ‘As the 
Ombudsman I am a neutral party. My presence here should not be 
construed as support to any particular person or position in this matter.’ I 
was out at one such employee hearing and I stood up to say my 
introduction and before I could even finish, the hearing officer told me to 
‘shut up and sit down, we know who you’re here for!’ I was stunned. I 
shut up and sat down, it was his hearing. But I never went to another 
hearing because it occurred to me, that what stunned me was of course, the 
assumption’s going to be made that it was the employee who asked me to 
go there and that I am there in support, at least morally, of that employee.  
[First] that’s not going to be perceived as neutral, [second] It was 
wrong…the perceptions engendered from such activities are very risky 
when it comes to the standards of practice…and I quit doing it. 
(O10A55:25) 
 
 
Another Ombuds described the range of activities in which an Ombuds will not participate: 
 
If let's say, a student does file a formal grievance against someone but wants me to sit in 
on a meeting. I would not do sit with the person or go to any office if the formal 
procedures are already taking place or involve a formal disciplinary process.  Anything 
like that. Or if a visitor has an attorney, anything like that I would not get involved in nor 
would I want to be a witness to any of those communications. I just play it safe. 
(O12A59:14) 
Still, some Ombuds are willing to speak with the individual who is involved in a formal process, 
as indicated by one Ombuds’s conversation with a visitor:  “Although I'll talk to you anytime 
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about, you know, how to manage your end of what you're going through, I can't really intervene 
or anything like that or help with any type of negotiation, as you’re already in this formal 
process” (O13B62:45).    
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype do not collect or keep records for the institution.  
Here an Ombuds described how they handle paperwork:   
It does no good when somebody comes in and prepares to hand you a half inch 
stack of papers. And occasionally, not as much for documentation [purposes], but 
because I want to hear it more out of their mouth than I do on a piece of paper, 
occasionally I will take the paper, do a quick once over, in terms of affirming 
them as this does have meaning for them, and yes this may have meaning for 
others, when in reality it has very little meaning for me. And so I don’t like 
spending time paperwork and on that kind of stuff because for the purpose of 
resolving it, it’s not going to get us where we need to go.  (O11B58:3) 
 
Nor do Ombuds who adhere to the archetype maintain records about their visitors.  For example, 
an Ombuds noted, “We actually do have an intake form. We destroy it after the case is over” 
(O2A17:29).  Another Ombuds described a similar practice: 
[O]ne of the reasons behind my practices around record keeping is that I don’t 
want to become a witness in litigation, so I don’t keep the names of people, I 
don’t keep any documentation, I’ll keep it as long as I’m working on a matter but 
as soon as it ends I shred anything. And I tell people I’m not going to keep 
records. There are places around the university that are repositories of records, 
we’re not one of them, there’s no reason for us to duplicate things.  (O7A37:25) 
 
Ombuds who adhere to the archetype argue Ombuds help potential visitors understand 
the benefits of invoking the more formal Title IX process.  This view is best expressed by an 
Ombuds: 
[A]t first she wasn’t going to report it at all, ever. And I think, had it not been for 
us discussing it, I think she ended up bringing that sexual harassment complaint 
forward, and would not have otherwise had she not talked to me. So, I think that’s 
a good example of how the Ombuds office can also encourage people to come 
forward because it’s confidential, but at the same time, a lot of times that gives 
them enough time to think about it and sort out their thoughts and make a decision 
for themselves, and so it eventually does get reported. So I do think the Ombuds 
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office plays a role even though we’re an informal office, that eventually it often 
does lead people to report things to a formal channel.  (O12B60:8) 
One of the major questions for practicing Ombuds is what constitutes acceptable 
interventions on behalf of a visitor?  At what point does an intervention take on more formal 
attributes of advocacy?  An Ombuds noted the risk of contacting individuals on a visitor’s case:  
I rarely, in less than one percent of cases, will contact someone, and here is why: 
the act of contacting someone on campus on behalf on a consultee, it inevitably 
engenders a perception of advocacy, and/or constitutes legally an investigation. 
And neither of those is consistent with the standards of practice of our profession 
(O10A55:20-23) 
 
Other Ombuds see each person they speak with as another “visitor,” for example: 
If they feel they can approach the professor, we'll talk about that, we'll talk about 
strategies, like I said I do coaching. If they have a good reason for not wanting to 
talk with the professor then we talk about that option. And let's say I do get 
permission and the student wants me to call the professor. Okay, when that 
happens I call those secondary contacts, okay. They’re not the first contact, 
they’re not the visitor who came to see me.   So they're secondary, they're the 
person I've been given permission to speak with. When I call that person up, I 
give them the same spiel because I'm a neutral, confidential resource for that 
person as well as the person who came to see me. S o I will say something like ‘I 
have permission from the student to talk with you, I'm calling’ and I then I give 
my spiel and I'll say, ‘Because we are impartial, I'm calling to get your 
perspective’ and then towards the end I'll say ‘Is there anything about this 
conversation that you do not want me to relay back to the student.’ So, then I 
make it clear that I'm not taking sides and that I’m calling to get their perspective. 
(O12A59:45) 
 
Many Ombuds have significant mediation skills, and Ombuds who follow the archetype 
often use those skills to informally facilitate such conversations as long as the discussion is 
voluntary and no record is created. An Ombuds observed: 
I have had situations when [visitors] come to talk and I'm there to just facilitate. 
Both parties have to agree… I reiterate that it’s voluntary and that if one party 
doesn't want to do it then we won't do it.  I try not to be a witness to certain kinds 
of communications, so [it] kind of depends on the issue. But if it is a plausible 
thing to do and if I think it would be beneficial to the parties and the parties agree 
then certainly I will facilitate the conversation.  (O12A59:13) 
Another Ombuds described formal mediation: 
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From my perspective it is the perception of the members of my community that 
mediation is a formal process. Any mediation that occurs without the uncoerced 
participation of all parties is unethical. So for a judge to mandate mediation is 
grossly unethical, and for the mediator to mediate [a mandated mediation] is 
grossly unethical from my professional organization’s viewpoint.  Because the 
parties did not come to the mediation without being coerced and intimidated into 
participating. Furthermore, their participation style and [the] content [of the 
discussion], once they get there, will be necessarily influenced by that coercion. 
The general public, I believe, in our society and certainly in my institutional 
community, believe that a mediator will not be only facilitative or transformative, 
but will essentially border on arbitration. [They] [w]ill further administrate the 
settlement by developing and signing with the participants a legally binding 
formal document at the end of the session and every single thing I’m listing is 
unethical for an Ombuds...I will be glad to facilitate conversations among people, 
but I will not do formal mediation in which a written agreement is an outcome 
and in which I might be called upon later to be a witness as to what occurred in 
that agreement.  (O10A55:30-15) 
 
He/she continued: 
 
[I]f you want formal mediation on our campus [you can go other places].  But if 
what you really want is to have a meaningful and facilitative conversation with 
someone so that you can come to some common ground, then sure, we’ll be glad 
to provide that service for you. And I make that distinction very carefully and 
very definitively on my campus and in my literature.  (O10A55:16) 
 
An Ombuds echoed: 
 
To someone else, it might look like…mediation, but I usually use another term 
like a “facilitated conversation,” although the process may very much look like a 
mediation.  So to give you – maybe a visitor comes to the office and it's like 
"Hey, I'm having this conflict with a peer, would you be willing to mediate 
between us?" and my practice in that would be, talk about other options, a way of 
addressing the problem too. And if it looks like, “Yeah, it’d really be helpful if 
you kind of served as a mediator” then I would want to contact the other person or 
have that person contact the other person, but ultimately I'd want to have a private 
conversation with the other party and make sure that's voluntary.  I wouldn't refer 
to it as mediation.  I'd refer that as a facilitated conversation that may or may not 
lead to an agreement of some kind between the parties.  (O13A61:39) 
Another observed: 
 
I don’t know if you hear this from other Ombuds but my campus is not very 
friendly to mediation…People don’t like the word mediation. Hardly ever do we 
have someone call to say ‘I really want a mediation with someone.’ I don’t know 
if this is typical…but I’ve been really surprised by it. And I tried in many 
ways…very few people have taken up on my offer in my [time] here. It’s really 
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strange! I don’t even use the word mediation much anymore. I call it a “facilitated 
conversation.” [I’m] just sanitizing the word. It’s very odd.  (O14A63:66) 
Regarding records of a mediation, an Ombuds observed: 
 
Yeah. I do some mediation. I know Ombuds have different feelings on this. I call 
them very informal mediations.  I don’t keep any records here, but I do follow a 
similar format.  What I do if I’m going to take some kind of agreement notes for 
them is write them up on a big white board or a giant sticky on the wall that they 
can then take with them, because I don’t keep any records here. I let them know 
that at the beginning. I keep notepads on the table for them so if they want to take 
notes for themselves, they take them as well.  (O8A51:50) 
 
Some Ombuds will even facilitate conversations using themselves as the go-between, as an 
Ombuds observed:  “I have on a number of occasions, mediated, and I will shuttle back and forth 
if they don’t want to meet together but give me permission to do it” (O3A21:44).   
In sum, although Ombuds face considerable pressures to relax their commitment to 
informal processes many Ombuds remain principled in their commitment to informality. 
OMBUDS WHO DEPART FROM INFORMALITY 
 
Ombuds who depart from the archetype do so along a spectrum and slide toward 
formality in various ways.  Ombuds first depart from the archetype by mimicking more formal 
processes such as conducting investigations and enforcing policies in ways that are much more 
akin to formal process.  For example, an Ombuds described their initial conversation with a 
visitor: 
I explain my role at the institution and what is the process that I take. I also tell 
them, they have the ability to say “use my name, don’t use my name” and “I want 
you to investigate this case for me.  (O6A34:32) 
 
Another described pursuing a quasi-formal escalation of steps: 
I will try to get the person’s permission to take it forward and if I get that 
permission we’ll try to talk to the offending person and see if there was a mistake 
made and if they want to correct [it]. And if they don’t want to correct that and we 
think that it was a violation of policy and we give them an opportunity to make it 
right and they don’t, then we’ll probably go onto their supervisor and [we] will 
work our way up the chain.  (O9A53:43) 
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Ombuds also violated the archetype by utilizing formal mediation processes.  For example, an 
Ombuds differentiated formal from informal mediations: 
If [visitors] want to have a conversation we’ll try to get the parties around the 
table and talk about it. Sometimes we do it very informally and other times I’ll try 
to make it more formal if I think we’re going to need a written 
agreement…[Those are for] problem[s] that could blow up bigger down the road 
[where] I might make it a more formal mediation.  (O9A53:45) 
 
In addition to resulting in a written agreement or other documentation requiring enforcement, 
formal mediations were also described by Ombuds as not being entirely voluntary and being a 
part of a disciplinary process: 
[I]f I get a referral from the [student disciplinary office] and as part of their 
sanctions [the students are] asked to come over and consider mediation.  I can’t 
require them once they get here because it’s voluntary, but if [it is] part of their 
sanction they say ‘yes, we’re willing to have a mediated discussion’ then I’ll have 
them find a confidentiality agreement and put their resolutions on a mediation 
form, and then they send that back to whoever sent them over saying that the 
sanction was fulfilled.  [B]ut I don’t keep those records here. (O8A51:50) 
 
Other Ombuds described utilizing formal mediation processes that caused conflicts with other 
formal offices. For example: 
I mediated several faculty/student disputes and I would have the department head, 
the faculty person, and the student and myself, sometimes we would have an 
additional advocate there. We would conduct a mediation session. Now the 
faculty, several times when I did that the faculty got very irritated and called their 
faculty issued rep on me…[but] I stuck to my guns…because I hadn’t don’t 
anything outside of my purview.  (O5A28:39) 
 
In other instances, the growing legalization of formal processes increases the pressure to use 
more informal processes.  In some universities, the top administration or the Title IX Coordinator 
use the Ombuds to avoid litigation or liability, placing additional pressure on Ombuds’ 
informality.  An Ombuds described such a situation: 
And legal wanted me to deal with [the individual] because I could have 
conversations about what it is [the person] wanted out of all of this that legal 
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couldn’t have.  Our lawyer…didn’t want to have to talk to [the other person’s] 
lawyer, and if they could resolve it informally and come to an amount that would 
be an easier route.  [After going back and forth] I think we would have agreed on 
the money…but [the school] was not going to admit liability…[and] eventually 
the situation went back to the lawyers. (O9B54:32) 
 
In such situations, mediation effectively becomes a part of a formal process. For example, an 
Ombuds described mediating at the Title IX Coordinator’s request: 
The Title IX Coordinator referred them to the Ombuds Office for help in 
mediating a resolution. They understood that our role was a confidential one, that 
we would not be the keeper of any mediation agreement, we certainly would not 
be the enforcer of one. But they also set things up in such a way that, and I 
confirmed this with both parties, if they were able to reach some agreement in the 
Ombuds Office about how they were going to deal with each other in the future, 
that agreement would be given to the Title IX office in addition to [being a 
document held by each of] the individual parties.  Although, if there was an 
agreement in writing and signed and dated between the two parties [where] either 
of them later perceived [there] to be [a] violat[ation], [the Title IX Coordinator 
would be] in a better position to [use the agreement] and call them in and 
investigate.  (O2B18:28) 
 
An Ombuds described visitors who have recognized this relationship between the formal and 
informal, and have threatened filing formal actions as a mechanism for “getting to the table.”  
For example: 
[R]arely…will [visitors] come and say to you, ‘I've been discriminated against 
and I want to talk about…what options I have available to me to stop this 
harassment.’ It's rarely like that. It's usually far more subtle in my experience… 
where someone [says] “Hey, I don't like the treatment. I don't like the scene, kind 
of my work environment and I suspect it might have something to do with the fact 
of my race or my gender or my age or whatever it might be.  I could file a 
complaint, I'd consider filing a complaint.’  [M]any times it seems that [formally 
complaining] would be a means to get the flashlight put on [the] situation, but 
would it get [the visitor] what [they] want? What [they] want is [the] behavior to 
stop or [to] be treated more respectfully or be treated with more autonomy… and 
…sometimes, not always, …the filing of the complaint is a way to get the venue. 
Does that make sense, a way to get to the table.  (O13B62:8) 
 
Ombuds also described how the informal mechanism often leads to the formal process.  For 
example: 
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[O]mbuds offices…encourage people to come forward because it’s confidential, 
but at the same time, a lot of times that gives them enough time to think about it 
and sort out their thoughts and make a decision for themselves, and so it 
eventually does get reported.  So I do think the Ombuds office plays a role even 
though we’re an informal office, that eventually it does lead people to report 
things to a formal channel.  (O12B60:8) 
 
In these examples the informal mechanism shades towards formalism and may 
even become an extension of the formal process. 
Ombuds also depart from the informal archetype by violating confidentiality in ways that 
make the Ombuds a part of the formal process.  As indicated in chapter five, Ombuds who depart 
from the archetype maintain or create records that can be used in formal processes.  Ombuds 
tend to do so by formalizing their processes with waivers and intake forms and by using e-mail 
to communicate with visitors.  For example: 
Sometimes students will waive their right to confidentiality, and I have them sign 
a specific waiver for that that says they allow me and permit to speak to person X 
and Y, sometimes it’s as specific as a name, I can speak to that person and that 
person alone. Sometimes they don’t know, they just say ‘anyone over in the 
department,’ or ‘anyone you need to [in order] to fix this.’ So I’m willing to sort 
of work with that if they do offer that kind of permission.  (O4A22:21) 
 
Another Ombuds stated: 
 
There is a formal intake process. The student…comes to my office and [fills out] 
intake forms…. Basically their basic information. We…ask them what the [type] 
of complaint [it is], academic, judicial, which department, which faculty person, 
was it personal, was it a hostile evasion…we have many things for them to fill in 
(O5A28:24) 
 
Another Ombuds described a system of keeping records of problems that are identified and then 
resolved: 
There’s no pressure on me [to take something to a formal office if it smells of 
harassment or discrimination], however there’s simply the traditional internal 
motivation that if I see a trend, if I see more than a couple people coming forward 
regarding the same person and/or concern, then at that point in time that’s where I 
need… in fact, on my Access form on my computer I’ve got two check-off points. 
One’s called system’s identified, and the second one is systems actioned. And so 
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this gets back to your original question about do you ever do reports, and my 
answer is I don’t necessarily do reports as opposed to alerts, and so occasionally 
when more than one student comes in to me with the same issue, that’s where the 
systems identified thing gets checked off on the Access form, and when there’s 
been some types of action on my part, that’s when we move to the second check 
off.  (O11A57:37) 
 
Ombuds also deviate from the archetypal model’s informality in violating confidentiality 
by serving as notice to the institution.  Ombuds currently or previously holding a second 
organizational role may receive notice on the organization’s behalf: 
[W]hen I became the Ombuds…some of the roles that I had as [D]ean of 
students…carried over to the Ombuds role…[and so] the biggest misconception is that 
the Ombuds is the dean of students.  (O5A28:39-42-43) 
 
Other offices either serve as mandatory reporters and do not have the authority to informally help 
visitors with issues of sexual misconduct, or do have the authority, but nonetheless funnel 
visitors into the formal process: 
We’re not [mandated to send cases there…[but] as sexual harassment or 
discrimination [is one of the] protected categories, we can’t do anything but just 
listen because we have two specific offices that are mandated to look into those 
matters once it’s brought to their attention…. What we will tell them is if it’s 
happening, it needs to be corrected.  Unfortunately, our office is not set up to be 
an advocate or supporter of this matter being looked into and corrected. So now 
what we can do is we can listen and be empathetic to validate how you’re feeling.  
Beyond that, in order for the problem to be looked into and/or changed and 
corrected, we can’t do anything. So we have to refer them, that’s a major function 
of our office, is to refer them to the appropriate office once we’re clear on what 
the issue is.  (O1A8:68; O1B9:57) 
 
In fact, there is growing pressure on Ombuds to act as mandatory reporters to the 
university, something that fundamentally violates the archetypal model.  An Ombuds observed: 
[T]here are offices that have been told that they have to report. That's the 
nightmare. I am willing to live with [it]. If this is an area that there is no informal 
option, we can still be helpful to someone who’s experienced sexual harassment. 
We can give them all the information…we can support them in all sorts of 
different ways. We just can't [go beyond that]…without asking permission from 
the [Title IX Coordinator]….[W]e have to give [the Title IX Coordinator] a 
description of [the] situation.  We don’t have to give names or identifying 
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information but we [can] just say, ‘Here is the situation, would you be 
comfortable if we try to resolve it informally?’  It does put limitations [on the 
office] but frankly given the alternatives, that's fine.  (O14B64:37-29-30) 
 
I asked the Ombuds who made this observation whether asking permission from the Title IX 
Coordinator puts that official on notice of a potential violation, which may trigger an 
investigation. S/he responded: 
No, no. Because I would not call with any detailed information, I would make, 
that's one of the functions of our office is to make these hypothetical calls. So I 
would call, I would have called [the Coordinator] up to say, "What would you 
think about a situation like this?"  And I would sanitize the description 
sufficiently so that there would be no way of…knowing who had come to my 
office and then [the Coordinator] would give the answer, then I would say, 
"Thanks" and I would talk to my visitor and say, “This is not a situation that I can 
help resolve informally, here are your other options.  (O14B64:35-36) 
 
The Ombuds then described having hypothetical conversations with the Title IX Coordinator 
about whether a situation might be handled through informal means.  The visitor agreed to meet 
with the Title IX Coordinator with the Ombuds present to talk about formal versus informal 
resolution options.  The Ombuds described talking with the visitor prior to that meeting and the 
outcome of the situation: 
I told [the visitor]... ‘[The Title IX Coordinator is] not guarantee[ing] an informal 
resolution. No one could do that and the best guess [of the Coordinator]…hearing 
my hypothetical about the situation was that…there is a reasonable chance that 
[the situation] could be handled informally.’ So [the visitor] knew there was a risk 
[and] we discussed this over the course of [a number of] weeks because [the 
visitor] was very, very leery about going forward... If someone can't move on 
from a bad experience then I feel like it [is an Ombuds’s] role to help [the visitor] 
figure out what they need to do so they can move on, and [this visitor] couldn’t let 
it go.  You know, lots of tears and it was really affecting [the person’s] health…to 
[the] point where [the visitor] was willing to take the risk of talking to people who 
could do something about the situation. [We met with the Title IX Coordinator 
and after hearing the situation] they told the visitor that a formal process would be 
required, because of the severity of the situation.  It’s really hard.  (O14B64:10) 
 
Often Title IX Coordinators create standard mechanisms for routinely sharing 
information about cases.  These mechanisms require Ombuds to violate the archetype’s 
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confidentiality and to thus take part in formal processes.  For example, a Coordinator 
described meetings with campus officials, including the Ombuds, to discuss cases: 
We do [interact with the Ombuds].  We try to keep them informed and in the loop 
with many of the initiatives that we’re doing on campus. Their role is very unique 
in that they see themselves as kind of a sounding board for individuals that are 
having concerns. Generally they will direct them in the appropriate direction in 
terms of where they may seek support or health or file a complaint or what have 
you, so we have a very good working relationship. We have periodic meetings 
with general counsel, [Diversity], my office, human resources, Ombuds … just to 
go around the room and talk about what’s going on, cases in a general sense, just 
kind of bounce things off just so we’re in the loop on what’s going on.  They do 
share some information if they think there’s some issues or some things that may 
be bubbling up that we may need to pay attention to, they certainly share that kind 
of information…  (T13A49:15) 
 
As another Ombuds noted, mandatory reporting represents a violation of the archetypal model: 
 
I know some Ombuds offices have to report sexual harassment but to me that's 
against the standards of practice and what's the point of having an Ombuds office 
if it's going to be treated like a formal office...so I honestly would resign in protest 
if I had to do something like that.  (O12A59:28-29) 
 
Third, Ombuds depart from the archetype by collaborating with Title IX Coordinators in 
ways that make the Ombuds part of the formal process.  For example, an Ombuds observed, 
[I]f you work with [formal] offices early on, they can [call it] informal fact 
finding and it doesn’t look like it fits into their process, [but] how can we work 
together to say ‘is this someone who you’ve made claims of before? Give me 
some very general information.’ [The Title IX C Coordinator] do[es] have some 
security [to maintain], but I’ve always been able to… work back and forth…[and] 
find ways to direct each other to get the information that we need, if it’s 
something we feel we can’t share. That’s when the offices work best, is when they 
work together  (O8A51:46) 
 
Another Ombuds likewise described how formal and informal offices can work together: 
 
If one office keeps records and one doesn’t, sometimes me sharing what is 
happening on a case and linking it to earlier cases will not have an effect.  It’s 
important for them to keep the records, but it’s important for us to piece things 
together for them sometimes.  (O8B52:23) 
 
Another Ombuds echoed: 
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[I see it as a] triangulation, when multiple people have reported to me… I [start 
to] see the same thing from a few different perspectives, I’ll begin to believe that 
there might be something going on, and I might say to a department chair, ‘[Y]ou 
know, I don’t know that this is really true, but you might want to sensitize 
yourself to this, there might be something out there…Any time I’ve dealt with 
[sexual misconduct] I’ve worked to get [the individual] to the [Title IX 
Coordinator] and file a complaint.  (O3A21:21) 
 
Yet another Ombuds described working collaboratively with the Title IX Coordinator: 
The Title IX Coordinator is an attorney…[who] takes a very legalistic approach… 
[and] is not one of the people that I can go to and say ‘have you been hearing 
things about [this] department? What’s going on over there? Have we got a 
faculty member losing it over there? Do we need as an institution to think about 
stepping in and doing something over there? Would it help if I went and talked 
with the chair or you went and talked with the chair?’  [There are a few staff 
members in these offices] with whom I have a relationship like that…[but their 
bosses] don’t know it. [The staff] trust me and know that I won’t out them and 
need my input, because what’s happening in the classroom is very useful for 
[them], who then based on what I have heard from students about this faculty 
member [can take action].  (O10A55:28) 
 
Often the lines between formal and informal processes are blurred.  An Ombuds 
described expectations regarding resolving cases and frustration at not having the cooperation of 
formal offices. 
I talked to the president [and said] I wanted to file a complaint [against the formal 
office] because…the president was really concerned about the length of time it 
took our office to resolve an issue…it would take sometimes two or three weeks 
to have a situation come to closure and [the president] thought that was an 
awful[ly] long time.  Well, I told [the president] that sometimes people don’t want 
to cooperate, and this was a classic example, for me, about resistance from 
another office in terms of [my office accessing records and] resolving issues. So 
that’s why I said I wanted to file a complaint against this particular department. 
(O5B29:13) 
 
This view, of course, conflicts with an Ombuds’s preference to only provide anonymous 
information that will maintain confidentiality.  Consider an Ombuds’s reaction to precisely this 
expectation:  
The Director of our [Title IX] office is an attorney [and]…wants just the facts, 
[and tells me] ‘I can’t single out…three departments. If they ask me how come 
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they got singled out, what am I going to say? ‘Either we give training to the whole 
campus or we don’t, and we don’t have the resources to do it for the whole 
campus so it ain’t gonna happen. Now, if you have a victim, I want to see them, 
you send them to me and we’ll start and investigation and we’ll follow the 
numbers, but in the absence of that I don’t want to hear about it.’  (O10B56:35) 
 
Fourth, Ombuds depart from the archetype by violating impartiality and blurring the line 
between being an advocate for a visitor and for fair process. Advocating on behalf of fair process 
often requires an Ombuds to determine the legitimacy of a visitor’s concerns.  This increases the 
formality of an Ombuds role as it places the Ombuds in a position of fact-finding and 
determining valid violations of Title IX law or university policy. One Ombuds indicated, “I 
explain to them that my job is to sift through what you share with me for what is a legitimate 
concern” (O1B9:25).  Determining what is a legitimate concern is difficult, as one Ombuds 
noted: 
[S]ometimes you figure out how far do I dig, and when do I stop?   You 
know…where I have enough information to know what really happened and 
proceed without making the student feel uncomfortable...  (O6B35:39) 
 
The perception of advocacy for specific individuals or judgment about the situation increases the 
perception of the Ombuds formality.  This was described by many Ombuds, as illustrated by 
these comments: 
A visitor will come to us [and] say ‘I have a problem with this person, will you 
contact them,’ and a very common misconception when we make the call is for 
that person to feel that we’re calling because they’re in trouble…[for them] it 
feels like we are coming out of the blue.  We’ve been likened to being the 
principal’s office and they’re getting called to the principal’s office… 
(O14A63:74)    
  
 In sum, many Ombuds slide toward formality in many ways.  These departures can be 
conceptualized as evidence of an Ombuds’ frustration at not being able to effectuate needed 
changes.  Alternatively, departures may indicate an Ombuds desire to help survivors, stop 
perpetrators, and address organizational problems.  These departures seem driven especially by 
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pressures from changing legal norms and concerns about liability.  Liability pressures encourage 
Ombuds to shade towards formality in an effort to demonstrate adherence to the formal 
requirements of Title IX.  Further, the normative power of the due process model is subtly 
changing how sexual misconduct is handled, even informally.  This pressure is evidenced by the 
following Ombuds:  
Whenever we get into something that looks like sexual harassment or borderline 
sexual harassment…I always involve [the Title IX Coordinator]. I try to get the 
person in my office to walk over to [that office] and file a complaint with them, 
because as much as I’m willing to entertain people’s complaints and promise 
them confidentiality if they really insist on it, I really think that everybody’s better 
served by going on the record with all that.  (O9B54:2) 
 
The same Ombuds continued to describe why they believe in the formal process: 
 
[W]ithout a formal investigation you’ve got kind of a “he said-he said” situation, 
and in those situations the [Title IX Coordinator] should handle it.  [T]he 
problem, which the complainant always has trouble with, is that we can’t just 
assume that [the complainant] is telling the truth, and even if we think they’re 
telling the truth we can’t just [discipline the respondent] without due process. So 
the need to protect…the alleged perpetrator’s due process rights is something 
that’s really hard for the victim to understand, but the university doesn’t want to 
be sued on either side...  (O9B54:5) 
 
Another Ombuds described the challenge in the current environment of utilizing informal 
processes for sexual harassment versus the less scrutinized topic of racial discrimination.   
I think we're much more likely be able to [utilize informal processes] in cases that 
don't involve sexual harassment. That is such a loaded topic for our campus and 
so there is very little room to move on that, but we do have ways that we can [do 
that such as]… racial discrimination, where we might be able to do something 
informally there because it's just not as loaded.  (O14B64:45) 
 
The statement provides evidence of pressure to depart from the informality of their model due to 
changing legal norms and concerns about liability.   
 
	   318	  
Ombuds confidentiality departures can also be seen as a response to organizational pressure to 
address things in any way that avoids a formal record and publicity.  For example, one Ombuds 
described the organizational interest in avoiding formal processes: 
To resolve problems at the lowest possible level, and that’s really key there, 
because organizations prefer that an issue, if appropriate, gets resolved at the 
lowest possible level to minimize formals processes, or lawsuits for that matter, or 
people going to the press and saying not so nice things about people within the 
organization.  (O1A8:23) 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In sum, both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds depart from their respective archetypes 
of formality and informality.  These departures by Title IX Coordinators result from pressure to 
serve organizational interests in avoiding liability and out of frustration with what they see as 
excessive formalism. Departures from the Ombuds model appear especially motivated by 
changing legal norms and liability pressures.  Departures also occur as both Ombuds and Title IX 
Coordinators seek to help survivors and alleged perpetrators navigate organizational dispute 
processes.  For both Ombuds and Coordinators, these departures lead these officials increasingly 
to resemble each other, albeit not entirely.    
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CHAPTER 9:  CONCLUSION  
 
Since beginning this research in 2011, sexual misconduct has reached a new level of 
heightened awareness in our society.  Today there is widespread awareness of the allegations 
facing Bill Cosby, the NFL’s struggles with domestic violence, and the fact that universities are 
grappling with how to responsibly stop the epidemic of campus sexual misconduct.  Rarely has a 
week passed in the past three years without an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education 
addressing sexual misconduct and its related causes, effects, legal implications, and the 
universities’ responses.   
Originally, this research was formulated in the spring of 2011 to examine how university 
Ombuds dispute-processing systems differed in practice from more formalized systems of 
internal alternative dispute resolution by investigating grading disputes, racial discrimination, 
and sexual misconduct.  While that would have been a fine research study, the release of the 
Dear Colleague Letter on April 4, 2011 refocused this research on Title IX and the impact of 
changing legal norms on the handling of campus sexual misconduct.  One conclusion from this 
research is that in designing research studies, it may be better to be lucky than good.  Truly a 
fortuitous time frame for research, interviewing subjects between the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
and the creation of the White House Task Force provide timely insight as to how universities 
have and continue to struggle with the changing definition of Title IX compliance.  A watershed 
moment redefining Title IX compliance, Universities during this time scrambled to update 
grievances policies and processes, attempting to determine how to respond to sexual misconduct 
in a way that protects alleged victims, the accused students, and institutional interests.    
On university campuses, complaints of sexual misconduct are addressed by formal 
offices led by Title IX Coordinators and informal offices led by Ombuds.  Title IX Coordinators 
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partake of a formal legal structure and ideology that emphasizes notice, law-like due process, and 
punishment.  Ombuds use an informal structure and ideology that emphasizes confidentiality, 
psychological values of truly hearing the perspectives of affected parties in all of their 
complexity, and use of this knowledge to inform systemic change.  The purpose of this study was 
to examine how these formal and informal dispute mechanisms, under intense pressure from 
external activists, internal legal counsel, and changing legal norms, interact in the handling of 
sexual misconduct disputes on university campuses across the United States.   Ombuds and Title 
IX Coordinators are each, in somewhat different but somewhat similar ways, struggling to 
address complex issues of abuse, individual responsibility, organizational liability, and fair 
procedures.   
The lens I have used for studying how universities respond to the dilemma of university 
sexual misconduct is the literature on non-law forms of ordering, neo-institutional theories of the 
construction of legal compliance, and theories of street-level bureaucratic discretion.  Conley and 
O’Barr’s (1991) framework of rules versus relationships highlights the essential difference 
between the archetypal Title IX Coordinator (with a formal, rule-based orientation based on 
compliance with and enforcement of Title IX law and policy) and the archetypal Ombuds (with 
an informal, relational orientation based on the core principals of impartiality, independence, 
confidentiality, and informality).  Another lens used here is the large body of neo-institutional 
research demonstrating how people create non-law dispute resolution systems to avoid the 
strictures and proceduralism of the formal legal system, and how comparisons to the legal model 
push these non-law systems increasingly toward adopting more law-like procedures (Auerbach 
1983, Dobbin & Kelly, 2007; Epp 2009).  These theories help us to see how organizational 
actors seek to define and manage both compliance with law and its very definition.  Although 
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Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds start from very different institutional premises, these theories 
suggest both to be pulled somewhat toward legal formality and somewhat toward informality.  
How they respond in practice to these cross-cutting pressures was the question of this 
dissertation..      
BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This research articulates a new theory of procedural convergence:  Formal and informal 
non-law organizational dispute mechanisms, needing to use both rules and relational-based 
strategies, converge over time and begin to resemble one another.  Coordinators and Ombuds 
converge on confidentiality, impartiality, and procedural formalism.  In attempting to navigate 
the legal mandates and realities of handling sexual misconduct, both roles offer complainants 
less confidentiality than promised by the principled Ombuds model, but more than offered by the 
enforcement-oriented Coordinator model.  Ombuds and Coordinators offer complainants less 
procedural formalism than a court of law, but considerably more than the wholly informal 
Ombuds model allows.  Both roles offer less impartiality than either the strict independence and 
non-partiality of the Ombuds model or the clear separation of investigative and adjudicatory 
roles mandated by administrative law.      
The archetypal models are more or less clear in their requirements, but prove hard to 
follow in practice.  As we have seen, Title IX Coordinators slide toward informality and Ombuds 
move towards formality under pressure from liability and the desire to produce substantive 
justice (good outcomes) in individual cases as opposed to strictly following a principled model.  
Ombuds and Coordinators often powerfully feel the need to do the right thing in the cases that 
come before them.  This desire for substantive justice pushes these officials to relax their 
respective commitments to informality and formality. Both Ombuds and Coordinators hear 
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painfully difficult cases, like freshman women who have been raped, and then they must try to 
figure out how to help them and deal justly with the alleged perpetrators.   Coordinators and 
Ombuds converge as they abandon strict adherence to their respective model’s principles, in the 
interest of accomplishing substantive justice for individuals.  
Likewise, liability concerns push both Coordinators and Ombuds to relax their 
commitments to their respective models. Both are buffeted by powerful pressures from 
university administrators concerned with ensuring correct institutional responses to comply with 
the law and avoid negative publicity and liability.  The present study illustrates the complicated 
ways in which liability pressures affect organizational disputing processes.  This includes not 
only ways in which organizations seek to create managerial solutions illustrated by Edelman’s 
(2010) theory of legal endogeneity but also more generally the organizational responses to 
external law and liability pressures illustrated by the theory of legalized accountability (Epp, 
2009).  Universities are struggling to ensure their processes satisfy the law while at the same 
time trying to avoid instituting formal, legal processes within the educational setting.  That 
tension is illustrated by Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators who deviate from their archetypal 
models.  	   
Related to these liability concerns, both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds converge as 
they depart from their norms in order to establish professional worth with the institution.  
Dobbin’s Inventing Equal Opportunity (2011) illustrates how personnel administrators used 
demands for equal opportunity to expand the reach and influence of their professions.  As one 
Ombuds noted, “My boss says to me…the more problems you can keep off my desk, the more 
I’m going to appreciate what you do for the organization” (O1A8:84).   With liability and the 
legal requirements of Title IX acting as the driving force, Title IX Coordinators face fewer 
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challenges to their legitimacy than do Ombuds, but they must navigate the often conflicting 
interests expressed by university legal counsel, administrators, students, and activists.  Ombuds 
face greater threats to institutional legitimacy than Title IX Coordinators due to the attention and 
pressure on universities to discover, investigate, and eradicate sexual misconduct.  This places 
significant pressure on organizational actors like Ombuds who provide absolute confidentiality.  
Operating outside traditional operating procedures, and without an ability to evidence results, 
Ombuds are experiencing pressure to relax their stated principles and act as an additional 
compliance mechanism.  
Finally, adherence or departure appears to be a function of the individual official, as some 
Coordinators and Ombuds are “adherers” and others are “deviators.”  More commonly, departure 
and adherence was seen to operate along a spectrum, with some Coordinators or Ombuds more 
or less likely to adhere or depart than others.  Coordinators who favor win-win situations and 
Ombuds who prefer formal reporting illustrate how personal preferences can lead to 
convergence.  While personal preferences of individual officials may explain convergence in 
some situations, much of the convergence is due to the other two explanations: the strongly felt 
need to produce substantive justice and to avoid legal liability.   
How these officials respond to a felt need to produce substantive justice may be best 
understood through the lens of street-level bureaucracy theory.  This theory posits that 
individuals on the front lines of administration vary in the extent to which they enforce the rules 
and laws assigned to them, and that they do so specifically in order to produce outcomes in 
individual cases that seem to them more just and appropriate than the outcome demanded by 
strict application of the rules (Lipsky, 1983; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003).  Ombuds and 
Title IX Coordinators must navigate the unresolveable tension between the demands of rules, 
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procedures, and policies and the needs and character of the individuals served. In navigating 
these tensions, they sometimes depart from the strict requirement of the rules so as to protect a 
vulnerable individual from further harm, or to protect other people from harm by a serial abuser. 
Sometimes, at least in the view of Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, the goal of producing 
justice seems to require departure from the rules, whether these be the rule requiring strict 
confidentiality (in the case of an Ombuds) or the rule requiring an investigation of every 
complaint of abuse (in the case of a Title IX Coordinator).     
 In sum, convergence of the formal and informal mechanisms is a result of a desire to help 
survivors and alleged perpetrators navigate organizational processes and a felt need to protect the 
university from liability. More fundamentally, convergence occurs due to complex tradeoffs that 
require Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators to maintain or relax their standards in the face of 
significant pressure to protect the university community from harm.  
The theory of procedural convergence can be contrasted with Edelman’s (1992) concept 
of symbolic mimicry and her claim that organizational grievance procedures mimic law but in 
reality are far from law-like.  Symbolic mimicry can be considered procedural divergence as 
organizational due process is pulled toward managerial values by organizational pressures.  The 
present study has suggested that even as university processes mimic the law, they are drawn into 
carrying it out more than the theory of symbolic mimicry might seem to imply.  When 
universities wrestle with how to address sexual misconduct they are influenced by the powerful 
pull of the law and pressure to comply with its requirements.  
In fact, in university responses to sexual misconduct, it is the lawyers who are increasing 
their reach and influence.   Many universities, including Swarthmore and Florida State, have 
utilized retired judges to overhear sexual misconduct hearings (Wilson, 2015, p. A4).  Lawyers 
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have opened legal practices designed to guide colleges through sexual-assault cases (Wilson, 
2015, p. A4).  Title IX job postings now commonly list a Juris Doctorate degree as a “preferred” 
or “highly desired” qualification.  Examples include, but are not limited to, recent job postings at 
Wake Forest University, University of San Diego, Montana State University, Sacred Heart 
University, and Eastern Illinois University (Higheredjobs.com, retrieved 6/12/14).  In sum, the 
law is strongly influencing universities’ reactions to campus sexual misconduct.     
As opposed to symbolic mimicry, procedural convergence occurs when formal and 
informal organizational dispute mechanisms, facing external and internal liability pressures, 
depart from their respective models. They converge toward a hybrid style of management and 
law that incorporates some elements of each. Thus, Ombuds, the quintessentially non-formal 
dispute-processing entities, are drawn toward more law-like processes. These general 
observations are found in particular form in the study’s key observations, to be examined next. 
KEY OBSERVATIONS 
In keeping with the rules-relationships distinction suggested by Conley and O’Barr 
(1991), Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators tend to articulate archetypes that are either primarily 
formal (utilizing rules) or primarily informal (using relational strategies) in nature.  Still, both 
have evolved in practice and “cheat” towards their opposite: the formal Title IX Coordinator role 
becomes more informal, and the informal Ombuds becomes more formal.  As a result, over time 
formal and informal non-law dispute mechanisms tend to converge and resemble one another, 
although not entirely.  
1. Both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators use both relational and rules-based forms of 
influence.   
 
While Title IX Coordinators are framed towards a court-like ideal, their offices tend 
toward more informality in practice.  Coordinators seem unable to effectively apply the rules and 
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prevent sexual misconduct without establishing and maintaining relationships with stakeholders.  
As a result, the relationship-building aspect of a Title IX Coordinator’s work is an important 
determinant of the authority and legitimacy necessary for effectuating rules-based compliance 
with law and policy.  For example, a Coordinator described needing both rules and relationship 
building strategies: 
[I]t’s really hard to do the case work without the authority because when you 
[have] a [sexual misconduct] report you realize sometimes that you’ve got to go 
forward even though the complainant doesn’t want to. You have the authority to 
say to someone ‘issue the notice,’ but if people are really worried, if it’s been a 
faculty member, a high profile athlete, you’ve got to have the confidence…of the 
athletic director or the Provost’s office…[They need to trust and believe that] I 
know what I’m talking about and to go forward… (T8A39:76) 
 
While Ombuds are framed towards an informal counselor-like ideal, their offices tend 
toward more formality in practice.  Ombuds expressed utilizing more formal means when 
relational strategies are ineffective:   
[If a policy has been violated] I will try to get the person’s permission to take it 
forward and if I get that permission we’ll try to talk to the offending person and 
see if there was a mistake made and if they want to correct. And if they don’t 
want to correct that and we think that it was a violation of policy and we give 
them an opportunity to make it right and they don’t, then we’ll probably go onto 
their supervisor and work our way up the chain. (O9A53:43) 
 
Ombuds often directly or indirectly referenced their reporting relationship to top administrators 
as a means of encouraging compliance with rules or policies.  The ambiguity and lack of 
understanding of the limitations placed on the role allow Ombuds to use rules as a source of 
authority to press for specific outcomes.   
Instead of relying exclusively on either formal or informal strategies for navigating 
organizational disputes, organizational actors utilize both formal and informal strategies in order 
to achieve their goals.  Relying heavily on relationships is an unexpected strategy for formal 
offices designed to either effectuate or mimic compliance with the law.  Retreating from uniform 
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and consistent rule application will not project an institution from liability, and creates a host of 
issues for formal actors designed to operate by rule and policy.  When informal mechanisms and 
relationships are utilized, it is often because alleged perpetrators and victims may prefer more 
informal approaches and this may result in fewer formal complaints.  Similarly, Ombuds who 
utilize formal rules and authority contravene the ethos of empowerment espoused by the field 
and embody a radical departure from the standards of organizational Ombuds.  As the next 
observation indicates, both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators must alter their core missions as 
they blur the lines between formal and informal and dilute the core attribute of each model. 
2. Using the rules-based strategies require Ombuds to formalize their missions, and using 
relational influence require Title IX Coordinators to informalize their missions.  
 
Needing relational or rules-based bases for establishing authority, the practical missions 
of the Title IX Coordinator and Ombuds reflect converging strategies.  Specifically, both 
mechanisms elicit trust and gain authority by increasing the formalism and informality of their 
respective processes.  Thus, in order to encourage reporting, minimize liability, and maintain a 
culture in which people want to share their complaints, Title IX Coordinators often seek to 
provide opportunities for voice and to use informal means of resolving conflicts.  Ombuds, 
meanwhile, often express a preference for formal mechanisms and rules. This may be due to a 
lack of authority to make or enforce decisions.  Ombuds often interpret and provide informal 
determinations of policy or legal violations, for example:  “A lot of times we have to check the 
policies and get information on what policies are and try to make sure whether anything has 
actually been violated” (O9A53:16, 32).  By utilizing strategies running counter to their 
archetypes, both Title IX coordinators and Ombuds shade towards a combination of formalism 
and informality.  The resulting options for assistance available to victims and alleged 
perpetrators become variations on the same theme or distinctions without real difference.  When 
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the Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators hedge towards their opposite, the individuals served by 
both offices are left with a menu of options that become variations on the same theme and 
distinctions without real differences. 
3. Confidentiality illustrates the tensions between rules and relationships, and between 
formality and informality. 
 
Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators often violate the confidentiality expectations of each 
role, illustrating the challenge of combining rules and relationship-based approaches.  
Confidentiality is an essential aspect of an Ombuds’ work, as it allows individuals to feel 
comfortable asking for help or making a complaint.  Ombuds often experience pressure to share 
information about sexual misconduct with formal offices, making it difficult to protect 
anonymity.  Ombuds who adhere to the archetype provide their visitor with control over 
confidentiality, and thus over whether they want to make a formal complaint.  Many Ombuds, 
however, do provide notice to the institution either by specifically being required to report all 
instances of sexual misconduct or by functioning as notice by violating confidentiality or 
anonymity.  Ombuds often complained to me of this erosion of confidentiality, and they gave 
this as an explanation for why the number of visitors to many Ombuds offices has declined over 
time.  For example: 
We’re not getting as many people coming to this office because we can’t provide 
them with a level of confidentiality that would ensure that if they don’t want the 
information disclosed if they were to report sexual harassment, for example, that 
we would be duty bound to respect that.  I believe that’s one of the reasons…they 
don’t come to our office because we can’t offer them that blanket confidentiality 
that they’re looking for.  (O7A37:22, O7B38:1) 
 
 Many Ombuds depart from the archetype by not providing visitors with self-determination 
regarding reporting.  They directly refer visitors to the Title IX Coordinator, or report the 
information without protecting anonymity.  
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Title IX Coordinators operate in a compliance regime that seeks to elicit reports of, and 
over time, works to prevent sexual misconduct.  Title IX Coordinators thus rely on mandatory 
reporters (technically, all employees) to provide the office with information and so compliance is 
prioritized over confidentiality.  Title IX Coordinators deviate from the archetype by allowing 
Ombuds to not serve as mandatory reporters, by not informing visitors of their confidentiality 
obligations, and by providing visitors with control over the process in ways that run counter to 
compliance.  For example: 
I do not provide any initial statement before students start talking, I’m just letting 
[the student] get it off [their] chest and see where it takes them…If it’s sexual in 
nature there are some key things that a person will come in and tell me that will 
lead me to believe that something was not consensual and now we’ve got to do 
something.  I tell them, ‘I need to stop you.  I need to review what I’ve heard, and 
I need you to know that this is no longer a ‘what do I do conversation, this is a 
‘what are we going to do’ conversation.  There’s just too much information, 
there’s too many things going on making my skin crawl, and now we’ve got to 
address it.  I don’t care if they tell me they want to investigate it or not, if I’ve got 
evidence, I’m investigating, especially sexual harassment. (T11A45:14-23-42-43)   
 
Instead of providing clear alternatives regarding confidential versus non-confidential 
but private places of reporting, Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators who do not operate 
according to the archetypal standard eliminate the predictability and thus the confidence 
that individuals can and should come forward with complaints.  This also provides 
ammunition to alleged perpetrators already wary of the true motivations behind 
organizational dispute processes.  On campuses with only a Title IX Coordinator or only 
an Ombuds, a combined approach in theory may provide the best of both worlds.  As  
illustrated here, it is impossible in practice to fully protect an individual’s confidentiality 
wishes, provide them with complete control over information, and ensure that the 
organization can know of, and effectively combat sexual misconduct. These goals 
conflict, and compromise among them is inevitable. 
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4. Both Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds deviate from their respective archetypes and as 
a result also converge in the area of impartiality.  
 
By design, Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds play opposing roles in university sexual 
misconduct processes.  Deviating from their respective archetypes risks undermining their 
impartiality and thus weakens the legitimacy of the process.  Title IX Coordinators are to be 
impartial to any specific outcome while being partial to the correct application of the law to the 
facts.  Ombuds meanwhile are to be impartial to any specific outcome or individual but partial to 
the overarching value of fair process.  In practice, Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds often give 
preference to informal settlement and outcomes that avoid institutional liability or negative 
publicity.  To achieve this, Title IX Coordinators often act with partiality toward one side or 
another, advocate in favor of particular outcomes, or hold multiple roles within the process.  
Questions remain about whether Title IX Coordinators are prohibited from doing the 
investigation and making findings and recommendations.  Many Title IX Coordinators continue 
to make findings and recommendations in their post-investigation reports.  
In order to advocate for procedural fairness, Ombuds must necessarily determine if a 
process has been unfair, and this affects their impartiality as it requires an Ombuds to determine 
the facts and evaluate the details of a situation.  What is fairness can be subjective, and so 
Ombuds further implicate their impartiality when advocating for specific outcomes, individuals, 
or for institutional goals.  Further, many Ombuds advocate for settlement outside of the formal 
process, and this may erode their impartiality in situations in which the institution, a survivor, or 
an alleged perpetrator may prefer a specific outcome.   
Deviating from their respective archetypes results in Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators 
converging in the area of impartiality.   Title IX Coordinators who exhibit partiality and do not 
carefully guard the integrity of the process leave the outcome of investigations open to legal 
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challenges.  Ombuds who act on behalf of the university’s actors or enforce rules without regard 
for the principle of impartiality risk being deemed capable of receiving legal notice.  Ombuds 
who act on behalf of individuals instead of advocating for fair processes risk alienating 
organizational actors and limiting their overall effectiveness.  Given these risks, why do Ombuds 
and Title IX Coordinators violate their roles’ archetypes?  The next observation addresses this 
question.   
5. The use of rules-based (formal) and relational (informal) strategies is motivated by a 
desire to serve individuals and avoid liability. 
 
The law is a powerful force that paradoxically pushes Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds 
to utilize each other’s core strategy.  By becoming more formal or informal, each role seeks to 
serve both the institution and the individuals involved.  The Title IX Coordinator’s model uses an 
investigative process designed to ensure compliance with Title IX law and policy.  Departing 
from the archetype, Title IX Coordinators often do allow informal mechanisms to be used, with 
some Coordinators first requiring that they be informed of the complaint in order to ensure there 
are no law or policy violations.  Other Title IX Coordinators use informal processes without 
notice, and even without a reliable investigation.  Title IX Coordinators’ slide towards 
informality is motivated by organizational interests in protecting against liability.  There are Title 
IX Coordinators who prefer and use mediation, a relatively more informal alternative to the 
formal process, as it avoids litigation.  For example:   
I’ve been given the green light to sort of identify cases that maybe can reach an 
informal resolution without having to go through a full investigation. Now that 
informal resolution sometimes also means can we bump somebody out of the 
institution on the base of which you already know without having to go through a 
full investigation.  (T7A32:44)  
 
	   332	  
Coordinators also choose informal options due to frustration with what they see as 
excessive formalism.  Finally, Title IX Coordinators become more informal under pressure to 
serve and address the needs of survivors or alleged perpetrators.   
Ombuds by contrast face considerable pressure to formalize their processes due to 
liability concerns.  One Ombuds noted, for example:   
[E]ven though we’re supposed to be independent, we’re not independent, because 
we are required to be involved with Title IX Compliance.  I have to coexist with 
the offices with responsibility for compliance, and if I don’t [I am] out of here.’ 
(O7A37:25)    
 
Ombuds depart from the archetype and formalize their processes in order to help 
survivors or alleged perpetrators, and in response to liability pressures.  Further evidenced by 
liability pressures, Ombuds mimic more formal processes such as conducting investigations and 
enforcing policies in ways that are much more akin to formal process.  Ombuds also depart from 
the archetype by violating confidentiality in ways that make the Ombuds part of the formal 
system.  This includes using intake forms and other records that can be come part of formal 
processes, and by holding a secondary role that may receive notice on the organizations behalf.  
Finally, Ombuds formalize their processes by directing visitors which actions to take, or 
taking those actions themselves.  There are also Ombuds who engage in more formal versions of 
mediation.  While many Ombuds use mediation-like communication techniques, formal 
mediation occurs when the parties are required or influenced to attend and the mediator is 
directive or imposes an agreement.  
In sum, both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators shade towards one another, with 
Ombuds becoming more formal and Coordinators becoming more informal.   Title IX 
Coordinators’ and Ombuds’ practices converge more often than they diverge and it is often not 
always easy to determine which mechanism is which.  Despite very different forms, functions, 
	   333	  
and missions, Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators are often more alike than different.   The result 
is organizational processes that mimic formal legal processes in many ways, while at times 
neglecting legal mandates and responsibilities.  Both roles face pressure from liability to 
formalize their processes, but for several reasons sexual misconduct disputes are often not easily 
or best addressed via highly formal processes.  First, adversarial processes often put the victim 
on trial for their sexual history, or drug or alcohol use when the incident took place.  Second, the 
victim may not want to have to confront and again see the alleged perpetrator.  Third, the public 
interest in university sexual misconduct creates unwanted publicity for victims and alleged 
perpetrators.  Finally, incidents of sexual misconduct may fuel a misperception that certain 
campuses have sexual misconduct problems while others do not.  The reality is that all campuses 
are impacted by sexual misconduct.  By utilizing formal policies and actors who do not ensure 
consistent and uniform application of the rules, the positive attributes of formal processes are 
outweighed by the negative repercussions listed above.  Formal processes are designed to ensure 
the due process rights of everyone involved while examining the evidence in order to apply the 
correct legal standard to carefully determined facts.     
 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
On college campuses there remains considerable ambiguity regarding 1) what constitutes 
due process and fair procedures; 2) where the balance lies between individual self-determination 
and settlement on one hand and collective and organizational prerogatives relating to safety, 
liability, and precedent on the other.  These tensions are especially acute in the area of 
confidentiality, where significant questions remain, including:  1) Who on campus are mandatory 
reporters; 2) What information must they report; 3) How are victims informed of confidential 
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versus non-confidential places to have these discussions and 4) Depending on where the 
discussion occurs, what control do victims have regarding next steps and on what level must they 
participate in formal processes?   
Confidentiality encourages and supports victims in coming forward, but it also masks 
problems and may inhibit an institution’s ability to address serious issues.  Inherently the 
question of Ombuds’ confidentiality is one of whether it simply becomes a mechanism by which 
universities may insulate themselves from liability.  The ultimate question is how can institutions 
encourage victims to come forward?  This research indicates that both formal and informal 
mechanisms are valuable for encouraging reporting but no one mechanism can provide for 
confidentiality and at the same time bring forward complaints for appropriate disposition.  The 
question of what constitutes a “hearing” and the separation of investigative and judicial functions 
is another area that remains unresolved.  Presently, liability concerns are pushing universities to 
adopt increasingly formal processes and structures, particularly by separating the investigation 
and judicial functions.   
In regard to these issues, I recommend:   
1. Ombuds should not be mandatory reporters and specific guidelines for Ombuds’ reports 
regarding sexual misconduct should be developed.   
 
Allowing people to make anonymous reports of incidents of sexual misconduct may fulfill 
both Coordinators’ and Ombuds’ core goals, as long as the reports do not identify, nor can lead 
to the identification of, any specific person or department.   Anonymous reporting may enable 
Ombuds to collect otherwise unreported incidents of sexual misconduct.  Title IX Coordinators 
will then gain important feedback about weaknesses in policy, procedures, or where 
improvements can be made to better educate the campus about sexual misconduct.  Ombuds’ 
ability to help visitors think through their informal and formal resolution options may lead more 
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visitors to make formal reports.  Coordinators and Ombuds must work together to define the 
contours of these requirements and to determine when issues should be referred to Ombuds.  
2. The IOA should provide Ombuds with additional practical guidance  
 
Given evidence that Ombuds are not conforming to the IOA Standards, more specific 
guidance on how to operationalize the standards is needed.  The pressure placed on Ombuds to 
conform to organizational goals and the resulting formality required to work towards realizing 
those organizational goals places Ombuds outside of their stated mandates.  Given the 
convergence between Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, Ombuds risk serving mainly to 
insulate the institution from liability or to ineffectively mimic formal structures.  Failing to 
adhere to the informal, confidential, impartial, and independent standards will harm efforts to 
provide alternatives to formal reporting mechanisms.  Often these departures are motivated by a 
desire to demonstrate professional worth and effectiveness, but the result is to do just the 
opposite.  
Ombuds often seem to prefer getting to resolution and settlement, and this tendency 
contributes to the view that Ombuds are a mechanism by which institutions may avoid liability.  
Either the impartiality standard must be more specifically defined, or a new standard providing 
for visitor self-determination is necessary.  Ombuds often must determine what constitutes fair 
procedures in the absence of any professional guidance from the IOA.  A standard of justice 
(Shelton, 2010) or fairness may help Ombuds to better navigate these questions.  Finally, 
creating differentiating standards for classical Ombuds (who conduct formal investigations) and 
organizational Ombuds (who do not) will assist the field in developing and solidifying the 
public’s understanding of the role.  It will also provide practitioners with guidance and 
understanding of the boundaries and limitations of each respective role.  
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3. Title IX Coordinators must take a more active role in establishing professional norms  
 
Title IX Coordinators often expressed ambivalence or negative perceptions of the 
Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) as a professional association.  Much of this 
may be due to the fact that ATIXA was developed and exists as a project of the National Center 
for Higher Education Risk Management (NCHERM),4 creating the perception of a financial 
conflict of interests.  NCHERM is a law and consulting practice that provides consulting and risk 
management services for universities and colleges.  NCHERM’s partners are all lawyers with 
significant experience in higher education risk management, but none has ever served as a Title 
IX Coordinator.  Brett Sokolow holds a dual role as the Executive Director of ATIXA and the 
President and CEO of NCHERM.  ATIXA provides model policies and guidance that are 
developed specifically by the members of NCHERM, who are then available to provide 
consulting services to institutions of higher education.  While ATIXA provides considerable 
practical advice to the Title IX compliance field, it would serve the Title IX Coordinator field 
well for Title IX Coordinators to make the association their own and to take an active role in the 
development of the field.    
4. Title IX Coordinators must develop specific, uniform standards of practice.   
 
While the ATIXA Training Manual (2013) provides bedrock beliefs and guidelines from which 
standards can be inferred, specific standards are needed to guide and inform Title IX Compliance 
work.  Specifically, Title IX Coordinators need additional guidance regarding when 
confidentiality should be strictly maintained and when it may be subordinated to other values. 
Coordinators also need guidance on how to operationalize the impartiality required under Title 
IX.  In conjunction with the previous recommendation, active and broad participation by Title IX 
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Coordinators doing the work on campus will help to ensure that the standards address both the 
legal and non-legal aspects of the work.   
5. Colleges and Universities need both Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators to effectively 
manage sexual misconduct disputes. 
 
As both relational and rules-based strategies are necessary for effective organizational 
complaint handling, Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators play unique and important roles in Title 
IX work.  Ombuds function to assist individuals in thinking through options, to create a safe 
environment for having difficult conversations, and to provide visitors with control and self-
determination over the direction of the conflict.  Even in keeping with their commitment to 
confidentiality, Ombuds can provide valuable information to their institutions regarding general 
trends in problems and complaints, and, drawing on this information, they can provide helpful 
recommendations for improvements in institutional policies and procedures.  Effectively, 
Ombuds provide a safety net catching complaints that might otherwise not be brought forward.  
Title IX Coordinators function to educate the campus about Title IX’s responsibilities and to 
ensure that complaints of sexual misconduct are investigated, adjudicated, punished, and 
deterred.  Both relational and rules-based strategies are necessary for effective organizational 
complaint handling, and neither Ombuds nor Title IX Coordinators can effectively implement 
those strategies alone without the other.  As the tensions illustrated by confidentiality, 
impartiality, and formality indicate, universities need both formal and informal dispute 
mechanisms to effectively handle sexual misconduct disputes. 
I have been a mediator for years, and I teach mediation. I have also provided consultation 
to organizations.  In conducting the interviews for this study I felt great sympathy for the 
dilemmas facing Ombuds and Coordinators. Sometimes I would have done things differently 
than they described. But I am also certain that there is no sure recipe for handling the difficult 
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dilemmas facing these officials. I do, however, believe that how universities address the problem 
of sexual misconduct could be improved by more forthright discussion among Coordinators and 
Ombuds on these difficult issues. In the course of my interviews and my analysis for this study, I 
have come to firmly conclude that both approaches—formal and informal—are key elements of 
an appropriate institutional response. 
LIMITATIONS 
 
There are three primary limitations to this study.  First, the interviews were between 2011 
and 2013 in the context of growing political pressure to address campus sexual misconduct.  
Longstanding issues with campus sexual misconduct resulted in dramatic changes to Title IX 
legal requirements with the Dear Colleague Letter released in 2011.  The DCL’s release resulted 
in the formation of the Association for Title IX Administrators (ATIXA) and universities 
scrambled to define compliance.  Both the VAWA reauthorization and the White House Task 
Force provided further guidance.  During this period, the Ombuds and Title IX coordinators 
faced unusually intense pressures and were struggling to determine their roles in an uncertain and 
new era of compliance.  Interviews conducted during this period thus may not provide a window 
into how these two offices operated in less tumultuous times. Still, this time frame provides an 
opportunity to examine the change as it was occurring, with some actors remaining true to their 
archetype and others redefining their roles.   
A second limitation of this study is that while the officials interviewed for the study were 
understandably unwilling to divulge confidential details of particular cases of sexual misconduct, 
the heightened controversy over the issue may have encouraged them to err on the side of not 
telling me things even when there was no true risk to confidentiality.  Confidentiality became a 
barrier to hearing the participants’ stories.  In order to encourage participation I agreed to provide 
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the participants with complete control over the content of their stories, and as a result I was 
unable to publish almost any of the specific details shared in any specific instance.  This limited 
my ability to fully illuminate the participants’ statements with concrete examples.   
Finally, the sensitive nature of the topic restricted the sample size.  Despite contacting 
hundreds of Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, only fourteen Ombuds and thirteen Title IX 
coordinators agreed to participate in the study.  This raises some concerns about the 
representativeness of my interview sample. Still, while it is possible that the twenty-seven 
officials who agreed to be interviewed were somehow systematically different from others who 
declined, I suspect that they were more typical than unique. The participants were from a wide 
range of geographic areas, with participants primarily from large doctoral degree granting public 
and private research institutions, but several master’s level institutions were also included. 
Participants described working to address a wide range of complaints of sexual misconduct, 
including some cases of what can only be described as egregious abuse by high-level university 
employees, and so those who agreed to be interviewed were not limited to officials who had 
faced only low-level, uncontroversial cases. Nor were the participants limited to people new in 
their role; they included a number of seasoned veterans. In all of these ways, the participants, 
while relatively small in number, do not appear to be systematically skewed in any obvious way.     
In sum, this research’s limitations are framed by confidentiality concerns and the timeliness of 
the subject matter.   
FUTURE RESEARCH 
This work has several implications for future research.  First, even in this detailed study 
of Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators some aspects of procedural convergence were beyond the 
scope of the study.  Is it possible to discern specific types of “adherers” or “deviators”?  To what 
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extent does institutional context or the nature of the dispute shape officials’ willingness to depart 
from their respective models? These questions may be examined with a more focused study 
designed to address them. 
Second, and more broadly, the theory of procedural convergence merits further study in 
other compliance areas and in other institutional forms.  These may include governments, 
businesses, and non-profits that use both Ombuds and formal non-law compliance mechanisms.  
How do institutional complaint handlers in more established areas of law navigate these issues?  
To what degree is the unsettled nature of the law responsible for the convergence?  Do other 
factors contribute to the convergence of institutional complaint mechanisms?   
These questions may be pursued in a wide variety of areas where elements of procedural 
convergence seem manifest.  In the formal justice system, a significant body of legal research 
suggests that as mediation is incorporated into the formal legal system, it becomes legalized and 
formalized in various ways (Nolan-Haley, 2012); yet at the same time, formal adjudication 
processes increasingly engage in informal “problem solving” (Portillo et al., 2013).  Pressures 
towards convergence also occur when informal Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
mechanisms like mediation are combined with more formal ADR processes like arbitration, in a 
process known as “med-arb” (Pappas, 2015).  When the mediator in a case becomes the 
arbitrator, this formalizes the neutral’s role as the person who will make a decision if the case 
does not settle during the mediation.  The neutral’s role during arbitration has also gained greater 
informality, however, as the record of the mediation stage is often used as the arbitral record and 
the neutral was privy to private conversations during the mediation (Pappas, 2015).  In each of 
these examples, efforts to gain the flexibility and efficiency of informal processes depart from 
the due process and justice model of the formal justice system; at the same time, these shifts 
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toward informality are often checked by a countervailing pressure not to depart too far from the 
formal system’s due process model.  In sum, again and again systems of justice in the shadow of 
the formal law are neither entirely formal nor entirely informal: they converge toward a hybrid of 
these strains. 
To the extent that procedural convergence is found in other settings, a host of possible 
research questions arise.  As legal norms and definitions of compliance become clearer, do 
organizational forms of non-law complaint handling tend towards greater formality?  Do formal 
and informal organizational forms of non-law compliance both shade towards formalism?  How 
do non-law alternatives change when used directly, as a complement to, or within formal, legal 
processes?  Specifically, how does the use of facilitative forms of mediation change when 
incorporated or mandated into steps that precede litigation?  How do these non-law alternatives 
impact the formal process?  What are the advantages and disadvantages of formalizing these 
alternatives?  These questions merit empirical study and have important implications for access 
to justice efforts and how individual rights are resolved organizationally and in our justice 
system.     
CONCLUSION 
 
Sexual misconduct is an ongoing problem on college campuses.  Universities are 
increasingly under pressure from the White House, Congress, and Victims’-rights advocates to 
find ways to reduce sexual misconduct.  Universities are scrambling to update grievance policies 
and processes and to determine how to respond to sexual misconduct in a way that protects 
alleged victims, the accused students, and institutional interests.  How universities balance these 
interests makes it possible to examine an age-old debate in American law and socio-legal studies 
between those who favor legal formality and those who favor informal alternatives.  Utilizing 
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neo-institutional theories, theories of how non-law norms are developed, and the dichotomy 
between rights and relationship-based means of complaint handling, this dissertation has 
examined the current state of Title IX compliance on university campuses.  Given the intense 
focus on university sexual misconduct, this research has important implications for the work of 
organizational complaint handlers, university legal counsel, government administrators, and 
policy-makers.   
Overall, the story of sexual misconduct dispute handling on university campuses is 
complex, shaped by institutional pressures and sincere desires to bring healing and justice.   
Ombuds and Title IX Coordinators, needing to address and resolve sexual misconduct, seek to 
both help survivors and to ensure fairness for alleged perpetrators.  Ombuds who depart from 
their standards are motivated by changing legal and liability pressures and want to stop a 
perpetrator or address a departmental problem.  Title IX Coordinators who depart are often 
concerned, in a normal human way, about a real individual’s pain and they decide to help the 
person even if this does not yield institutional enforcement.  As a result, Title IX Coordinators 
often depart out of frustration with what they see as excessive formalism.  Put another way, in 
both instances these are understandable responses to real moral dilemmas, occurring while each 
role attempts to establish professional worth and influence in organizations pressuring them to 
ensure protection from liability.  In sum, navigating these individual and organizational pressures 
results in both mechanisms departing from their professional norms and becoming more formal 
(Ombuds) or more informal (Title IX Coordinators). The resulting picture of university sexual 
misconduct dispute handling is one in which the practices of Title IX Coordinators and Ombuds 
converge, although not entirely. 
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